Conclusion

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Indirect effects on the unity of behavior take place also through party centralization.

Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix D present the effects of systemic factors on centralization.

The results show that centralization is enhanced by high district magnitude in proportional electoral systems. This means that the more MPs are elected under closed list proportional representation rules, the more parties will concentrate decision making at the centre. As centralization is a strong factor which upholds unity of behavior, this relationship also explains why the effect of district magnitude fades away in the general integrated model as opposed to the simple systemic factors model of explaining unity of behavior.

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of unity, and therefore active indirectly. Party system fragmentation, type of political system, the existence of federalism and an MP’s focus of representation, all have a significant impact on MPs’ attitudes towards the ideology of their party. Apparently, the more parties there are in a parliament, the more congruence there is between MPs’

attitudes on the parties’ policy positions. Federalism also has no direct impact on voting unity, but it leads to low congruence of opinions in terms of party ideology (H4).

Table 6.8 Summary effects of systemic variables on unity of behavior

Focus of representation, as perceived by the members of a parliament, matters for party unity but in a negative way and only when MPs put their constituency first and disregard the party or the nation (H8). The more MPs think of representation only in relation to their constituency, the more this is detrimental to united behavior in parliament. The majority of MPs who are more attached to their constituency have been elected under open lists or in SMD and this explains their choice of representation (table 2, Appendix D). Whether the focus of representation is the party or the nation has no significant effect on unity of behavior. Given this result, and based on the interviews conducted with MPs, I conclude that MPs’ focus of representation is constantly changing and depends either on the policy areas or on the nature of the bills on which they must vote on or on other specific circumstances

Systemic factor Predicted effect on

unity of behavior Effect Verified District magnitude (increase) Positive Partly (indirect)

Ballot structure (open) Negative No (indirect)

Federalism Negative No (indirect)

Parliamentarism Positive No (indirect)

Fragmentation Positive No (indirect)

State subsidies Positive Yes

Ceiling on donations Positive Yes

Focus of representation (narrow) Negative Yes

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which are considered important at the time of the vote.²⁵ These results have also to be interpreted bearing in mind that the hypotheses about the focus of representation were tested only against 1996 data. Possible changes over the last decade in the focus of representation could not be accounted for.

The ballot structure does not impact directly on the unity of behavior as expected (H10). Whether the electoral list is closed or open with a preferential vote, it impacts directly on the ideological congruence of political parties. Closed lists facilitate unity of attitudes while open lists foster intra-party competition and low ideological unity which will later translate into low unity of behavior.

Whether states are parliamentary or not only makes a difference for unity of attitudes.

The power associated with a vote of confidence seems to generate the formation of parties that are united in their ideological beliefs (H12). The number of parties in a parliament and their actual strength measured in parliamentary seats is significant only when we explain ideological unity. High number of parties in a parliament signifies more unity of attitudes to be preserved by parties (H13).

Contrary to expectations, and against many inferences advanced in the party literature, systemic factors, like those described in the present analysis, perform poorly in explaining MPs’ behavior in a parliament. Party finance plays quite an important role in making parties behave as unitary bodies inside parliament. The more subsidies political parties receive from the state, the higher their unity level (H14). In a marginal way, the bare existence of a ceiling on donations also impacts positively on

25 The other possibility is that the question addressed to elite during the surveys is totally redundant and lacks any significance for the MPs.

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unity of behavior (H15). Even at first glance, a close relationship of a party with the state would seem detrimental for representative democracy, but in fact the effect turns out to be beneficial, making parties vote in a united manner and implement their policy program.

This chapter has shown that institutional constrains coming from the state level cannot be isolated and considered alone when explaining the parliamentary behavior of parties. In order to achieve unity of behavior, implement their program and portray themselves as a feasible choice into the eyes of their voters, parties also make use of their own mechanisms. The latter relate to centralization of decision making, candidates’ selection or distribution of finances, disciplinary measures like expulsion or verbal warnings (as I have shown in chapter 5). Where it exists, high party unity of attitudes leads to high unity of behavior, but when the country institutional setting does not always favor party unity, the sticks of persuasion come from the internal party organization.

The conclusions of this chapter show the ideal institutional conditions under which a party can form and maintain its unity of attitudes and further its behavioral unity. In an ideal case, taking into consideration only the institutional environment, a highly united party in terms of attitudes and behavior will emerge in a parliamentary system where fragmentation is moderately high and the MPs are elected under closed list PR, and the parties also receive a substantial amount of financial support from the state.

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