1989 and 2010 in HunGary
1. The 1989 transition and the main characteristics of the subsequent period
In Hungary after World War II the major part of economic activities was conducted by state-owned enterprises or cooperatives and state farms. Although Hungary enjoyed one of the most liberal and economically advanced economies of the former eastern bloc, both agriculture and industry began to suffer from several internal and external effects (oil-crisis etc.) in the 70’s, and Hungary’s net foreign debt rose significantly – from $1 billion in 1973 to $15 billion in 1993. After the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet satellites had to be transformed from a one-party political system and centrally-planned economy to a market economy with a multi-party political system.
Hungary is widely known to have one of the most successful ‘transition’ economies and since the early 90s it has received a disproportionate share of direct foreign investment.143
‘the democratically elected governments of the 1990s privatized several state-owned companies, liberalized markets, attracted foreign direct investment and restructured the economy, which were dominated by private and internationally competitive companies in those years. Hungary reformed its industrial relations and institutionalized a cooperation between the economic interest associations and the government. Political and economic reforms spurred the economic growth, which increased significantly from 1996 onward.
governments successfully reduced the tension with the neighboring countries, which had become after the First World War home to sizeable Hungarian ethnic minorities.’144
Some developments, from liberalization and democratization to privatization that struck deep at the heart of traditional attitudes led to fundamental changes in the society;
the make-up of Hungarian society altered significantly.145 in the last two decades in the economic sphere, Hungary found itself confronted by even greater global pressures. it was a period of intense and often painful social, economic and political upheaval. Many ser-vices and functions were removed from the state hands and placed in the control of bodies managed by different concerns. a large number of people were encouraged to buy, and subsequently bought, their council house. A major programme of privatisation put industries nationalised after 1945 back into private hands, and downgraded the power and position of the trade unions.146 the european union acknowledged the success of the country’s
143 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2005/hungary>accessed 17 May 2012
144 BTI 2010. Hungary Country Report. Bertelsmann Stiftung, gütersloh, 2009. 3.
145 Jack Straw MP: The Changing Role of the British State…http://www.nlgn.org.uk/public/2007/the-changing-role-of-the-british-state/>accessed 11 April 2009
146 ibid.
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democratic and economic transformation by granting membership to Hungary in 2004147 by a decision which was supposed to herald a new era of prosperity.148
nevertheless ‘against this backdrop of socio-economic and cultural change, previ-ously entrenched views began to shift, with many people displaying a more individualist, consumerist, less class and state orientated outlook. (…) The private realm of individual choice and freedom – at least partly autonomous from the various organs of the state – greatly expanded. Society became more atomised.149 in sum, socio-economic and political changes over several decades have given rise to a new kind of citizen, less deferential and more demanding than in the past.’150 Traditional social and political identities and affilia-tions have declined; the concept of voting as a civic duty has weakened; at the same time the public wants more control over decisions.151
1.1. features of Hungarian public and legal politics
‘in 1989, round-table discussions were established following the Polish example. However, given the prevailing circumstances in Hungary – a demobilized and apolitical society – the debates remained exclusive and resulted in a compromise negotiated by the elites. the compromise consisted of an agreement to hold free elections in 1990 and to implement constitutional amendments necessary for this process. Center-right political groups that had emerged from the opposition won the first democratic elections. In the years that fol-lowed, Hungary was able to establish a stable democratic political system characterized by several alternating governments of either center-right or socialist-liberal coalitions, all of which were largely sustained over their full terms of office. Reforms were implemented in all areas of public policy and society necessary to achieve democracy: public administration, the judicial system, the media, the non-governmental sector, education and social affairs.’152
a starting point of this subchapter is that new Central-eastern european democra-cies established after 1989 did not build the political system on layered, sophisticated consultation procedures and institutional systems based on wide scale social participation, but – almost exclusively – on the Parliament-centred politic formation structures operating on the principle of representation. Many believe that one of the greatest problems of the societies getting out from under a dictatorship is that due to the lack of the civil society filling in the gap between individuals and the state during their socialisation, the members of these societies could never actually learn to incorporate the identification of problems, to formulate their interests, to exchange their thoughts, to harmonise different opinions, and as a result the various problem-handling methods were not developed, either. From the side of the public it may be stated that in Hungary the legal and institutional requirements
147 Bti 2010. Hungary Country Report. (n 144) 3.
148 Jack Straw MP: The Changing Role of the British State…http://www.nlgn.org.uk/public/2007/the-changing-role-of-the-british-state/>accessed 11 April 2009
149 ibid.
