importantly, heating and cooling degree-days reveal within-year temperature variations that are averaged out in annual average temperature.
2. Robustness to model specifications and alternative samples
One of our two main results is that temperature has a non-linear and convex effect on energyuse per capita. We test whether this main result is robust to alternative samples. Table 1 provides our baseline regression estimates (column 1) and shows how these estimates change when we (a) restrict the sample to countries with at least 10 years of energyuse data (column 2); (b) drop oil-rich countries, those with at least 20% of GDP from oil production (column 3); and (c) drop large heterogeneous countries—the United States and China (column 4). We also test whether this main result is robust to alternative set of independent variables: (a) adding continent fixed effects (column 5); (b) replacing year fixed effects with a linear time trend (column 6). Across these model specifications and samples, basic signs and magnitudes of our main result remain unchanged.
This is the first paper that estimates the global land usechange impact of growth of the bioenergy sector. Applying time-series analytical mechanisms to fuel, biofuel and agricultural commodity prices and production, we estimate the long-rung relationship between energy prices, bioenergy production and the global land usechange. Our results suggest that rising energy prices and bioenergy production significantly contribute to the global land usechange both through the direct and indirect land usechange impact. Globally, the total agricultural area yearly increases by 35578.1 thousand ha due to increasing oil price, and by 12125.1 thousand ha due to increasing biofuel production, which corresponds to 0.73% and 0.25% of the total world-wide agricultural area, respectively. Soya land usechange and wheat land usechange have the highest elasticities both with respect to oil price and biofuel production. In contrast, non-biomass crops (grassland and rice) have negative land usechange elasticities. Region-specific results suggest that South America faces the largest yearly total land usechange associated with oil price increase (+10600.7 thousand ha), whereas Asia (+8918.6 thousand ha), South America (+4024.9 thousand ha) and North America (+1311.5 thousand ha) have the largest yearly total
Building on the work of this study we see four promising fields for future research. First, the current political situation of a missing globalclimate policy and ambitious national technology support programs may change in the future. Climate policies may be implemented in ten or twenty years from now, but then it is important to know today whether early technology policy would reduce the enormous costs of delayed climate policies; see Clarke et al. (2009). Second, economic significance of coordinating instruments of technology policies and climate policies in an integrated framework should be studied intensively; see e.g. Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007). The available studies only used idealized models of the energy sector and did not consider the fossil energy supply side of the climate problem; see Sinn (2008). Conceptual research is needed to develop approaches that allow studying second best coordination of climate and technology policies in a perfect foresight framework like ReMIND. Then we could ask for the significance of coordinating policies and whether ill-defined technology support may do more harm than good. Third, the present study only focused on the two policy approaches for reducing CO 2 emissions from the energy sector. However, the same question is
As the development of these technologies moves forward, it is important to know what futureenergy markets will look like. What are the future business strategies for international invest- ment in the energy sector? In how far does the current financial crisis prevent or enhance domestic and international investment in energy saving technologies? What will be the dominant energy sources in different regions? In which fields of technology and locations will political action be necessary? Will action be taken by a global institution or on a regional level? In which form and time frame? Herein, an important step is the introduction of a CO2 emission price (tax or cap and trade system). In addition, the development, diffusion and application of new energy solutions may be fostered through all channels of international cooperation. The main actors would be multinational companies and investors. For example, they might invest in large-scale solar energy projects in African deserts, in large-scale offshore wind parks in Europe, or in CCS-equipped power plants in China. Policy makers should set a sound legal framework to give the right incentives to business initiatives, possibly via specifying energy efficiency standards on products. Where an efficient allocation fails, scientific advisors should identify policy strategies to promote international private investment and (international) tech- nology diffusion, for example via sorting out institutional barriers in implementing energy saving technologies. They should also provide guidance on effective public investment in R&D and foreign aid. Given the increasing demand for energy in developing countries, a particular focus should fall on efforts to transfer technologies to these countries.
four times higher than the carbon price derived from a model with no demography as in Golosov et al. ( 2014 ).
In this paper we explore optimal environmental policies in a climate-economy with population dynamics that entail changes in savings patterns and capital returns. Using a stylized overlapping generations model, we show that an increase in life-expectancy and a decrease in fertility rates raise households’ savings, declining the rate of return to capital due to its relative abundance. Changing savings patterns also lead to changes in the way people value future economic gains or losses, including climate damages. We propose a time-varying effective discount factor that allows climate policies to reflect demographic patterns.
Earth surface temperature series, which provides much better coverage of polar regions than HADCRUT4. We compare these results to a model using the HADCRUT4 data as a robustness check.
