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The signing of the agreement on the establishment of the Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus (later the Delegation of the European Union to Belarus) by President Alexander Lukashenka on January 8 marked the beginning of a new stage in the history of the Belarusian.European relations, as Belarus and EU officially established full.scale diplomatic relations. Prior to that, the delegation used to work in Belarus as a TACIS office designed to provide Belarus with technical assistance.
The opening of the EU Delegation to Belarus took place amid a bitter diplomatic conflict between the Belarusian authorities and the United States, which resulted in the expulsion of the U.S.
ambassador and significant staff reductions in the U.S. Embassy.
This may not be a coincidence, as Minsk may have been making clear indications that the EU’s instruments to influence Minsk were limited, and possible consequences of a too enthusiastic support for the Belarusian opposition could be devastating.
On February 19, Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary.General of the Council of the European Union, paid a visit to Belarus. During the visit, which had been arranged in half secrecy, the top European official complied with Minsk’s request to pursue dialogue without intermediaries and preliminary conditions1, thus indicating the end of the European policy of conditionality toward Belarus. Solana made it clear that EU was ready for informal agreements with the Belarusian government and that geopolitical loyalty was the cornerstone of mutual relations, rather than democracy and human rights.
Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero.Waldner, on the other hand, kept to the traditional European rhetoric fixed in the non.paper
“What the European Union could bring to Belarus” (2006)2. It could be for this reason that Lukashenka did not want to meet with her right after the visit of Javier Solana (Ferrero.Waldner’s visit, originally slated for March, had been postponed until June).
1 Javier Solana says he came not to make conditions: http://naviny.by/
rubrics/politic/2009/02/19/ic_news_112_306656/
2 See.: What the European Union could bring to Belarus: http://
ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf.
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In May, Lukashenka visited the European Union after a more than 10.year pause. Lukashenka went to Italy to meet with the Italian leaders and had an audience with the Pope. That European visit was to show that Belarus had not only broken its international isolation, but also was eager to consolidate its relations with the Catholic Church. In fact, the Belarusian leader had a more ambitious goal in mind – to act as an intermediary in the matter of reconciliation between the Western and Eastern Churches.
However, the Moscow Patriarch, just like Lukashenka himself, showed that he preferred pursuing dialogue without any intermediaries3 by disavowing Lukashenka’s statements.
In autumn, there were a few more international top.level visits that proved once and for all that Belarus had done away with its international isolation. In September, Lukashenka paid an official visit to Lithuania, and in late October, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi arrived in Minsk (he became the first European politician of this level to visit Belarus in the past 12 years).
In November, Lukashenka paid a visit to Kiev (see “Belarus.
Ukraine: On the Way to Strategic Cooperation?” in this yearbook), which alongside his stay in Vilnius in September and general enhancement of economic ties along the North.South axis could be regarded as a new trend in Belarusian foreign policy. This new tendency may be dubbed “regionalization” of Belarusian foreign political efforts aimed at strengthening its positions in talks with Russia and creating an “airbag” in the event of the failure of the dialogue with the European Union.
Besides top.level visits, there were plenty of Belarusian.EU contacts at the level of ministries and expert communities. Foreign Minister Sergei Martynov in the fourth quarter alone visited Finland, Romania, Spain, Austria and Brussels (twice). The revision of the EU’s attitude to Belarus thus brought an end to the period of political isolation of Belarus, which had lasted for more than a decade.
Eastern Partnership context
There was one more serious bonus for Belarus besides the cessation of its international isolation – the country got involved in the
3 See.: Bat’ka Crosses Pope’s Path: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?
DocsID=1244986
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Eastern Partnership (EaP) Initiative of the European Union, proposed by Poland and Sweden in the spring of 2008. EaP is an instrument of deepening the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and is in essence an alternative to membership of the European Union, offering all the countries involved a free trade area and visa.free travel to the European union in the long term.
The decisive factor for the immediate launch of the Eastern Partnership (compared to other EU programs, which had taken much longer) was the war in the Caucasus in August 2008. The primary motivation behind the Eastern Partnership is a purely geopolitical campaign to withdraw Eastern European post.Soviet countries from the influence of Russia with a view to forming a belt of friendly nations on the eastern border of the European Union4. The European Commission’s declaration dated Decem.
ber 3, 2008 and EU Council documents on the Eastern Partnership lost the phrases about a threat coming from Russia and added the context of values, but it did not mean the geopolitical foundation of the initiative had lost its priority5. High.ranking European politicians and officials have made it clear many times that Belarus’
involvement in the Eastern Partnership would depend on the non.
recognition of the breakaway Georgian republics by official Minsk6, which attests to the geopolitical rationality of the new European program.
During the first three months of 2009, the level of Belarus’
engagement was discussed, and the country was eventually granted the status of full EaP member. We believe Alexander Lukashenka’s meeting with Javier Solana contributed a lot to that decision. Whether or not Lukashenka would take part in the EaP inaugural summit in Prague on May 7 was a matter of grave concern to many, but a clever maneuver helped everyone save face:
Lukashenka got an official invitation to come to Prague, but there
4 This task is consistent with the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003, aiming at expanding the security belt around Europe.
