What about relations within the bloc? How has your country 's decision to let the East German refugees go affected these ties?

A. The East European alliance system itself must undergo reform. W e have to find ways of dealing with situations precisely, such as the flight to the West of the East Germns."

***

The Economist, October 14.1989.

"Pale-pink Danube

The death of Hungarian communism was officially recorded at 8.20pm on October 7th. That was when the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, as the communist party which had ruled Hungary for the past 40 years called itself, decided at its congress in Budapest to dissolve itself and to re-form as the Hungarian Socialist Party. The "new" party elected as its leader Mr. Rezső Nyers, a Social Democrat who became a communist when Stalin forced the parties to merge in 1948 and was an architect of the 1968 economic reform.

The Socialist say they are committed to a market economy and multiparty democracy, and stand somewhere between Italy's Eurocommunists and Sweden's Social Democrats.

This was a victory for the party's reform wing, in particular for its most prominent figure, Mr. Imre Pozsgay. It was achieved only after a hard battle for the support of the party's confused "timid centre". Old Stalinist shouted

"sell-out" and "betrayal" from the sidelines. Of the party's 25-member presidium, 14 are committed reformers (including Mr. Pozsgay and his two closest supporters, Mr. Miklós Németh, the prime minister, and Mr. Gyula Horn, the foreign minister). The rest are "centrists".

But conservatives left declaring that the old party was still in existence and that the majority of its members would soon show this by reversing the

"unrepresentative" congress's decisions. To the reformers visible disappointment, there was no immediate split in. the party, despite strong pressure on conservatives to get o u t The reformers hope now is that most of those who disapproved of what had been happening at the congress will simply not join the new party when the time comes for applying for party membership cards.

Why are H u n g a r y ' s communist (sorry, Socialist) going to such lengths to dissociate themselves from their past—not just the Stalinism of the late 1940s and early 1950s, but also the Leninism which had served them so well in keeping their monopoly of power? Observers at the congress in Budapest had the impression of watching passengers in a balloon dropping overboard every bit of ballast they could lay their hands on in order to stay aloft Poland has

shown with devastating clarity what can happen to a communist party which fails to move with time. That is why reformers like Mr. Pozsgay decided a while ago to act while their party was still in relatively good shape and the opposition still relatively weak, inexperienced and-above all-divided.

Last month they concluded an agreement with the opposition- the Hungarian counterpart to the Polish round-table deal in March - to prepare for power-sharing. The latest internal party calculations, based on opinion polls the communists had already been using for some time, have hown that a reformed party might hope to win at best only 75 out of the 374 seats (that is, 20%) at the free parliamentary election promised for early next year. The same calculations unpublished but leaked by reformists, show that an unreformed party could hope to get at most 15% ot the seats, perhaps even as little as 5%. The by-election results of the past few monts illustrated the communists troubles: out of five held, four were won by the largest opposition group, the Hungarian Democratic Forum. So the reformists opted for a complete break with the p a s t

Will it work, or will the voters see it as just a cosmetic exercise? Among Hungarians, scepticism seems to run almost as deep as anti-communist feeling. After all, Hungarians are cynical people who will tell a visitor that in Budapest before the war there were a number of places where young ladies, no longer virgins, could have their virginity restored if their prospective husbands absolutely insisted.

Doubters point in particular to the congress's decision, against Mr. Pozsgay's wish, to retain party organisation in factories and offices. So the party may still poke its nose into matters which are officially none of its business any more. There was also the decision to keep "for the time being" the 60,000-strong workers guard, the party's private army formed after the crushing of the 1956 revolution. Mr. Pozsgay wanted it disbanded; instead it is to be put under goverment control and used for civil emergencies. Then there is the question of the party's property-especially its numerous, now extremely valuable buildings in Budapest and elsewhere. The decision at the congress was "to give up whatever the new party did not need for its operations", instead of dividing it up with the other parties as the reformers proposed. Mr. Nyers's still rather stiff attitudes also raised eyebrows.

So doubts will remain until the new Socialists dispel them. But Mr. Pozsgay

can look forward with a fair degree of confidence to becoming Hungary's first direcdy elected president in the vote due to be held on November 25th.

(It was delayed. See later -L.G.) His personal popularity should see to that, even if, as now looks likely, Ije will face competition from at least one opposition candidate.

