An evaluation of countries’ efforts

The current NDCs of the top 10 GHG-emitting countries for 2030 are as follows (UNFCCC 2019b):

• Brazil: 43% reduction since 2005

• Canada: 30% reduction since 2005

• EU: 40% domestic emission reduction since 1990

• China: 60-65% reduction of emissions per unit of GDP since 2005, with a peak in absolute emissions expected by 2030 at the latest

• India: 33-35% reduction of emissions per unit of GDP since 2005

• Indonesia: 29-41% below business-as-usual emissions

• Japan: 26% reduction since 2013

• Mexico: 25%-40% below business-as-usual emissions, with a peak in absolute emissions expected around 2025-26

• Russia (has not yet ratified the treaty): 25-30% reduction since 1990

• USA (intends to withdraw from the treaty): 26-28% reduction from 2005 - 2025 (expected)

As the list shows, with countries taking their own approach to target setting, comparison of targets has become quite difficult. First, countries are using differ-ent baselines: as most countries (with the notable exception of Russia) increased their GHG emissions from 1990 to 2005, a 2005 baseline implies a smaller re-duction than a 1990 baseline (Canada’s 30% emission rere-duction target from 2005, for example, is equivalent to a 15% reduction from 1990 levels). Second, a major difference between developed and developing countries’ commitments is still that developing countries are usually only prepared to pledge a reduction rel-ative to their GDP, which means that their absolute emissions continue to grow – although some developing countries, such as China, have indicated the point at which they intend to start making absolute reductions. Some countries have conditional targets (the higher numbers in the case of Indonesia and Mexico, for example), which they are ready to implement only under certain conditions

33 If the world decides to shift to a low-carbon economy, existing fossil fuel reserves and infrastructure will need to be written off as ‘stranded assets’ (coal power plants will need to be shut down before they reach the end of their technical lifetime, oil reserves left in the ground, etc.), causing significant economic losses. The more we continue to invest in such infrastructure, the greater the potential loss and the more difficult it becomes to commit to making a change (UNEP 2018).

(which are usually quite vague, such as that other countries should also take ambitious action or that developing countries receive financial support). Last but not least, countries’ commitments also vary regarding the inclusion of land use and forestry emissions. As previously mentioned, these may be very important in some countries, but because their estimation is highly uncertain, their inclusion makes it more difficult to evaluate a country’s progress. (A positive approach is therefore taken by some countries, for example, India, which set itself a forestry target not as a part of but in addition to its overall emission reduction target.)

Figure 12 shows an assessment of countries’ current commitments published by an association of three independent research institutes (Climate Action Track-er 2019). Colours indicate whethTrack-er the level of ambition reflected in each coun-try’s target is in line with the Paris temperature goals, taking into account the individual situation of each country. While opinions may differ as to what exactly can be considered the ‘fair share’ that countries in different positions should contribute to the fight against climate change (the assessment in Figure 12 com-bines various approaches to determine this), it is clear (as is acknowledged by the principles of the UNFCCC) that more can be expected of prosperous nations than developing countries. (This is why, for example, India’s target is rated fa-vourably by the assessment, even though in absolute terms it is much lower than the pledges of many other countries such as the EU or Canada.)

Figure 12 Evaluation of current climate pledges according to Climate Action Tracker

Source: Climate Action Tracker 2019

When it comes to evaluating countries’ GHG emissions and reductions, all in-ternational treaties currently adopt the principle that each country is responsible for the emissions originating from within its own national borders. However, given the fact that today’s globalised economy is characterized by high volumes of inter-national trade, this may not be the best approach for accounting for GHG

emis-sions. It is questionable whether, for example, CO₂ emissions associated with the production of a smartphone (or any other product) made in China but sold and used in Europe or the USA should indeed be considered part of China’s emissions rather than those of the importing countries whose consumer demand was the reason for producing the product. Some suggest that the current production-based account-ing of emissions should be replaced by a consumption-based system whereby a country’s emissions are calculated by subtracting exports and adding imports to domestic emissions. This would make a huge difference for many countries, reducing the emissions of big exporters such as China (whose emissions would be more than 20% lower under a consumption-based system) and generally attribut-ing more to OECD nations (see Figure 13) (Davis – Caldeira 2010). A consumption-based system is generally regarded as being more favourable to the attainment of climate goals since developed countries usually have more ambitious climate targets which would then cover a larger proportion of global emissions – and they could no longer achieve reductions by ‘outsourcing’ polluting production activities to developing nations. The problem is that calculating consumption-based emis-sions is far more complex and involves more uncertainty than a production-based system and is therefore unlikely to replace the current production-based system in the foreseeable future³⁴ (Csutora – Vetőné Mózner 2013, Alfionis et al. 2017).

Figure 13 Largest flows of carbon emissions embedded in international trade

Source: Davis-Caldeira 2010

34 The fairest approach would probably be to somehow divide the responsibility for emissions embedded in international trade between consumer and producer coun-tries because they both enjoy the benefits of these activities (consumer councoun-tries benefit from the use of products, while producers benefit in the form of income and jobs). Various principles have been put forward to create such GHG accounting sys-tems based on ‘shared-responsibility’ but none are developed enough to represent a realistic alternative (Csutora – Vetőné Mózner 2013, Alfionis et al. 2017).