• Nem Talált Eredményt

The morning conference

In document The Hungarian World 1938–1940 (Pldal 81-84)

THE FIRST VIENNA AWARD, THE ENDGAME: WHAT HAPPENED

2.2. The morning conference

The morning session of the conference started at 12 p.m. It was opened by Ribbentrop who said that the Kingdom of Hungary and the Czechoslovak Republic had appealed to Germany and Italy with the request to demarcate the frontier between the two countries by arbitration. “Our task today is to establish the final frontier between Hungary and Czechoslovakia on an ethnographic basis and to find a solution to the questions connected with this.”6 He specifically noted that both the Hungarian and the Slovak parties accepted in advance the award to be made, meaning that the decision would be “binding and final”.

He then invited the representatives of the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak Governments to describe briefly their respective positions. Before doing so, however, he gave the floor to Ciano, who greeted those present by saying a few sentences.

Thereafter, Kánya had the opportunity to explain the Hungarian position.

In his short speech, the Hungarian Foreign Minister basically summarised the diplomatic events of the previous two months (September–October). The key point was that Hungary had been trying to settle the Hungarian-Czechoslovak relationship via negotiations in Komárom, pursuant to the Munich Agreement, but there were such significant differences of opinion on the territorial

6 The protocol of morning session is cited by Szarka 2017, Doc. 216, pp. 479–486.

questions that Hungary proposed arbitration. “Hungary looks forward with a clean conscience to the arbitral award of the two powers and is convinced that the two Great Powers will give a just verdict, satisfactory to both parties,”7 he said at the end of his speech.

Thereafter, Teleki supplemented Kánya’s speech by emphasising that the Hungarian territorial proposal was based on purely ethnographic principles.

“It is a simple matter to draw a frontier on the basis of these principles,”8 he said.

He also noted, however, that at two points – in the case of Nyitra and Kassa (today: Nitra and Košice, Slovakia) – the application of the ethnographic principle causes difficulties. He specifically mentioned Pozsony (today:

Bratislava, Slovakia), where none of the ethnic groups has an absolute majority (i.e. over 50%), although there was a relative Hungarian majority in Pozsony in 1910. In addition, Pozsony was once the capital city of Hungary during the Turkish regime. He finished his speech by saying that there were a few towns on the Slovak-Hungarian linguistic border “which in 1918 were 80-90 percent Hungarian, but were later denationalised. Hungary therefore raised a claim to these towns on the grounds of both ancient and recent rights.”9

Thereafter, Chvalkovský, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, was granted speaking time, who – after a few sentences of diplomatic courtesy – gave the floor to Ambassador Krno, who presented the following line of reasoning in his speech: the Munich Agreement gave three months for Czechoslovakia to settle the question of the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak minority. The Czechoslovak Government endeavoured to honourably comply with this requirement. It took part in negotiations with Hungary as early as 9 October, 10 days after the Munich meeting. However, in the course of the negotiations in Komárom the Hungarian delegation submitted a proposal which Czechoslovakia could not accept. In response, the Hungarian party declared the Komárom negotiations closed. Following the failed negotiations, Czechoslovakia submitted a new proposal to Hungary on 22 October, but the Hungarians rejected that as well.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

After that, the Hungarian Government made a counter-proposal and requested arbitration or a plebiscite. “Fully relying on the sense of justice of the German and Italian Governments, the Czechoslovak Government accepted this proposal.”10 Krno continued his reasoning, however, by stating that the ethnic border between Slovakia and Hungary could not be drawn based on the data of the 1910 census in Hungary. He used Kassa as a specific example, as follows: “In 1910, for example, Košice had a small Hungarian majority, but in 1880 the town was predominantly Slovak. Therefore, Teleki’s assertion that Hungary demands these towns based on ancient and recent rights is not totally correct, because if one ignores the last thirty years, the Slovak side can demand with equal justice that the 1880 figures should be taken into consideration […]”11

Krno’s arguments were responded to by Kánya and then Teleki. The Hungarian Minister of Culture explained that in the case of Nyitra and Kassa the changes that had occurred in the course of time needed to be taken into account. “The grandfathers of most of the residents who are now identified as Slovak were Hungarian,” he said.

In the unfolding debate, Chvalkovský asked that Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister, and Voloshyn, the “Ukrainian” Prime Minister [meaning Carpathian Ruthenian - L.G.] be heard. Ribbentrop refused to comply with this request and called the two politicians mentioned “experts”. He was only willing to promise to conduct an informal discussion with Tiso and Voloshyn during the official lunch. In his counter-response, Chvalkovský requested that the two politicians not be called experts in the protocol. Ribbentrop and Ciano expressed their agreement. This is how the morning session of the arbitration ended at around 2 p.m.

Thereafter, between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m. the delegates participated in a brunch, where they had the opportunity to have informal conversations. One such conversation took place between Ciano and Teleki, while Voloshyn and Tiso attempted to convince Ribbentrop about where they thought the Hungarian-Slovak border should lie.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

In document The Hungarian World 1938–1940 (Pldal 81-84)