5 D. Melyantsou. Eastern Partnership: Incomplete Gestalt. BISS 2009: http://
www.belinstitute.eu/images/stories/documents/bb072009by.pdf
6 Javier Solana: “Belarus should stand fast in its position on non.recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia”: http://belapan.com/archive/2009/03/17/
eu_291314/. “Possible recognition of South Ossetia, Abkhazia by Belarus will hardly promote Eastern Partnership collaboration, German Foreign Ministry says”: http://belapan.com/archive/2009/11/05/eu_341048/, etc.
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must have been some informal agreement that the Belarusian leader would not turn up and embarrass some of the re.
presentatives of Old Europe, who still felt skeptical about the normalization of relations with the dictatorship. The fact that the Belarusian head of state did not go to Prague proves that Minsk was willing to keep, among others, even unofficial promises.
Throughout the year, Belarusian officials would emphasize the importance of Belarus’ involvement in the Eastern Partnership.
First of all, Minsk is interested in attracting additional financing for the projects that cannot be funded from the state budget amid the global downturn. Its participation in EaP projects would also improve the image of Belarus, which until quite recently had been in political isolation, and which European investors would avoid.
The Belarusian authorities also liked the fact that they were invited to shape the development of the initiative from the start.
Despite the fact that the Eastern Partnership has a special place reserved for civil society (Civil Society Forum), one has to remember that the initiative had been designed as a form of interaction with neighboring countries at the interstate level, hence a limited influence of the Forum on decision.making and certain secrecy in the preparation and submission of suggested projects by the Belarusian side. Nevertheless, it is known that of the “post.
Soviet “sextet” taking part in the Eastern Partnership, Belarus was the first one to submit its draft projects to the European Commission (as of late 2009, the Commission had made no decision on the Belarusian proposals yet).
It should be noted that the transformation potential of the Eastern Partnership is very low. The program does not aim at reforming the economies of the member.states for further accession to EU or transforming the political systems of the six members. As for the financing of the initiative, it is quite modest:
the EaP budget amounts to 600 million euros for the six countries, and Belarus can only hope to get 40 million euros7.
Belarusian and European experts have noted that the Eastern Partnership program is a sort of alternative to the Russian Common Economic Area project. It will be impossible for Belarus to be involved in both, and in the end Minsk will have to decide which
7 J.E Holzapfel. Belarus.EU cooperation amounts to 40 million euros: http://
news.tut.by/135310.html
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of the two integration initiatives is preferable. This naturally narrows the room for political maneuver, and the Belarusian administration will keep doing its best to pursue the policy of avoiding the ultimate choice.
President Lukashenko made an unambiguous statement to this effect: “We tend to prioritize what we can implement earlier. If the Customs Union starts working for real in 2010, it will become our priority. Whether we will have a free trade zone of Belarus, Ukraine and the European Union or not, we don’t know yet. We have had nothing but discussions so far. It would be good if we established the Customs Union, as it will be very profitable to us. But it would naturally be advantageous if we created a free trade zone with the European Union”8.
The year 2009 marked the onset of the Eastern Partnership (its executive agencies are not formed yet). This European initiative has not resulted in any substantial preferences for Belarus yet, therefore the Belarusian authorities hurried to sign the Customs Union accord with Russia and Kazakhstan looking for immediate benefits, which put into question many potential benefits of the Eastern Partnership.
Dialogue without intermediaries and conditionality
From the very beginning, the Belarusian.European dialogue not only served the interests of Belarus, but also corresponded with the needs of the European Union. The previous policy, based on sanctions, had failed, and it was time to look for new ways to resolve the “Belarusian issue”, which appeared to be gaining importance for the enlarged European Union: an undemocratic transit country on the eastern border was a challenge for the then immature foreign policy of United Europe.
Since late 2006, the EU had been trying to force Minsk to fulfill a package of preliminary conditions stipulated in the non.paper
“What the European Union could bring to Belarus” and some other documents, claiming that compliance was a precondition for normalization of relations. However, official Minsk ignored that
8 A Lukashenka. “We would not turn down EU free trade zone, if it were proposed tomorrow”: http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2009/07/06/
ic_media_113_3219/
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conditionality insisting that political relations must be restored without any preconditions or “double standards”. As a result, Brussels cut the package of requirements from 12 to five, and then left only one, namely, the release of political prisoners, showing the inconsistency of its position and willingness to yield without having any reciprocal concessions.
After the Russian.Georgian war of August 2008 the significance of Belarus for the EU increased enormously – the “belt of neighborliness” would not be an organic whole without Belarus.
Being shocked by the events in the Caucasus, the European Union turned a blind eye to the undemocratic parliamentary elections in Belarus and failure to meet preliminary conditions, and opted for the one.sided recognition of the Belarusian regime, because geopolitical reasons proved weightier than democratic principles.
