level – nationality spokespersons in the hungarian parliament
Introduction
Although there had been claims for a special parliamentary representation of national minori-ties since the change of regime (Dobos, 2011, pp. 168–170; Majtényi, 2010, pp. 92–94; Pap, 2007, pp. 233–245),1 it was only ensured for the 13 acknowledged nationalities2 (formerly known as 11 national and 2 ethnic minorities) living in Hungary by the adoption of Act 203 of 2011. The electoral system of Hungary is mixed, which means that voters can vote for an individual candidate and a national list. The latter may be a party list or minority (nationality) list set by the national nationality self-governments. No plural vote is available to the mem-bers of minorities, which means that no voter can vote on both types of national lists. The recommendation of 1% of persons registered as minority voters – but no more than 1,500 proposals – is required to establish a nationality list. Electors wishing to vote for a nationality list have to register as minority voters. At least 3 candidates have to be on nationality lists and they also have to be registered as minority voters. National nationality self-governments may not establish a joint nationality list and one person may be nominated exclusively for one national list (either a party or nationality list). One preferential seat can be obtained on each minority list reaching a preferential threshold. The general threshold (5%) has to be reached to gain any other mandates. Should the number of votes cast for a nationality list be insufficient to acquire a preferential seat, the first-nominated person on the list will represent the minority as a nationality spokesperson (Electoral Act, 2011, §§ 7–10, 16, 18).3
1 Around the time of and after the change of regime (1989) multiple proposals were made. One law was adopted during the term of the socialist Németh government in 1990 (Act 17 of 1990 on the Parliamen-tary Representation of National and Linguistic Minorities Living in the Republic of Hungary) but the new, freely elected Parliament annulled it before it could be applied (Pap, 2007, pp. 233–245). This act would have ensured the parliamentary representation of 8 acknowledged national and ethnic minorities.
The law was modified by Act 36 of 1990 to extend the deadline for parliament’s decision on the co-op-tion of minority representatives. Act 40 of 1990 (see 1 §, and 5 § (2)) put the law out of effect, so it has never been applied (Dobos, 2011, pp. 168–170).
Legislation on the representation of minorities was adopted in 2010. The constitution of Hungary was amended on 25 May 2010. This modification would have guaranteed the election of a maximum of 13 MPs representing minorities in addition to 200 ‘ordinary’ MPs. The amendment declared thate separate law should have been adopted on the date of entry into force of this amendment, but this second law has never been adopted. This amendment would have changed the number of MPs from 386 to 200 plus a maximum of 13 minority representatives. (Constitutional Amendment, 2010, 1, §5(2)).
2 In this the paper, we use the terms nationality and minority interchangeably.
3 For additional information on the representation of national minorities in Hungary see Chronowski, 2015; Erdős, 2013; Kurunczi, 2015; Móré, 2015; Pap, 2013, 2014.
Non-territorial autonomy as the gateway to (effective) participation of minorities at national level
119 The National Assembly Act contains detailed rules concerning nationality spokesper-sons and the parliamentary committee representing nationalities (Committee of Nationalities Living in Hungary; National Assembly Act, 2012, §§ 22, 29–29/A). Minority spokespersons have fewer powers than MPs. They cannot vote at plenary sessions (merely in the committee representing nationalities) and they can only speak at plenary sessions if the House Com-mittee decides that an agenda issue is connected to the interests of nationalities or if there is an extraordinary case. They can hold advisory roles in other committees’ sessions subject to the approval of the committee concerned. They can ask questions to the same persons and instituions as MPs (to the Government and to its members, to the president of the State Audit Office, to the president of the National Bank of Hungary and to the chief public prosecutor) but only if they are related to the rights and interests of nationalities. They also have a free and – compared to each other – equal mandate, as well as parliamentary immunity (National Assembly Act, 2012, §§ 29–29/A).
Before the 2014 elections, several scholars argued that members of nationalities were not likely to gain even one preferential seat, so they would be represented only by nationality spokespersons with fewer powers than MPs (Balázs, 2014; Erdős, 2013, p. 5; Kurunczi, 2013;
Szalayné, 2014, p. 13; see also Kurunczi, 2014). These concerns were not unfounded. In this paper, we examine the following research questions:
Q1: Can nationality spokespersons of minorities with no realistic chance of passing the preferen-tial threshold be considered as
• consultative delegates of the national nationality self-governments as forms of non-territo-rial autonomy,
• as a representative
• or as something else?
