in Croatia
The liberalization of the political system in Yugoslavia during 1980s reopened the country’s “national question”.
In such a context, questions concerning the recent past become an essential part of the discourse of political ac-tors. The effects of this liberalization, which eventually led to the downfall of the communist regime, were felt in Croatia only at the end of the decade. The repressive response of the regime to the Croatian Spring in the early 1970s affected Croatian politics in such a way that the liberalization of 1980s was not felt on such a scale as in Slovenia and Serbia. At the same time, this meant that there was no serious questioning of the official commu-nist interpretation of history. Only in late 1980s, under the effects the Yugoslav crisis and the downfall of com-munism in Europe did substantial liberalization in Cro-atia take place. Due to the Yugoslav context, the open-ing of the political system soon placed the national and statehood questions at the top of the agenda, along with other issues related to events from the recent past. In this regard, the interpretation of history played a major legiti-mizing role for the political actors during the transitional period.
Key words: political transition, Croatia in 1989/1990, political actors, history, legitimizing politics
Introduction
In the former Yugoslavia, history has always enjoyed great impor-tance. Winston Churchill’s statement that “the Balkans produce more history than they can consume” proved right in Yugoslavia during the 1980s and 1990s (MacMillan, 2010: 88). Even at the beginning of the 21st century, the burden of history lays heavier on some ex-Yugoslav republics than in most other European states. In communist Yugosla-via, history played a significant role in the legitimization of the re-gime. One of the key claims of the communist regime was that they had resolved the “national question” in Yugoslavia. As in other com-munist regimes, it was also claimed that socialism was more advanced and progressive than capitalist, bourgeois societies. The revolutionary tradition of the Second World War was systematically employed in order to legitimize the totalitarian/post-totalitarian communist regime (see also Dimitrijević, 1989: 66). This tradition was increasingly em-phasized in times of crisis, when other sources of legitimization were depleted or gone (such as the economic effects of the industrialization or Tito’s cult of personality). However, the depletion of the communist ideology and the worsening interethnic relations gradually opened a Pandora’s Box of historical reevaluations and myths that were ulti-mately misappropriated by political actors, with tragic consequenc-es. The questioning of the official interpretation of history had been strictly prohibited in Yugoslavia. The death of Josip Broz Tito, an un-disputed and supreme authority, coincided with the economic crisis that would soon turn into a general crisis and seriously brought into question the legitimacy of the regime. The loss of legitimacy under the influence of the crisis led to a new wave of liberalization in the 1980s.
In addition to this, primarily in Serbia, a gradual abandonment of the interpretation of history in line with communist ideology occurred.
In such circumstances, aspiring political elites drew upon new or, in many cases, old, nationalist myths, which replaced the previous com-munist ones.
The Kosovo crisis in the early 1980s was soon defined as an ethnic issue, which included the reestablishment of the Kosovo mythology that symbolically linked the contemporary emigration of Serbs from Kosovo with the Kosovo myth of 1389 (Blagojević, 2002: 265-285).
During the 1980s, the discourse of Serbs as historic and contemporary victims of Yugoslavia, i.e. victims of coexistence with other Yugoslav peoples, was propagated by some members of the intellectual elite in Serbia (Dragović-Soso, 2002: 368-369). In order to substantiate such an interpretation, history was used in order to “prove that Serbs were endangered”. After Slobodan Milošević assumed power in Serbia in 1987, the political elite adopted a nationalist discourse, which included employing historic “facts” in order to legitimize their political goals.
While Serbia and Slovenia had in various ways embarked upon a path of liberalization during the 1980s, Croatia had, due to the expe-rience of the Croatian Spring of 1971, followed the path of political correctness and ideological dogmatism.
Dogmatism and certain aspects of ideological fundamentalism manifested themselves through a strong reaction by the regime to any public expression of attitudes that were contrary to the ideologi-cal orthodoxy of the Communist Party, including the interpretation of history. However, the increased liberalization in early 1989 led to the establishment of the first opposition associations and alliances, the majority of which would later transform into new political parties.
