SUMMARY

Pazaric Krupa is a well-situated site with scope for expansion, once the demining is completed, if the buildings were improved to NATO standard and licensed. The site is heavily overstocked and the staff are not trained for their tasks. There is no verifiable program for inspection of the storage conditions or for technical inspection of the ammunition. The guard force is adequate but physical security measures need significant improvement.

ASSESSMENT OF AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE EV 076 - RUDO 1 INTRODUCTION

Rudo is an ammunition storage site for the Army of the Republica Srpska located approximately 10km from Visegrad. The ammunition storage buildings within the explosives area were built by the Yugoslavian Army in the 1950s.

The site contains 14 ammunition storage buildings of standard Yugoslavian Army construction. The buildings are in a generally poor state of repair, with obvious cracks in the walls and water leaking in from the roof. Due to the structural damage, lack of blast protection for the windows and the double skinned construction of the doors none of the buildings meet NATO standards.

2. SECURITY

2.1 Existing Measures

x Perimeter fence. The perimeter fence is not complete, but repairs are not possible due to the presence of mines.

x Main entrance. There is only one entrance to the site which is permanently manned. The entrance is closed by means of a dilapidated gate which is not sufficient to stop a vehicle.

x Electronic Security. There are no alarms on the ESHs or the perimeter. There is lighting within the explosive compound but it is not sufficient to illuminate the whole area. There is no CCTV.

x Guard force The guard force is adequate to secure the area, in the absence of any electronic security measures. Any reduction in the guard force would severely compromise security.

x Security of weapons. The weapons held for the guard are easily accessible by all guard force members. The padlock securing the weapons is not high security. Ready use ammunition is stored with the weapons.

x ESH security. The ESH are secured by low quality padlocks and wire seals. In addition to this many of the windows are broken, with security bars missing or loose.

2.2 Recommended Improvements

x The perimeter fence should be replaces, once demining has been completed.

x The main gate requires replacement.

x A more efficient lighting system should be installed in the explosives compound.

x The ESHs require an alarm system

x The locks to the ESH should be replaced 3 AMMUNITION STORAGE CONDITIONS 3.1 Free Standing ESH

All but two of the ESH are traversed, however the traverses are not of sufficient height to prevent the ejection of high velocity projectiles and therefore cannot be considered for licensing purposes. The ingress of moisture is affecting the ammunition and the damage to the buildings is in some cases severe.

3.2 Ammunition Stocks

x General The site is heavily overstocked with a large amount of ammunition due to the closure of smaller sites. There is a large amount of bulk HE and anti-tank mines along with large calibre HE shell and grenades. Much of the ammunition is not in its original container, many of the containers are damaged exposing the contents. The majority of the ammunition is of Yugoslav or Russian origin. and dates from the last 20 years. There is also a quantity of war production ammunition. Large amounts of the ammunition stocks have already been earmarked for disposal.

x Storage The ammunition is stored with little regard to HD and CG, and there are multiple infringements. There appears to be a lack of proper training and no inspection of the storage conditions. Inspections are carried out by SFOR in an attempt to enforce ITP chapter 13, however the inspectors are not themselves technically trained.

x Unidentified Chemicals Building 21 contains fourteen containers marked

“Toxic”. There is concern that they may contain liquid propellant or oxidiser. These items are stored along with large amounts of Compatibility Group B and D ammunition, which considerably increases the risk of a major explosion in the event of a fire

4 SUMMARY

Rudo is stocked far in excess of the NEQs which would be allowed were the site licensed. Furthermore, there is no ammunition surveillance system or evidence of the conduct of routine inspections. The ammunition is generally of poor quality and is deteriorating. The removal of much of the HE stores should be a priority. The lack of regard for the correct mixing of Compatibility Groups is also a cause for serious concern, as is the storage of potentially toxic chemicals. The condition of some of the buildings is so poor that renovation may not be possible. This site is to be used for the Explosion Consequence Analysis as it is the closest to civilian habitation (300m).

ASSESSMENT OF AMMUNITION STORAGE SITE NB 075 - TUZLA 1 INTRODUCTION

NB 075 is an ammunition storage site for the Federation Army located approximately 20km from Tuzla. The ammunition storage buildings within the explosives area were built by the Yugoslavian Army in the 1950s with the exception of 1 smaller building that is of more recent construction

The site contains 9 earth covered igloo type buildings and 7 free standing ESH. Two buildings are currently empty. A tenth Igloo was completely destroyed by an explosion in 1995, when it is believed that an Improvised Explosive Device was being constructed in a building containing 1800 Kg of HD 1.1 ammunition.

2 SECURITY 2.1 Existing Measures

x Perimeter fence. The perimeter fence is complete, but insufficiently robust. There area inside the fence is mined. There is only one entrance to the site which is permanently manned.

x Electronic Security. There are no alarms on the ESHs or the perimeter.

There is no lighting within the ammunition storage area. There is no CCTV.

x Guard force The guard force is adequate to secure the area, in the absence of any electronic security measures. Any reduction in the guard force would severely compromise security.

x Security of weapons. The padlock securing the weapons is not high security. Control of access to the weapon storage area is good.

x ESH security. The ESH are secured by low quality padlocks and wire seals. In addition to this many of the windows are broken, with security bars missing or loose. The ventilation shafts are also insecure.

2.2 Recommended Improvements

x The perimeter fence should be refurbished, once demining has been completed.

x A lighting system should be installed in the explosives compound.

x The ESHs require an alarm system x The locks to the ESH should be replaced

3. AMMUNITION STORAGE CONDITIONS