Although there are no statistics that can prove the correlation between the reduction in crime levels and the operation of PSCs in Albania, local analysts believe it is likely that they have made some contribution towards crime prevention.34 For example the installation of security cameras and the presence of private security guards in banks has a discouraging effect on crime, and many public institutions, such as museums, now contract PSCs in the belief that this will give them added protection.
29 Law No 8770 dated 19 April 2001, ‘On the Guarding and Physical Security Service’, Article 16.
Op cit Tusha P and Softa F.
30 Op cit Mane; Kacorri; Miho.
31Article 17 of Law No 8770 dated 19 April 2001.
32Speech by the Director General of State Police, 06 November 2004.
33 Op cit Zaimi.
34 Op cit Hroni; Tusha; Caka. The crime prevention impact of PSC was also mentioned by State Police officials interviewed and in the speech of Director General of State Police in the meeting with administrators of PSCs on 06 December 2004.
With the expansion of the Albanian economy, it is expected that the number of PSCs will grow. Many established PSCs have predicted the need for stricter regulations as the private security market becomes increasingly crowded.
For example, it has been suggested that all companies be required to have an operation room or base equipped with communication devices. At present many PSCs lack this technology. The administrators of the largest and most established PSCs have a confident outlook about the future of the sector and speak of investing in their businesses, both by bringing the latest equipment into Albania and by training their staff. Another rapidly expanding sector is the sale of protection equipment. Some PSCs have argued that the law should be amended to allow them to purchase non-lethal weapons, such as nerve-paralytic gas sprays. This is a matter that should be addressed with some care - if these and other weapons such as electric stun guns are issued they should be used only as an alternative to the use of firearms and not a lesser weapon that could be used more indiscriminately. However, a potential barrier to the long-term development and consolidation of the industry and the increase in technical and professional knowledge is the cap on the size of companies relative to the number of police in a district. While the purpose of the law is laudable – protecting the relative power of the public security sector in the face of a growing private one – an unintended consequence may be that that consolidation does not occur because companies cannot afford to bring in
improvements while their size is restricted. As suggested below, alternative methods should therefore be sought to both contain the sector’s growth relative to the public sector and raise standards simultaneously.
6.1 Main recommendations
n Law enforcement agencies should pay increased attention to the practice of hiring armed individuals rather than licensed PSCs to secure property and fully enforce the law in this area.
n Further clarification and elaboration is needed on the law governing handling and usage of firearms by PSCs in order to close loopholes and limit their possession and use.
n The use of assault rifles (Kalashnikovs) by security guards should be phased out.
n PSC storage practices should be reviewed with a view to ensuring that registered SALW remain in company stores when not in use and that handovers between staff are correctly documented.
n The laws on storage of SALW and ammunition by PSCs should be amended, and a requirement for the two to be stored separately introduced.
n The MoPo should develop a system of certified training courses for PSC employees, which would encourage the development of a well-trained security guard profession. Particular attention should be given to training guards in the minimal use of force and firearms, consistent with the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
n Joint working agreements between PSCs and the police should be introduced as standard, so as to clarify the exact roles and responsibilities of both parties and thereby reduce the incentives for the two sectors to enter into competition.
n The PSC industry should consider strengthening the professional trade association to ensure that it is fully functioning and work towards developing an industry-wide code of conduct.
n In order to raise standards and combat corruption in procurement, the government should establish a set of standards and requirements for PSCs that wish to be considered for contracts for securing major public sites and buildings.
n The government should review the cap on the size of PSCs since it currently acts as a barrier to professionalisation of the industry. Other options such as imposing limits on the overall size of the industry, or providing exemptions to proven firms on the basis of objective criteria could be considered.
n Oversight should be improved by empowering parliamentary committees and an Ombudsman to scrutinise the conduct of PSCs and handle public complaints.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
1 Background to the privatization of security
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) suffered more damage and loss of life during the conflicts of the early 1990s than any other successor state of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).1 Following the 1995 Dayton Agreement, international peacekeeping forces - first under NATO auspices and then from December 2004 as the European Union Stabilisation Force (EUFOR) - have enhanced security to a great degree. By 2004 the United Nations announced that half of the estimated two million people displaced from their homes had returned to their communities, three quarters of them to the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (FBiH) and one quarter to the Republika Srpska (RS).