This chapter examines the role history has played in the context of liberalization and political transition. Along with a short overview of the role history played in the general media and political discourse, the analysis will focus on the main political actors, especially during the first multiparty election campaign in spring 1990. The aim of this chapter is to show how political actors interpreted history and used it to justify their policies during Yugoslavia’s dissolution.
2. Liberalization and political transition in Croatia
In the beginning of 1989, the “anti-bureaucratic revolution”80 in Serbia was at its peak. Milošević established control over the autono-mous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina as well as the republic of Montenegro, while Slovenia and Croatia were next in line according to the strategy of transformation of Yugoslavia. The pressure on Croa-tia manifested itself through the opening of the question of the status of Serbs in Croatia, as well as general accusations of support for Alba-nian separatists in Kosovo. The Serbian press increasingly published articles claiming that the Serbs in Croatia were in danger and that there was a deliberate policy of their assimilation and national subordina-tion. In the context of the collapse of communist regimes in Europe, the crisis of the Yugoslav system, economic crisis and pressure com-ing from Serbia, the political regime in Croatia was confronted with an ever growing issue of failing legitimacy. The main characteristics of Croatian politics after the suppression of the Croatian Spring begning of the 1970s were brought into question. These characteristics in-cluded a policy of ideological orthodoxy and insufficient participation in the debates about the reform of Yugoslavia, known as the “Croatian silence”. Responding to the loss of legitimacy, the regime allowed certain elements of liberalization, which was not only the result of government decisions, but also reflected the fact that the communist system was collapsing. In such circumstances, opposition groups be-gan to emerge which ever more openly questioned the politics of the Croatian Communists, as well as the ideological foundations of the regime, including the interpretation of contemporary history.
The loss of regime legitimacy and the ever more prominent conflicts between the Communist Parties of each of the six republics enabled a process of liberalization which opened up a broad debate about the re-form of the social and political system. As the crisis deepened, the scope
80 Mass rallies, directed from institutional centers of power, were meant to give an impression of spontaneity. They actually meant the transfer of Serbian nationalism to the streets where certain political actions were demanded. See Milosavljević, 2004: 319-336.
of reform proposals presented in the public increased. From the second half of 1988 until mid-1989, a concept of reform inside the existing sys-tem dominated. In other words, the socialist regime and the single-party system were not questioned. According to this viewpoint, a concept of
“non-partisan pluralism” was promoted (Polet, 7 April 1989: 10-11).
This was yet another concept through which the Yugoslav Communist Party wished to express its vanguard position and difference compared to other countries of the communist bloc. This concept was built upon pluralism inside the existing Socialist Alliance of the Working Peoples of Yugoslavia, which was meant to be reformed and liberated from total communist control (Komunist, 12 May 1989: 16).
In the second half of 1989 the concept of non-partisan pluralism was slowly abandoned, while the introduction of a multiparty system was promoted ever more openly. These demands were mostly voiced by the opposition, intellectuals, and journalists in public appearances.
The Party leadership did not reduce democratization only to non-parti-san pluralism, yet it did not have a clear vision of the scope of reform.
In fact, the communist regime in Croatia was still not prepared to give up its monopoly on power. Or, more precisely, the pressure by the fac-tions which supported democratization was still not strong enough for the reform wing to impose their views.
Inside the Party we can differentiate two main factions: reform-ists (soft-liners) and dogmatics (hard-liners). This general division should be further elaborated in the Croatian case. First of all, there was no clear line between the two factions and there were many sub-groups within the Croatian Communist Party.81 Among the Party’s top officials, a small group was formed which promoted a more radical reform of the political system. One should bear in mind that, due to the swift development of events, ideas which seemed reformist at the beginning of 1989 sounded dogmatic or conservative by the end of the same year.
81 For example, Darko Hudelist wrote in the weekly Start about a radical reformist faction,
“yes but” reformists, nineties leftists, restrictive pluralists, Titoists, normative optimists, mainliners, orthodox Communists – revolutionaries, anti-bureaucrats, etc. Darko Hudelist,
“Svi cvjetovi hrvatske kompartije,” Start, 23 December 1989, 33-35.