Q2: What concerns are raised by the fact that only national nationality self-governments, elected several years before parliamentary elections take place, are entitled to establish a nationality list?
Before we answer these questions, we present the theoretical and methodological background.
Representation, access to candidacy and democracy
Kymlicka (1995) provides one of the most systematic theory and categorisation of minority rights (Heywood, 2012, p. 320). He defines three groups of minority rights: self-government rights, polyethnic rights and representation rights (Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 26–33). He also em-phasises that it is important to differentiate between national minorities and ethnic groups, which – according to him – is neglected in the literature (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 20). He defines nation as ‘an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p.
18). From this viewpoint, national minorities, that is, territorially concentrated indigenous peoples sharing a common language and conducting a ‘meaningful way of life across the full range of human activities’ are entitled to self-government rights (Heywood, 2012, p. 320;
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120
Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 18, 27–30, 76). Polyethnic rights are aimed at supporting immigrant ethnic groups and religious minorities to maintain and express their ‘cultural particularity and pride’ (Heywood, 2012, p. 320; Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 30–31). The most important type of minority rights are special representation rights, which are claimed not only by national mi-norities and ethnic groups but also by non-ethnic social groups (Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 31–33).
Connected to the latter, it is worthwhile considering the theories concerning the relationship between substantive and descriptive representation of certain groups.
Parliamentary representation of national minorities means the erosion of the principle of popular representation. The assumption that persons belonging to a minority better represent the members of that minority than non-members is the basis for special representation. An-other argument in favour of special representation is that minorities are not capable of being elected to parliament when there are no special rules concerning their representation. Pitkin (1967) differentiates formal, descriptive and symbolic views of representation according to its characteristics. The idea of substantive representation is based on an ‘acting for’ approach, which assumes that MPs act with regard to the interests of their voters. On this basis, Sebők (2015, p. 8) describes this theory as the predecessor of the mandate model of democracy.
Nowadays, there is widespread discourse in the scientific literature concerning whether descriptive representation – matching the proportion of MPs belonging to a certain social group to the proportion of that group’s members in the society – is a precondition of sub-stantive representation, which means the presence and representation of the interests of the particular social group during the decision-making process (Várnagy & Ilonszki, 2012, p. 9;
see also Mansbridge, 1999). This question is often examined with regard to the representa-tion of Latin Americans and African Americans in the US Congress (Minta, 2009) and in US member states’ legislatures as well (Ueda, n.d.). There are also studies concerning the sub-stantive representation of minorities in other countries (e.g. Bird, 2011; Hodžić & Mraović, 2015; Rocha et al., 2010). Creators of systems that have special representation of minorities at national or local level assume that the descriptive representation of minorities enhances the substantive representation of them.
Another important question related to the substantive representation of minorities’ in-terests is how can they stand as candidates at elections? At this point, we must emphasise that cleavages can occur not only among national minorities, and among different national mi-norities in a country, but also within a minority community itself. That is why many scholars doubt whether there is a unified minority interest that can be represented by the presence of minorities in parliament (Bird et al., 2011, p. 5). Thematic Commentary No. 2. of the Advisory Committee on the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities – not accidentally – requires that more than one minority organisa-tion stands at elecorganisa-tions (Advisory Committee, 2008, pp. 75–59). This raises many quesorganisa-tions regarding parliamentary representation of minorities in Hungary, such as access to candidacy when the national nationality self-governments exercise a monopoly over establishing national minority lists at the parliamentary elections.
This system shall be evaluated by its extent of democratic character. During this, we use the Schumpeterian definition of democracy, that is, ‘that institutional method for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ – through being successful in ‘free competition for a free vote’
(Schumpeter, 1974, pp. 269–271. cited by Brooker, 2005: 9).
