Local Community Structures
The cooperation of neighbours in the village communities that were based on family economy was usual, but it has become less and less indispensable with the evolution of market economy and mass production. The socioeconomic changes resulted in the disintegration of interpersonal relationships; the previous scene of mutual help and long-term reciprocity, namely the local community lost its importance.29 People in wide or even in the immediate neighbourhoods barely know each other, the number of strong ties decreases in the relationship networks and consequently the interpersonal trust diminishes as well (Wellman and Wortley, 1990, Utasi 2001).
29 The cities of post-industrial societies, and the Western ‘welfare’ and Eastern ‘Socialist’ economies emerging from modernisation created the illusion that all services would be affordable and purchasable in the system of institutionalised organic solidarity, full employment and regular income, and this would release the individual from the compulsion and duty of everyday solidarity and reciprocity. But the removal of interpersonal ties resulted in the loss of supporting relationships, thus the individualisation led to atomization.
The decline of strong, primary relationships impedes the collaboration of the individual and the community.30
It was presumed though, that the neighbourhood relationships still have a significant role in the majority of small villages, therefore, people tend to trust each other more than the residents of larger towns and cities. The economic cooperation, however, is limited nowadays to the family and relatives.31 In the last decades, the inequalities increased by the economic competition have aggravated the shrink age of solidarity network and trust even in the villages (Utasi 2008).
Although the cooperation of neighbours has become loose due to the structural changes of economy after the political transition, the local communities have maintained their functionality. According to our research definition, the village community comprises the identity of the residents, their mutual solidarity, the common values shaped by similar living conditions and the preservation of customs and traditions (Weber 1987, Tönnies 1983, Hankiss 2004, Utasi 2009). It was presumed that most of the listed parameters still exist in the neighbourhood communities of small villages.32
The relationships are evidently weaker than decades ago; still the villagers have more opportunities to build strong
30 The competition of modernisation and the voracious lifestyle of consumer society do not leave time the people to build strong relationships and get to know each other closely. The time shortage does not favour the development of trust, so mistrust poisons the most direct circles of the individual; prejudice intensifies, partnerships, families, closer and wider communities fell apart.
31 Manifestations of everyday solidarity and mutual help is limited to the family and relatives, because only these ties ensure long-term reciprocity over generations consequently to the loss of mutual trust in interpersonal relationships.
32 It has to be emphasised that these relationship networks are typical only for small villages. In the large villages where the small communities and relationships disintegrated more rapidly due to the effects of modernisation,
personal ties based on tradition and trust than the residents of settlement with large population do. Consequently, villagers might have a better chance of getting involved in the local public life so as to influence the decision-making process of the local authorities. The immediate nature of relationships in the village neighbourhoods might revive the inclination for civic participation and for democratic improvement.
According to our hypothesis, village communities are constituted by various relationship circles. These are partly traditional circles formed by similar origin, goals and values, and partly formalized civil communities created in reaction to the civilization process. Our research is focused on these small groups with different functions which are encompassed by the local communities.
Two categories of small communities were differentiated.
Our attempt was to determine the conditions of entering informal and/or formal small communities and their prevalence in the villages (Weber 1987).
Furthermore, we examined how the small groups with different motivations coalesce into the local community of the village, and how they influence local public life. In the era of globalisation and internationally centralised economic-political power, local communities are of primary importance, since they can become the counterpoints to the centres by articulating local interests, sustaining local value preferences, traditions and local public life as well.
Local public life is, in our understanding, the attention and activities of the population of a settlement that are aimed at common resolution of actual social, local or political problems of the living place. Dominant fields and elements of local public life or local democracy are, for example, the common work for the improvement of local circumstances, opinion exchange, and political activity. Local community and public relationships do not necessarily lead to civic participation and
activity, since these require consciousness and the ability to understand information. However, the majority of the resourceless population lack both. In the examination of the relationship network of democracy and democratic public life, our starting point was Dahl’s theory who emphasized that citizens should effectively participate in collective decisions, receive adequate information, improve their knowledge and know the agenda of social issues. As we have indicated in the preface, Barber’s view of the preconditions of democracy, namely civic participation, civil dialogue, civil actions and active citizens who have community ties, correspond to our research concepts (Dahl 1989, Barber 2004, Utasi 2009).
The results of a nationally representative survey, as it has been discussed earlier, revealed the living conditional determinants of civic participation and the need for it:
education, financial security and socialization through childhood communities.
Accordingly, public life was expected to be intensive in the villages where the majority of the population live in advantaged social circumstances and have an average or high level of education. Indigence and the lack of education limit the needs to the acquisition of primary goods, and this impedes the flow and the comprehension of social-political information and the pursuit of interests. In addition to the adequate living conditions, emotional attachment to the village is an important factor, since people who intend to live their lives within the same community presumably want more influence on the public life.
