hybrid optimum ranking criterion (Bonnafous and Jensen, 2005): the ‘output’, defined
as the ratio of the socioeconomic NPV to the amount of subsidy it needs. In the case ofinfrastructure financed exclusively by public subsidies, the public objective function has traditionally been the NPVse provided by the program of scheduled projects, the question of their optimal ranking being solved by the decreasing order of their IRRse's and the rhythm of their implementation depending on the available budget. We have shown that in the case of a PPP, and more generally when the projects are partially financed by the users, the objective function of the public authority still being the total NPVse of the program, the decreasing order of the IRRse's does not provide the optimal ranking: the pure financial IRR is a better ranking criterion, and this is the truer the tighter the budget constraint. The ratio of the socioeconomic NPV to the amount of subsidy required is a still better criterion - in fact, the best. We can conclude, therefore, that both the tyranny of financial profitability and the error ofranking by the IRRse become issues as soon as the user becomes involved in the financing of water infrastructure.
A large majority of the demands made by civil society actors in these conflicts are socioeconomic ones. Sixty-four percent of all community mobilizations make such claims. This is the same as the incidence of informative challenges and, not surpris- ingly, there is a great deal of overlap between the two categories. As already noted, civil society is most likely to mobilize around issues related to compensation for damages from the project and those are mostly socioeconomic in their content. Just 37 percent of all challenges raise environmental issues, sometimes in conjunction with socioeco- nomic ones. The frequent complaints about dead fish resulting from hydroelectric dam construction, for example, have both a socioeconomicand environmental dimension. There is a disjuncture between the major institutional framework for consultation, environmental impact assessment, and the content of the complaints articulated by civil society, of which only a minority raises environmental issues (see also Moraes, 2005, p. 220-221). The federal licensing agency, Ibama, does have analysts of a wide variety of disciplinary backgrounds who can help to assess socioeconomic impacts, but this is a heavy burden for small state and municipal agencies. The predominance of non-environmental demands is a distortion in Ibama’s workload too, but there are no other institutionalized routes for citizens to offer opinions and concerns about specific economic projects. I return to this point below.
3.3 Operational risks
Operational risks are related to uncertainties which arise in context with the execution of single tasks and thus in the course of the deployment process and throughout the entire operational phase of the network. Given that the network has been properly planned and the different tasks and processes have been designed adequately, operational risks cover the prevailing risk due to their realization by the involved project members or sub-contractors who are responsible for a proper execution of all assigned operational issues like project controlling, communication, methods, structural aspects (leadership, coordination and responsibilities), on-time delivery, quality etc. As operational skills of the individual project partners or sub-contractors are hard to assess in advance, operational risks can only be addressed in the course of prior evaluationof feasibility through the establishment of a realistic schedule and by designing contracts with sub-contractors which include rules (e.g. penalties) in case of non-compliance with defined objectives. The latter implies a shift of risks towards the executive members or sub-contractors of the consortium which usually comes along with a markup that is included in the price of the delivery that has to be considered in the evaluation (12). Beyond their impact on delivery-pricing, operational aspects will not be treated in further detail within this paper.
The paper examines from a methodological and theoretical point of view the consequences for traffic flows and for regional economies of a major transport infrastructure investment, here the fixed link across the Øresund between Denmark and Sweden.
The focus of the paper is ex post evaluationof major traffic infrastructure investments, in contrast to ex ante analyses which dominate the literature. Ex post analysis starts with observed changes in traffic flows and in regional economic variables. The point of departure in ex post evaluation is the observed changes and the methodological problem is to decompose these changes into components which permit identification of the relative contributions of different factors: the effect of the fixed link, the effect of other transport infrastructure investments and changes in regional economic activity, including changes in interregional interaction. It is argued that only an integrated transport and regional economic model can perform this type of analysis. In order to illustrate how the contribution of effects of changes in regional economies is evaluated an interregional general equilibrium model is presented.
2. THE ROLE OF PROJECT APPRAISAL IN LOCAL DECISION-MAKING
A number of surveys and analyses, such as those of the EC-funded TIDE and EVIDENCE projects 1 , obtained insights into the actual assessment practices in cities across Europe. TIDE surveyed 14 variously sized European cities (ranging from 50,000 to 2.7m inhabitants) and from 10 different countries (the results may be influenced by the respondents’ various roles and positions within the local administration). The analysis revealed that the cities usually do not have a standard appraisal method for all transport projects, while some cities stated that they select or adopt a method depending on the measure being assessed. In line with the results from the literature, CBAs are often applied to assess larger infrastructureprojects in the cities; several respondents referred to national regulations requiring them to do so. For instance, in Italy a CBA is “the ordinary tool for projects above €10m and mandatory for projects above €50m”. Several other cities referred to national guidelines on the CBA method and cases to which it must be applied (Hüging et al., 2014b).