After the parliamentary election, probably in March, the communists-turned-Socialists are likely to form a coalition with the Democratic Forum, which is particularly strong in the countryside. One of the Forum's leaders, Mr. Sándor Csoóri, was at last week's congress talking to Mr. Pozsgay. The Forum insists that no deal has been struck in advance of the election. But co-operation could clearly help both sides. There is talk of a possible prime minister from the Forum, perhaps Mr. József Antall, one of the negotiators in this summer's talks between government and opposition.

W h a t ' s the Hungarian for cohabitation?"

***

So, after this above-mentioned vote where I was one of the 159 delegates who voted NO, Congress was basically split in two—or more. Unfortunately, those of the 159 NO voters who want to keep on the HSWP were mostly silent They got helplessly isolated. They maintained their silence concerning those ethical, political, legal considerations (and failed to organize themselves into a reliable party as characteristic partners along those lines) that they and others would raise on their banners soon after the Congress, causing a lot of disturbance. The old, the new, and the newly old parties' political and inheritance relations are still unclear. The Left has fallen apart.

But let us be j u s t Since a considerable part of the over 1000 YES voter delegates was deeply disturbed, the new party had amorphous members, earring many kinds of potential break lines. In the mood of his speech delivered in the evening of October 7, celebrating the birth of the HSP, Rezső Nyers was able to make up of it for the future. Here is his address: (I do not know the political or moral grounds on which Rezső Nyers passed judgement on his comrades of y e s t e r d a y H e was not President of either the old party any more, or the new party yet. And he and they are collectively responsible for all that happened.)

The plan submitted now is, inbmy opinion, such a principally acceptable compromise that is suitable to serve our party's renewal in creating a new, leftist Socialist party of a new type, which party will put a distance between itself and the Stalinist remnants stil existing in our predecessor party, put a distance between itself and the errors of the past, and remain the inheritor of the HSWP's progressive reformist endeavours. In my view this is the political essence of the relation between the old and new parties. From the aspects of Hungarian democracy are not yet laid down: the laws are being prepared and must be passed. The laws themselves do not mean the realisation of the new democratic system. There must be political strength standing behind it, for democracy is not only elections, not only voting slips, but also the people's system in possession of some political support. In the late 1950s we witnessed the collapse of France's Fourth Republic which had a perfect multiparty-system, a perfect voting mechanism, and yet it collapsed, and then it was de Gaulle, who was a conservative man but a great statesman, who had to save democracy, help it survive.

That is how we should take care, that is how we should prepare for democracy, and I say that because no well-founded, fundamental democracy is possible in Hungary without a Socialist movement. And those who want to see a fragmented Socialist movement after the HSWP and those who unwittingly serve that cause, they are not serving the cause of democracy.

Without the Socialist workers class, the co-operative peasantry, the Socialist and leftist intelligentsia we will be unable to perform the great and difficult historical task of constitution-making.

Shall we become a renewed party or a new-type party, this principal platform decides the dispute in the sense that it declares its faith in a new party of a new type. It is, I think, a very progressive historical step forward, and every Socialist must support it wholeheartedly. That means we must consistently and permanently break with the dictatorsip of the proletariat as a method of exercising power and an ideology. I would like to say something on my personal opinion on the name. I am not ashamed of the name of Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, or my having been a member of that party. I kept wondering, this is a good name, the name Socialist Party is also dear to my heart, which one shall I choose? Finally I decided that if I am a reformer, drawn towards novelty, true, a long-distance reformer who has been often outrun by a lap on short distances, well, if I have to choose between the old and the new, then I will choose the new, and this is what I suggest you, dear Comrades, to consider.

What must we distance ourselves from? W e must distance ourselves from the narrowly interpreted and rigid class policy but not from the workers and the

peasantry. We must distance ourselves, naturally distance ourselves, from those who wished to transform the new Socialist party into a bourgeois party.

There will be several bourgeois parties, better than we would be, we cannot be such a bourgeois party and should not be, either. János Berecz asked me whether I considered the reformist Communists and reform—Communism as part of the new party. I do, and they belong here, but then they must be reformist Communists, accept the programme of this party and accept its statutes. I would like János Berecz to struggle on for the reformist party as a reformist Communist, armed with a pen rather than weapons. That is his right I am sorry if he spoke with a short temper, but others also spoke with short tempers.