150 ibid.
151 ibid.
152 Bti 2010. Hungary Country Report. (n 144) 3.
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of representative democracy were fulfilled after 1990, but since then no material change has occurred in order to establish participative democracy; this means that the Hungarian democracy ‘has frozen into’ the level of representative democracy.153
A father tendency, a feature which may be hardly separated from the one mentioned earlier is that the all-time state – formed after the transition – imitates, reconstructs and replaces the civil sector through its conscious efforts, by this making it weaker. During the analysis of this, it must not be forgotten that in the economic and sociological literature of the past one or two decades the state, by undertaking the ‘replacement’ and ‘simulation’ of the organisation of market and by self-regulating the social mechanisms and the political organisation of society, it eventually hampers the connection between political decision-making mechanisms and the actual fragmentation of the interests of society.
In the 1990s – after the transition – there was a regrettable shift: during the transition to a market economy, the state formally withdrew from a number of fields, but during this
‘abolishment of the state’ several tasks could not be exposed to the profit-oriented processes of the market. These tasks were usually incorporated to the so-called nonprofit sector, which was unfortunately mixed up with the civil organisations both legally and practically: ‘It often happened that in complete sectors only the signboards were repainted, shifted from state to public utility status, while the old structure, the old system of operation, the state financing and the old ‘expert’ staff remained.’154 This environment, however, had a weakening effect on organised civil society, upholding its – unnecessarily strong – dependent status.
the gradual weakening of the state and the failure of the substantial reform of the state budget together resulted in the formation of a territorially big, but not efficient state. ‘The Hungarian state model became too extended for night guard state and too weak for welfare state. This model could be mostly named ‘speed bump state’ as it spreads along many fields of the economy and of the society, but it is not present where its strength and organisational skills would be needed the most; it protects regarding its intention, but actually it rather breaks down the processes, wants to obstacle bad, but eventually it can be bypassed and stepped through’.155
Based on the main features of the public policy/administrative environment it must be stated about Hungary in advance that a) due to the traditional ‘from top-to down’ system, a general – and tendency-like – weakness is the lack of democratic control, accountability and transparency; b) due to the politicised and instable practice of the reconciliation of interests,156 the quality of the decisions made in the public sector is often inadequate, as
153 Jenei György. Adalékok az állami szerepvállalás közpolitika-elméleti hátteréről. [Supplements to the public policy – theoretical background of state participation] In: Hosszú Hortenzia and Gellén Márton (eds.): Államszerep válság idején [State role in crisis] COMPLEX, Budapest, 2010. 95.
154 Pankucsi Márta: Civilekkel a civilekért – Az ellenzéki szerveződésektől a minisztériumon át a Furmann alapítványokig. [With civilians for civilians – From opposition organisations through the ministry to the Furmann foundations] In: Simon János (ed.): Civil társadalom és érdekképviselet Közép-Európában.
[Civil society and the representation of interests in Central Europe] L’Harmattan – CEPoliti. Budapest, 2012. 144.
155 Pulay Gyula: Az éjjeliőr államtól a fekvőrendőr államig. Merre tovább? [From night guard state to speed bump state. Which way to go?] Új Magyar Közigazgatás 2010/6–7. 29.
156 Gerő Márton – Kopper Ákos: Fake and Dishonest: Pathologies of Differentiation of the Civil and the Political Sphere in Hungary. Journal of Civil Society (2013) vol. 9 issue 4, 361–374.
