Anhelita Kamenska and Ìirts Valdis Kristovskis
Are the military and police forces under civilian control?
8.1 How effective is civilian control over the armed forces,
Law and the Law of the National Guard (Zemessardze) of the Republic of Latvia and other regulatory enactments regulate the rights and duties of citizens involved in national defense.
The duties and rights of the National Armed Forces in cooperation with civil society in situations of peace and threat to the state are specified. The division of rights and responsibility of the senior state officials and institutions, as well as of the local governments, was defined more accurately only at the end of 2001, when the National Security Law was adopted. Its Section 4 states that the basis for the division of competence of persons or institutions responsible for the national security is the State structure, parliamentary democracy and the principle of division of State authority determined in the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, as well as the principles in accordance with which the parliamentary and civil control over the National Armed Forces, institutions of the system of the Ministry of the Interior and State security is performed.3
Basically, the existence and utilization of these instruments in Latvia ensures the process of democratic control over the armed forces. In addition, the process should be facilitated so that it happens systemically instead of being based on passing interests and on what is current at that moment. Chapter V of the National Security Law Development and Approval of Concepts and Plans to Prevent Threats to the State solves this problem with sufficient effectiveness. It defines the participation of the senior public officials of the state and the institutions in the preparation and implementation of the most relevant documents regulating national security and defense measures.
Yet the laws still contain a few unsolved problems. The unregulated mechanism to ensure the principle of the one-man management of the politico-military chain of command may influence the action of the senior public officials and institutions in situations when the state is under a threat. On March 25, 2004, the force of law was given to the provision that enables the President of the State, who is not a member of the executive power, to send units of Latvias armed forces to participate in NATO operations. If the President of the State chooses to do so, while the Prime Minister opposes such participation, what is the Minister for Defense supposed to do in a situation like this? International experience testifies that this is exactly the problem that has caused governments to fall, instability in the respective countries, and subsequent constitutional amendments to eradicate the problem.
The demand to define explicitly and ensure the control by civil representatives of the government over the Ministry of Defense and the system of the armed forces is important. The regulatory documents in Latvia specify explicitly enough the duties of the Minister for Defense, the parliamentary and the state secretary, as well as the employees of the Ministry of Defense when implementing the national defense policy. The minister shapes and implements national defense policy and measures that are approved by the Cabinet of Ministers and the Saeima. The internal control process of the system is carried out by the political as well as the civilian administration leadership of the Ministry of Defense. It is the Minister who knows best what is going on in the armed forces, and being both a civilian and a political person, controls the quality of national policy implementation, defines the priorities and takes the appropriate measures to utilize the alloted funds. The Minister determines the ideology that motivates the receptiveness of the armed forces to society and searches for ways to explain better what is happening in the field of national defense. Even after ten years since the restoration of Latvias defense system, a considerable effort had to be and is still invested in changing the understanding of the meaning and content of civilian-military relations among the people employed in the national defense system, especially among those with Soviet military education and thinking. Society as well often demonstrates a lack of understanding of who, and to what extent, provides national defense arrangements and the internal control process of the entire system. The mass media and society often confuse and incorrectly reflect the functions of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense.
Latvias experience shows that it was the purposefulness of the political will that played a crucial role in many efforts to develop the national defense system and increase its effectiveness. It is important that enough effective instruments are available to help both to improve the defense and to implement control. During 1999-2004 it was the Minister for Defense who initiated and gradually introduced a considerable number of fundamental measures which provide regularity in the process of democratic control over the defense system.
For example, projects like the Planning, Programming and Budget Utilization Control System, the Centralized Accounting System, the Personnel Career Planning System, the establishment of the Armament and Accoutrement Council, Audit Council and Service, transfering the supervisory authority over the Military Intelligence and Security Service to the Minister, regulations on the readiness of the units to participate in international operations and similar measures, the purpose of which is to ensure a democratic, reliable and effective system of control over the armed forces and the operation of the Ministry.
Deficiencies in the operation of the defense system identified by the State Controller, the Procurement Supervision Bureau, the state security services and other controlling institutions of similar nature further enable the Minister to control.
The parliamentary control over defense in Latvia is being carried out by traditional means. Although there is an opinion that special knowledge and information is not fully available to parliaments4, the deputies gain a detailed insight into the development process that is going on in the armed forces by participating in the legislation process to improve the defense. The visits of the parliamentarians to the units of the armed forces both in Latvia and in places where international peace-keeping operations take place are traditional and informative. Regular informative meetings and presentations are held in the Saeima and the Ministry of Defense, where plans, programs and specific measures for the development of the armed forces are reviewed. The consideration and approval of the national defense budget is an annual process, prescribed by the law. Similar requirements are laid out when discussing the national defense plan or examining publicly at the Saeima plenary session the National Security and National Defense concepts or the participation of the national armed forces in international operations.
