GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN BELARUS

2.1. Nature of social contracting in an authoritarian society

A social contract may be necessitated in an authoritarian society for two reasons.

The first one emerges when the authoritarian institutions of power go through a crisis of legitimacy and/or encounter an open, and often violent, challenge, and are bound to make concessions to society by offering not only new material benefits, but also new rules of the game, which demark the borders, beyond which the state will not interfere in the lives of those who it governs. One example of this social contract type is Goulash Communism in Hungary in the 1960s%1980s, which was practiced after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The then Hungarian leader clearly defined the rules of the game between the authorities and society as «who is not against us is with us».

Society was given three options: submission («loyalty»), protest in any of its forms («voice»), or withdrawal from confrontation in case of disagreement («exit»).

It is important for the state to make «voice» the least attractive option – by way of

From social contract to social dialogue...

increasing the severity of the punishment for the failure to comply (dismissals, administrative punishments, etc.), or owing to some benefits offered in exchange for «loyalty» or acquired independently as a result of «exit». In turn, citizens assess the consequences of «voice» manifestations. If they believe the «voice» strategy, if applied, will result in uncertainty and disorder, the existing social contract will be valued more than any alternative strategy.

The second reason for social contracting in an authoritarian society appears when the contract serves as a continuation of the paternalistic tradition, which may be started both for ideological reasons and tactics aimed at maximizing the authority of elites that seek to consolidate their legitimacy and engage public support in their combat against rivals. This was the social contract patters used back in Soviet Belarus, when high welfare rates not only ensured nation%wide love for leaders (which was essential to secure official positions inside the country), but also strengthened their hand in the Union%level power clashes.

In the same fashion, in conditions when «primary» accumulation of absolute power called for electoral legitimacy, the authorities of post%Soviet Belarus chose to restore and maintain the «Soviet» social contract, only slightly disrupted by the stormy developments of the late 1980s%early 1990s. Reliance on society as an instrument to consolidate the new group in power was also determined by the weak structuring of the elite groups inside the country and somewhat uneasy relationships between existing factions and the new chief executive.

The political memory of the commanding elite played its role, too: the strikes of industrial workers in the spring of 1991 undermined the faith in the communist model and shattered communism%related hopes. It appeared that the old

«Masherov»%style social contract was not executed. The attempt to completely withdraw from the «Masherov» contract in the period of semi%reforms of 1991–

1994 provoked a backlash from the Belarusian society and ended in a political victory of the conservative Soviet populism advocated by Alexander Lukashenko in 1994. The new contract proposed by Lukashenko was a replica of the old Soviet one, but at a lower level of incomes: «We don’t need this democracy with hullabaloo.

We need a democracy when a person works, earns some wages to buy bread, milk, sour cream, sometimes a piece of meat to feed his baby».

2.2. Evolution of the social contract in Belarus

That was the material minimum of the contract offered to society during the initial phase, in 1994–1996. The new authorities phased down political and economic reforms and commenced to restore, albeit with modifications, the constituents of the Soviet system. They included the dominance of state property, five%year production plans, ideology, a youth organization resembling Komsomol, and other ingredients of political and social control. However, the chief economic tasks were economic growth and preservation of production without restructuring, including through massive state support – in order to guarantee employment and permanent increase in wages and pensions. Contractual relations have been modified over the past decade, and often because of changes in «external» fundamental conditions of

Vital Silitski

the functioning of the Belarusian system and need for adjusting the so%called

«selectorate» – the social and elite backbone of the system – in order to optimize its stability.

The second phase in the development of social contracting took place after mass campaigns against economic and administrative elites in 1994–2001, when a turn to nomenclatura privatization became evident, and nomenclatura acquired broader possibilities for corrupt practices (it is for this reason that the fight against corruption is a burning issue for the state now, hence so many official anti%corruption declarations). The need for that turn was caused by the situation when it was getting harder and harder to maintain the conditions necessary for the existence of the system (cheap energy resources and unconditional support of the Kremlin), whereas the authorities needed to ensure 100 per cent loyalty of the central government and its cooperation in safeguarding the chief executive.

Also, there were certain changes in the income distribution policies. During the early years of the system, the authorities were «leashing the electorate» by ensuring that incomes were growing fastest is the largest electoral group of nonworking pensioners. In after years, the authorities were much less concerned about the possibility of a defeat in elections (by 2004, the regime had managed to liquidate the competitive electoral process, and only some external features remained, like the plurality of candidates taking part), shifting their focus to preventing any chance of a revolutionary (say, «orange») scenario of change of power in the streets of Minsk and other large cities. As a result, the mid%2000s saw hikes in real wages in urban areas, substantial improvements in the living standards of the group that can be roughly categorized as the middle class, new offers to young people (their social mobility increased), who were paid for political loyalty and non%participation in the public life on the side of opposition institutions, and campaigns to recruit and engage creative and media elites who mold public opinion.

The third adjustment could be observed in the wake of the Russian%Belarusian gas row in 2007. Overall, the rise in energy prices and the global financial crisis that followed confronted the Belarusian authorities with the fact that it might be impossible to preserve the current socioeconomic model in the long run. A structural modification was indispensable, hence a major revision of the existing social pattern, in other words, curtailments of social payments and mass layoffs. After the «gas rift», the authorities started amending the system of privileges, which used to apply to over 65% of population. The abolition of preferences and privileges, financially insignificant as it was, affected the least protest%inclined, albeit socially immobile, groups of pensioners and state%paid workers. This move was not only economic, but also symbolic, indicating the first step away from the habitual «selectoral base».

However, the consequences proved unexpected: our study showed that virtually all social groups were dissatisfied with the abolition of privileges, including those who do not depend on privileges at all, since pensioners and physically handicapped have young and healthy children, relatives and friends, who called that measure cynical and unceremonious. As a result, under the pressure of changing public mood, the authorities took care of revising the scheme of distribution of benefits. Decisive

From social contract to social dialogue...

actions were postponed, and some of the privileges were reinstated (for instance, subsidized suburban trips for pensioners and children in summer and fall).