of transportation variables for the economic model 1 . Until the early 2000s, the former approach was
prevalent in exploring the impacts of transportation infrastructure investment on economic growth (Roson and Del’Agata, 1996; Conrad, 1997; Kim, 1998; Rioja, 1998; Friesz et al., 1998; Seung and Kraybill, 2001; Haddad and Hewings, 2001; Conrad and Heng, 2002; and Brocker, 2002). With respect to productivity in the cost-based approach, Roson and Del’Agata (1996) showed that an increase in transport investment would reduce both traffic congestion and the gap between the user optimum and system optimum. Kim (1998) found that the elasticities ofinfrastructure investment with respect to GDP and inflation were determined by institutional restrictions on the foreign capital and financing alternatives for infrastructureprojects, and Rioja (1998) discussed the infrastructure investment might cause a negative effect on welfare levels. Haddad and Hewings (2001) analysed the long-term effect of the total factor productivity of the transportation sector on transportation costs and spatial price differentiation with a mark-up structure using the Brazilian Multisectoral And Regional/Interregional Analysis Model. Brocker (2002) estimated the impacts of transportation costs and road development of the Trans- European Transport-Networks (TEN-T) on the spatial distribution of the benefit using a static CGE model with three major blocks such as final demand, production, and transport cost and equilibrium.
In all cases we present here we gained insight in the variation of output and stakeholders by applying the Contextual Response Analysis (CRA). The analysis is based on an assumption similar to citation analy- sis, namely that identifiable and unique traces of a publication found on the internet and in specialized databases represent meaningful forms of use, in particular if these traces are linked to identifiable and relevant users. Firstly, traces on the internet and in specialized databases are not arising from publications but from the actions of users that can be seen as a response to the publication even though the nature of this response is unknown. Secondly, by paying close attention to the identification of the users, the response can be placed in context. Identifying users is in part necessary to exclude traces that cannot be regarded as a meaning- ful response such as those traces that emerge due to fully automated editing of websites. Identifying users also offers the opportunity to place the response into a context of use, such as characterized by the domain in which the response emerges (e.g. News media), or by the characte- rization of the user on the basis of social function or social-economic sector (e.g. Education, Individuals (Blogger), For-Profit Services etc.). An implication of the method is that the empirical data about use are restricted to traces of users that maintain institutional structures and re- lated infrastructure, in the form of websites and databases. As with any analysis based on internet traces, the societal use by the unconnected population or by those who have little means or time to maintain web- sites or blogs goes unnoticed. However, the method attempts to focus particularly on the variety of use, comparing both the diversity of use of various products of one institute and the diversity among users among different institutes.
How different elements of social environment effects the performances of one social actor and, vice versa, how the behaviour of a single actor is contributing to social change on macro levels of society, are leading questions for social research since its beginning. Generalized, social sciences are trying to detect causal linkages between different levels of social aggre- gation and, moreover, want to develop useable impact models which are able to include as many as possible of these linkages. For evaluation research, three different aggregate levels of social systems could roughly be distinguished: projects, organizations, and the social envi- ronment (which of course could be differentiated in several elements by a great amount of criteria varying with research questions or the peculiarities of an individual case study). Projects can be conceived of as organizational entities with specific objectives, aimed at trig- gering innovations. As a rule, projects are embedded within the organizational structures of an implementing agency. Examples of such implementing organizations are governmental institutions, associations, foundations, enterprises, or other nongovernmental organizations. In principle, the interventions of a project can be oriented toward the creation of (internal) changes in the implementing organization itself as well as in other (external) social systems. Accordingly, the implementing organizations can be objects that are transformed, but they can also serve as transmitters for the diffusion of innovatory processes.
Against this background, health in- equality continues to constitute an impor- tant sphere of activity where public health and health policy are concerned. The large number of empirical findings avail- able outlines the existing problem areas and identifies distinct connecting points for political interventions. In this context the contribution that primary prevention and health promotion can make towards reducing health inequalities is discussed [43, 44]. It is also discussed to what ex- tend medical, rehabilitative and nursing care are satisfying the specific demands of socially disadvantaged population groups . It is quite obvious that a sustainable reduction in health inequality will pre- sumably only be possible, through effec- tive combating of poverty and strengthen- ing of social integration. The prerequisite for this are interdepartmental efforts and the coordination of measures and pro- grammes between the relevant areas of politics, which include employment, ed- ucation, social, family as well health pol- icy. The regular provision andevaluationof meaningful data, as can be guaranteed by health monitoring and health reporting at the Robert Koch Institute, is of prime importance here.
