The Comparative Analysis of the Post- Post-socialist Eastern European Countries

The previously introduced hypotheses are now proved with comparative analysis. Before starting to compare the main variables of the examined post-socialist countries, we examine how the main variables of the EU 13 and post-socialist countries differ from each other. The examined variables are the following (see Table 3):

- Intellectual Property Rights Index (2009) - Culture Index (2009)

- Cultural Sector Employment (2006)

- Cultural Sector Value Added to GDP (2006)

- Household Expenditure on Culture and Recreation (2006)

- GDP per Capita (2006)

- Direct Government Support on Culture, Religion and Recreation in % of GDP (2006)

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Table 1. EU Member States Cultural Statistics on Cultural Sector Value Added to GDP and Cultural Policy Injured

Sources:^aERICarts (2012);^bKEA (2006)

Table 2: Regression on Cultural Sector Value Added to GDP and Cultural Policy Injured (own calculation)

*10 % significance level

Table 3: Statistical data on the cultural sectors of the EU 13 and the Central Eastern European countries

Structural Transition in Cultural Policy: A Post-Socialist Perspective 40

The most robust finding of the comparative test is that the post-socialist countries average of direct government support in % of GDP is higher and the household expenditure on culture and recreation is almost similar to the EU 13 average. So the post-socialist countries and the citizens spend a little bit more in percentage on culture from the given budget than the more developed western ones.

If we compare the data on cultural sector value added to GDP, the result is different, as the EU 13 countries data is 1,17 % higher.

Based on this result the first argument of the re-search is that direct expenditure of the government and the households on culture and recreation has no real effect on the economic performance of the cultural sector.

If we compare the data of direct government support and the GDP per Capita it is noticeable that it is not automatic that a rich country spends more on culture in % of GDP. The best examples are Austria, Germany and Ireland. Hungary’s GDP per Capita is low, however it spends 1,6 % of the GDP on culture.

The data clearly demonstrate that the level of cultural sector employment and cultural sector value added to GDP correlate with each other. The more people work in the cultural sector, the higher the value added to GDP is, as the actors’ income in the cultural sector appears in the GDP.

Finally we focus on institutions. Both IPR Index and Culture Index are higher in the EU 13 countries, so the quality of institutions is determining. It means that the enforcement of formal and informal institu-tions has positive effect on the economic perfor-mance of the cultural sector.

The data and the results of the comparative ana-lysis show that more than 25 years after the change the political, economic and social quality of the post-socialist countries is below the EU 13 average. The post-socialist countries are almost reaching the level of the examined Mediterranean countries, but far behind Scandinavian countries, or etatist France, federal Germany or liberal Great Britain.

Now we turn to compare only the post-socialist countries. Although there are some general charac-teristics of the transition such as the immediate abolishment of censorship after the change, the still existing heavy and inflexible cultural institutions, the fast development of the mass cultural production or the reduction in public subsidies, we argue that the post-communist countries didn’t develop in the same way after the political turn. First the change in the direct government support on culture, religion and recreation in percentage of GDP is compared, and then we demonstrate the size of fiscal centrali-zation or decentralization in the cultural sector.

Finally we describe the main structure of the currently used cultural policies.

Figure 1. Direct Government Support on Culture in percentage of GDP (1998–2011)Source: Eurostat (2013) The curves in Figure 1 show that the most hectic

are the Slovakian and the Hungarian government supports on culture in percentage of GDP. These countries did not use a consequent strategy in the examined period. After the change they tried various models to set how much the optimal size of direct government support should be. The Czech Repub-lic, Poland and Slovenia use a consequent strategy as they slightly increase the direct government support on culture in the examined period, no hectic changes can be seen. Based on the data Hungary’s average support is the highest followed by Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. It is an important result that the higher government support

does not mean automatically that the cultural sector value added to GDP is higher in a country. The value added to GDP is the highest in the Czech Republic, followed by Slovenia and Slovakia. Hun-gary and Poland produce the lowest level of value added to GDP. The tendency of the household expenditure on culture and recreation is the same as the value added to GDP. Except Poland the crowding out theory is valid in practice as in those countries where the government support is higher the household expenditure is lower and vice versa (see Figure 1 and Table 3).

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The result of the comparative analysis on the role of the direct government expenditure on culture is the same for the EU 13 and 5 post-socialist coun-tries too. We argue that the size of direct govern-ment support on culture is needed, but has no real effect on the cultural sector value added to GDP.

However government expenditure can have ne-gative influence household expenditure on culture.