I would like to say something, dear comrades, on the relations between the party and the government. I hope the government will not be transformed into an independent "experts" government but will remain the H S W P ' s government and then we, the Hungarian Socialist Party, if that is what we will become, we will have to support the government in its difficult tasks, the economic renewal, the reforms and the stabilisation, too. Here I have heard a nice list of the government's fine achievements, I would say this üst should be still augmented. I said that even when I was and would say it even if I süli were a member of the cabinet Our relations with the government: we must support the government and must not return to the earlier error of die party trying to direct the government; the government must be independent and only that is how it can be responsible. The party will control die government through its members of parliament, and that is the right way, and if we have ütüe strength in parliament then we cannot influence the government So we need a strength in parliament At the same time I agree with the idea of our becoming the governing party, but let me add here a üttle correction, let us add that it is a question of principle for every Socialist movement over there in the West, less so in die East, for die situation there is troubled, so I mean, die party is not die government's party: die party is the masses party. And even when it provides a government it must realize the masses' interests to the government, and call it to account if necessary.

I would like to say something about our relations with the opposition. We must recognize the merits of those parties' narrow democratic movements—they were narrow movements—that kept calling our earlier party for years to account for democracy. They have merits in criticism.

The erroneous earlier political structure was attacked from two sides: from the side of Democratic Socialism, from the side of die reformists within the party, and from the side of the bourgeois democracy. This is the truth and we must admit that truth. We must be fellow travellers with the really democratic opposition which intends to provide a wide basis for democracy. We need

new partners in constitution-making, even if we will compete at the elections, so we should maintain the possibility of co-operating with those democratic forces, even though at present they are putting a distance between us and themselves for short-term popular interests. Even so we offer our hands for the sake of democracy. But please—I would like to add this: we will not and do not want to interfere with any other party's internal affairs. We do not want to create their leaderships, but with all respect we ask the other parties and movements not to want to elect, from the outside, the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Party and not to want to define its polices.

Finally, I would üke to draw your attention to the importance of appropriately defining our role in the world Socialist movement, in this principal programme here it is essentially well defined in my opinion, but we still have to elaborate it in the future and make it clear both abroad and at home.

We must strive for an alliance and co-operation with the Communist parties carrying on the reforms, on a solidarity basis. At the same time, even if it seems early for some, still principally and in the long run we must aim at the faraway but fine target of the international reunion of the Socialist movement on a democratic basis. And on this same basis we must be able to build up our contacts with the Socialist parties, Social Democrat parties and the Socialist International. Dear comrades, as far as I can see, a new strength is born here after a long labour, or gets accepted, a force encouraging from the aspect of Socialism and even of democracy, provided we find a leadership -we can put that up—that is sufficiently homogenous to be capable of action, but also sufficiently pluralistic to be capable of debating, providing the opportunity for Party control over it, and capable of creativity: if this leadership does not want to be fully monolithic, then it will be a good leadership.

I think, dear comrades, that thus the plan of the party's Manifesto and its organizational rules, statutes, could be considered as accepted now, and only practical comments should be made, in order to correct the text, but in a well-organized operative way rather than in long negotiations. As we have seen now, the platforms are working increasingly better, more skilfully: in their platform activities they would collect the comments, on the basis of which the drafting committee might create these two documents in a short time, and so we have done our bit.

Thank you for your attention."

An ovation followed Rezső Nyers's Saturday evening speech launching the HSP. The Congress enthusiastically celebrated the passing of the previous months' tension, the dilemma of "Will there be a party break? Must it happen

or shall we keep warm together?" But in the heat of elation, did the two main characters, Rezső Nyers and Imre Pozsgay, clearly see the price of the compromise? How long wül the doubtful period of peaceful "co-existence"

and "sub-existence" last?

Did Imre Pozsgay not have to pay a price too high for taking part in the summer in the four-member Presidium whose makeshift and forced character was clearly obvious from the beginning? And were his fellows - rivals—led only by their good will when they in turn announced that Imre Pozsgay was the Party's candidate for President of the Republic?Who wanted his early nomination more: Pozsgay himself or the Grósz-Nyers duo? See what time shows: In the summer of 1989 Imre Pozsgay' s authority was total and undeniable. In late summer the attacks started against him. And now, in writing these words, I am worried: what will the presidential elections bring him? And at what price? Will he have been aided or damaged by the Congress rally of a hazy content? How much power was behind the promise of Rezső Nyers to support the presidential candidate? And anyway, why did the Party retreat even in accepting the suggestion of aggressive, small opposition parties on putting off electing a President of the Republic in 1989?