One of the key events of the political transition was the consent of the non-democratic regime to hold a free and democratic election. We can broadly divide the factors which led to the adoption of true de-mocratization in Croatia into four groups: intra-partisan (the conflict between reformists and conservatives/dogmatics); internal (the deep-ening of the general crisis and an ever growing pressure of the opposi-tion and the liberalized media); internal-external (the “rally of truth” in Ljubljana and the pressure of the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” from Serbia) and international (the increasing collapse of communism in Europe). The joint influence of all of these factors enabled the reform-ist faction to push its demands through in December 1989 and open up the way towards true democratization. This decision, which surprised many, did not mean a final defeat of the dogmatists. A testimony to this is the new electoral law, adopted at the end of December, which provided only minor changes and were by all means inappropriate for true democratization. Although the ruling cadres tried to justify this by claiming that the legislative procedure for the adoption of this law began before the decision on free elections was made, such a debate it-self showed that the strength of the conservative faction was still quite substantial. It was not clear which faction would emerge victorious in the struggle between the reformists and dogmatists until the adoption of the new electoral legislature in February 1990. In this struggle, the reformists were greatly aided by strong pressure from the opposition and part of the media, as well as the collapse of the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
At the end of December 1989, the government and the opposition began negotiations about the conditions of the first multiparty elec-tion. The reformed Communists tried to use this to take the initiative for democratization from the hands of the opposition. In other words, the Croatian Party leadership tried to portray the democratization as an exclusive choice and strategy of the Communist Party, and not as a result of the abovementioned factors which had in fact forced them to agree to changes. Such a strategy was also used by communists in some other countries, such as in Bulgaria (Brown, 2009: 541-542;
Linz and Stepan 1998: 406-419).
The election campaign was conducted in the context of an ever growing crisis, uncertainty, increased interethnic conflicts, and na-tional homogenization. In such circumstances, the nana-tional question and the issue of Croatian statehood became dominant. This was best employed by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) which assumed some characteristics of a national movement. The HDZ insisted on state and national issues most often and most directly, which gave it an advantage over other parties. The main issue confronted by the reformed Communists was to simultaneously keep a moderate policy (and thus keep the Serbs in Croatia on their side) while addressing sensitive questions in the context of national homogenization and win the election.
The handicap of the League of Communists of Croatia – Party of Democratic Change (SKH-SDP), as was the case with all reformed communists in Europe, was the heritage of the past. In other words, Croatian citizens expressed considerable anticommunist sentiment, which was characteristic for the transition period. The third force in the election campaign was the Coalition of People’s Accord (KNS).
The Coalition tried to assume a centralist position between the HDZ and the SKH-SDP by moderately stressing Croatian national interests, but also by promoting liberal civic values. However, the Coalition did not succeed in building a clear identity and a uniform program plat-form, while the lack of aggression in the wake of national homogeni-zation ended in poor electoral results. In the given context, the HDZ, thanks to its national and statehood program, its similarity to a national movement, and its organizational structure (and financial foundation), won a relative majority of votes in the two-round elections in spring 1990. On account of this, thanks to the electoral system, the HDZ won an absolute majority in the tricameral Croatian Parliament (Sabor). It should be noted that a fully democratic election was held only for the Socio-Political Council of the Parliament (Sabor) of the Socialist Re-public of Croatia, while the elections for the Council of Municipalities and the Council of Associated Labor had serious shortcomings.
Compared to other communist countries, the establishment of the new government in Croatia was conducted under specific condi-tions. Democracy as a way of governing a sovereign state is not pos-sible without a state (Linz and Stepan, 1998: 32; Maldini, 2008: 41).
Therefore, this means that the existence of a sovereign state was a prerequisite for democracy. Specific issues arise in a situation of a simultaneous establishment of a state (especially a nation state) and a process of democratization. In countries where democracy has yet to be stabilized, the politics of a nation state often go against the logic of democracy. In the process of building a nation state, consciously or unconsciously, the dominant ethnic group is favored in many ways (language, religion, identity, symbols, preferential hiring, etc.).
