Xenophobia, prejudice, and right-wing populism in East-Central Europe
Anna Kende
1and Pe´ter Kreko´
1,2,3Right-wingpopulistpartieshavebeenparticularlysuccessfulin East-CentralEuropeintheseconddecadeofthe21stcentury.
Weexplainthisphenomenonusingademand—supply framework.WereviewstudiesaboutcharacteristicsofEast- CentralEuropeannationalismandintergrouptensionswith minoritiesonthepsychologicaldemandsideandtheanti- immigrantpoliticaldiscourseonthepoliticalsupplyside.We concludethatthesuccessofright-wingpopulismcanbe explainedbyahigh,butunstablenationalidentityinthe region’scountriesbasedontheexperiencesofthefragile nationalsovereignty,thedeeplyembeddedandsocially acceptable(i.e.normative)intergrouphostilitieswithminorities (especiallytowardtheRomaminority),andtheeffectiveuseof immigrantthreatinthiscontext.
Addresses
1DepartmentofSocialPsychology,ELTEEo¨tvo¨sLora´ndUniversity, Budapest,Hungary
2PoliticalCapitalInstitute,Budapest,Hungary
3InstituteofHumanSciences,Vienna,Austria
Correspondingauthor:Kende,Anna(kende.anna@ppk.elte.hu)
CurrentOpinioninBehavioralSciences2019,34:29–33 ThisreviewcomesfromathemedissueonEmotion,motivation, personalityandsocialsciences*politicalideologies*
EditedbyJohnJost,EranHalperinandKristinLaurin
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.11.011 2352-1546/ã2019ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.
Successfulmobilizationbynationalistfar-rightpoliticsis notuniquetoEast-CentralEurope(i.e.theformersocial- ist countries of Europe), as far-right parties have been massivelysuccessfulin WesternEuropeaswell.Infact, supportforgenuinefar-rightparties(e.g.GreaterRoma- nia Party, Slovakian National Party, Ataka in Bulgaria) tendstobemorevolatileinEast-CentralEuropethanin theWest.However,thesepartiesendorseideologiesfar moreextremethantheirWesternEuropeancounterparts.
Themaindifferenceisthatnationalisticandexclusionist discoursesof populistright-wingpartiesare mainstream andrepresentthecenterofthepoliticalspectruminEast- Central Europe [1,2,3]. In line with this, mainstream
right-wingpopulistpartieshaveturnedideologicallyand rhetoricallyintogenuinefar-rightparties,especiallysince the refugeecrisis in 2015[4].Indeed, the rise of right- wing populismcorresponded with thetrend of growing ethnicnationalism onlyin thisregion,accordingto data fromconsecutivewavesoftheInternationalSocialSurvey Programme [5].
To further elaborate the differences, firstly we must acknowledge that right-wing populism in East-Central Europeisembeddedinthehistoricallyunstablenational identitiesbasedonterritorialinsecurities,whereasWest- ernEuropeanright-wingpopulismcapitalizesfrominter- group conflictswithinthenationalcontexts.Right-wing nationalistideologiesarethereforeinseparablefromter- ritorialrevisionismandthefearofextinctionofthenation (i.e.collectiveangst)[6].Accordingto Minkenberg[2], thiscanbeexplainedbytheunfinishedprocessofnation- buildinginEast-CentralEuropewhichisconnectedtoits turbulent history in which most of the time, nations experiencedlimitedornosovereignty.Secondly,conser- vatismisideologicallyandpsychologicallydifferentinthe region than in Western Europe, due to theheritage of socialism. Core conservative attitudes (resistance to change and anti-egalitarianism) are often connected to a wishto ‘be takencare of’bya powerful authority on both sides of the political spectrum due to socialist nostalgia [7]. Conservativism in this sense is more dis- persedonthepoliticalspectrum,andstronglyattachedto fearof changeand norm-violatingorculturallydifferent out-groups[8].Inthiscontext,right-wingpopulistleaders can successfully emerge as ‘entrepreneurs of identity’
(i.e. leaders who depict themselves as representing the experiences of their followers, rather than as skillful leaders or politicians, see Ref. [9]), exploiting fears of cultural changes.
For these reasons, anti-democratic political trends can especiallyeffectivelydeepensocial,economic,andpolit- icaldividesandfuelprejudiceinthishistoricallyunstable region.Inthecurrentreview,buildingontheconceptof nationalism, existing intergrouptensions with historical minorities(e.g.Romapeopleandotherminoritynational groups), and the recent emergence of anti-immigrant politicaldiscourse,we explainthesuccessof right-wing populism by ademand—supply match (for a review of far-right politics froma supply—demand approach, see Refs.[10,11].Althoughthedemand—supplydynamicisa universalmodelforright-wingpopulism,asittakeshold in unstable social contexts and amid identity fears
throughout the world, in this paper we investigate the uniquehistoricalandsocialcharacteristicsthatcharacter- ize the region and generate locally relevant questions regardingtherise ofright-wingpopulism.