Yet although security continues to improve, in many areas ethnic divisions continue to frustrate a proper rehabilitation process. The reality is that ten years after the end of a war that displaced half the population, BiH is still struggling to overcome strong political and ethnic tensions. One burdensome legacy of the 1995 peace settlement is a complex constitutional structure in which BiH is divided into two semi-autonomous entities comprising the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in turn consisting of ten cantons), and the Republika Srpska, a single administrative unit. Political, bureaucratic and often ethnic differences make the operation of this structure difficult at times, creating significant challenges for eventual integration into the EU and NATO. At least until very recently, major reforms in the defence, rule of law and public administration sectors which are of pressing importance for national development and peace-building, have tended to be driven by the Office of the High Representative, the international office with unprecedented executive powers charged with overseeing implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. A bureaucratic regulatory framework and parallel Entity structures also contribute to the country’s economic problems, with 20% of the population living below the poverty line, and domestic and international investment remaining low.2
PSCs first emerged in Bosnia in 1995, immediately after the wars. The first company known to have operated in the country was a Croat-owned firm ‘Soko’, that started up in 1995. The first PSC of Bosnian origin was BLOC, which began operating in 1996.3 It is perhaps unsurprising that today the industry’s structure reflects the legal structure and workings of the country as a whole, the industry being regulated not at the national, but only at Entity and Cantonal levels. This system makes it highly impractical for a firm to obtain the multiple registrations necessary to operate legally across Entities. In the case of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), where administration is further devolved to Cantonal level for implementation, it is also difficult to work across Cantons. According to current records only one firm in FBiH, ‘Alarm West’, has a cross-Cantonal spread of work.
Despite the difficult regulatory environment, the market has expanded considerably in the past ten years with a growing number of PSCs becoming registered in the country. According to official figures there are currently 41 companies operating across BiH employing around 2,000 people.4 The biggest names in the industry are GAMA, BIGA, Alarm West, IPON, Sword, Laufer, Cipos 007 and Sector Security. Unlike many other countries in the region where PSCs predominantly operate in major business centres, there is considerable diversity in the location where companies work. Decentralised government and ethnic segregation are major factors in determining this geographical spread of activity. The list below shows the locations where the major firms in BiH operate.
1 Estimates of the total number of casualties range from around 150,000 to 250,000. See e.g. BBC News Online BiH Country Profile, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1066886.stm accessed 05 May 2005.
2 Country profile, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarke t/Xcelerate/ShowPageandc=Pageandcid=1007029394365anda=KCountryProfileandaid=1019233782245, accessed 28 July 2005.
3 Interview with Muamer Bajraktarević, Cantonal Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sarajevo, 04 April 2005.
4 Information given by the Cantonal Ministries of Internal Affairs in FBIH and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in RS; Interview with Duško Vejnovic, Professor, Advanced School for Internal Affairs in Banja Luka, 29 January 2005; op cit Bajraktarević.
Bihać Prijedor
Banja Luka Tuzla
Zenica
Mostar Goražde SARAJEVO CROATIA
SER.AND MONT.
Brčko Bosanski Brod Republika Srpska
Republika Srpska Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Adriatic Sea
n Sarajevo: Alarm-West, Gama Sigurnost, Cipos 07, BIGA Security, Glock Sigurnost;
n Banja Luka: Sector Security;
n Bihac: Bodyguard Filekovic;
n Tuzla: Puma, Cobra Security;
n Mostar: Buntić Sekurity, Alarm West, IPON Graupa; and
n Siroki Brijeg: Kamir, Delta, Redarstvenik.5
As discussed further below, the lack of national regulation within BiH poses major problems for the control and development of the industry. This is not simply due to the quite different regulations that apply between FBiH and RS. There are also serious questions about the extent to which companies are linked to either organised crime groups or ex-warlords from the war period with related issues surrounding the enforcement of regulations.
