A Factiva és a LexisNexis azonban forrásaihoz csak korlátozott hozzáférést enged, a többi kiadó pedig többnyire csak az előfizetett tartalmak eléré­.. sét

A Factiva és a LexisNexis azonban forrásaihoz csak korlátozott hozzáférést enged, a többi kiadó pedig többnyire csak az előfizetett tartalmak eléré­.. sét

WANG, An inequality of Ostrowski-Grüss type and its applications to the estimation of error bounds for some special means and some numerical quadrature rules, Comput..

Differences between life expectancies do not explain the difference between the French and the Japanese patterns. 2nd answer: differences of the labor market, pension system

• Monotonicity: if income is given to an individual below poverty threshold, then the value of poverty index decreases (strong monotonicity). Weak monotonicity requires that

Population independence: if population increases in all income categories by the same ratio, the inequality index should not change. Symmetry: if two individuals

Note: FABR: private asset based reallocations; GABR: public asset based reallocations; TG: public transfers; TF: private transfers... Channels of financing the per capita

• UCT does not effect education: every parent chooses the optimal level of human capital investment. • CCT lessens the direct cost of studying: the lost wage is not w, but

• The share of cash transfers in total income decreased between 1995 and 2005 in most OECD countries. Sharpest decrease took place in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Ireland

– time, spent on child raising, decreases the human capital of the parent (primarily the mother) → foregone future labor income. • contribution to public life cycle financing

3 statistical indicators, a new family of political economy models, new cost components of the welfare state (redistribution across entire life-cycles, fertility effects) as

Population independence: if population increases in all income categories by the same ratio, the inequality index should not change.. Axiomatic approach to the measurement

Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest (ELTE) Department of Economics, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest.. Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy

– age profiles of transfer-flows and accumulation of life cycle wealth in traditional and industrial societies – family as the organizer of ”welfare programs”:..

Resource reallocation between generations of the traditional society: insurance performance of the family as the organizer.. of

Child rearing is mostly individual (household) effort, whereas the life cycle income of the child raised can be a public source up to 60 percent → externalities are

• If a household with characteristics x obtains a welfare level of u(q,x) by the consumption of consumer basket q, then the minimum level of expenditure

A) The rational median voter does not want total redistribution. B) The dominant preference is not that of the median income individual. A) The rational median voter does not