Marvel et al. (2016) argue that the efficacy of some forcings is less than that of greenhouse gases and anthropogenic aerosols. They use single-forcing experiments to estimate these efficacies and revise TCR and ECS estimates upward to 1.7K and to 2.6-3.0ºC, depending on the feedbacks included. Armour (2016) highlights the joint (multiplicative) importance of the Richardson et al. (2016) and the Marvel et al. (2016) studies, which together should raise observational ECS by 60%, reconciling the discrepancy between observation and model based estimates. We test this idea by estimating models with both total aggregated radiative forcing using a uniform efficacy and radiative forcing adjusted for the lower efficacy of some forcings. Knutti et al. (2017) carry out an extensive survey of the literature, concluding that based on estimates constrained by different lines of evidence an ECS value of 3ºC is most likely. On the other hand, Brown and Caldeira (2017) argue that models that better simulate the current energy budget predict greater future warming and that the mean observationally informed ECS is 3.7ºC with a 25-75% interval of 3-4.2ºC. But Cox et al. (2018) find that based on models that estimate the observed climate variability better, the ECS is 2.8 ºC with a 66% confidence interval of 2.2- 3.4 ºC.
Denote ν i (U (ε i (α i ), ε −i )) as individual i’s damage function. A variable α i ≥ 0 is
the abatement cost associated with his/her effort to avoid damages due to too much warmed urban air by reducing heat and gas emissions. It is assumed that α i is known
only to individual i. Functionings to cool cities are, for example, economizing in power by reducing the use of electrical fittings and by using a bicycle or a public transportation system instead of a private car. As urban warming accelerates, city dwellers will want to buy newly developed, more efficient air conditioners, which result in reduction of heat emissions. These are examples of functionings which ex- plain α i . Resident i has to pay t i (ε i (α i )) as an urban warming tax, in order for the
Sally Olasogba and Les Duckers provide another African case study in “The Impact of climatechange on the value of growing maize as a biofuel. As awareness about the dangers of a carbon intense global system dependent on burning fossil fuels increase, calls to replace fossil fuel energy sources with renewable ones are growing. Thus, renewable resources such as wind, hydro, geothermal, wave and tidal energies are being deployed or explored. However, since every country in the world has some capacity for biomass, this article examines the role that a changing climate could have on the growing and processing of biomass for power generation purposes. The article points out a major concern for the use of biomass being climatechange itself which could adversely affect the yield of crops, such as maize which are used in biomass processes. The study used four different Nigerian agricultural zones (AEZ) growing maize and modelled futureclimate conditions in each while forecasting the impact that such conditions may have on the yield of maize, and by extension the potential of biomass use in Nigeria. As climatechange increases, biomass yields may decrease, an important factor in considerations of power production sources in the future.
attractive as the other two options. In that scenario, farmers will take the flood risk of cash crop into account and, therefore, the majority would prefer short-rotation forests. The existing grassland, which is characterized by the same likelihood of complete crop failure (every 10 years) as short-rotation forests, will become significantly less attractive. Especially the traditional farmers will be very attracted to the short-rotation forests (78.62 %) (Table 5 ). When introducing higher price fluctuations for cash crop, the attractiveness of short-rotation forest would increase further and the share of traditional farmers would increase to 82 % (56.42 % of all farms). If the environ- mental premium for grassland were to increase to 900 €, the likelihood of growing short-rotation forests would remain high, even though short-rotation forests do not fetch any premiums at the moment. The trends toward heating houses with renewable energy (i.e., wood chips) in rural areas and an already very intensive agricultural land use, could lead to such a premium for short-rotation forests. The sample reacted significantly to this (invented) new pre- mium, especially the ‘‘dynamic, large farms’’ and the ‘‘farms with perspective.’’ The likelihood of a complete cash crop failure every 2 years was another argument in favor of this new land use option. A further effect of cli- mate change can be shown if we assume faster growth of short-rotation forests and a decreased harvest period of Table 3 One class model
). In addition, the proposal effectively reduces the current mandatory 10% target by 2020 through a system of double or fourfold counting of biofuels from feedstock that has a lower effect on land use such as waste or lignocellulosic materials. For example, the 10% renewable energy target could be met by producing 2.5% of total transport energy from organic waste, which counts fourfold. Furthermore, the proposed Directive introduces estimated iLUC emission values, which should be considered in reporting carbon emis- sion savings to the European Commission, but which do not yet count against the emission reduction targets. Including iLUC values, however, even if solely for reporting purposes, would make transparent how little biofuels contribute to GHG emission reduction and how expensive support policies are relative to the small amount of GHG reductions. Thus, any plans for reporting are heavily opposed by bio- fuel supporters. Finally, the Commission proposes to anticipate the 60% minimum greenhouse gas emission saving requirement (relative to fossil fuels) for biofuels from new installations from January 2018 to July 2014. For existing installations, the saving requirement of 35% would be valid until 2017 and increase to 50% in 2018. Massive opposition against this proposal, which has the potential to become a landmark of biofuel policy change in the EU, has been formulated by the agricultural as well as the biofuel lobby, especially in Member States with currently high biofuel shares such as France and Germany. The French minister of agriculture recently favored a 7% limit for first generation biofuels (agri.eu 2013) whereas the German government initially supported the 5% limit for biofuels from crops suggested by the Commission proposal (Deutscher Bundestag 2013). The EU parliament adopted a legislative resolution on September 11, which is introduced to the European Council for further decision-making and suggests that the maximum limit for first generation biofuels should be 6% instead of 5% (European Parliament 2013, Amendment 152). Recent news on the discussion in the EU Council of environment ministers (EuropeanVoice, 2013) suggest, that the Commission’s proposal may be watered down further substantially with the maximum for first generation biofuels being set at 7%.
