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international funds in the aftermath of war, the number of NGOs in post-conflict zones has skyrocketed and, in particular, there has been a mushrooming of NGOs whose vision and mission overlap with the liberal peacebuilding agenda (Pouligny, 2005: 499).

Such donor-driven NGO-centred civil society that lacks legitimacy among its constituency clearly limits its capacity to create any kind of domestic social capital and ownership over the peace process. All of this leads to the organisations and the local development as a whole becoming dependent on foreign presence (Belloni, 2001: 163).

In addition to the process being approached as a primarily technical dimension, separated from politics, the development of a civil society is also based on the faulty assumption that there exists a clear distinction between the political and the social, or the non-political. Yet, despite this assumed distinction, practice shows that the interventions themselves often contribute to a state-society relationship that in actuality allows for the state to manipulate citizens’ representation (Cubitt, 2013). It is, therefore, for all these reasons that scholars and more seldom practitioners have sought to expand the understanding of the local beyond the present understanding of civil society.

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practitioners. While there is a wide recognition of the poor quality of peace and the relapse to violence in many societies that have been subject to international peacebuilding efforts, there is a plethora of studies, analyses, and reports aimed at improving the existing liberal peacebuilding approaches. A smaller number of scholars have, on the other hand, been critical of some of the assumptions that have informed liberal peacebuilding and the kind of political order that has emerged as a result of the interventions. Shahar Hameiri (2010), for instance, argues that it is the very nature of statehood that has been transformed in both the intervened and intervening countries, which has resulted in transnationally regulated states. In a similar fashion, albeit less radically, David Chandler (2006) problematises the issue of political sovereignty and the principle of autonomy in light of the presence, influence, and involvement of external actors in the governing of a country. He further questions the approach in which statebuilding or the building of the institutions is separated from politics (Chandler, 2005). Looking at the consequences of this approach of offering technical solutions to political problems (Bendaña, 2006), Vivienne Jabri (2010) notes that such a superficial transfer of power from interveners to local actors diminishes forms of local agency.

To that end, what appears for most of the different critiques to have in common is the recognition that by reducing it to or presenting the engagement in conflict-ridden and post-war societies as a mere technocratic approach, the liberal peacebuilding ignores the agency and the capacity of the ‘local’, thereby appearing imposed (Tadjbakhsh, 2011: 3–4). Indeed, the essence of the critique of the liberal peace promoted by Western states and organisations is that it fails to take into account the needs of the

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local population, their customs and culture, as well as the traditional and indigenous ways of dealing with conflicts. Prioritising stability and security, peacebuilders have been criticised for ignoring and failing to positively affect the everyday lives of the conflict-ridden countries’ citizens (Richmond, 2010). Liberal peacebuilding, having been focused on governance institutions primarily, has failed to ‘come to terms with the lived experiences of individuals and their needs in everyday life’ (Richmond, 2008: 108). This has been argued to undermine the emergence of a social contract between the state and the society (Richmond, 2009; Tadjbakhsh and Schoiswohl, 2008).

Moreover, liberal peacebuilding has also been criticised for the assumption that political rights are more important to the local population than needs and material gains (Richmond, 2009: 568–569). With such neglect of the socioeconomic realities on the ground, this approach has reinforced inequalities that serve to limit political participation and perpetuate social division (Pugh, 2005). Michael Pugh (2009) also argues that with neoliberal economic policies seen as a technical solution to reconstructing the war-stricken economy, there is no place for discussion of possible, potentially better suited, alternatives for the economy of a post-war society.

Recent cases of peacebuilding have also shed light on the asymmetries of power in global politics and the dominant position of the Global North, as well as on the promotion of Western culture and knowledge at the expense of local culture, resources, and knowledges.²³ This imposed dominance of Western conceptions and peacebuilding

23 Without any intention of implying homogeneity, this thesis uses ‘the West’ and ‘the Global North’

interchangeably in reference to a set of Western-originating values that have been promoted as universal through various intervention and governance mechanisms. ‘Western’ in this sense also encompasses

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approaches at the societal level is argued to have limited the space for any alternative approaches to peacemaking, such as the indigenous and traditional ones (Mac Ginty, 2008). As a result, legitimate local traditions are said to be either sidelined or, when they do get recognised, mainstreamed and instrumentalised (ibid.).

Drawing on many of the issues outlined above, a number of critical scholars see the exercise of peacebuilding as a neo-colonial project, resulting in local resistance (Burnell, 2009; Liden, 2011; Richmond, 2011a). Rarely had it happen before that the locals’ involvement was examined beyond their engagement within the limits of what the international peacebuilders had allowed, which has frequently been in the form of CSOs. That is to say, against the background of liberal hegemony, the locals had been perceived either as loyal partners in implementing a certain agenda, as explained in the previous section, or as spoilers to the peacebuilding process. Broadly defined as

‘groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means and for a variety of motives’ (Newman and Richmond, 2006:

1), ‘spoilers’ and ‘spoiling’ even in the peacebuilding process can be seen as normative judgements, which strengthen the role and agency of external peacebuilders or ‘third-party custodians of a peace process’ (ibid.: 17), justifying their use of a range of strategies in dealing with ‘spoilers’ (Stedman, 1997). As far as the analysis of local agency is concerned, however, the discussion on spoilers remains primarily focused on the political and military elites.

what has been presented as ‘European’ in the mainstream discourse in the EU and its periphery, which includes Bosnia.

