Nach oben pdf Violent Behaviour: The effect of civil conflict on domestic violence in Colombia

Violent Behaviour: The effect of civil conflict on domestic violence in Colombia

Violent Behaviour: The effect of civil conflict on domestic violence in Colombia

effect on people all over the United States of America (Cohen Silver et al. 2002). It seems more than comprehensible that combat taking place only a few kilometres away from their homes will feel even more threatening for the Colombian population. If experiencing or witnessing brutal physical violence - as present in a conflict - causes a behavioural change towards more violent patterns, the consequences which society has to cope with are diverse and serious. We believe that the potential for future violence is increased. High crime rates can be observed in societies afflicted by violent conflict (for the case of Colombia see, for example, Richani 1997). We think that the sparking of new conflicts becomes more likely and the reconciliation of ongoing ones more difficult. We also expect post-conflict recovery of societies to get hampered. The consequences of the specific behaviour known under the term domestic violence are not only dire for the directly affected victim. Detrimental effects arise for society as a whole from at least two elements. If domestic violence is a widespread phenomenon in a society we believe it to cultivate future conflict due to the lack of peaceful conflict resolution role models. Children whose ability to build affectionate relationships is destroyed are prone to resort to physical violence to resort conflicts in their adult life (Karnofsky 2005). Furthermore, children who become victimized - or witness family members becoming victimized - often get stunted in their development of a free and confident personality. Fonagy (1999) proposes an attachment theory perspective on violence by men against women, with intimate partner violence being regarded as an “exaggerated response of a disorganized attachment system” in consequence of absence of a male parental role model and a history of abuse. Pollak (2004) introduces an intergenerational model of domestic violence in order to capture the influence of violent parents onto their children’s future behaviour and the resulting vicious cycle, or “cycle of violence”. In the long run we presume the detrimental effects for children to lead to negative macroeconomic consequences (see also Calderón, Gáfaro and Ibáñez, 2010, on inter-generational consequences of violence).
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Unfinished lives: The effect of domestic violence on neonatal and infant mortality

Unfinished lives: The effect of domestic violence on neonatal and infant mortality

Welfare Programme in 1977 to the National Rural Health Mission in 2005 1 . These programmes rely on equitable healthcare and improved access to public health services with a distinct focus on rural areas and low socio economic status groups. Despite these efforts, India failed to achieve its former objective to reduce the Under Five Mortality Rate(U5MR) to less than 100 per 1000 births by the year 2000 (Unicef Report, 2012). Several social and economic factors beyond access to healthcare can have an effect on child mortality. This paper aims to test the existence of a causal pathway between domestic violence against the mother and child mortality in India and provide new insight into the magnitude of its impact. Violent behaviour is a recognised multifaceted problem with negative consequences for the individual, the economy and for the society as a whole. Unfortunately women, solely on account of their gender, face an increased threat of violent behaviour. Gendered violence is present without boundaries in every country irrespective of diverse social, economic and political backgrounds. In developing countries, violence against women causes more death
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Oil and Civil Conflict: On and Off (Shore)

Oil and Civil Conflict: On and Off (Shore)

Our identification strategy is similar to the one used in the literature investigating the effects of income shocks induced by commodity price changes (Brückner and Ciccone, 2010; Berman and Couttenier, 2013; Caselli and Tesei, 2016; Dube and Vargas, 2013). An important distinction in these studies has to do with the extent of capital and labor intensity of different commodities. Dube and Vargas (2013), for example, show that price shocks to the capital-intensive oil sector in Colombia are positively related to violent conflict, while the relationship is negative for the labor-intensive coffee sector. This lends support to the hypothesis that oil income fosters rent- seeking behavior by increasing the state prize, while income from coffee triggers an opportunity cost effect by increasing worker wages. Our results show that, besides differences in factor intensity, other characteristics of natural resources contribute to explain their tendency to fuel conflict. We argue in particular that, while onshore and offshore oil are similar in terms of capital intensity, they are asymmetrically appropriable by the two sides in conflict, thus affecting the relative fighting capacities of government and rebels and the ensuing probability of conflict. 3 This interpretation, based on the different ability of government and rebels to access onshore and offshore oil facilities, echoes similar arguments on the importance of conflict financing (e.g. Fearon, 2004; Collier et al., 2009). This is also in line with recent empirical evidence by Berman et al. (2015), who show that the appropriation of mining revenues by rebel groups contributes to the spreading of conflict to other parts of the country, something the authors attribute to the increased financial ability to sustain larger-scale insurgency.
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Oil and civil conflict: On and off (shore)