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121
Data and methods
When considering the legal background to the parliamentary representation of people living in Hungary who belong to one of the 13 acknowledged nationalities, we observe that there are concerns related to entry into the competition for candidacy and democratic elections (e.g.
equal voting rights and secret-ballot voting) occur. In order to answer our research questions, first, we examine the circumstances of the candidacy of the elected spokespersons in 2014 and 2018. We review the data on the websites of the National Election Office (2010, 2014d, 2019) and the National Assembly (National Assembly, 2018c, 2018d). We examine the or-ganisations nominating the spokespersons and their mandate share at the 2010, 2014 and 2019 elections of the national nationality self-governments. We also analyse the participation data of national minorities at the parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2018. We outline the nature and characteristics of the nationality spokespersons’ institution and then analyse their activity based on the data on the National Assembly of Hungary website. We also examine data concerning the occurrence of the issue of nationalities and their inner conflicts on the parliamentary agenda, among parliamentary questions (interpellations, questions and urgent questions). We mainly focus on indications of conflicts and cleavages within the acknowl-edged minority communities.
To research the changes in the number of interpellations, questions and urgent questions, we use the search tool of the Hungarian National Assembly website (National Assembly, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a, 2018b), comparing the 2014–2018 and 2010–2014 parliamentary cycles. We se-lected these two terms as they are close in time and had similar composition of the legislation (e.g. the Governing party Fidesz had two thirds of the seats). One of the differences between the two cycles is that nationality spokespersons also participate in parliamentary activity since 2014.
However, the comparison is a little complicated due to the fact that in 2012 a new act on the National Assembly was adopted and in 2014 a new standing order was passed (Standing Orders, 2014), so the operation of the Parliament changed a lot. At the same time, the number of MPs decreased from 386 to 199 (Electoral Act, 2011, § 3 (1)). As a consequence, it is worthwhile comparing these two cycles with regard to the issue of nationalities. This research will later be extended to all parliamentary cycles since the change of regime in 1990. A dictionary had been compiled of the word stems connected to minorities and we carried out a search on these words using the substitute character ‘*’.4 We classified the nationality-related content of interpellations, questions and urgent questions based on their titles. In the absence of a title or if the title did not provide adequate information, we considered the content of the question. We included only those questions related to the rights, history, culture, representation and identity of the 13 acknowledged nationalities living in Hungary as minority-related ones. We did not examine questions, interpellations and urgent questions related to Roma people as a socially and eco-nomically disadvantaged group, nor those concerning the protection of Hungarians living in neighbouring countries nor those which, although connected to minority issues, primarily came under another policy area (e.g. education) .
In section 4, we present data and highlight some concerns and regarding the candidacy and legitimacy of the spokespersons.
4 The dictionary contains the terms nationality and minority and the official and commonly used names of nationalities living in Hungary, as follows: nemzetiség*, kisebbség*, romá*, roma*, cigán*, ruszin*, német*, lengyel*, ukrán*, szlovák*, szerb*, szlovén*, horvát*, örmény*, görög*, bolgár*, vend*, rác*, tót*, sváb*, oláh*.
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Some data and concerns and regarding the candidacy and legitimacy of spokespersons
From our point of view, the main problem related to the monopoly of national nationality self-governments in establishing minority lists is that these bodies deciding on candidacy are elected several years before parliamentary elections take place. Examining census and vot-er registration data, we obsvot-erve that most minorities do not have any chance of reaching the preferential quota. In their case, National Nationality Self-Governments are the bodies elected years before deciding on the delegate of the minority to the parliament. These issues raise concerns regarding legitimation, when the interests of voters and the self-government’s position can deviate by the time the minority list is drawn up. In 2014, national nationality self-governments that had been elected 4 years earlier decided the candidates and, in most cases, on the person representing the minority (the spokesperson) as well. In 2018, there was a similar 4-year gap. The term of nationality self-governments has changed to 5 years, while the parliamentary term is 4 years. Therefore providing there are no early elections, the gap will be 3 years in 2022, 2 years in 2026, 1 year in 2030, then 5 years in 2034 and so on. On the positive side, it may be argued that this division can lead to a better separation of power.
Legitimation concerns remain valid, even if we take into consideration that Act 97 of 2021 amended the act on nationalities and clarified the process of establishing a nationality list. Section 2 of the legislation made it clear that the national nationality self-government has to decide, in the form of a resolution, on the establishment of the nationality list and on the order of candidates no earlier than 1 October of the year preceding the parliamentary election year. The legislation also stipulates that this decision shall be made public. It is important to mention that the nationality spokesperson or the nationality MP is entitled to participate at both open (public) and closed sessions of the national nationality self-government in a con-sultative status (Nationalities’ Act Amendment, 2021, § 2).
