• Nem Talált Eredményt

centralises financial instruments across the remit of the Partnership Agreement and offers refundable or combined assistance to projects fitting into the priorities of the operational programmes. A

In document Innovative finance in the health sector (Pldal 149-157)

Case studies 1. Hungary

Priority 8 centralises financial instruments across the remit of the Partnership Agreement and offers refundable or combined assistance to projects fitting into the priorities of the operational programmes. A

budget of HUF 202 million has been earmarked to support R+I activities in the business sector.

Table 11: Financial Instruments 2014-2020 in Hungary

TO Loan programs Combined loan programs Venture capital programs

TO1

buildings with the use of renewable energy

To resolve the problem of late programme start, the Government decided to apply a very steep spending profile for all the operational programmes. This has practically meant a very compressed timeframe, accelerated project selection and contracting which has doubtless brought about positive absorption impacts. At the same time, by to date grant assistance allocations under the operational programme has been depleted by to date, there is no open call for proposal for companies wishing to innovate.

The geographical scope of the Competitive Central Hungary Operational Programme is limited to Budapest and Central Hungary. As in the period 2014-20 these territories are not eligible for support under any of the other operational programmes, the CCHOP essentially includes measures which supplement interventions in the less developed regions by the sectoral operational programmes including EDIOP. The CCHOP allocation is very restricted, national funding has had to be mobilised to meet the acute need of development in Pest county.

The Commission’s legislative proposal for the budgetary period 2021-27 has given a firm impetus to preparations. As many of the sectoral policies largely coincided with the EU present financial perspective, the need to revisit these documents became evident. Accordingly, the R+D+I strategy has been recently undergoing an updating process. The new strategy for the post 2020 period, among others encourages creativity and generation value added, collaboration within the innovation ecosystem and reinforces R+D resources and activities at the universities.

Setting out the new framework for Cohesion Policy implementation is underway, too. The formal launch of the planning process in February 2019 was accompanied by carving the key principles into stone too. The Government called for a stronger emphasis on

• long term positive impacts on efficiency and productivity, business environment, human capacity and well-being,

• effectiveness of the interventions paid by the operational programmes,

• concentration of objectives and interventions,

• the working out of simplifications and prepare applicants to ease access to funding.

Discarding the approach of polishing the existing set-up, the idea of assessing sectoral and to a lesser extent territorial needs and reconciling the deriving intervention strands with top-level priorities has prevailed so far. An elaborate programming structure was set up whereas main consultative/decision-making platforms include

• programming working committees42

• thematic working committees covering 37 thematic intervention areas,

• the Coordination Committee for Development Policy,

• the Strategic and Family Policy Cabinet, and the ,

• the Economic Affairs Committee I

42 1024/2019. (II. 11.) Korm. határozat a Programozási Munkacsoport létrehozásáról

n July 2019, the Government discussed its global goals for 2030 and the contribution of the next round of Cohesion Policy funding to their realisation. The national strategic concept for long-term socio-economic development assigns utmost priority to, among others,

• Improving growth, health and labour market competitiveness of the population

• Creating a demographically sustainable life concept and lifestyle

• Achieving world-class, innovative, highly-value added economic – production – performance Consequently, the key strands for using Cohesion Policy resources includes, among others

• business development and innovation: this intervention area concentrates on Hungary’s international competitiveness and aims to significantly raise its level as well as industrial production both in

absolute43 and relative44 terms.

o The objective of better value adding, which leads to widened participation in global value chains, brings about the need to improve the position of indigenous firms.

• These companies are become capable of forming supplier integrations and raising their share in GDP production45 and total exports46.

• sustainable labour market development: this intervention area focuses in increasing employment (also involving the mobilisation of the retired population groups) and advancing labour market performance.

o Productivity of the labour force is expected to attain an annual average growth level of 2% in the period 2020-2030.

• improve human capital for renewal in the labour market: this intervention area presents strong links to overall competitiveness based on the achievement of a demographic change, a region-wide leading educational system and reduced inequalities. Targets are also relevant to health and innovation including

o The total number of births should amount to 90.000 per year, meanwhile the birth rate-death rate relationship is improved too. Longetivity is aimed to be extended by 2 years. The early mortality rate is reduced by 50%.

o Mandatory health screening, good-quality and accessible basic services will be provided. Home-based social and health services will be made accessible for the entire ageing population. The health sector will be endowed with motivated and highly-qualified health personnel.