Oil and civil conflict: On and off (shore)

Our identification strategy is similar to the one used in the literature investigating the effects of income shocks induced by commodity price changes (Brückner and Ciccone, 2010; Berman and Couttenier, 2013; Caselli and Tesei, 2016; Dube and Vargas, 2013). An important distinction in these studies has to do with the extent of capital and labor intensity of different commodities. Dube and Vargas (2013), for example, show that price shocks to the capital-intensive oil sector in Colombia are positively related to violent conflict, while the relationship is negative for the labor-intensive coffee sector. This lends support to the hypothesis that oil income fosters rent- seeking behavior by increasing the state prize, while income from coffee triggers an opportunity cost effect by increasing worker wages. Our results show that, besides differences in factor intensity, other characteristics of natural resources contribute to explain their tendency to fuel conflict. We argue in particular that, while onshore and offshore oil are similar in terms of capital intensity, they are asymmetrically appropriable by the two sides in conflict, thus affecting the relative fighting capacities of government and rebels and the ensuing probability of conflict. 3 This interpretation, based on the different ability of government and rebels to access onshore and offshore oil facilities, echoes similar arguments on the importance of conflict financing (e.g. Fearon, 2004; Collier et al., 2009). This is also in line with recent empirical evidence by Berman et al. (2015), who show that the appropriation of mining revenues by rebel groups contributes to the spreading of conflict to other parts of the country, something the authors attribute to the increased financial ability to sustain larger-scale insurgency.
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Violent Conflict Exposure in Nigeria and Economic Welfare

Violent Conflict Exposure in Nigeria and Economic Welfare

Effect of Conflict - Studies on African Countries There is a growing literature focused on the effect of conflict in African countries. One of the first attempts at considering the effect of conflict was Akresh and de Walque (2008). They study the effects of the 1994 Rwandan genocide on schooling. Their results suggest that children who lived through the Rwandan genocide, lost nearly a half year of schooling compared to their peers who were not exposed. They were also 15% less likely to complete grades three and four. Leon (2012) also considered the Rwandan conflict but focused on it from a different angle used the classic education production function model to identify the long- and short-term effects of the civil war on educational attainment. The study finds that exposure to violence affects adult human capital accumulation through both supply and demand side effects. Overall, the results show that the average person exposed to political violence before school-age (during in utero, early childhood, and preschool age) accumulated 0.31 fewer years of schooling upon reaching adulthood. With respect to the Cˆ ote d’Ivoire crises, Minoiu and Shemyakina(2012) used the postconflict survey data from the cross-sectional 2002 and 2008 Household Living Standards Surveys (HLSS) and the
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The Impact of Women's Labour Force Participation on Domestic Violence in Jordan

The Impact of Women's Labour Force Participation on Domestic Violence in Jordan

income or financial support from outside the marriage will decrease the level of violence within households. Women’s financial independence will increase their probability of leaving the abusive relationship by providing better outside options. This may lead to either the end of the abusive partnership or a decrease in violence in an intact family. In a similar setting, Tauchen Witte and Long (1991) developed a Nash-bargaining model of domestic violence in order to represent the effect of changes in income on the incidence of domestic violence. In their model, every spouse has a specific level of the threat-point which should provide the minimum level of welfare of each spouse within the relationship. The threat- point of the women determines the level of violence she is willing to accept given a specific amount of financial transfers from her husband without leaving the marriage. The model predicts that an increase in the man’s income enables him to “buy” more violence by increasing the financial transfers to his wife. On the other hand, an increase in woman’s income constrains him to reduce violent behaviour towards his wife. Similarly, in the resource-theory, the additional income of the women leads to a higher household income. This resource effect causes a decrease of the economic stress in the household which would thereby serve to reduce spousal violence indirectly (Gelles, 1997). All of these models thus predict a protective effect of female employment for the women concerned, leading to a reduced incidence of domestic violence.
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The effect of civil war violence on aid allocations in Uganda