At the same time, the national self-governments’ monopoly over candidate selection is aimed at preventing the election to parliament of people who do not belong to a minority group but who claim to represent it in order to further their political careers. However, it must be stated that there are not many objective criteria that need to be met by those wishing to stand as a candidate at nationality self-government elections. Instead, the system relies on the self-declaration and statements of the potential candidate (e.g. a declaration that he/she knows the language and culture of the minority and intends to represent them). In addition to eligibility for the election of local governments and mayors an additional objective limitation that a person who has been a candidate of a minority group during one of the two preceding elections or at any interim election cannot stand as a candidate for another group (National-ities’ Act, 2011, § 54).
In light of the above, it is important to examine which organisations’ candidates topped the nationality lists – and so were predestined to become the spokesperson or MP of their nationality – and their mandate share at the national nationality self-government elections.
We use the data from the websites of the National Election Office (2010, 2014d, 2019) and the National Assembly (2018c, 2018d) in order to conduct this examination.
Of the 13 spokespersons elected to parliament in 2014, 7 were also elected in 2018.
Emmerich (Imre) Ritter, the former German spokesperson, gained a preferential mandate in 2018 so he became an MP with full rights, while the other 6 successful candidates remained as spokespersons: Ljubomir Alexov (Serb), Félix Farkas (Roma), Vera Giricz (Rusyn), Erika
Non-territorial autonomy as the gateway to (effective) participation of minorities at national level
123 Kissné Köles (Slovene), Traján Kreszta (Romanian) and Szimeon Varga (Bulgarian). All of them were nominated for the national nationality self-government elections by the organi-sations winning the highest number and proportion of mandates at the national nationality self-government elections in 2010, 2014 and 2019. The Serb spokesperson was the candidate of Szegedian Serbs which ran on a joint list with other parties at both the 2014 and 2019 national nationality (minority) self-government elections. This organisation received 71.4%
of mandates in 2010 and the joint list received all the seats in 2014 and 2019. The Slovene and Bulgarian spokespersons and the German MP (former spokesperson) were elected to their respective national nationality self-governments as members of organisations that gained 100% of mandates at the 2010, 2014 and 2019 elections. In these cases, the monopoly of the national nationality self-governments extends over several election cycles. There is a more complex picture regarding the Roma, Rusyn and Romanian spokespersons. The Roma spokes-person’s organisation (Lungo Drom) obtained 69.8% of mandates in 2010, 61.7% in 2014 and only 42.6% in 2019. This drop in popularity may be due to corruption scandals related to their national self-government which we will return to later. The Rusyn spokesperson’s organi-sation (the National Alliance of Rusyns Living in Hungary) gained 48% of mandates in 2010, 46.7% in 2014 and 60% in 2019, while the Romanian spokesperson’s organisation obtained 44% of mandates in 2010, 46.7% in 2014 and 60% in 2019. It is important to mention that this latter organisation stood with a new name at the 2014 elections.
In 6 instances, there was a change of spokesperson in 2018. In 3 cases (Croat, Polish and Ukrainian), the new spokesperson was a candidate of the same organisation as their predecessor.
Both Mišo (Mihály) Hepp, elected in 2014, and József Szolga, elected in 2018, were candidates of the Alliance of Croats Living in Hungary. The Polish spokespersons elected in 2014 (Csúcs Lászlóné) and 2018 (Ewa (Éva) Rónayné Słaba) were both candidates of the József Bem Cultural Association. This organisation has become decidedly weaker during the time covered by this study, receiving 76.2% of the mandates at the 2010 national self-government elections, 53.3%
in 2014 and only 26.7% in 2019. It is common in the aforementioned organisations that they had the highest proportion of mandates during the examined period of time.
The Ukrainian spokespersons Jaroszlava Hartyányi (2014) and Brigitta Szuperák (2018) stood at national nationality self-government elections as candidates of the Ukrainian Cultur-al Association in Hungary, which received 61.9% of mandates in 2010, 100% in 2014 and 40% in 2018. This organisation had the most mandates in the national self-government in 2010 and 2014 and became the second largest in 2019. We observe that all of these spokes-persons were nominated for the national nationality self-government elections by the organi-sation dominating the national nationality self-government.
The Slovak spokesperson elected in 2014 (Ján (János) Fuzik) stood at the nationality self-government elections as a candidate of the Slovak Union, which received 51.7% of man-dates in 2010 and 69.6% in 2014. The spokesperson elected in 2018 (Antal Paulik) was not a member of a national nationality self-government.