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Consequently, the need to engage with ‘the local’ in the domain of the everyday, thereby relocating politics from international actors and states to local actors exercising their own agency, has been emphasised (Richmond, 2010: 681). This has been the basic premise of an emerging body of literature that has marked the recent ‘local turn’ in the critical ‘camp’ of Peace and Conflict Studies (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). As noted by Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013: 769), this comes as ‘a recognition of the diffuseness of power (even the “normative” power of the UN, donors, and the EU) and its circulation, of the importance of culture, history and identity, the significance of local critical agency and resistance, of the unintended consequences of external blueprints, and of rights and needs in everyday contexts’.

The importance of this ‘local turn’ in analysing the role of post-war societies’

population as peacebuilding agents in their own right notwithstanding, questions over who ‘the local’ really is have caused some discussion in this emerging literature. The macro-level approach still appears to be dominant, with the ‘local’ in most analyses meaning ‘national’ (Autesserre, 2014: 492). In the micro-level analyses, however, perhaps the most widely accepted understanding is the one presented by Roger Mac Ginty, who uses ‘local actors’ in reference to ‘all levels within the state subject to a liberal peace intervention: national government, municipalities, political parties, militant groups, NGOs and civil society, businesses, communities, and individuals’ (Mac Ginty, 2011: 84). On the other hand, in an effort to emphasise a distinction from the non-Western and non-liberal elites part of the liberal peacebuilding process and the Western-defined civil society, i.e. ‘the local actors’, Oliver Richmond uses ‘local-local’

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referring to the diversity of communities and individuals beyond these groups who are part of the political society (Richmond, 2011c: 133).

To that end, Isabell Schierenbeck (2015) identifies at least three main conceptions of ‘the local’ in the recent ‘local turn’. The first one is ‘the local’ understood as local institutions, local governing structures and local officials. This conception disentangles ‘the local’ from the global–local framework and analyses it solely within a national framework (ibid.: 1024–1025). This conception is used by scholars who analyse, to name but few examples, the emergence of accountable and legitimate local governance, the working of subnational governing units, the decentralisation of power, the processes and outcomes of the use of mechanisms established for consultation and co-operation between the local officials and the citizens.

The second one is the already mentioned conception of ‘the local’ as agency (ibid.: 1025–1026). Namely, in an attempt to challenge the aforementioned fundamental problem of the liberal peacebuilding, that of depoliticising conflict-ridden societies through technical approaches, scholars have increasingly started to look at the everyday as a site for repoliticisation, whereby local actors or the grassroots local can exercise their agency. Local agency is exercised in different ways and different venues, all of which cannot be easily categorised. Some of the forms of local agency discussed by the existing literature include co-optation, resistance, acceptance, tactical forms of participation, autonomous counter-organisation (Richmond and Mitchell, 2011: 329), assimilation, adaptation, hidden agencies (Richmond, 2011a: 128), and compliance.

Each of them relates to power and liberal peacebuilding, presented as an international

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endeavour. Local agency in this sense can be exercised not solely by the ordinary people and the grassroots movements and activities (Pogodda and Richmond, 2015), but also by the elites in some settings (Hyden, 2015; Öjendal and Sivhouch, 2015).

The one form of local agency that has received most scholarly attention is resistance. Drawing on Foucault and his well-known statement that ‘[w]here there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’ (Foucault 1978), Richmond (2011b: 420) conceives of resistance as an act of power and hegemony being resisted either discursively or through social practices. Referring to Foucault’s work, he (ibid.: 422) goes further to explain that

resistance is not merely an antidote to power but reconstitutes politics according to those who express agency, however diffuse. The point of resistance is to elude power rather than to confront it head on.

In relation to this, he particularly emphasises the agency that becomes visible through the hidden and everyday forms of resistance, a concept advanced through the work of James C. Scott. Scott (1985: 32) suggests that everyday forms of resistance are

‘intended to mitigate or deny claims made by superordinate classes or to advance claims vis-à-vis those superordinate classes’.

The third conception of ‘the local’ is as a process (Schierenbeck, 2015: 1026).

This conception highlights the non-static nature of ‘the local’. Scholars have emphasised the need to deterritorialise ‘the local’ and understand it as a contextualised activity and process (Mac Ginty, 2015), while others have drawn attention to the

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constant positioning and repositioning of local actors within peacebuilding networks and dynamics, i.e. to the on-going parallel delocalisation and relocalisation (Kappler, 2015).

The above sheds light on the novelty and the importance of the recent ‘local turn’. This is particularly the case in it turning the previous analytic approach that focused on a top-down view of governance upside down by zeroing in on how the governance agencies are seen and engaged by the governed and how the agency of the governed transforms governance (Corbridge et al., 2005: 8).