The effect of civil war violence on aid allocations in Uganda

Army (LRA), which operates mainly in Northern Uganda, was declared a terrorist organisation by the 2001 U.S. Patriot Act. Due to this development, Sudan ceased its tacit support of the LRA and allowed Ugandan military forces to operate within certain areas of its territory. Therefore, in March 2002 the Ugandan defense forces launched Operation Iron Fist which had the strategic objective to root out the LRA. Fighting between the Ugandan military and the LRA in Northern Uganda, as well as violent LRA reprisals against the local population, lasted until 2005, and hostilities were officially ended by a cease-fire agreement in 2006. This sudden surge in violence is used to estimate the effect of conflict on aid allocations, looking at both commitment and disbursement levels. The fact that this study is able to estimate the effect on both commitments and disbursements is a departure from the existing literature which typically relies on commitment data.
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Democratization and civil liberties: The role of violence during the transition

Democratization and civil liberties: The role of violence during the transition

e.g. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005). To account for a possible direct role of past civil liberties we also test an extensive specification of equation (11), by including lags of the dependent variable. This should help accounting for this potential confound. The empirical results are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Table 3 presents the results for the most parsimonious baseline specification that reflects the empirical model (11) but only includes country and year fixed effects as additional controls. Columns (1) and (2) suggest that democratization, regardless of whether it was associated with violence or not, has a significant negative effect on the civil liberties index. Recalling that the index takes larger values for worse protection of civil liberties the result implies, as expected, that democratization leads to improved civil liberties. The magnitude of the effect is somewhat smaller, but still statistically significant, if past civil liberties (lagged by one year) are included as a control, as indicated by the results in column (2). Column (3) presents the results when distinguishing between democratic transitions without and with violence in the year of, or prior to, democratization, where violence is measured as any incidence of conflict using the PRIO data. The results show a substantially larger improvement in civil liberties after a peaceful democratization, compared to the average (pooled) results in Columns (1) and (2). At the same time, violent transitions exhibit a deterioration of institutional quality compared to countries with a peaceful transition to democracy. This finding emerges consistently throughout all specifications, regardless of whether conflict incidence in a particular year is added as additional control, or whether lagged institutional quality is controlled for. Columns (7)-(10) repeat the same analysis when restricting attention to
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Colombia: Between the Dividends of Peace and the Shadow of Violence

Colombia: Between the Dividends of Peace and the Shadow of Violence

implementation of each of the six points of the accord up to April 2019 (Kroc Insti- tute for International Peace Studies 2019). Whereas those areas related to the dis- assembling of the guerrilla group’s military structure report the highest degree of progress, where little advancement has been made is in regard to structural trans- formations – for instance, measures aimed at tackling rural marginality and under- development. While it is true that the current government has no interest in pushing structural reforms, the lack of engagement with these kinds of changes goes back to the administration of Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2018) – whose readiness to foster FARC-Ep’s disarmament and reincorporation sharply contrasted with his re- luctance to engage with deep-rooted reforms. Although solving all social problems was clearly beyond the reach of the agreement, the shortfall in the implementation of structural reforms endangers one of the most valuable contributions thereof: its addressing of the socio-economic and political problems that lie at the heart of the (re)production of violence in Colombia.
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Malaria risk and civil violence

Malaria risk and civil violence

To our knowledge, none of the existing contributions has explored the role of health shocks. By extending the scope of the investigation to health shocks, our paper thereby complements this earlier line of research and highlights that weather shocks can have different effects on the opportunity cost of violence. Specifically, an increase in precipitation can increase agricultural productivity but also the risk of a malaria outbreak. The ensuing income shock can thus be positive or negative, also depending on whether the weather shock takes place during growing or harvesting seasons. The specificity of the epidemiology of malaria also allows us to isolate the malaria channel above and beyond the direct effects of weather, e.g., on agricultural production, by conditioning on cell×year effects that implicitly absorb all shocks that affecting a cell at yearly frequency. By accounting for cell fixed effects (in yearly panel data) and cell×year fixed effects (in monthly panel data), the analysis isolates the effect of malaria shocks by implicitly accounting for both the long-term (time invariant) and short-term (yearly) cell-specific determinants of civil violence. The findings document the existence of a relevant, but previously unexplored, effect of localized health shocks for civil conflict in Africa. By using high frequency panel data for the entire African continent for over a decade, the current study represents an advancement in terms of internal and external validity. Complementary to the determinants of violence documented in the existing literature, the results also suggest that health shocks take effect on impact (within two months), are attenuated by genetic immunities, have the biggest effect on violence during harvest seasons, and in the form of unorganized social violence and confrontations between militias and civilians, rather than in terms of geo-political, ethnic or strategic struggles.
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Domestic Violence and Child Mortality