Resource allocation has been defined at a macro level. The weight of the business and innovation strand is well reflected by its share, which equals 33% of the country’s financial allocation (as compared to the present 28%). Competitiveness linked labour market and social policy interventions hold a share 24% (presently 31%) and infrastructure development accounts for 41%.

The setting forth of ambitious aims induced a notably altered approach in financing policy interventions. The intervention area of business and innovation support will benefit from more targeted financial assistance, marking a break with the provision of support for general economic development purposes. Moreover, the proportion of refundable support will increase, as well. The Government has recently approved the preparation and introduction of a pilot convertible loan scheme which allows the partial conversion of refundable loan assistance into non-refundable grant assistance in case the beneficiary meets the pre-defined performance targets.

43 An increase in industrial output by 40% is set out.

44 An increase from a share of 25% to a share of 35% in the total economic output is set out.

45 An increase from the current 50% to a share of 65% is set out.

46 An increasefrom the current 30% to a share of 50% is set out.

The successful pilot is intended to be rolled out to a broader range of business and innovation promotion schemes in the period 2021-27. This could turn out as a particularly relevant model for health innovation projects, where due to the novel nature of projects, beneficiaries carry a much higher risks.

The Government is firmly committed to improve Hungary’s innovation performance. The system of priority objectives under Cohesion Policy offers an adequate context for supporting the delivery of innovation policy goals from both the EU and national resources. Correspondingly

• the new mission-oriented innovation policy will be continued. This enables responding to

outstanding socio-economic challenges by tailoring assistance (through content, deadlines, indicators etc.) to addressing of specific problems

• the National Innovation, Research and Development Fund enables multiannual project funding from national budgetary sources,

• the three pillars of Hungary’s innovation policy – SME innovation, academic and educational sector, priority projects (e.g. science parks) - will ensure a direct link to the progression towards excellence.

Broadly set and long term open calls for proposals will make certain the utilisation of multiple – EU and national level - funding sources for high-potential projects,

• exploiting the Seal of Excellence mechanism will bring about a fast track route for projects of

outstanding quality. This means that EU regulations allow for direct take-over of project proposals from centrally managed EU programmes (e.g. Horizon Europe) into the relevant operational programmes in case the project has been judged of sufficiently high quality nonetheless rejected in the absence of funding. The commitment of the Hungarian authorities (in charge of either policy or implementation of the operational programmes) is unclear at this stage. General transfer modalities as well as the technicalities of taking over projects, which are generally launched by international consortia, and charge them against the national operational programmes requires more analysis yet,

• also the efficiency and effectiveness of R+D+I support needs to be increased. The ratio of R+D+I support to R+D+I spending by firms, which is relatively low by international comparisons, reveals significant unlocked potential.

• human services promotion schemes will target persons rather than institutions. (Under ESF financed schemes the preparation of studies and methodologies will become ineligible. Rather than creating new services, access to the existing portfolio of technologies and services should be promoted.)

The next milestone was initially fixed for 31st October 2019 when the Government was to take a decision on priority axes, operational programmes and the breakdown of finance. Also the mode of addressing complex territorial problems was to be determined. Although tby the above deadline the Government’s final formal position has not been established, the continued strategy formulation process has led to some important clarifications.

The Government aims at introducing a simple, straightforward architecture for the operational programmes.

Namely, the concept of three operational programmes seems to have consolidated greatly to date; this implies the launch of a(n)

• Competitive Economy Operational Programme: This operational programme is foreseen to include a priority focusing on fostering innovation whereby projects will benefit from ERDF funding and a higher education, vocational education priority which will be supported by the ESF.

• Infrastructure Development Promoting Competitiveness Operational Programme, and

• Renewable Human Resources Operational Programme: this operational programme is foreseen to comprise a priority which is dedicated to health sector development with funding to come from ESF.