Toaddresstheselocalquestions,onthedemandside,we reviewrecentworkonnationalidentityandnationalism, describethenatureofprejudicetowardhistoricalminori- ties and other target groups as the psychological ante- cedentsofright-wingpopulism,andonthesupply side, weshowhowthreatmessagesusedbyright-wingpopulist politicians in the mainstream could lead to unprece- dented levels of xenophobia even in the absence of tangible immigrationboosting the popularity of radical rightparties(foravisualpresentationoftheprocess,see Figure1).
Thedemand Side
NationalidentityandnationalisminEast-CentralEurope Theories of national identitydistinguish betweenposi- tiveattachmenttoone’snationontheonehand,andan exclusionary,inflated,anduncriticalviewofthenational ingroup on the other (building on Adorno et al.’s [12]
distinctionof trueandpseudo-patriotism). Thisdistinc- tion indicates that nationalism is not simply a stronger form of identification, but something qualitatively different. Studies about collective narcissism capture theambiguityof astrong,but unstableingroupidentity andsuggestthatnationalismrequiresconstantdefending
[13].This needcreates hostility toward allpeople who representaninternalorexternalthreattothegroup[14].
ThesalienceofnationalidentityandnationalisminEast- Central Europe hasbeen shown in anumber of recent studies. A study conducted among Polish participants revealedastrongerconnectionbetweencollectivenarcis- sism and external threat (in the form of beliefin anti- Polishinternationalconspiracies) than betweeningroup positivityandexternalthreat.Whencollectivenarcissism wasaccountedfor,ingrouppositivitywasnolongercon- nectedtothesebeliefs[15].Incontrast,inthecontextof Hungary,Kende,HadaricsandSzabo´ [16]showedthat boththemodeofidentification(attachmentversusglori- fication)and thecontent ofidentity(nationversusEur- ope)matter:ingroupglorificationalwayspredictedhigher hostility,however,therewasadifferencebetweenattach- ment with Europe and attachment with Hungary. The firstpredictedpositive,whereasthelatterpredictedneg- ativeattitudestowardimmigrants.InSlovakia,onestudy foundthattheperceptionof aculturalthreattoidentity was a strong predictor of negative attitudes towards refugees—unlikeperceivedeconomicthreatandmod- ernracismthat didnotadd anythingto theexplanatory value of identity-based cultural threat [17]. From these studies, it seems that prejudice and intergroup hostility are rooted in both nationalism and its milder form of national attachment or cultural identity in the region, underlining that exclusive nationalism is more mainstreamintheregion.
The strongerconnection betweennationalidentity and intergroup hostility may be explained by the specific content of national identity. Definitions of the nation asanimaginedcommunityreflecttheuniquecharacter- isticsofthehistorical,political,andculturalcontext[18]
thatindividualsadapttodifferentdegrees.Ifmembership inanationisdefinedinexclusiveterms,ameresenseof belongingcanalsopredictintergrouphostility[19].Citi- zensofWesterncountriesembracetheirnationalpridein democraticpoliticalinstitutions more stronglythan citi- zensinEasterncountries[20],suggestingtheexistenceof differencesinnational identitycontentthat in turncan affectintergroupattitudesandhostility.
Prejudiceagainsthistoricalminorities
In East-Central Europe, questions of belonging have been contested for national minorities evenbefore the birthof nationstates.Ethnictensions havebeenampli- fiedbythepeacetreatiesoftheFirstWorldWar–which redrew all borders of East-Central Europe – and the repressionofthecommunistregime.Anxietiesconnected tosocialtransformationsregardingnationalcitizenshipin the post-communist period have shaped political deci- sions regarding minorities. This is most prominently reflected in punitive solutions in connection with the Roma, the largest ethnic minority group of the region
Figure1
Nationalism
Right-wing populism
Intergroup prejudice
Mobilization by threat
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences
Thecircularconnectionbetweennationalism,intergroupprejudicethat makespeoplesusceptibletothreat,whichleadstogrowingright-wing populismthat.
[21].Datafrominternationalsurveysmeasuringindivid- ual-levelattitudesclearlyindicatethatprejudiceagainst variousout-groupshavebeenhighintheregioncompared to other parts of Europe in the past decades (Special Eurobarometer, 2015: https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/
data/dataset/S2077_83_4_437_ENG), and closely con- nected tonationalidentity[22].