Domestic Violence and Child Mortality

ABSTRACT IZA DP No. 11899 OCTOBER 2018 Domestic Violence and Child Mortality * We examine the effect of domestic violence on mortality of children born to female victims using Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data across thirty two different developing countries. We start by examining associations between interpersonal violence and child mortality while controlling for potential confounds. We find that children of (ever) victimized mothers are 0.4 pp more likely to die within thirty days, 0.7 pp more likely to die within a year and 1.1 pp more likely to die within the first five years of being born in comparison with children born to mothers who never experienced violence. We find similar patterns when examining the effect of violence taking place in the last twelve months on female victims and their children. Our results are similar when we use matching methods. We also examine the causal effect of violence on child mortality using an instrumental variables strategy. Exploiting variation in domestic violence and marital rape laws across countries and over time, we find that laws that criminalize violence against women and/or marital rape lower its incidence. Using this as an exogenous source of variation in domestic violence, we find that children born within the last twelve months to female victims were 3.7 pp more likely to die in the first thirty days of life. Our results indicate significant externalities to violence against women and underline the importance of recent efforts to tackle this violence in developing countries.
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Does Domestic Violence Jeopardize the Learning Environment of Peers within the School? Peer Effects of Exposure to Domestic Violence in Urban Peru

Does Domestic Violence Jeopardize the Learning Environment of Peers within the School? Peer Effects of Exposure to Domestic Violence in Urban Peru

The negative externality of exposure to violence at home on school peers has only been addressed by Carrell and Hoekstra, in two studies that look at short-term school achievement outcomes, such as math and verbal test scores and disciplinary incidents (Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010); and longer-term labor market outcomes, such as college enrollment, degree attainment and wages (Carrell and Hoekstra, 2018). This paper complements their critical contributions to this area of study in two main aspects. First, they identify exposure to domestic violence by linking administrative student data to public records information on cases filed in civil court, whereas in our study we rely on students’ responding to a set of questions about exposure to family violence.
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Malaria Risk and Civil Violence

Malaria Risk and Civil Violence

R-squared 0.241 0.241 0.259 0.261 0.350 0.315 0.393 Number of Cells 2,556 2,556 2,556 2,556 2,556 2,556 2,556 OLS estimates (linear probability model). The dependent variable is a binary indicator variable taking value 1 if at least one conflict event (ACLED dataset) was registered in the given cell in the given year. “High Malaria Risk” is a binary indicator for intermediate malaria exposure taking value 1 for cells with an average malaria transmission stability index larger than 0 and lower than 15; “Malaria-Suitable Month” is an index that represents the number of months in the current year that were suitable for malaria to be transmitted, relative to the cell-specific mean over the observation period; “MSM D.×High M. Risk” is the corresponding interaction term; see text for details. The “Weather” controls include the average temperature, the average precipitation and the effective rainfall (the Standard Precipitation and Evapotranspiration Index -SPEI) registered in the respective year (both in levels and demeaned with respect to the yearly average). The “Weather Lags” include the first two lags of the same variables. The “Geographic Controls” include absolute latitude, mean elevation, average terrain ruggedness, total cell area, total area of the cell occupied by water, average precipitation and average temperature. The “Location and Distances” controls includes the natural logarithm of the distance to the country capital, to the coast, to the country border, to the closest river and to Adis Ababa. The “natural resources” controls include the average land suitability for agriculture, the presence of diamond mines and the presence of petrol fields. The ”Ethnic-Diversity” controls for the number of ethnic groups in the cell (GREG). Country-Year fixed effects are a set of country specific year fixed effects. Panel data from 1998 to 2012 at yearly frequency. The unit of observation is a 1 x 1 degree cell. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses, (·), and Conley standard errors allowing for spatial and serial autocorrelation up to the threshold of 400 km are reported in square brackets, [·]. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5-, and 10-% level computed using the respectively largest standard errors (country clusters or Conley) of each specification.
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Domestic violence is never OK!