R+D+I as well financial instruments will enjoy a greater share of funding. This goal is clearly shared by the European Commission and the Government of Hungary and its details will be put in place and finalised during the negotiation of the operational programmes, in the second half of 2020.

Hungary’s current Partnership Agreement for the period 2014-20 takes note of the economic growth potential which involvement in the H2020 programme could help to unlock and calls for the EDIOP and HROP to improve access to H2020 via helping the preparations of prospective applicants.

Accordingly, the EDIOP R+D+I priority has been planned to aid companies in their innovative actions, to promote R+D+I strategic collaboration and initatives, to support the research sector in attaining excellence as well as to advance their capacity, domestic and international collaboration.

• Not only specific measures have been outlined, aimed at narrowing the gap between the preparedness of the Hungarian innovation actors vis a vis H2020 requirements ; measures to follow up successful H2020 projects promised the exploitation of their results.

• Besides, the operational programme projected a preferential approach in project selection to companies and Widening participants which have met the respective H2020 call requirements47 and have been only rejected due to the shortage of funds.

• The wording of the programme also allowed for parallel financing of complementary actions48.

• The performance framework for the priority does not exert any pressure for a paced realisation of the above objectives.

The HROP deploys its ESF monies for the academic and higher educational sectors to further strengthen their existing research capacity and to build the future research leaders, and the programme also promotes their integration into the global and international research communities.

• Similarly to the EDIOP, the outline of the priority and the measures do not translate the aim of advancing synergies either into the broadly defined key selection criteria or the performance targets.

In accordance with the demarcation line drawn between the EDIOP and HROP, project preparation can only be funded from the former.

The responsibility to coordinate the various funding streams is clearly assigned to the line ministry.

Additionally the Partnership Agreement describes the role of the Development Policy Coordination Committee (FKB) in discussing issues and progress. The presentation of the coordination regime with internal and external financiers is standardised, again not provoking a real thinking process about how the use of the various funding instruments could be effectively approximated.

Whereas, operational programmes funds have been practically depleted (fully committed), new

opportunities for funding may arise even in the last years of the programming period (e.g. replacement of projects affected by financial corrections, withdrawals, exchange rate fluctuations etc.).

47 .Kiválóságot szolgáló K+I kapacitások megteremtése/Reinforcing excellence focused R+I capacity;

48 With the exception of the same expenditure element, whcih the EU regulations excluded at the point in time when the programme was adopted.

1.3. Project implementation: experiences, obstacles and best practices

1.4.1. Project preparation

The experience of exploiting synergies, which the combination of ESIF and H2020 (or other centrally managed programmes) enables, is practically missing. Just the opposite, the use of the ESI Funds gives abundant experience and food for thought.

Without any doubts regarding the positive side of obtaining public contribution, especially grant assistance for R+D+I projects, both applying for and implementing Cohesion Policy funding effectuates major risks for a project promoter.

The first risk relates to the preparing a fully-fledged project for finance under any of the operational

programmes. This requires massive investments from the project promoter which only pays off if the project is (i.) selected and (ii.) successfully implemented so that the public support is fully released. Small surprise, instead of mature, well grounded concepts applicants tend to reach out to broadly defined, immature project ideas which are then massaged into an acceptable form. This means that the application has to meet the dictated – at least minimally required - technical-professional as well as project quality standards and to conform to all the administrative conditions which the use of the EU funds implies.

The difference between the case when an organisation is planning a project for its own purpose and when the project is devised against a call for proposals is hard to illustrate. Public contribution involves/may involve

• additional obligations for the beneficiary, which would otherwise not be provided for within the project (extra activities, extra expenses, nonetheless they are eligible),

• worded exclusion of activities or expenditure (which may be necessary for the project),

• the assignment of maximum/minimum limits to the value of certain project components or activities, e.g. setting a percentage for the purchase of equipment, project management etc. ( which in reality may cost more),

• the attachment of deadlines to project components, deliverables, e.g. milestones (which may be tight or unreal)

• a lack of reference to/clear guidance on activities, expenditure necessary for the project,

• a series of administrative tasks, e.g. reporting, payment application, whereas the timeline for approving their satisfaction is unknown.