In addition to the annually planned control measures, parliamentarians receive for consideration suggestions and complaints from society and the mass media, as well as from the civilian employees of the defense system, the soldiers of the armed forces or their relatives. The qualitative aspects of cooperation with the defense sector are crucial for the effectiveness of the parliamentary control process. Despite that the majority of the aforementioned instruments of parliamentary control were established back in the early 90s, in terms of quality they have not been improved. Until the late 90s the Saeima deputies had to deal with very superficially and inaccurately gathered information, prepared by the Ministry of Defense and the National Armed Forces.
As from the end of 1998, the Minister for Defense put forth new requirements to ensure civilian-military cooperation. Since then, regular explanatory materials were introduced for the needs of the Saeima deputies. A practice of providing the deputies with explanatory notes on the Ministry of Defense budget, the annual report to the Saeima by the Minister for Defense on the national defense policy and the development of the National Armed Forces was introduced. The deputies received NATO Membership Action Plans.
The belief that the principles of transparency of the defense will ensure broader public support and more rapid development of the National Armed Forces was consolidated. Such openness was applied to the mass media as well. Consequently, during the period of 1999-2001, approximately one third of the population of the country changed their opinion from skeptical to positive regarding what is going on in the defense sector.
Considerable state and public support was provided to the efforts of national defense development. An increase in the funding totaling 50 million lats, needed to ensure development, was achieved over these years, and strengthened the belief that the allocated resources are being utilized appropriately, and Latvias accession to NATO was ensured.
However, lately some undesirable things have happened as well. In 2004, politicians began to participate actively and ostentatiously in the testing of armaments and accoutrement, while their leading role in ensuring the development process of the armed forces diminished. Also, the mechanism of the parliamentary control over the armed forces should be defined more accurately. In the spring of 2004 a dubious practice was introduced in Latvia the Head of the Saeima Defense and Internal Affairs Commission simultaneously took the position of the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Defense. Even if no traditional conflict of interest can be detected in this situation, it is still clearly obvious that the effectiveness of the parliamentary control over the armed forces is seriously jeopardized, and the principles of division of power in a parliamentary state are not guaranteed.
The participation of the President of the State as the Constitution-appointed Commander-in-Chief of the national armed forces in the national defense efforts and their control is important as well. The Constitution obligates the President of the State to take initiative in carrying out national defense measures in situations when a war has been declared against the state or an enemy has invaded it. The President of the State must be specially prepared for such measures. Therefore, the legislature has provided for the right to establish the Military Council of the State President. Moreover, the President has the options of nominating a candidate for the Commander of the National Armed Forces and of conferring service ranks to officers of the armed forces. These duties and rights give an opportunity to become acquainted with the national defense situation and, in case of necessity, influence it within the limits of the presidential competence. Evaluating the situation in Latvia with regard to the second part of the first question of this study how free is the political life from military involvement? it should be recognized first that the regulatory documents clearly define the subordination and competence of the National Armed Forces and their leadership. The realization of the democratic principles requires and ensures their political neutrality vis-à-vis the political life of the country without depriving any soldier or civilian of their individual political rights. At the same time, the prohibition for the military to run for elected political offices is significant for ensuring the political neutrality of the military. The system of political leaders characteristic of the USSR does not exist and is not allowed in the National Armed Forces of Latvia.
Democratic norms such as these and the increased understanding of the need for political neutrality have eliminated trends that were often present during the early 90s, when the commander of the Defense Forces repeatedly tried to declare his political demands by infringing upon the supreme political leadership of the state.
Currently, there is no concern in Latvia that the National Armed Forces, including the voluntary National Guard, might interfere in the political life of the country. The leaders of the National Security services also deny the existence of such trends.5
However, even before, there have been cases when political party leadership has attracted individual military to events of a hidden corporate nature by promising to assure advancement in their military careers with the help of pressure from these political forces. These are illegal attempts to involve senior officers of the National Armed Forces to facilitate the support of these political parties. Such precedents undermine the cohesion and motivation of the armed forces personnel, seriously threatens their political neutrality, as well as the stability of democracy of the state in general. All senior public officials and security authorities involved in the process of civilian-military relations should consider this not only from the perspective of the administrative law, but from the criminal law as well. Yet, it has been impossible in the previous years due to the weakness of the national democracy. Such a conclusion only confirms the complexity of the democratic control in the process of reconstruction of the state and development of political culture.
The existence of the preconditions described in this chapter does not necessarily guarantee constant stability of the qualitative aspects of democratic control over the armed forces. The political process of the state regularly renews the members of the political dialogue. Their preliminary knowledge of the public administration, the military, the specific features of the civilian-military relations, their personal responsibility and duties are often different and not always sufficient. Therefore, the effectiveness of the process of democratic control over the armed forces is inconsistent. Its consolidation is a long process.