We observe changes in nominating organisations in 3 cases. The Greek spokesperson Laokratisz Koranisz (elected as spokesperson in 2014) was a candidate of Syllogos, which ob-tained 52.4% of the vote at the 2010 national nationality self-government elections and 60%
at the 2014 national nationality self-government elections. The Greek spokesperson elected in 2018 (Tamás Sianos) was a candidate of the HELLASZ GMKE, which received 40% of the mandates at the 2014 national nationality self-government elections (the second largest share) and 20% in 2019 (the third largest share of mandates). In this case, we observe a sharp
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decrease in support for the organisation by the time the nationality self-government elections took place – one and a half years after the parliamentary elections.
The Armenian case is the most complicated. Tamás Turgyán, the spokesperson elected in 2014, was not a member of a minority self-government; nor was Silva Simani, who was the spokesperson elected in 2018. She was replaced by Szeván Simon Serkisian who got into the national nationality self-government as a candidate of the organisation which received 53.3%
of mandates at the 2014 national nationality self-government elections but only 13.3% of the mandates (the third largest share) in 2019. An informational letter of the president of the Municipal Armenian Self-Government has been published in the journal Erdélyi Örmény Gyökerek (Transylvanian Armenian Roots)’ regarding the candidacy (Esztergály, 2018). The letter begins with ‘Armenians and Transylvanian Armenians!’ which demonstrates a split in the organisation. The letter also tells us that the members of the National Armenian Self-Gov-ernment could not agree on the candidates even after 4 sessions. Szeván Serkisian was the president of the National Armenian Self-Government at the time of the establishment of a nationality list in 2018. Tamás Turgyán wished to be re-elected as spokesperson but Silva Simani, Vahan Malhazjan, Antranik Lutfi Bezijan, Szeván Serkisian and Zsófia Zita Esztergály also wanted to take on the role. Vahan Malhazjan and Antranik Lutfi Bezijan did not even reg-ister for the nationality electoral roll for the parliamentary elections. The form of establishing a nationality list had not been regulated by this time, so they reached a ‘decision’ instead of a resolution of the national self-government which means that they did not vote on the candi-dates (Esztergály, 2018). We observe that our aforementioned concerns regarding legitimacy are confirmed in the last two cases only (Greek and Armenian). It is important to mention that there is an immigrant – autochthonous divide within the Greek nationality as well, hence there are two groups of Greeks in Hungary: the one group came to the Hungarian Kingdom a long time ago, and the other group fled to Hungary after the Greek civil war (1944-1945) (Sztavrosz, 2005).
Participation of minorities in the 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections
As mentioned earlier, prior to the 2014 parliamentary elections in Hungary, several scholars noted that members of national minorities did not have any realistic chance of gaining even one preferential seat (Balázs, 2014; Erdős, 2013, p. 5; Kurunczi, 2013; Szalayné, 2014, p.
13; see also: Kurunczi, 2014). Erzsébet Szalayné Sándor, the deputy ombudsman for mi-nority protection even stated before the 2014 general election that the new electoral law had changed the one person–one vote principle to the ‘one minority voter–half vote’ principle, which means that the regulation’s effect is the exact opposite of its aim of ensuring a preferen-tial mandate for minority voters (Szalayné, 2014, p. 13). The outcome of the 2014 election demonstrates that these concerns were not unfounded. The situation did not substantially change following the 2018 elections, when only one preferential nationality mandate was ob-tained by the list of the National Nationality Self-Government of Germans living in Hungary.
Of the other minority groups, only the Roma nationality had a realistic chance of winning a preferential mandate in the National Assembly.
Examining the data on registration, we observe that many members of minorities who registered on the electoral roll of minorities for the election of national self-governments did not apply to extend their registration to the parliamentary elections (see Table 1 and Table
Non-territorial autonomy as the gateway to (effective) participation of minorities at national level
125 2). We can also see that these numbers are much lower than the 2011 Census data on people declaring themselves as being a member of one of the 13 acknowledged nationalities (see Table 3), even if we exclude those who were too young to vote and if we consider that one person may declare multiple identities at censuses.
Table 1.