Domestic violence is never OK!

These are counselling centres for women who are experiencing domestic violence.. You can find the addresses at the end of the booklet.[r]

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Meaning and influences of domestic violence: feelings reflected by women in the state of violence

Meaning and influences of domestic violence: feelings reflected by women in the state of violence

I was a great, so I'm a good housewife only I don't have that love to do things that previously I did; He was in me, I'd get a black eye, he gave whack me, I never got my parents stick! Understand? And he gave me, I tried more or less than eight years because I tried hard, but I'm not ashamed to tell you, I wanted to like him as I'd like, but there's no way, because he won't let me live! He won't let me, is that he wants me to be happy, he's not happy! It's too late because I already, I found me, I wanted to turn me, I wanted to paste the little Crystal again but not getting to [...]. (Lily, 37 years old, emphasis added).
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Entrepreneurship and violent conflict in developing countries

Entrepreneurship and violent conflict in developing countries

Second, the channel through which entrepreneurs may benefit or suffer from violent conflict depends not only on the characteristics of the particular entrepreneur and firm but also on the type of violent conflict. A business may lose its employees (they may flee or might be killed) and a business’ main assets may be destroyed. If conflict affects a business in a once-off, shock-like manner, then activities may be resumed following a cessation of violence, resulting in a temporary dip in profits. In contrast, more persistent conflict may have a pernicious impact on firm-level investment and growth over the long-term and may result in growing numbers of business failures. From an economic point of view, we can distinguish between conflicts that deplete the capital stock of a country and its firms (including buildings, infrastructure, hospitals, land, and cattle) and conflicts that mainly target the civilian population (for example, through displacement or with a heavy death toll). All conflicts have elements of both, but for analytical reasons it is worth making this distinction. The wars in Mozambique or Angola, for example, are notorious for their use of landmines. This has obvious consequences in terms of human suffering but it also prohibits the use of the land as a productive asset during and many years after the war (Brück and Schindler 2009). Thus, an entrepreneur (e.g. a large commercial farmer) in such a setting will be handicapped by the land being unavailable. The Rwandan genocide is a case in point. Here the main target was not the country’s capital stock but its civilian Tutsi population. This has lead to a massive loss in human capital (as the victims were better educated and urbanized compared to the country average) (de Walque and Verwimp 2010).
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Impact of Ethnic Civil Conflict on Migration of Skilled Labor

Impact of Ethnic Civil Conflict on Migration of Skilled Labor

we consider two separate types of shocks: (1) an ethnic civil war and a (2) non-ethnic civil war. From existing empirical evidence, it can be assumed that an ethnic civil war would lead to a greater upward shift of the curve and we may move from an initial equilibrium point like A to a point like B as shown in Figure 1a for ethnic war and Figure 1b for a non-ethnic war. These shifts show an increase in skilled migration for both types of wars, given a fixed level of proportion of educated people. However, as the destruction is greater in ethnic wars on average (and also because wars appear to last longer), we have represented a greater upward shift of the curve in the case of the ethnic war. Not only is there a direct exogenous impact on skilled migration as assumed in earlier work, but war is also likely to lead to lower educational attainment because of closure of schools, risk to life and lower returns to schooling. This has been found in Blattman, and Annan (2010), Chamarbagwalaand Morán (2011), Kecmanovic (2013), Singh and Shemyakina (2016), Swee (2009), and Walsh (2000). This would make the equilibrium point shift from B to C as shown in Figures 1a and 1b. Here, too, it can be assumed that the negative impact on proportion of educated people will be greater in ethnic wars. Thus, point C is further up (and with fewer educated people as a share of the total population) in this agglomerating economy with an ethnic civil war compared to a non-ethnic civil war. In the data, this type of economy would show a positive correlation between an ethnic war and skilled emigration.
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Self-employment and conflict in Colombia