The level of prejudice is not simply an aggregate of individual attitudes of a country’s citizens. Prejudice (theway itis expressed andthe choice of its targets)is alsoastrategicexpressionofingroupidentityinthesense thatintergroupattitudescanbebothunacceptableformsof behavior(i.e.prejudice)andacceptableformsofconduct [23].Thismeansthattheharshtreatmentofcertaingroups canbeconsideredarationalresponsetoperceivednorm violationsandnotconsideredproblematic.Thisisparticu- larlyrelevantforprejudiceagainstRomapeople(i.e.anti- gypsyism,fortheterm,seeEuropeanCommissionagainst Racism and Intolerance, https://www.coe.int/en/web/
european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance/
recommendation-no.13)inEast-CentralEurope.Itisrec- ognized as aformof prejudice whenit ismanifestedin violence, butit isgenerallytoleratedwhenexpressedas
‘reasonableantigypsyism’[24].
Romapeople(alsoreferredtoasGypsies)constitutethe largest ethnicminority group in Europe,making up 5–
10% of the population in Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Serbia andBulgaria[25].Despitealong, shared history with the Roma in East-Central Europe, Roma people representamarginalizedsocialgroupthatfacesdiscrimi- nation in all areas of social life [26]. Recent studies conductedinHungaryandSlovakiafoundthatprejudice against the Roma is highly normative and acceptable.
This is underlined by the way prejudice is expressed againstthem,thatis,throughtraditionalnegativestereo- types,andthefactthatpeopledonotadjusttheirlevelof prejudice to external expectations [27]. La´sˇticova´ and Findor [28] pointto therisks and limitations of relying onindividualisticapproacheswhentryingtoreduceprej- udice in highly hostile social contexts. Orosz et al. [29]
offeradditionalsupportfortheimportanceofsocialnorms in shapingattitudestoward theRoma bydemonstrating the predominantly negative content of personal dis- coursesaboutRomapeopleconsistingofnegativestereo- types,threatsand dehumanization.Decadesofantigyp- syism research suggest that antigypsyism is a stable attitude consisting of traditional negative stereotypes andheldbythemajorityofthepopulationinallcountries of East-CentralEurope [30,31].
It must be noted that antigypsyism and hate crimes againstRomapeoplearecommoninotherpartsofEurope too.Whatmakesthecontextdifferentisthatantigypsy- ismhasbecomethecornerstoneofpoliticalmobilization in some countries, such as in Hungary, Slovakia, and
Bulgaria[3,32].Thiswasenabledbyanormativecontext that is permissive with antigypsyism and prejudice against groups that are perceived as norm-violating or culturallydifferent[7].Againstthishistoricalandpolitical backdrop,fearsovertheemergenceofthearrivalof‘new strangers’ only exacerbated the general animosities towards minorities, and mobilized people’s generalized prejudice [33], making prejudice and the norms of prejudice expression the link between nationalism and right-wingpopulism.
The supplyside
According to results drawn from the EuropeanSocial Survey, positive attitudestowardimmigrationappear incountries with a largerMuslim immigrantpopulation, moreliberal integrationpolicies, andgreaterstate supportof different religiouspractices[34].Inlinewiththis,hostilitytoward Muslim immigrantsishighestin countriesunaffectedby immigrationandterrorism,suchasinEast-CentralEurope [35]. In this region, we can observe a form of ‘Platonic Xenophobia’ (i.e. hatred of Muslim populations without their presence, (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
hungary/2015-07-30/scaling-wall), or the fight against the
‘imaginaryMuslims’(https://www.brookings.edu/research/
imaginary-muslims-how-polands-populists-frame-islam/).
ThepathchosenbymostEast-CentralEuropeancountries inresponsetotherefugeecrisisof2015 wasthepoliticization ofimmigrantthreatandthemobilizationoftheelectorate basedonthesemessages[36,37].Thisrhetoricisnotunique totheregion(seeforexamplethecaseofItaly:https://www.
brookings.edu/research/muslims-in-the-west-and-the-rise- of-the-new-populists-the-case-of-italy/),butin thedefacto absenceofimmigrantpopulationsfromMuslimcountries,it ismerelyapsychologicalmanipulationbasedonthehistori- callyfounded fearofthenation’sdisappearanceandthreatto its sovereignty (i.e. collective angst) which are genuine historical experiences of people in this region. In East- CentralEurope,wherenationalsovereigntyhasbeencon- testedandfearsoverterritoriallossesarestillstrong,nation- alist populism can mobilize against minorities based on these particularfears[2]ratherthanforexampleeconomicthreat.