Climatechange is happening. We have to deal with it. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research in Ger- many (BMBF) is funding the research priority "KLIMZUG – Managing climatechange in the regions for the fu- ture". The objective of KLIMZUG is the development of in- novative strategies for adaptation to climatechange and related weather extremes in regions. Here, the anticipated changes in climate shall be integrated in processes of regional planning and development. The funding acti- vity particularly stresses the regional aspect since global problems such as climatechange must be tackled by measures at regional and local level. The future compe- titiveness of regions, also in a changing climate, must be ensured. Also, KLIMZUG is meant to advance the deve- lopment and use of new technologies, procedures and strategies for adapting to climatechange in the regions. KLIMZUG contributes especially to the German High-Tech Strategy on Climate Protection as well as to the German National Adaptation Strategy. It also complements BMBF’s first funding activity on research and develop- ment of measures to deal with climatechange "Research for climate protection and protection from climate impacts" (klimazwei).
The estimated land usechange elasticities confirm interdependencies between energy, bioenergy and agricultural markets identified in the theoretical literature (Gardner 2007; de Gorter and Just 2009; Ciaian and Kancs 2011). Our results suggest that rising energy prices and bioenergy support policies contribute significantly to the global land usechange. On the one hand, the share of agricultural commodities being used for bioenergy production increases compared to food production. On the other hand, the total cultivated area expands, as the energy prices are rising. These results have high policy relevance, because a better understanding of the food-energy- environment relationship may allow to increase policy efficiency and to reduce negative/offsetting side effects. For example, increasing food prices may have undesirable social implications, as they affect particularly the poor (Negash and Swinnen 2012). Tapping into land resources currently not or extensively used may have undesirable environmental implications, and may offset the positive environmental effects associated with the production of bioenergy (Searchinger et al 2008). In order to avoid such undesirable side effects, policy makers need to understand the food-energy-environment relationship in the context of expanding bioenergy production. Our study provides such insights by estimating the sign and magnitude of the global land usechange.
EU useful ﬂ oor space is increasing at a rate of approxi- mately one per cent per year. 29 This expansion of the
stock leads to an increase in energy and material ﬂ ows. Energy is of course required for using the buildings (i.e. heating/cooling, lighting, etc.), and material requirements grow along with construction activities, but also due to the future material ﬂ ows required to keep the increasing building stock intact, as a larger building stock requires larger physical (and economic) ﬂ ows for reconstruction and renovation. At the same time, the positive beneﬁ ts of renovating buildings should also be noted, which in- clude substantial increases in energy efﬁ ciency. Indeed, the application of energy efﬁ ciency measures to buildings through retroﬁ tting could save up to 75% of energy con- sumption. 30 However, with a realistic average refurbish-
production, transmission, distribution and use. This objective should reflect the need for equity, adequate energy supplies and increasing energy consumption in
developing countries, and should take into consideration the situations of countries that are highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export, and/or consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-intensive pro- ducts and/or the use of fossil fuels for which countries have serious difficulties in switching to alternatives, and the situations of countries highly vulnerable to ad- verse effects of climate change2l." Agenda 21 thus acknowledges that levels of en-
“Thirty per cent of our people are living in poverty. I cannot tell them: British people have benefited from coal-based power for 200 years and have spewed all that carbon up there and now India will pay three times the cost.” 