Number of voters applying for the extension of registration to the minority electoral roll during the 2014 parliamentary elections and number of votes cast by them National
minority Registered for the parliamentary elections (voters)
(25 March 2014)
Registered for the parliamentary elections (voters)
(6 April 2014)
Votes cast on the na-tional nana-tionality list
(2014)
Bulgarian 106 104 74
Greek 138 140 102
Croat 1 634 1 623 1 212
Polish 134 133 99
German 15 455 15 209 11 415
Armenian 190 184 110
Roma 19 731 14 271 4 048
Romanian 652 647 362
Rusyn 612 611 463
Serb 344 349 362
Slovak 1 323 1 317 995
Slovene 199 199 134
Ukrainian 510 502 293
Source: National Election Office (2014a, 2014b, 2014c)
Table 2.
Number of voters registered on the minority electoral roll and applying for the extension of registration to the parliamentary elections of 2018 National
minority Registered on the minority electoral roll (20 March
2018)
Registered for the parliamentary
elections (20 March
2018)
Registered on the minority electoral roll (27
March 2018)
Registered for the parliamentary
elections (27 March 2018)
Votes cast in the parliamentary
elections (8 April 2018)
Bulgarian 1 311 159 1 311 160 158
Greek 1 728 241 1 727 241 159
Croat 10 198 2 102 10 229 2 316 1 743
Polish 2 182 273 2 184 277 210
German 51 227 32 326 52 419 33 762 26 477
Armenian 2 278 276 2 272 270 159
Roma 151 532 19 602 15 1442 19 166 5 703
Romanian 4 801 846 4 812 805 428
Rusyn 2 990 966 2 984 915 895
Serb 1 614 422 1 616 428 296
Slovak 11 597 1 702 11 596 1 689 1 245
Slovene 701 246 718 256 199
Ukrainian 982 529 1 017 566 270
Source: National Election Office (2018a, 2018b, 2018d)
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Analysing the data from the 2018 elections (Table 2), we observe that only the German minority passed the preferential quota (23,831 votes) to obtain a full mandate (National Election Office, 2018c).
Table 3.
Number of members of national minority communities in Hungary according to the 2011 Census
National minority Number of members
Bulgarian 3 556
Greek 3 916
Croat 23 651
Polish 5 730
German 131 951
Armenian 3 293
Roma 308 957
Romanian 26 345
Rusyn 3 323
Serb 7 210
Slovak 29 647
Slovene 2 385
Ukrainian 5 633
Source: Central Statistical Office (2011)
To understand the bigger picture, we now need to examine minority-related parliamen-tary activity, with a focus on signs of cleavages between or within minority communities.
Nationality-related issues on the parliamentary agenda and cleavages within minority groups
It is worthwhile examining the activity of nationality spokespersons during the 2014–2018 parliamentary cycle, focusing on indications of cleavages within minority groups. We inves-tigate the number and topic of nationality spokespersons’ speeches and questions based on data available on the Hungarian National Assembly website (2018c) and conduct our analysis from a different perspective to Móré (Móré, 2016). Figure 1 shows the number of speeches given and questions asked by nationality spokespersons during the 2014–2018 electoral cycle.
Most of the nationality spokespersons’ speeches connected to parliament’s official agenda concerned the central budget and public finances, with 6 spokespersons (mostly the Bulgar-ian, German and Serb) giving speeches related to such issues. The second most frequently mentioned issue was culture, with more than half of the culture-related speeches being given by the German spokesperson and the president of the Committee of Nationalities Living in Hungary, Emmerich (Imre) Ritter, while 4 other spokespersons spoke on this issue. Several speeches are connected to various procedures (e.g. misdemeanour procedure, registry and criminal) and the use of minority languages, which is an important issue for minorities. Al-most half of these speeches were made by the Serb spokesperson. These topics are followed by the annual reports of the Commissioner of Fundamental Rights and his deputies. It is
Non-territorial autonomy as the gateway to (effective) participation of minorities at national level
127 important to mention that the Slovene spokesperson spoke most regarding education. There were also speeches concerning the Electoral Procedure Actand the National Assembly Act.
Two speeches were related to both consular protection and the census. A report on the activity of the Committee of Nationalities Living in Hungary during the first year of the electoral cy-cle was also heard. The spokespersons also spoke to the bill related to subsidies from abroad for non-governmental organisations. If we examine the speeches related to the official agenda, we observe that they are mainly connected to the common interests of the 13 nationalities. How-ever, there are some exceptions: the Polish and Bulgarian spokespersons’ speeches concerned resolution proposals of symbol importance that they submitted alongside MPs.