The geographical situation and regional economic position in the country, employability and labour market affect the public and community life of the villages as well. Our sample consisted of villages that are in the vicinity of cities, with a population previously engaged in collective farming and not exceeding 2500 people. Out of the seven villages that were
studied in the survey, three were located in Hungary, and four were in two other countries, but these villages had Hungarian majority population as well. In Hungary we examined Ruzsa, near Szeged, Petőfiszállás, near Kiskunfélegyháza and Ramocsaháza, a village from the most disadvantaged region and county (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg) of the country. The villages outside of Hungary were Hajdújárás in Vojvodina, near to Szeged and Subotica (Serbia), Bácsgyulafalva (Serbia), a remote and closed village, Agyagfalva and Bögöz in Transylvania near Odorheiu Secuiesc (Romania).
The geographical location of the villages and the fact that they belonged to three different countries enabled us to compare the public and community lives of Hungarian population within and outside of the borders, to examine the same aspects in advanced and less advanced regions and to reveal the economic strategies of different communities.33
Economic Strategies in the Villages
The majority population of the seven villages in the sample used to make their living from collective farming before the political transition. Even today, the families of every second respondent (58%) did supplementary farming, and many of them sold their products on the market. Agricultural activity was characteristic for three fourths of the families in the villages far from the Hungarian border. In Hajdújárás, near Szeged and Subotica, the proportion of farmers was relatively
33 We balanced the sample with the population (N=845). The houses were selected with random sampling with the help of topographical maps received from the local authorities. In the households with more than one people we interviewed those whose birthday was the closest to the time of the survey.
low, but the number of those who sold their products on the market was the highest here and in Bácsgyulafalva (Vojvodina).
The proportion of farmers was the lowest in Ruzsa (near Szeged) which is probably the consequence of the proximity of the urban labour market, the impacts of urbanization and the low quality of the soil. However, the residents who were actually engaged in agriculture tended to sell their products which again points to the possibilities offered by the city.
The villagers in the sample were strongly attached to their living places: three fourths of the respondents had not even considered living elsewhere. Only a few percentages planned to move away, or reported the wish for leaving the village.
Although the examination of the income sources and the economic activities showed a high proportion of inactive residents (retired + unemployed = 57%), it did not mean that only the ‘formally’ employable people worked, as farming and in some villages tourism were of great importance. In other words, the villagers tried to exploit multiple sources of income, and the ‘real unemployed’ were only the people incapacitated by age or illness.
The average age of the village populations (aged 50-55 years) and the high proportion of the younger generations suggests either strong attachment and favourable circumstances, or the opposite, factors that impede change and mobility. The number of young residents was the highest in Ramocsaháza and Bögöz. Ramocsaháza, in the Nyírség region, had a peculiar social composition. There was a high proportion of young, Roma residents who barely find employment in the economically disadvantaged region, not even with commuting;
therefore they are compelled to get along with the scarce possibilities locally. Employment and unemployment rates also indicated the lack of possibilities: the former was the lowest
and the latter the highest in Ramocsaháza among the studied Hungarian villages. Moreover, Bögöz and Ramocsaháza had polarized social structures, as the age distribution was the most imbalanced in these two villages: despite having the highest proportion of young respondents in the sample, the number of the retired elder was also remarkably high. The reason for this phenomenon is probably the strong preservation of the traditional forms of extended family.
Our data revealed that the villagers of the sample sustained and continuously reinforced their relationships.
Besides the people in their households, the respondents communicated regularly with six relatives on average. It has to be added that approximately half of the relatives with whom the respondents interacted weekly lived in their villages, but modern-day technology enables people to overcome distance, thus the participants kept in contact with the reported number of relatives personally, and/or through telephone and e-mail.
The information exchange between the respondents and their relatives about their lives, neighbourhoods, etc. is continuous, and they can help each other in case of need (Molnár 2003).
Despite the strong attachment to the villages, people who are not restricted in their mobility leave their living places permanently or temporarily impelled by socio-economic and financial difficulties, or by the effects of civilization process and consumerism. The proportion of the respondents’ relatives who were living abroad in the time of the survey informed us about the extent of migration.
The four villages outside of Hungary had the highest number of migrants currently living abroad. In Bácsgyulafalva, four fifths of the respondents had relatives (at least one) abroad, in Bögöz and Hajdújárás the proportion was two thirds, and in Agyagfalva more than half of the participants reported the same. Presumably, the living conditions in these ethnic
villages led to an economic strategy which involved migration as the final solution for a great part of the population.
In the case of the three villages in Hungary, it became obvious that the proportion of migrants depended on the economic and regional situation of the village and on the quality of the living that the region can offer. In Ruzsa, for example, which is a village near to a city with considerably good employment oppotunities, only a quarter of the participants had relatives abroad, while the proportion was one third in the economically most disadvantaged village, in Ramocsaháza. The majority of the migrants had left the village (and the country) motivated by economic factors in hope for a better living temporarily or permanently.
Obviously, the more livelihood opportunities the village provides, the stronger the pull factors are. But the isolated geographical situation, in and outside of Hungary, aggravates the economic difficulties, compels people to abandon their communities and seek employment abroad. The village community strives to keep the relationship with the migrants.