Western ‘carbon imperialism’ and international environmental non governmental organisations are therefore cast as villains, undermining the government agenda of development. Several non-governmental organisations such as Greenpeace have experienced crackdown in the country . The hero of this narrative is expert planning and technocratic policymaking that reconciles economic considerations of the need for affordable energy with macro level energy questions over supply, demand and grid stability. This narrative is also supported by several actors in the Indian private sector who point to the ambitious RE goals of the government and a series of central government policy initiatives such as providing land and other infrastructure to power producing companies, introduction of generous feed in tariff schemes, and creation of an overall investment friendly atmosphere, as critical to the rapid growth in RE in the country (Interview 1,2). The strong emphasis on economic growth and energy security however means that no technological option, particularly domestic coal based power, will be abandoned. All major thermal power companies in the private sector including Adani Power, Tata Power, and Reliance Power also have significant investments in RE plants themselves which creates limited incentive for the large thermal power companies to pressurise government intervention in the rapidly changing power markets. Furthermore, some market actors feel that it is a matter of time before industrial demand once again picks up and long term economic growth rationale leads to an increase in the use of coal power . This view is supported by government officials who are confident overall coal use will continue to steadily increase even if certain coal plants have reduced profitability (Interviews 9,10). To reconcile the significant role of coal in India’s electricity grid within the overall narrative of a rapid increase in low carbon power, there is also a strong discourse surrounding ‘clean coal’– several government documents and reports refer to new coal power on the grid as clean coal and emphasis is given to the fact that newly installed coal power stations will use ‘supercritical’ technology, i.e. having lower pollution levels and higher efficiency. The Central Electricity Authority’s (CEA) National Electricity Plan for instance consistently argues that clean coal technology and supercritical power plants are part of a ‘low carbon’ growth strategy .
Continuous yield increases and substantial investment into yield-increasing R&D would be needed to fulfil the food demands of a growing population, especially when agriculture competes with afforestation. The high price on CO 2 emissions, and hence the strong incentive to free up agricultural land for afforestation, initiates continuous yield- increasing technological change in our study, with values well above those observed historically. In contrast to other partial equilibrium land-use models (e.g. GLOBIOM: Kraxner et al (2013), GCAM: Calvin et al (2014)), technological change is endogenously derived within MAgPIE (Dietrich et al 2013b, von Lampe et al 2014), and yields tend to increase stronger in response to additional pressures on the land-use system (Nelson et al 2014, Lotze-Campen et al 2014, Delincé et al 2015). During recent decades, yields of main staple crops increased linearly at average rates of 1% (wheat, rice, soybean) and 1.5% (maize), while the relative annual rate of increase constantly dropped (Fischer et al 2014). Increased investment into R&D would be needed to make afforestation a realistic option, but when research spending increased in recent years this was largely driven by the development in single countries like China and India. Almost every third OECD country actually had a negative trend in public agricultural R&D spending. And in the developing world, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where in our afforestation scenarios yields more than tripled between 2010 and 2100, public spending on agricultural R&D amounted to only about 1.6 billion US$ or 5% of global agricultural R&D spending in 2008, and almost half the African countries had a negative trend in their budgets (Beintema et al 2012). This trend of low R&D spending would certainly have to turn around in order to achieve the yields projected in our model.
In this paper we develop a flexible methodology to characterize geographic variations in climatechange impacts on energy demand across the globe. Our first step is to econometrically disentangle the short- and long-run responses of per-capita energy consumption to variations in exposure to hot and cold, dry and hu- mid days. The resulting long-run semi-elasticities capture the nonlinear effect of the climate on energyuse indicative of adaptation responses by final consumers along the intensive as well as the extensive margins. Second, we combine these estimates with ESM temperature projections and consistent scenarios of popula- tion and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth to elucidate the potential climatechange impacts on final energy consumption at the sectoral, regional, and global levels. Our temperature projections are simulations of two representative concentration pathways (RCPs— Van Vuuren, 2012) indicative of a high-warming no-policy scenario and moderate-warming mitigation poicy scenario. These are augmented with a shared socioeconomic pathway (SSP— Kriegler et al, 2012; Van Vuuren, 2014) scenario of conventional economic development, slow population growth, international convergence, and rapid increases in final energy con- sumption. A comprehensive assessment of the implications of different climate and socio-economic trends on futureenergy demand is left to future work.