That fatal mistake resulted in a whole range of problems, which the EU will have to tackle later.
The European Union painted itself into a corner when it agreed to give up conditionality and restored its relations with Belarus without drawing up a “road map” of normalization. First, it let Lukashenka see that non.recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was more important for the EU than democratization and liberalization of Belarus, and that the EU will be ready to cede its positions in future. Second, once it started the dialogue with Belarus, the EU will find it impossible to suspend it even if Minsk
“misbehaves”, as it would mean another failure of an EU policy on Belarus.
Third, by agreeing to make unilateral concessions, the European Union limited the range of instruments to impose any conditions on Belarus in future. Minsk interpreted the situation perfectly well and played along with EU when the right time came.
It appeared that the European Union “hooked” Belarus using its programs, whereas Belarus “hooked” Brussels using the inconsistency of the European approach.
The Belarusian authorities did not make any serious moves toward democratization of the internal political life in 2009; the political system remained unreformed; the only change was a slight alleviation of political practices. At the same time, Belarus became a full member of the Eastern Partnership Initiative, broke the international isolation, received stand.by loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (EU gave its consent), started
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negotiating financial aid and simplified visa procedures with EU.
In other words, the Belarusian administration became the winning party. Civil society, too, managed to reap the benefits of an additional vote in the Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership.
One should admit that the “policy of dragging” toward Belarus may prove efficient if EU manages to make its programs attractive enough for Belarus to lose its interest in the integration projects with Russia. In order not to lose control of the process, EU needs to pay more attention to tactical issues, such as “road maps” and interconditionality of concessions. So far official Minsk has been playing in the framework of the old scheme, based on geopolitical bargaining and taking political opponents hostage. A new configuration in the scope of the region would give the Belarusian authorities more room for maneuver.
The EU’s “soft policies” on Belarus are explained not only by geopolitical factors, but also by economic interests of some member.states, corporations and firms, certain opportunities offered by the participation in the privatization of Belarusian state property, which will start sooner or later. For that matter, political reorientation of Belarus toward the West could create an alternative to one.way capital inflows from Russia.
First disappointments
When evaluating the initial phase of the Belarusian.European dialogue, one should note that both sides are somewhat disappointed: EU has not seen any progress in democratization of Belarusian political life; political opposition, civil society and independent media are still persecuted, and the political system has showed no institutional changes. The relation between the EU and Belarus still lack the institutional framework: the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has not been adapted and ratified;
Belarus has not become part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which prevents the country from taking part in the bilateral format of the Eastern Partnership as a full member. On the other hand, as it was mentioned above, the policy of dragging applied to Belarus may prove successful only in the long run.
The Belarusian government had expected fast financial benefits from the dialogue with the EU, especially through
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financing of EaP projects, but unfortunately for the Belarusian authorities, the program has been taking too long, and not a single project from the list proposed by the Belarusian side has been adopted. Additional difficulties will be encountered when the Eastern Partnership starts forming EaP administrative agencies.
The European Parliament refuses to include Belarusian representatives of the National Assembly in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly and demands seats for the Belarusian opposition.
The process of normalization did not result in a complete abolition of sanctions – they were suspended until autumn 2010.
The country’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits have not been reinstated, and Belarus has failed to gain membership in the European Neighbourhood Policy, which restricts its access to possible sources of financing.
Being quite disappointed with the immediate results of the Eastern Partnership, Belarus turned to other options, namely, the Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan, hoping it would reincarnate the subsidies that it had enjoyed prior to 2007. These sharp swerves in the foreign policy of official Minsk puzzled European politicians, who seem to question the seriousness of Belarusian partners’ intentions. At the same time, this behavior of the Belarusian administration appears to be a natural result of the low attractiveness of European programs, which should prompt European institutions to work out a full.scale strategy for its eastern partners, especially for Belarus.
Conclusions
A major breakthrough for the Belarusian.EU relations came in 2009, which appeared to be the most productive and favorable year in the past decade. In a very short time span Belarus made remarkable progress from “the last dictatorship” in Europe to an EU partner. However, the rapprochement did not lead to a transformation of the political system of the country, because political repression still remains, albeit less severe than before, whereas European values are still alien to the Belarusian elite currently in power.
Once the EU failed to work out a “road map” for normalization, it lost its influence over Belarus, and it does not seem to be in charge
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of the process now. The inconsistency of the European approach at the early phase of the dialogue does not allow EU to get back to the policy of conditionality, which is why the dialogue continues according to the rules imposed by official Minsk.
The policy of dragging employed by the European Union may prove efficient in the long run, but the delays in the implementation of Eastern Partnership projects encourages the Belarusian authorities to look for more beneficial alternative integration projects, primarily those involving Russia.
The Belarusian.European relations have formed a separate line in Belarusian foreign policy that is now independent of the situation in the Belarusian.Russian relations. Nevertheless, Belarus has not given up its strategy of balancing between the “two monsters” and has not made its choice in favor of a single center of gravity.
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