THE RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 29 NOVEMBER 1947

Arab and Jewish attitudes

1. General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 provided for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish State, an Arab State and an international territory of the City of Jerusalem, within the framework of an economic union embracing all three. This plan was accepted by the representatives of the Jewish Agency but rejected by the Arab States and the spokesman of the Arab Higher Committee, who declared that they did not consider themselves bound by the resolution. On 14 May 1948, the Jews declared the existence of a State

of Israel, and when on the following day the Mandate officially ended, the newly-proclaimed Provisional Government of Israel was in control of the most important parts of the area allotted to the Jewish State by the Assembly resolution. The Provisional Government of Israel claimed that it was acting according to that resolution as far as

circumstances permitted, and that it made no claim to territory beyond the boundaries of the partition resolution. When the armies of the Arab States entered Palestine on 15 May, and became involved in conflict with the Jewish forces, the Provisional Government of Israel appealed to the Security Council against the attack of the Arab States and invoked the resolution of 29 November.

2. The Arab States, on the other hand, claiming that the resolution of the Assembly was illegal and unjust, contended that they had come legitimately to the assistance of the Arabs of Palestine. Their opposition to the resolution of 29 November has continued unabated.

3. The Provisional Government of Israel, according to recent

pronouncements, has apparently modified its attitude to the resolution of 29 November. Although the general position of the Provisional Government of Israel rests broadly on the foundation of the Assembly resolution, it is now being urged that boundaries should be modified to take more fully into account both the present military situation and the necessity for more readily defensible frontiers. In regard to Jerusalem, there is a more sceptical attitude towards internationalization and a marked tendency to press for the inclusion of at least the Jewish part of Jerusalem in the State of Israel

Economic Union

4. An essential feature of the plan of partition was the integration of the three proposed territorial entities into an economic union, by

expressed, between the parties. An economic union cannot be imposed on a completely unwilling partner, and the fact of Arab unwillingness to co-operate has inhibited the realization of the resolution of 29 November in one of its most essential features.

The boundary provisions

5. The boundary provisions of the General Assembly's resolution were also designed within the framework of economic union, which

presupposes full freedom of transit, and therefore within that

framework, no difficulty was foreseen in providing for separated parts of the Jewish and Arab States joined to their other parts merely at points of intersection of frontiers. This arrangement, while rational within the framework of an economic union, is open to serious objections if no such union exists. The assumptions of the Assembly resolution largely excluded military considerations in the

determination of the boundaries between the three parts of Palestine.

Also the proposed boundaries were related to the then existing distribution of population, a distribution which temporarily, at least, has been significantly affected by the large-scale movements of Arab refugees.

The proposed Arab State

6. The effective establishment of a Jewish State in an area which corresponds in large measure to that envisaged in the partition plan has already been accomplished by the events of the past few months.

As regards the parts of Palestine under Arab control, no central authority exists and no independent Arab State has been organized or attempted. This situation may be explained in part by Arab

unwillingness to undertake any step which would suggest even tacit acceptance of partition, and by their insistence on a unitary State in Palestine. The partition plan presumed that effective organs of State government could be more or less immediately set up in the Arab part of Palestine. This does not seem possible today, in view of the lack of

organized authority springing from Arab Palestine itself, and the administrative disintegration following the termination of the Mandate.

7. The partition plan took into account that a partition of Palestine without economic union would leave the Arab State economically nonviable, unless the population should be forced to submit to a substantial fall in its standard of living. This problem was met in the partition plan by economic union, which, by maintaining the essential economic unity of the whole area, attempted to ensure that the flow of capital and labour and the consequent distribution of economic activity would not be greatly influenced by partition. Further, it attempted to meet a substantial fall in standards of social and public services in the Arab State by including the whole area in a single customs union, and by providing for a division of the revenues of the union in such a manner as to offset materially the effects of partition on the distribution of public expenditure and revenue.

8. A Jewish State, whose boundaries have not yet been established, has come into existence, although not in the manner envisaged in the resolution of 29 November. Thus, there now exists in Palestine a form of partition, though an Arab State, for which the partition plan

provided has not materialized and there is no economic union. The problem of the future of the Arab part of Palestine and its economic viability is therefore thrust into the foreground.

The problem of Jerusalem

9. The Assembly resolution of 29 November provided that Jerusalem and the surrounding area, including Bethlehem, should be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime, which also was to be an integral part of the economic union. It is quite evident

economic union, which guaranteed freedom of transit and the maintenance of a unified system of transport and communications. It also provided for adequate public revenue for the area by the reversion to it of a 5 to 10 per cent share of the revenues of the economic union.

In so far, therefore, as the complexity of interests involved may require the treatment of Jerusalem as a special case by the creation of an international regime, and since economic union is not immediately practicable, the problem of economic viability assumes great

importance.

VII. PROTECTION OF THE HOLY PLACES; COMMON