on the environment are re-evaluated again and again in an “iterative tale of de- struction” (Mertens / Craps 2018, 147) that exposes the temporal and spatial nodes offered by the text as ineffective loci of repetition. After a disastrous ex- pedition to Planet Blue in part one, Billy is a male sailor in part two who wit- nesses the natives of Easter Island destroy their Moai statues and cut down their trees, deliberately destroying their culture and ecosystem in the aftermath of Eu- ropean invasion headed by Captain James Cook. The novel becomes even more dystopian in parts three and four, which are set in an apocalyptic war zone where nature has entirely surrendered to technology and human beings are subjected to a totalitarian system. In all parts, the underlying message is clear: history will inevitably repeat itself and humans are doomed to destroy the world in which they live. As one of the novel’s characters notes, humans exist in “[a] repeating world – same old story” (Winterson 2007, 59), where “life on Orbus began as escaping life from the white planet – and the white planet began escaping life from…who knows where?” (ibid., 68). The implications of such a historical con- ceptualization for climatechange are dire, of course: ultimately, Winterson sug- gests, human beings would be incapable of making use of a second chance. Or, as Billie puts it, “it’s so depressing if we keep making the same mistakes again and again…” (ibid.). In fact, Planet Blue, the alternative to the destroyed planet Orbus, turns out to be as uninhabitable as Orbus, because the first human im- pact on this new planet is utterly damaging: the attempt to deflect an asteroid so that it will strike Planet Blue, causing the extinction of the dinosaurs living there (this part of the novel is set 65 million years ago despite its futuristic feel) by triggering a “mini ice age” (Winterson 2007, 91) to make room for humans fails. The asteroid hits early and its energy is too great for Blue to absorb: humans have thus managed “to destroy the place before it had even begun” (ibid.). The activation of a different node therefore proves ineffectual, as human nature, in The Stone Gods, is shown to be intrinsically flawed across time and space; indeed, the Robo Sapiens Spike seems to be a much more intelligent, compassionate, and kind alternative to humans for most of the novel. Thus, the promising re-try that the characters initially perceive as an opportunity is flattened out into a mere reiteration of what has come before:
Progress on NDC targets
India’s NDC outlined the shift in India’s engagement with the UNFCCC and globalclimate politics. Traditionally, Indian climate policy has focused on balancing the twin narratives of equity and co-benefits (Dubash, 2013). While significant sections of the document continued to engage with questions of equity and fairness, the core of the commitments themselves focused on mitigation and adaptation targets. Critical among these commitments with regards to mitigation was the target to increase non fossil fuel capacity to 40% of total electricity capacity by 2030 (Government of India, 2015). Furthermore, India pledged to reduce the carbon intensity of its economy by 33-35% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels (Government of India, 2015). This commitment is an update on the Copenhagen pledge in 2009 where India promised to reduce emissions intensity by 20% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels. Although the NDC does not specify this, it is assumed that the NDC pledge excludes the agriculture sector, as that was the form of the Copenhagen commitment. It is also assumed that the commitment does not cover emissions from land use, land usechange, and forestry (LULUCF), given that the NDC lists a separate target on creating additional carbon sinks (Government of India, 2015). These commitments were found to be compatible with a 2 degrees pathway by Climate Action Tracker (Climate Action Tracker, 2017) and the Indian government itself called its NDC ‘fair and ambitious’ (Government of India, 2015). However, India’s commitments were in reality fairly modest and are inconsistent with domestic achievements and progress. For instance, as of October 2015, when India submitted its NDC, non-fossil fuel electricity capacity was already 30% 1 and it stood at more than 34% at the end of 2017 (CEA, 2018a) (see Figure 1). This indicates that India is already well on its way to achieving NDC targets spelled out for 2030.
Sergey Kiselev, Roman Romashkin, Gerald C. Nelson, Daniel Mason- D’Croz, and Amanda Palazzo
Globalclimatechange presents long-term risks to agriculture. In general, globalclimatechange is expected to positively affect Russian agriculture. In high and middle latitudes, global warming would expand the growing season. Acreages of agricultural crops may expand toward the north, although yields would likely be lower due to less fertile soil. However, in the south there is a possibility of drier climate, which has a negative impact on crop yields and livestock productivity. In addition, climatechange is expected to increase the scarcity of water resources and encourage weed and pest proliferation, and it is expected to increase the short-term risks associated with an increase in extreme weather events and natural disasters. This paper uses data on current conditions to simulate future scenarios and examine possible impacts on crop production in the Russian Federation. It also considers adaptive measures for agriculture in response to climatechange. Paper submitted to the special issue Food Security and ClimateChange