Private detective agencies

Almost all firms that offer private investigation services are small and informal companies with only a handful of employees.¹⁰⁰ In fact, many of the companies working in this market have no full-time employees, relying instead on a network of contacts that effectively act as consultants when work arises.¹⁰¹

91 Simpson, p 4.

92 Ibid, p 9.

93 Author’s experience.

94 Interview, Prelevic.

95 Simpson, p 5.

96 Halilovic, p 30.

97 Anonymous interview with an employee of a Belgrade based PSC, February 2005.

98 Simpson, p 9.

99 Halilovic, p 29.

100 Simpson, p 3.

101 Ibid, p 5.

PROGARD Security Search Team at Hyatt Regency Hotel, Belgrade, 2005

Copyright © PROGARD Securitas, 2005

The range of services that private investigation firms offer includes corporate due diligence and intelligence gathering, searching for missing and kidnapped persons and surveillance for a wide variety of clients, both foreign and domestic. The ongoing privatization process means that corporate intelligence gathering is a growth area for private investigators.¹⁰² Because of the secretive and informal nature of these PSCs it is difficult to gauge the full nature of their activities. Industry insiders claim that reputable firms, despite requests from some clients, do not employ force.¹⁰³ The same sources claim that most private detectives do not carry firearms although they are legally permitted to do so.

4 Affiliations between PSCs and other sectors

4.1 Security sector affiliations

There are a number of strong informal connections between PSCs and Serbian security structures. Most PSCs, such as Pro-Gard Securitas, are managed and directed by retired police officers.¹⁰⁴ Further, as in the rest of SEE, PSC personnel are disproportionately likely to come from state law enforcement and security services.¹⁰⁵ A limited survey conducted for this report revealed that around 40 per cent of employees working for the top five PSCs were previously employed by the Serbian police service. These former police officers and security services personnel will have informal links to the state security services. While it is not necessarily problematic to have former state security personnel working for PSCs, it is problematic that serving police officers work simultaneously for PSCs.

There have been a number of incidents in which serving police officers have been found moonlighting for PSCs.

For example, in 2004 three Belgrade policemen were dismissed and charged after they were discovered working for a businessman with connections to a criminal gang.¹⁰⁶ Officially, the Police Code of Conduct outlaws serving police officers from moonlighting for PSCs.¹⁰⁷ Although no study has been undertaken, it is also believed that a large number of former armed forces personnel are being attracted to the private security sector.¹⁰⁸

While private detective work and static security is usually carried out by personnel with law enforcement backgrounds,¹⁰⁹ the close protection and bodyguard services for high profile individuals are often carried out by former security service personnel, often drawn from the disbanded Special Operation Unit (JSO).¹¹⁰ A variety of sources also pointed to the continued presence in PSCs of paramilitaries from the war in Bosnia.¹¹¹ In the case of the Lupus Security Agency, owned by the wife of the man accused of Prime Minister Djindjic’s murder, all security personnel are former members of the JSO.¹¹²

4.2 Political affiliations

A number of political parties employ PSCs for private security provision. Both the Radical Party (SRS) and the Yugoslav Left (JUL) are known to use PSCs for their own perceived security needs.¹¹³ While ministers receive protection from members of an elite company of the army,¹¹⁴ the majority of politicians do not have access to the state security apparatus. As politicians remain genuinely vulnerable to political and criminally motivated

102 Anonymous interview with an employee of a Belgrade based PSC, February 2005.

103 Ibid.

104 Simpson, p 2.

105 Ibid, p 4.

106 ‘Sorting the criminals from the police’, B92, 10 October 2004.

107 Republic of Serbia Mol Code on Police Ethics, Article 7 of ‘Law on Internal Affairs’, August 2000, Article 25.

108 Interview, Marko Malijkovic, 12 December 2004

109 Simpson, p9.

110 As in the case of the Lupus Security Agency, quoted in VIP News Service, Daily News 18 May 2005.

111 VIP News Service, Daily News, 08 May 2005.

112 VIP Daily News Report, Issue No 3080, p 2.

113 Simpson, p9.

114 Interview, Aleksandar Radic, Journalist, VIP News, 03 July 2005.

violence, some political figures do require a level of protection that the state security services are unable to provide. The use of PSCs by political actors does, however, raise concerns of political intimidation, particularly in smaller communities¹¹⁵ and could also provide an explanation for the lack of political will in tightening the regulations on private security companies.

