Governance Structures for Higher Education Institutions

Indeed, the changes in the HE landscape just described have a certain resonance with those in the rest of the region, but there are overriding differences, especially to compare to CEE countries. This is particularly true with respect to the HE governance and control. We have seen that to repatriate the research function to HE institutions was one of the first steps that governments of newly liberated countries have embarked upon in the wake of the regime change. In Georgia, the integration of teaching and research was not really placed on the policy agenda before the political changes of 2003, when the newly appointed Minister of Education pointed at imminent changes in the structure and functions of the Georgian Academy of Sciences. Neither was establishing unified control over the entire system of HE - another vital component of the post-communist legislative reform – ever applied in pre-2003 Georgia. HE institutions continued to be steered by different agencies, the MoE being just one of them; others included so called branch ministries, the Patriarchy and the Academy of Sciences. As the result, of all 26 public institutions, only 9 were under the direct authority and control of the MoE, 5 had independent status, which in the Georgian context meant that they operated as separate spending units in the annual state budget, and the rest 12 were subordinated to different branch ministries (Gvishiani, Chapman 2002). The new Law on Higher Education has eventually established unified control of the Ministry over all but two institutions; the Tbilisi Fine Art Academy and the Georgian Sports Academy continue to be supervised by the Ministry of Culture and Sports.

The whole issue of the status of HE institutions had remained extremely vague until recently as clear guidelines defining universities were missing from the 1997 Law on Education. In pre-transition Georgia, only one institution - the Tbilisi State University – held university status while the rest were highly specialized institutions typical to the Soviet style HE system. Soon after the sweeping changes of 1989, many specialized institutions turned into universities as the result of which 13 out of 26 public educational establishments functioning by 2002 had acquired a university status. It is needless to add that the surge of upgrading the status was not matched by organizational changes in the structure of educational establishments.

There were many other practices in place to which the 1997 Education Law made no explicit reference. The role played by the intermediary bodies in co-coordinating between the state and HE institutions is case in point. Serving as an important channel for advancing and negotiating the aggregate interests of the public sector leadership, the Rectors’ Council of State Higher Education Institutions, comprised of rectors and representatives of the major public institutions, was founded in 1993 (Sharvashidze 2005). In all other post-communist countries we witness the creation and legalizing of coordinating agencies, and while none of them can be said to be completely independent from the state influence, this reliance in the Georgian case was much more profound. On the one hand, the members of the council were appointed by the president. On the other, this semi-formal body had direct advisory function to the president who in turn was in command of granting the final approval to all HE policy choices.

As to the institutional level changes, despite considerable transformation of its mode, the governance of state HE institutions had remained to be highly centralized and resided with the rector. According to the stipulations of the Education Law, public institution rectors were elected by respective Academic Boards (Scientific Council) and approved by the president of Georgia, following to the recommendation by the Minister of Education. If considered appropriate, the president could also dismiss rectors before the end of the term (Article 17 Para 4 and Article 23 Para 1). While it is common for post-communist legislation for HE to contain the clause concerning the presidential or the prime-ministerial authority in approving as well dismissing rectors of public institutions, in most cases it serves as a mere formality, if not directed toward enhancing the status and prestige of the elected rector (Hungary is one example). The reverse was true for Georgia: even though the Scientific Council of an institution was vested with formal power to elect its rector who at the same time headed the Council, in actual fact the process entailed in appointment by the president.⁵⁸ Thus, appointed by the president, the rector was in charge of both administrative and academic aspects of an institution. As the chairperson, the rector supervised the activities of the Scientific Council – an elected body responsible for most important matters such as approving curricula, projects and scientific reports as well as supervising elections of the heads of departments, professors, deans and the rector (Gvishiani Chapman 2002). Together with an administrative unit, the Scientific Council also took part in drafting the budget and in defining terms for distributing the state support among its students.

58 The developments related to the Tbilisi State University rector appointment in 2003 provide a vivid illustration of this point. Following to Roin Metreveli’s resignation, Rusudan Lortkiphanidze was nominated as a candidate for the Rector’s position by the president of Georgia. Nomination of a candidate with no previous affiliation with the University by the president was seen as a gross violation of the university autonomy and was countered by several internal nominees. But as most of them withdrew their candidacy just before the elections, the president protégée won the position.

Problems with implementation of licensing and quality assurance procedure most vividly illustrate negligent attitude of the Georgian governmental authorities before the changes of 2003. Not only private institutions have escaped much of the governmental control as discussed in the previous chapter, but the whole system of HE evolved against overly lax regulatory regime. It was noted that the first noteworthy attempts to establish some control over institutions were given in 1995, when the MoE issued “State Program for Education Reform and a Plan for its Realization” - the first major document intended to facilitate the reform of the HE field. To establish quality assurance mechanism was one of the major aims of the 1997 Education Law, which was followed by the numerous governmental decrees and ministerial orders, also aimed at regulating the enrollment growth via licensing and accreditation procedures. If only formally, a license became necessary for institutions to get started, whereas accreditation mechanisms would not get implemented earlier then 2004.⁵⁹ To ensure they meet certain standards for appropriate facilities and qualified personnel, institutions were required to obtain a license, but in reality, almost no institution has ever been denied one. On the other hand, there is ample evidence pointing at the corrupt practices pervasive in licensing agencies of that time.

59 There are several reasons responsible for this. Firstly, not just higher education provisions, but implementation of laws in general had proven to be most enduring setbacks in Georgia of that period.

The Education Law, in particular, lacked the depth and detail necessary for a successful application.

Secondly, the pressure instigated from public institutional leadership opposing accreditation of public institutions seems to have prevailed over the effective functioning of the accreditation working group.

Exploiting their status, some of the most prestigious and well-established institutions opted not to abide in any way by the new regulation and continued awarding their own institutional degrees (Gvishiani and Chapman 2002). The Georgian example of public institutions restricting introduction of the quality assurance mechanism stands in stark contrast to post-communist communist experience in which accreditation process was brought into play as an effective means of controlling and regulating private sector expansion. Clearly, it could be employed for thwarting the growth of private institutions, which, in spite of their being poorly endowed and less prestigious, have considerably fostered competition. But it should be remembered that quality is by no means a concern only for private sector in Georgia. While public institutions still continue to enjoy higher prestige and status, they too have many reasons to fear quality evaluation.

Both, the 2000 Lorentzen and the 2002 Gvishiani and Chapman studies of the Georgian HE sector, as well as numerous interviews with stakeholders and the ministry officials indicate that the licensing process had been a source of corruption endemic to the HE system and to the country in general (Janashia 2004).

The regulatory regime in which HE institutions operate started to change fundamentally only after the governmental change in 2003. Although pace and efforts have varied, reforms were undertaken in all public sectors, education being one of the most prominent. The major objectives on the reform policy-agenda included curbing widespread corruption, establishing some control over unruly processes taking place in the field in general and implementing quality assurance procedure in particular. Responsible for carrying out accreditation of HE institutions, The National Education Accreditation Center was set up in October 2004. In the same year, but before the agency started functioning, the revision of all licensed HE institutions was carried out, as the result of which only 79 out of 178 licensed institutions satisfied nominal requirements. It is important to note that among the institutions that were not allowed to admit students for the 2005/2006 academic year were ten public institutions. Accreditation is voluntary for public institutions but if an institution fails to obtain accreditation twice, the government retains right to dismiss management and administrative body officials or initiate reorganization or liquidation of it.