Traditionally, mobilization against historical minorities, suchas Jews,theRomaand nationalminoritieswasthe dominantstrategyofradicalrightparties.Therefore,the influx of refugees to Europe from the Middle East in 2015gavemomentumtopopulistradicalrightpartieswho couldcapitalizeonexistingprejudices[38]andthenor- mativecontextsthatallowtheopenexpressionofpreju- dice.Thepoliticalexploitationofimmigrantthreatledto spectacular electoral successes for populist right-wing parties. It is not surprising that anti-Muslim and anti- immigrantrhetorichelpedsecuretheelectoralvictoryof two mainstream parties (PIS in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary) and created space for the rise of xenophobic playersinthemainstream–contrarytoWesternEurope wheremainlytheradicalpartiescouldcapitalizefromthe
immigration issue. The success of the anti-immigrant rhetoric in Hungary, at a time when Europe was still dominated by ‘wilkommenskultur’, exceeded expecta- tions. However, apart from the Law and Justice Party inPoland andFidesz inHungary, otherpoliticians who exploited anti-immigrant sentiments had electoral suc- cessesaswell,suchasCzechPresidentMilosˇ Zeman in 2018 (http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/156782/1/156782.pdf). Say- yid [39] argues that the Czech case fits well into the pattern that Islamophopic mobilization works well in countries where theMuslim minority is negligible, but peoplecanbemobilizedbythreat.Theauthorrecallsthat President Zeman warned Czech citizens about a
‘superHolocaust’thatMuslimrefugeeswereplanning.
Recentstudies,usingopinionpolldataandinternational databases,suggestthatxenophobicpropagandabyright- wingpopulist politicians,representingmainstreampoli- tics in most East-Central European countries, did not onlycoincidewiththesuccessfulmobilizationofvoters, butalsowithanincreaseinintolerance.Thereby,wecan assume that propensity to external threat due to the unstablecontents of national identity canbe described notjustasalinearprocess,butalsoasacircularone(see Figure 1). The most recentwaves of ESS datasuggest thattherefugeecrisishasdeepenedthegapbetweenthe prejudice levels in new (Eastern) and older (Western) member statesof theEU (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/
bueros/budapest/14181-20180815.pdf), despite the fact that Western Europe was much more exposed to the refugeecrisisastherealtargetofasylum-seekers.Com- parative research shows that hostile attitudes towards immigrants have become muchstronger in some East- CentralEuropeancountriesthaninmostWesterncoun- tries[40].InalloftheVisegradcountries(CzechRepub- lic,Hungary, Poland,andSlovakia), asignificantrise in xenophobiawasmeasured[41].
Conclusions
Using the demand—supply framework to capture the match between the psychological needs of individuals andthedominantpoliticaldiscourseandsuccessofparties, wereviewedtheconceptofnationalismandissuesrelated toprejudiceinthecontextofEast-CentralEurope,andthe recent success of the use of anti-immigrant rhetoricby right-wingpopulistparties.Wehaveshownthatalthough thedemand—supplyframeworkmaybeauniversalchar- acteristic of right-wingpopulist mobilization, bothsides have unique elements in the East-Central European region. The psychological demand is different because nationalidentityhasbeenhistoricallyunstable,encapsu- latingagenuinelyfoundedfearof extinction bothculturally andterritorially, makingEast-CentralEuropeancitizens susceptibletocollectivenarcissismandnationalistideolo- gies. Because of the content and instability of national identitythatneeds constant defending,the harsh treatment ofethnicandnationalminoritygroupstendstobesocially
permissible,easilyjustified,andevenmainstream.Inthis normativecontextintergrouphostilityisnotevenneces- sarilyrecognized asprejudice. Thisisevidencedbythe marginalizedpositionandpoliciesregardingRomapeople andtensionswithnationalminoritygroupsintheregion, butalsobythemoreexclusive policiesagainstrefugees.
Withinthiscontext,right-wingpopulistleaderscouldnot makeextremeclaimsaboutthethreatimmigrationfrom Muslimcountriesrepresentthatwasnotacceptablefora broadpublic,andconsequentlycapitalizeontheinfluxof refugeesinEuropein 2015to agreaterdegreethanany WesternEuropeanpoliticalmovementsdid,eveninthede factoabsenceofimmigrants,refugeesoraculturallydiffer- entMuslimpopulation.
Conflictofintereststatement Nothingdeclared.
Acknowledgements
ThisworkwassupportedbytheJa´nosBolyaiResearchScholarshipofthe HungarianAcademyofSciencesforAnnaKende.
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