Besides questions, pre- and post-agenda speeches provide an arena for the expression of interests of each minority and for raising the issue of their relationships with their kin-states.
We provide the following examples. The German spokesperson held a pre-agenda speech related to Germans transported to the Soviet Union for forced labour. The Bulgarian spokes-person’s pre-agenda speeches were connected to the past, present and future of of Bulgarians living in Hungary, to their folk traditions, accordingly to the centenary of the establishment of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in Hungary. He also held an exposé (opening speech) connected to the resolution proposal on the establishment of the day of Bulgarian-Hungarian Friendship. The Slovak spokesperson spoke on the memorial day of Hungarians expelled from Slovakia and the Czechoslovak-Hungarian enforced population transfer, furthermore on the people transported to the Soviet Union for forced labour. He also spoke on the joint exercise of the Visegrád countries’ armed forces. The Serb spokesperson’s questions were related to the future of nationality theatres, to the opportunities for renovating the cultural heritage of Serbs living in Hungary by craftsmen from their kin-state and to the Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Buda. He also gave a post-agenda speech related to the 575 years of Hungarians and Serbs living side by side. The Slovene spokesperson spoke on the past, present and future of Slovenes Figure 1. Number of speeches given and questions asked by minority spokespersons at plenary sessions during the 2014–2018 electoral cycle
Source: Author’s own diagram based on data from the National Assembly (2018c)
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living in Hungary, on Ágoston Pável – a researcher of Slovenes living in Hungary – and on the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the Slovenian constitution, which she delivered entirely in the Slovene language. The Armenian spokesperson made speeches related to the memorial day of the Martyrs of Arad, on the Armenian genocide and on the 25th anniversary of Ar-menia’s independence. The Rusyn spokesperson’s speech was entitled ‘Ferenc Rákóczi II and the Rusyns’. All the Polish spokesperson’s speeches related exclusively to the Polish nationality and some of them concerned resolution proposals that she submitted alongside MPs from almost all parliamentary groups: on the 70th anniversary of Henryk Slawik’s death and the 40th anniversary of József Antal Senior’s death, on the declaration of 2016 as the year of Pol-ish-Hungarian solidarity and on the revolution of 1956. The Ukrainian spokesperson spoke on Ukrainian-Hungarian relations.
Overall, we do not observe many indications of cleavages among minority communities or within a particular minority community from the activities of the nationality spokesper-sons. However, there is one exception when the Armenian spokesperson spoke in the plenary session regarding conflicts among the so-called Hungarian-Armenians who had immigrated from Transylvania 350 years earlier and ‘eastern’ Armenians who came later from Armenia.
We find evidence of his concerns regarding this issue in the activity of the Committee of Nationalities Living in Hungary. During a 2017 session, for example, he alleged that Hun-garian-Armenians who have one less mandate in the National Armenian Self-Government were completely excluded from the decision-making process in the national self-government, that ‘eastern’ Armenians would have all the resources and that the president of their nation-al self-government had nation-alleged that Hungarian-Armenians were not renation-al Armenians, would have no knowledge of Armenian culture and could not represent anyone (National Assembly, 2017). Interestingly, the spokesperson read the letter from the majority the ‘eastern’ Arme-nians at the plenary session and read the Hungarian-ArmeArme-nians’ opinion at the Committee of Nationalities living in Hungary.
We observe another example of cleavages within a particular national minority commu-nity when we examine the content of minority-related interpellations during the 2010–2014 and 2014–2018 parliamentary cycles. For an adequate evaluation in this context, we consider the overall number of minority-related interpellations, questions and urgent questions during this period (see Table 4).
Table 4.
Minority-related parliamentary questions during the 2010–2014 and the 2014–2018 electoral terms
2010–2014 2014–2018
Interpellations
Submitted 1 752 1 356
Performed 957 820
Minority-related 2 3
Questions Submitted 8 491 15 431
Asked 869 1 081
Minority-related 2 12
Urgent questions
Submitted 1 307 1 454
Asked 1 136 1 059
Minority-related 4 21
Source: Results of a keyword search of the National Assembly the website (2014a, 2018a)