2 Contemporary security threats
The increasing demand for private security services in BiH has its root in rising crime rates across the country at a time when faith in the state security services is low, and the public feels generally insecure in a post-war context.
The slow but constant liberalisation of the once socialist economy that has occurred in all ex-Yugoslav republics has also brought ever greater amounts of property into private ownership, creating the necessary conditions for a demand for PSCs. Theft and armed robbery are the threats that most commonly persuade clients to employ PSCs in BiH. Thus far there has not been a major market for close protection services.6
In 2004 there were 28 armed robberies of post offices, banks and money transport vehicles across the entire country, and approximately five million convertible BiH marks (KM) in cash was stolen. Police clear-up rates are low in both Entities. Of the 13 armed robberies in RS, only four cases were solved, while in FBiH, only six of 15 cases were solved.7 Although commercial clients are the main employers for PSCs, fear of theft also causes some private citizens to employ PSCs to provide static security for their apartments out of fear of break-in. Additional motives for using private security companies include a lack of faith in the state security sector’s ability to protect property, a fear of losing property that was illegally gained, and to collect unpaid debts.8
The range of threats above was generally considered to be serious by most interviewees consulted for this research. Official statistics provided by the FBiH authorities indicate that the rate of violent crime there is lower than the European average, but rising (see table below).9 However, there seems to be little difference in the crime rate in those areas where security companies are operating and those where they are not present. This correlation could be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, it may be that PSCs are not doing a good job. Secondly (and more probably), it is possible that private security companies are more likely to operate in areas experiencing high crime and that they are actually having a positive impact.10 Third, it may be that the use of PSCs is an effective deterrent only at those sites where they are in use, but that this is having a displacement effect on crime within cantons, making it more likely that neighbouring sites are targeted by criminals with the same net result in terms of recorded crimes. It is difficult to come to any firm conclusions on this question since the validity of these figures is undermined both by the fact that court statistics are widely believed to underestimate the level of crime, and the fact that the general public tend to report crimes reluctantly.11
5 Interviews with Mirsad Jašarević, Executive Director of Sicra Security, Sarajevo, 13 January 2005; Marinko Buntić, Owner of Puma-Buntić Security, 26 January 2005; Lazar Stupar, Head of the Police Department in RS, 01 February 2005.
6 Op cit Jašarević.
7 Karić S and Muminović D, ‘Thieves took more than 5 Million KM’, The Independent newspaper, 16 January 2005, pp 12 - 13.
8 Interview with Mirsad Abazović, Professor, Faculty of Criminal Sciences, Sarajevo, Security Department, 31 January 2005.
9 Official information from Cantonal Ministries of Internal Affairs.
10 Data does not include Una-Sana, Mostar and West Herzegovina Canton.
11 Op cit Abazovic; Vejnovic.
Table 1: Number of reported criminal incidents in FbiH.
CRIMINAL ACTS 2002 2003 2004
Theft 1,057 2,010 2,139
Serious Theft 7,696 8,234 11,138
Robbery 241 364 577
Frauds 163 219 240
Violent Behaviour 180 192 219
Source: Official information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the FBIH.12
An increase in the availability of firearms in BiH is one of the main reasons that the armed robbery rate is on the increase. All evidence points towards the continued widespread presence of substantial numbers of firearms throughout BiH. While pre-war statistics on registered firearms indicated that there was almost one firearm for every ten members of the public, the figure is now higher.13 It is impossible to accurately estimate the quantity of firearms and military equipment that entered BiH during the war, but the figure is believed to be high. As routine seizures by the security forces demonstrate, many of these firearms have remained in the country after the end of the conflict.14