Concluding Suggestions

Philosophy is frequently said to utilize highly top-down methods to address the problems in its subject-matter. Conversely, sciences are said to be bottom-up researches. Both of these claims are partially correct and partially false. Scientists in practice use whatever meth-ods or tools they think useful, regardless of those being bottom-up or top-down. To a lesser extent, this is also true for the actual prac-tice of the greatest philosophers. It is certain that there are import-ant differences between them. However, that they are different (i.e.

difference in degree) is not equal to saying that they are categori-cally different or should be different. Philosophy should be a reliable and venerable branch of knowledge, not the rotter of the academic world. Icy isolation between them should not exist anymore. They have never been enemies, but now they should also be close allies.

27 Werner Callebaut, ed., Taking the Naturalistic Turn, Or, How Real Philosophy of Science Is Done (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 42. Italics are from the original.

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8

Arthur Danto’s philosophy of art often and emphatically asserts the strong relatedness of art and philosophy. His “end of art”

thesis, based on a Hegelian thought, is not only a strong statement about the history of art, but it also gives account of the changing relationship between art and philosophy. In this paper I will attend to the question of what the end of art means, in order to see what consequences it has got for the state of philosophy, since it is as much about philosophy as about art. Danto gives a special understanding of art history, which logically concludes in the end of the linear historical narrative whose stages manifest the divergent relationship between art and philosophy. His philosophy of art history is the necessary precondition for his arriving at an ontology of art. This ontology is not in contradiction with the contemporary art, which he identifies as the age of pluralism, but he considers it reconcilable with the autonomy of art and with an essentialist notion of it. I will provide three possible interpretations of the dis- or re-enfranchisement of art by philosophy. I will also look into the question in what sense Danto maintains the deep relatedness of art and philosophy after their ways have parted. I will argue that in Danto’s theory it is by art that philosophy can come to realize the nature of its essential problems, and in this sense the philosophy of art is a kind of metaphilosophy.

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