The main goal of the new government was to establish Croatian sovereignty and statehood and to resolve relations with the other Yu-goslav republics – either by establishing a confederation or by dissolv-ing the country. Such goals were at odds with the wishes of Belgrade to centralize Yugoslavia under Serbia’s leadership. Already in the first half of 1990, i.e., after the failure of the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Serbian leadership became aware that changes in federal relations could not be achieved through formal procedures, but had to include the establishment of borders of an ex-panded Serbia, which meant changing the internal republican borders.
In accordance to such viewpoints, in Serbia it was always stressed that, in the event of a breakup of Yugoslavia, republican borders are to be treated as administrative borders (see also Banac, 1992: 55-58).
This was connected with Serbia’s stance that the right to self-determi-nation was reserved for peoples and not for republics, as claimed by Slovenia and Croatia. The Serbs of Croatia were intended to be used in order to fulfill these ideas. The danger posed to Serbs in Croatia by the
“new Ustasha state” was supposed to legitimize the Serbs’ rejection of decisions passed by the democratically elected Croatian government and to justify their usage of extra-institutional methods of rebellion.
The threat to territorial integrity of the republic and the reluctance of rebel Serbs to recognize the decisions made by the new government
enabled the ruling party (HDZ) to retain certain elements of a national movement even after the election, coupled with the continued process of national homogenization. Such circumstances affected the behavior of the opposition, which was for the better part already marginalized by election results due to election system. The threat to Croatian sov-ereignty, as well as the results of democratic processes, led the opposi-tion to support the new Croatian government in its defense of naopposi-tional and state interests, which substantially reduced opposition criticism.
On the other hand, the new authorities often perceived criticism to be in conflict with national and state interests (Vjesnik, 16 May 1990: 3).
The adoption of a new constitution in December 1990 represented a final step in the institutional building of a new regime. The constitu-tion formally confirmed the basic goal of the new government – to establish a sovereign Croatian state. The choice of a semi-presidential system contributed in an institutional sense to the authoritarian ten-dencies of the new regime.
The whole process of political transition occurred in an increasing-ly tense inter-republican and interethnic atmosphere as the Yugoslav crisis evolved in the direction of an armed conflict to determine state borders. In this regard, using history to legitimize political actions be-came a key strategy by the new political elites during the transition period in Croatia.
3. History in the context of liberalization of media
Even before the appearance of opposition groups in Croatia, the liberalization of the political system introduced viewpoints on history which differed from the ones propagated by the communist regime.
As mentioned previously, a hard communist dogmatist discourse prevailed in Croatia for a much longer time than in Slovenia and Ser-bia. Only in the late 1980s did this discourse begin to undergo major changes with the increased liberalization. At that time, the media be-gan to cautiously criticize the regime, as well as to question
commu-nist myths, including the interpretation of the Second World War.
In late 1988, as part of the propagandist nationalist discourse in Serbia, the negative role of the Catholic Church in the Second World War was especially emphasized. The Church was accused of “clerical nationalism” and for being part of a “conspiracy of the Comintern and the Vatican” against Yugoslavia. However, the liberalization enabled the Church to respond to these attacks more freely. On 15 December 1988, the archbishop of Zagreb, Cardinal Franjo Kuharić, issued a protest in response to a wave of accusations against the Church and the Croatian people. He characterized the alleged genocidal nature of the Croatian people and the Catholic Church as a “grave injustice”
and “dark slander” which could lead to new violence and tragic conse-quences (Blažević, 2009: 55-57). In mid-January 1989, Glas Koncila, an ecclesiastical weekly, began publishing a series of eight articles aimed at shedding a different light on the role of Catholic bishops in the Second World War. In June 1989 the Zagreb weekly Danas pub-lished an interview with Cardinal Kuharić. Among other things, he said that the Catholic Church was being demonized for forty years for
and “dark slander” which could lead to new violence and tragic conse-quences (Blažević, 2009: 55-57). In mid-January 1989, Glas Koncila, an ecclesiastical weekly, began publishing a series of eight articles aimed at shedding a different light on the role of Catholic bishops in the Second World War. In June 1989 the Zagreb weekly Danas pub-lished an interview with Cardinal Kuharić. Among other things, he said that the Catholic Church was being demonized for forty years for