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is their execution; c) public policy has balance problems; the weight and coordination of the relevant players is disproportionate and incalculable due to the extreme politicisation, and to the fact that political predominance characterises the relationship of the political-administrative system and society; d) the final phase of public policy is missing; public policy processes begin but they often do not get to the end. there is no evaluation phase and closure.157 Within the scope of the latter evaluation, the preliminary and subsequent impact studies are determinative, the main goal of which is grounding the decision-making situa-tion of the legislator, in so far as the analysis expands the pool of factors, the considerasitua-tion of which is – or should be – essential for a carefully planned, grounded decision.158 in the Hungarian model of public policy decision making – as mentioned before – the ‘top-down’
approach is dominant, in so far as the institutional mechanisms of the involvement of inter-est protection-integrative organisations operate only formally.159 it is inseparable from the latter fact that the traditional features of the Hungarian political culture are paternalism, intolerance and the transformation of personal relations into political ones,160 and last, but not least the presence of corruption phenomena, which may be observed at a degree exceeding the average of the surrounding area.161 among the classic governmental failure phenomena – which is not traditionally Hungarian, but may definitely be observed here as well – the theoretical difficulties of setting and measuring public policy goals may be mentioned, as well as the influence of strong interest groups, the difficulties related to the size and complexity of governmental activities, and to the causal interconnection of certain public policy problems.162
It is also important that in Hungary ‘[the] all-time present stands out by the strong and unreasonable delegitimizing of the all-time past, instead of putting forward its own performance’.163 In this field of force even the changes of the governmental course have
‘disastrous’ features. the phenomenon of value crisis known in sociology can arise follow-ing such legitimacy struggle…164
157 Pesti, Sándor. 2001. Közpolitika szöveggyűjtemény. Budapest: Rejtjel. 206.
158 in details see: A Közigazgatás Korszerűsítésének kormánybiztosa által készített szempontok. “Rész-letes útmutató a hatályos jogszabályok utólagos és jogszabálytervezetek előzetes felülvizsgálatához.”
[aspects prepared by the government commissioner of the Modernization of public administration.
‘Detailed guide to the subsequent review of valid laws and the preliminary review of draft laws.’]
Közigazgatás Korszerűsítésének Kormánybiztosa. Budapest, 1995. 5.
159 Jenei (n 153) 95.
160 Kulcsár Kálmán: Politika és jogszociológia. [Politics and legal sociology] Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1995. 336.
161 http://www.ey.com/HU/hu/Newsroom/News-releases/global_fraud_survey_2010_pr>accessed 11 July
162 Hajnal György: Adalékok a magyar közpolitika kudarcaihoz. [Supplements to the failures of Hungarian 2013 public politics] KszK ROP 3.1.1. Programigazgatóság, Budapest, 2008. 33.
163 Szigeti Péter: A Magyar Köztársaság jogrendszerének állapota 1989–2006. [The state of the legal system of the Hungarian Republic 1989–2006] Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2008. 17.
164 ibid.
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1.1.1. multi-level Governance
the concept of multi-level governance has become extraordinarily fashionable in recent years.165 the main value of the concept of multi-level governance is that it allows an under-standing of complexity at and between different levels. in this sense, the vertical notion of multi-level governance, including but also seemingly ‘above’ and ‘below’ the nation state, goes alongside the horizontal notion of complex governance to address relationships between state and non-state actors, and new forms of public-private partnerships. this goes beyond a linear approach to the study of international organisations on the national polity and on specific thematic areas such as social policy. A multi-level governance perspective forces one to address processes of the supranationalisation, the decentralisation and the dispersal of authority as potentially coterminous, rather than engage in very narrow-ranged, linear, debates about the influence, or lack of influence, of international agencies.166 ‘While multi-level governance remains a contested concept, its broad appeal reflects a shared concern with increased complexity, proliferating jurisdictions, the rise of non-state actors, and the related challenges to state power’.167 insofar as the transition in Central and eastern europe, and the wars of the yugoslav succession, came at a time of increased focus on non-state actors, it is not surprising that a large literature has emerged focusing on the role of international and domestic non-state actors, in the context of the importation of Western models of civil society and democratization to the region.168
this concept of multi-level governance refers also to the need to move away from understanding decision-making in terms of ‘discrete territorial levels’ and, instead, to get closer to the need of conceptualizing it in terms of ‘complex overlapping networks.’169 Moreover, the concept forces an understanding of the ways in which traditional notions of democratic accountability are being undermined and challenged. the challenge to account-ability has been raised in a variety of texts on post-communist transition.170
nevertheless, we have to underline the fact that the concept of multi-level govern-ance does not derive from political and practical realities in Central and eastern europe, especially in Hungary.
165 Paul Stubbs: Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance. Policy Transfer and the Politics of Scale in South east europe. Southeast European Politics (2005) vol. vi. no. 2, 66.
166 ibid. 67.
167 ian Bache – Matthew Flinders: themes and issues in Multi-level governance. in: ian Bache and Mat-thew Flinders (eds.): Multi-level Governance. oxford university Press, 2004. 4–5.
168 Stubbs (n 165) 68.
169 ibid.
170 ibid. 68–69.
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