The cohesion and persistent power of the village communities are reflected by the frequency of interaction: one tenth of respondents who have relatives abroad communicate daily and one fourth at least weekly with the migrants. The in-depth interviews revealed that the majority of the migrants return home for village days, fairs, other events or celebrations in the village. The most preferred destination of the migration, both for study and work reasons, was Hungary. The possible explanations for the high percentages of immigration from the Hungarian majority villages outside of the border to Hungary are the strong linguistic and cultural ties, as well as the lack of knowledge of other languages. The second most likely target is Germany, with even more potentials.
The significant discrepancy in the proportions of people migrating from the Hungarian villages and the Hungarian
ethnic villages suggest that the four villages in Serbia and Romania are in a more disadvantaged economic situation than the other three settlements of the sample. The employment opportunities abroad detract the mobile workforce even from the cohesive village community. It is a well-known sociological fact, however, that predominantly the active, qualified and young people endeavour the work abroad, thus migration deprive the local communities of some of their most resourceful and valuable members.
According to our previous results, financial security is the precondition of the individuals’ intensive attention to common issues and of the active participation in the community life which could later evolve into civic practice.
However, deprivation confines individual activity to the acquisition of primary goods, and impedes the development of higher needs, such as the need for public participation (Maslow 1954, Allardt 1993, Utasi 1984).
The income scale was determined by the hierarchic index of assets of the families.34 The average amount of the assets per family was the highest in Agyagfalva where the distribution of the index was relatively low, in other words, the financial inequalities were less significant here than in the other villages of the sample. Agyagfalva has a long and effective tradition of family farming involving several generations, and this practice guarantees the decent wealth of the residents. The second village on the income scale is Petőfiszállás, but the distribution is higher which indicates more significant economic inequalities.
According to the income scale, the most disadvantaged village in the sample was Ramocsaháza, moreover, the index distribution
34 The list assets included: Cable TV, colour TV, landline, mobile phone, dishwasher, automatic washing machine, home cinema system or DVD player, PC, laptop, Internet connection, digital camera, car, art object, vacation property, own house/flat, another house/flat, land/agricultural property.
here was the highest in the whole sample, ergo deprivation is combined with huge inequality.
If our hypothesis is correct, and the low level of education and the financial difficulties prevent the improvement of public participation, then Ramocsaháza has the civically most disinterested population. As far as educational attainment of the residents is concerned, Ramocsaháza has the lowest proportion of graduates (4, 4%, the sample average = 9, 6%). In other words, Ramocsaháza was the most afflicted by the two impeding factors of public life in the sample.
Village Community and Trust
Previous examinations have proved that the interpersonal trust is diminishing in the modern consumer societies as a consequence of urbanization, industrial development and individualization; workplaces are in a constant state of flux, and the living places are repeatedly changed, people always have to adapt to new co-workers and neighbours which hinders the emergence of trust in relationships. In contrast with the dynamic population of cities who have less primary and more secondary relationships, the village communities are able to reinforce their connections with face-to-face interactions daily, and this favours the development of close and reliable ties (Fukuyama 2000, Utasi 2005).
The averages of the composite trust index that was aggregated from the four trust-related variables showed insignificant discrepancies in the sample of the village communities.35 The averages of the trust index were the highest
35 Indicators of trust: a) there are only a few people one can trust entirely
in Bögöz and Agyagfalva, possibly because the tradition of cooperation between families, neighbours and communities has been strongly preserved in the interdependent Transylvanian villages; and in the isolated Bácsgyulafalva (Vojvodina) where the members of the community protect their ethnicity in this way. The outstanding averages of these three villages reflect the traditional value preferences and the stronger cohesion of the village communities as well.
Figure 21:
The averages of the trust index in the villages of the sample (Z-scores)
In contrast with the three previous examples, the averages of trust index were low in the Hungarian villages. The reasons for the results are presumably the values of civilization and market economy that play a greater role in people’s lives here due to the proximity of cities. In addition, many inhabitants regard the settlement as accommodation, but not as a living place, as they find employment in the cities and do not
other’s benevolence. c) if I am not careful enough, people will take advantage of my benevolence. d) The best is if everyone relies exclusively on her/himself and not on others.
feel attached to their neighbours. The village community disintegrates more easily and its members do not trust each other. The residents of Ramocsaháza also reported low degrees of trust, but the explanation in this case is not the atomizing effect of advantaged economic situation, but the deprivation and economic inequality within the community. The residents’
strong desire for leaving and their lack of identity also confirm this theory.
In sum, not only the prosperity and advanced level of urbanization reduce interpersonal trust in the modern-day consumer society, but deprivation and social inequalities as well.36 Financial difficulties, if combined with extreme social discrepancies precipitate the loss of trust and local disintegration to a similar extent as the effects of urbanisation and consumerism do in the more advantaged settlements and regions. Advertisements and
In sum, not only the prosperity and advanced level of urbanization reduce interpersonal trust in the modern-day consumer society, but deprivation and social inequalities as well.36 Financial difficulties, if combined with extreme social discrepancies precipitate the loss of trust and local disintegration to a similar extent as the effects of urbanisation and consumerism do in the more advantaged settlements and regions. Advertisements and