4.3 Organised crime affiliations

While more secure and stable than at any time in the last fifteen years, Serbia continues to face a number of obstacles to its transition process that if mismanaged pose the potential to threaten further stability. Of these, organised crime ranks amongst the most serious. Its reach may be reduced, however the effects of organised crime continue to weaken the state, imperil nascent democracy and crowd out the legitimate sector. The scale of organized crime and the cost it infers socially and economically is hard to measure but in Serbia it is by all accounts significant. A recent survey by the Serbian Statistical Office indicated that the grey economy accounts for approximately 9% of GDP, although when illegal activities such as prostitution, drug trafficking and piracy violations are included, the true figure could be between 20 – 25% of GDP.¹¹⁶

Organised crime in Serbia is undergoing a period of transition, one significant aspect of which is the attempted legitimisation of ill-gotten capital.¹¹⁷ Organised criminal networks are no longer certain of support from state structures to facilitate their activities and have consequently had to find new ways to insulate their businesses.

As a result, organised criminal groups have used private security companies as fronts for criminal activity. The Belgrade Special Court, designed to try those accused of serious acts of organised crime, is currently unravelling the extensive and complex relationship between established organised criminal networks, private security firms and those connected to former state structures. Further research would be needed to determine the extent of this problem.

5 Regulation and conduct

5.1 Legal basis for control of PSCs

In contrast to the rest of SEE, there is a near total absence of regulatory control of the private security sector in Serbia. Although it is unlawful to run a business and employ staff without registering with the Serbian Business Registers Agency, private security providers are not legally obliged to register as a ‘private security company’. Every PSC that has staff members will be registered with the Serbian Business Registers Agency as an incorporated legal entity, although it is likely that very small informal ‘firms’ that provide ad hoc PSC type services will not be registered, have company names or any of the other legal characteristics of a company. Currently the only advantage of registration is that it provides legitimisation and evidence of professionalism, especially to potential clients from the international sector. A list of those private security firms operating in Serbia that have chosen to register is available from the Chamber of Commerce.¹¹⁸ A large number of smaller and informal PSCs – such as Lupus for example - do not appear on this list.

According to sources in the PSC industry, the Mol does ‘inspect and observe the work of all PSCs’.¹¹⁹ It was not possible to corroborate this or analyse the process of oversight, as Mol officials were unavailable for comment.

It is also presumably difficult to inspect PSCs and their activities when there exists no definitive list of those companies providing private security services. At most the Mol would only be able to ensure that PSCs meet the same requirements as any other legal entity registered with the Serbian Business Registers Agency but could not regulate their actions as private security providers.

115 Interview, Prelevic, Op Cit.

116 http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=5118, 15 September 2004.

117 Interview, Aaron Presnell, Jefferson Institute, Belgrade, 16 November 2004.

118 Privredna komora Srbije.

119 Interview, anonymous PSC employee, Belgrade, January 2005.

5.2 Use of force and firearms

There is no distinct legislation covering the licensing and use of firearms by PSC employees. Private security guards need only fulfil the same legal criteria as any other Serbian citizen licensed to own and carry firearms.

The legal provision governing firearm possession is the 1992 ‘Law on Weapons and Ammunition’. Article 17 of this law regulates companies, institutions and other legal persons that possess firearms for the purpose of

‘performing physical protection and objects’ protection’ and is therefore applicable to private security companies.

Article 17 forbids firearms holders from carrying automatic pistols, although they may possess automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Some 2,395 rifles are licensed under this legal provision.¹²⁰ Those holding firearms under Article 17 may acquire firearms ammunition ‘in quantities necessary for their work or activity’, which is probably at the discretion of the licensor.

The type of firearm carried by a private security guard will vary and is dependent on the type of security being provided although generally there are only two services that warrant a firearm being carried.¹²¹ For a transfer of money between two different geographical locations, guards tend to travel using long barrelled guns such as rifles or the AK-47. When protecting a property or person, PSC employees tend to carry a sidearm. Larger firearms are unusual except in the case of an embassy or building at risk of terrorist attack. The majority of PSC employees that are armed carry 9mm semi automatic revolvers.¹²² Exceptions to these practices are thought to exist especially with in-house security arrangements, where rules and regulations are at the discretion of the individual in charge of security policies, or in the smaller PSCs that employ less staff.

Article 17 stipulates that firearms holders must be medically fit and trained for arms handling, be mentally capable and without a criminal record.¹²³ While PSC employees cannot legally own a firearm if they have a criminal record, this is not a sufficient safeguard as the 1990s witnessed a near collapse in the law and order and judicial processes with criminals such as ‘Arkan’ being actively employed by the state. It is therefore highly probable that a number of persons that committed criminal acts during the 1990s and have not had criminal proceedings brought against them are presently employed as private security guards.

Article 17 further stipulates that the individual rather than the company receives the firearm permit and only those people named as being responsible for the protection of persons or objects are permitted to hold weapons.

Firearms holders may only carry their weapons while performing their professional duties and may not take their weapons home. Firearms holders must hand over their weapons and ammunition within fifteen days of the termination of their employment. Professional PSCs tend to store firearms and ammunition in locked gun cabinets on company premises. According to one PSC guard interviewed for this research, the best run firms in the industry have armouries that are supervised by authorised personnel or shift managers who take responsibility for issuing weapons and ammunition to the guards on duty.¹²⁴