The cultural policies also show some differences, which can have effect on the efficiency of the cultu-ral sector’s performance. In the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia there are injured cultural strategies. On the formal institutional level the main aims are well determined, although the

cultural experts show some dissatisfaction with the system, but comparing to the Hungarian case (as we show later), these systems are more transpa-rent, as there is no long-run cultural policy and stra-tegy in Hungary. The lack of strastra-tegy has its effects on the economic performance of Hungarian cultural sector as those countries, which have well deter-mined strategy (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland) show more efficient economic performance.

Centralization vs. decentralization is another deter-mining factor. In Poland the cultural decision-making is decentralized, and the fiscal allocation is directed by the government to the local governments (see Table 4).

Table 4: Public Cultural Expenditure in Poland (2011)

In Poland there is no “arm length body” for cultural subsidization. The main aims of the Polish cultural policy [2]:

- “decentralization – shift the competencies from the central administration to the regional level, and from the regional to the local level;

- public financial support for selected cultural institutions and crucial cultural events;

- support for the development of non-public cultural institutions and funding mechanisms which could supplement the public funding of culture.”

The Czech Republic is smaller in size and popula-tion than Poland, but it uses also a decentralized system. This country has a cultural strategy for the period 2009–2014 with four main objectives [2]:

- “Economic and Social Dimensions: to use the be-nefits of arts and cultural heritage and associated creativity to increase competitive strength in other areas and activities.

- The Civic Dimension – Personal Development: to emphasize the role of culture in the individual pro-fessional and personal development of citizens, especially with regard to creativity, the cultivation of democratic values and individual attitudes and thus increasing the general responsibility for inhe-rited values as well as the newly created ones.

- The Role of the State, Regions and Municipalities in Supporting the Maintenance and Formation of Cultural Values: to provide direct and indirect support to maintain existing cultural values and create new values.

- The Role of the State in Formulating the Rules: to create a transparent and non-discriminating envi-ronment for cultural activities and their support at the levels of the state, regions and municipalities.”

Culture appears at the State level in the concept materials of other ministries, mainly the Ministry of

Education, Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other bodies of state administration, which approach is used in the British system as well. The financing is also decentralized as the pub-lic cultural budget is mainly spent by the local autho-rities (see Table 5). Both the decision-making and the fiscal system of the cultural sector is decentrali-zed, the system is homogenous.

In Slovakia the decision-making is centralized, but there is an independent committee, the so called

“Committee on Culture and Media” with monitoring and controlling rights. The local governments also have decision-making on local, municipal cultural institutions, amateur projects. The Slovakian system is fiscally centralized (see Table 6).

They try to implement some “arm length” principle with “advantaged or state-supported credits for in-vestments in the area of culture and the selective reduction of taxes for cultural goods and services”

[2]. We can see that this system is less eclectic than the Hungarian one.

Slovenia is running a different model comparing to the previously mentioned two models. The main institutional body is the Ministry for Culture, but the arm length aspect is determinant too as the so cal-led “National Assembly” deals with culture in gene-ral level through bills, national four year programs for culture and annual state budgets [2]. Beside the-se institutions the National Asthe-sembly appoints an in-dependent body, the National Council for Culture, which monitors and assesses the impact of cultural policy on cultural development. The whole system can be characterized as being poly-central. Altho-ugh the State subsidies are relevant, the municipals have also important role in the decision-making and fiscal allocation (see Table 7).

Structural Transition in Cultural Policy: A Post-Socialist Perspective 42

Previously we analyzed countries, in which the decision-making and the fiscal resource allocation is in harmony, so the system is homogenous. In the

Czech Republic and Poland decentralization is the priority in cultural policy, while in Slovakia and Slovenia, the system is centralized.

Table 5: Public Cultural Expenditure by Level of Government in the Czech Republic (1998–2011)

Table 6: Public Cultural Expenditure by Level of Government in Slovakia (1998–2011)

Table 7: Public Cultural Expenditure by Level of Government in Slovenia (1998–2011)

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Hungary is an exception with its hybrid system.

After the political change the Anglo-Saxon cultural financing was preferred. The fast creation of the non-profit sector, tax reductions and the National Cultural Fund (arm length body) are examples for

the liberal way of financing culture. The fiscal sys-tem was also decentralized as the local govern-ments take the major role in public expenditure on culture (see Table 8). However the political deci-sion-making was and is still centralized.

Table 8: Public Cultural Expenditure by Level of Government in Hungary (2001–2009)

The results of the comparative analyses focusing on the homogeneity of the formal institutions (decision-making and fiscal resource allocation) support our hypothesis that the harmony of institutions has determining role in the economic performance of the cultural sector of a country.