Working with the ESI Funds necessitates that the applicant, later beneficiary secures a rather unique combination of skills. The applicant’s capacity should include

• discipline/subject matter specialists relevant to the topic area of the call,

• broader sectoral policy understanding - and preferably expertise,

• Cohesion Policy implementation – knowledge and experience,

• general project management skills and experience.

Without a critical mass of OP funded projects which would have instigated the setting up of a dedicated project implementation/management unit, most organisations struggle with ascertaining the above skills base. They can usually come up with the technical expertise, besides heir functional managers (legal, financial, HR etc.) can contribute to project preparation in a meaningful manner. For Cohesion Policy grant application and management, the probability that external expertise has to be engaged is quite high. Its expensiveness is compounded by strict admission deadlines which gravely increase the intensity of the project preparatory efforts.

Competition is limited to domestic actors. It is all the fiercer though as it is timely compressed, due to the dominance of one-off type calls for proposals, the unpredictability of future funding options, absorption pressure motivating a rapid commitment of the funds.

Networking, lobbying is assumed to be relatively widespread.

The grave risk of failing the award of assistance may come from various factors:

• Despite a step of simplification steps, submitting a grant application still comes along with enormous requirements for administrative-regulatory compliance.

o There is a serious disparity between the admission deadline and the requirements.

o The magnitude and complexity of the call and all the corresponding documents makes a misstep relatively easy.

• Some of the missteps are incorrigible. (A missing documents leading to instant rejection.)

• As mentioned earlier, grant application goes hand in hand with probable delays, among them rather serious ones, in the appraisal process.

o New applicants have to familiarise themselves with such a situation and learn how to handle the undesired pause properly, e.g. keeping the project on the agenda, proceed with the preparation as possible.

• Imbalance between the grant scheme funding volume (total allocation) and the total requested funding repeatedly leads to the suspension or even closure of the call.

o Regulations oblige the managing authority to provide some “buffer time” before the call is closed, so that applications with a maturity close to submission standards can be completed and uploaded into the electronic grant application system.

o However, this short period of time proved insufficient for many of the less progressed applicants.

Not only was their chance to obtain grant assistance nullified, they lost the monies they had invested in the working out of the application, as well.

Project promoters can only meet the first outstanding challenge of obtaining the funds if they have sufficient information about the requirements, on the basis of which they can measure the pros and cons, secure the necessary resources (financial and human), last but not least set in motion and control a project for the preparation of the project.

• Many applicants just have not got enough experience to do it. Moreover, applicants are likely to keep their experience to themselves and rarely share the details with potential or real competitors.

• Although mystified by inexperienced applicants and private consultants (even to some extent by the OP delivery bodies) writing up a grant application is far from rocket science. To understand this, applicants are in strong need of straightforward, very pragmatic support especially in the orientation and early stage of project preparation.

o Support could be – partly - institutionalised for R+D+I projects as private consultancy companies rarely if ever can present the highly specialised technical knowledge.

o Advice and information should be supplemented by bridging the gap between the applicant and the grant provider organisation (managing authority, NKFIH), which is usually done by private consultancy companies.

o Technical support can include the organisation of sharing experience.

• Capability gaps of innovators were early recognised by the EIT Health InnoStars. Its local development project scheme offers a combination of project preparatory support and pre-assessment for entities wishing to submit applications for centrally managed EU programmes. Experience has revealed that accessing centrally managed programmes pre-supposes a significantly higher level of quality which innovators could rarely meet without externally arranged technical assistance. Feedback from leading international experts does create value to the project applications. Similar support should form an integral part of the instruments which the new EU operational and national programmes will offer.

1.4.2. Project selection (structures and processes employed for the award of finance)

1.4.3. Cohesion Policy Regime Annual operational plan

Operational programmes are broken down into annual operational plan (ÉFK)49, which is discussed by the monitoring committee and the Development Policy Coordination Committee (FKB)50 and approved by the Government. The approval lists all the call for proposals (budget, mode and date of launch51) and the priority projects (name, beneficiary, indicative allocation, main technical requirements52) the managing authority will start. It is published on the central website53, providing indication for applicants on the probable schedule of calls.

In document Innovative finance in the health sector (Pldal 149-157)