Self-employment and conflict in Colombia

[Insert Table 2 here] Only between 2.4% and 2.8% of the labor force is unemployed. This is substantially lower than the average national unemployment rate during that same period. One possible explanation for this low unemployment rate is given by Attanasio et al. (2004), who point out that in Familias en Acción’s case unemployment is defined as being unemployed or looking for a job only in the last week and excludes people who were looking for a job the weeks before. Perfetti (2009) mentions two possible factors for the low unemployment rate in rural areas of Colombia: on the one hand, many people are underemployed instead of unemployed meaning that they do not appear in unemployment statistics and on the other hand there are methodological problems that make measuring unemployment rates in rural areas difficult. There is a shift from having a job to pursuing other activities across the waves, as shown in table 2. There are two possible explanations for this. First, the economy recovered from a recession during the period of study, which improved household economic situations. Leibovich et al. (2006) points out that household members, other than the head of household, withdraw from the labor market when the head of household earns a higher wage, which is likely the case when there is a period of economic recovery. Spouses return to take care of the children and to concentrate on household chores, while sons and daughters continue schooling instead of working. A second point is that the subsidy received by the program also makes the households better off financially, which raises the probability of a spouse staying at home. Furthermore, an explicit goal of the Familias en Acción conditional cash-transfer program is that older children return to school.
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Beyond the overall economic downturn: Evidence on sector-specific effects of violent conflict from Indonesia

Beyond the overall economic downturn: Evidence on sector-specific effects of violent conflict from Indonesia

broke out into overt conflict and destructive violence during the country’s transition to democracy and decentralization. While conflicts occurred throughout the archipelago, some regions were particularly affected by violence. In the provinces of Maluku and North Maluku, tensions between religious and migrant groups caused over 7,000 deaths between 1999 and 2002 (see Brown et al. (2005) for a conflict overview). Populated by Muslims and Christians in approximately equal proportion, historical inequalities stemmed from preferential treatment of Christians during Dutch colonialism. The political, social, and economic dominance of Christians, however, began to erode under the Islamization policies during the last decade of the New Order regime, when Muslims were increasingly appointed to key positions in the civil service. Continued influx of mostly Muslim migrants from Java and Sulawesi further challenged the fragile ethno-religious balance, and resulting tensions over communal land and resources were aggravated by the 1997 economic crisis.
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The Effects of Regime Cooptation on the Geographical Distribution of Violence: Evidence from the Syrian Civil War

The Effects of Regime Cooptation on the Geographical Distribution of Violence: Evidence from the Syrian Civil War

Column 1 estimates the logit model with our measure of changes in light outputs between  2007 and 2009, controlling for confounding factors and including fixed effects on the gover‐ norate level. The coefficient is statistically significant below the 5 percent level and negative,  indicating that the less the amount of time a subdistrict experienced power shortages during  the period under investigation, the lower the probability that a subdistrict experienced vio‐ lence. This result is mirrored in columns 2–4, which display the results for our three alterna‐ tive independent variables with all other specifications remaining unchanged. Column 2 pre‐ sents  the  results  for  the  changes  in  light  output  in  relation  to  the  original  output  in  2007.  Again, we find a statistically significant association between changes in light output and the  likelihood of the occurrence of violencethe lower the relative losses in power supply, the  lower the likelihood of the occurrence of violence. From all four conceptualizations of our  variable, changes relative to the original light output are weakest, with statistical significance  below the 10 percent level. Columns 3 and 4 display the results for our two dummy varia‐ bles.  In  column  3,  the  dummy  variable  captures  whether  a  subdistrict  has  been  better  off  than the average in terms of changes in light output between 2007 and 2009. In column 4, the  dummy  variable  differentiates  between  those  subdistricts  whose  light  output  further  de‐ creased after the initial shortage in 2007 and those subdistricts whose light output started to  increase again. For both variables, we find the expected association with the likelihood of po‐ litical violence and both are statistically significant below the 1 percent level. Overall, these  results lend consistent support to our hypothesis that those regions of Syria that have been  favored in terms of the provision of electricity in times of power scarcities had a smaller risk  of experiencing violence in the period between March 2011 and November 2012. Before we  proceed  with  various  alternative  estimations  to check  the  robustness  of  these  findings,  we  should have a look at the performance of our control variables.  
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