Bolivia presents an ideal setting in which to study this because of the radical and well-defined decentralization reform process introduced in 1994. The Bolivian decentralization was linked to a far- reaching law of popular participation, which dramatically empowered citizens by granting grassroots organizations the right to participate in the planning, budgeting, and monitoring of public services. Further, the law granted grassroots organizations the right to discipline sub-municipal providers by giving them veto power over sub-municipal budgets and budget reports to ensure both that funds were well spent and that local elites did not capture a disproportionate amount of resources. The Bolivian decentralization and the law of popular participation have been widely studied and are considered the landmark for the design of decentralization reforms in developing countries (Bardhan, 2002). In addition, Bolivia provides a unique opportunity in which to empirically assess the effect of improved information on public service delivery because all of the conditions previously discussed as necessary for effective local-level monitoring hold in this setting. First, there is a very large demand for small local infrastructureprojects involving community participation, and their delivery is something community members greatly value. Moreover, its delivery is something very visible for the community as a whole and its benefits immediately observable for the users (street lighting for instance). Second, the delivery of small infrastructureprojects is pervasively used by local leaders, in this setting, as a political investment to make it to the district council office. This creates huge personal incentives for local leaders to engage in monitoring activities for the provision of these goods on behalf of their communities. Third, the decentralization and law of popular participation introduced well established formal mechanisms to voice complaints and to discipline sub-municipal governments.
97 estimates becomes the base for next year’s Budget bid, and another out year is added to the forward estimates.
MTEF is aligned with Fiscal support to PPP because it helps to manage better fiscal risk and liabilities by using longer time horizon. Despite the difficulties and costs of changing the system the overall benefit will be larger. Current annual budgeting system has hampered planning and executing of investment program. Specific transfer to region fits only for one-year project execution, while the need for larger infrastructure development will require beyond one-year program. It also made budget harmonization between central and local government problematical since both tiers have same budget cycles while some concurrent tasks require sequential planning from central to local. In the context of PPP scheme operating at the local level, MTEF will help local government to better plan future spending and long-term fiscal capacity and burden, including the possibility to raise revenue through municipal bonds, or making debt. For Central Government, it helps to manage fiscal consolidation, risks, and efficient allocation of resources.
For M ODULE C, the data can only be entered to the extent that it is quantifiable. Depending
on the number of interviewed firms, this is not always necessary. For the main body of collected information one might rather speak of “digesting” the interviews. How this is implemented depends on whether the interviews have been done by the principal researcher or by someone else. In the latter case, a systematic way of reporting the information has to be developed. This digestion step bears the potential that information gets lost and, in any case, will be time consuming – another reason for assigning the interview work directly to the researcher. At least, the staff member who conduct the interviews should be in close contact to the researchers responsible for the final report, also during the reporting phase.
options “I predominantly disagree” and “I rather disagree” regarding the approval of the state- ment that such an offer is attractive.
To further improve the clarity of the information provided by the regression coefficients, we divided the values of ‘density EVSE in cities’ by 100 (resulting unit = 100m) and the values of ‘charging duration in cities/along the highway’ as well as ‘density EVSE along the highway’ by 10 (resulting unit = 10 minutes / 10km). As a consequence of centring and harmonization the effects in Table 7 can be interpreted and summarized in the following way: An in all other respects average EVSE offer is evaluated .033 points less positive for every euro increase in the basic monthly fee. Similarly, increasing the distance between charging points in cities/along the highway by 100m/10km results in a .014/.016 point less favourable evaluation, respectively. Conditional level 1 effects (effects of attributes of EVSE offers conditional on respondent char- acteristics). If charging for 100km range takes 10 minutes longer in cities, the evaluationof an otherwise average EVSE offer by a respondent of average age (the mean age is 48 years) and technophilia (3.2 points of 5) worsens by .037 point. The effect is .001 point more/less negative (γ3/7) for every year the person is older/younger than the average. Furthermore, this effect is .011 point more/less negative (γ3/9) for every point the person is above/below average on the technophilia scale. The effect for charging points along the highway is in a similar range. In- creasing charging time for 100km by 10 minutes results in a .042 point less favourable evalua- tion for persons with an average attitude towards EVs (4.4 points of 6). This effect is .006 point more/less negative (γ5/10) for every point the person is above/below average on the scale that measures the general attitude towards EVs.
Our research shows that over the last decade effective biogas systems suitable to the feedstock and environmental conditions of the Thai biogas market have been developed. This is probably mainly due to the biogas research centres such as that at Chiang Mai University, at the King Mongkut`s University of Technology Thonbury (KMUTT) or at the National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC). The technologies such as UASB and others show high degradation rates for organic matter and are widely used on tapioca-, palm oil or animal farms. They have even been exported to other countries, such as the AHR plant of the company ECO Waste, which has been exported to Nigeria 127 . However, a lack of equipment andof any local technology providers was reported in the other studies consulted for the current thesis 128 . This lack of equipment has been verified by our own research regarding the availability of locally produced engines, which formed the weakest part of the swine farm biogas plants we visited. The farmers had either to use modified diesel engines (resulting in energy losses and need for frequent repair), or to import engines at higher cost and with higher associated maintenance costs (since the repairs can only be undertaken by the foreign companies themselves). We could not find any data as to whether the same problems occur for other components of high-tech plants; additional research would be necessary here. Our hypothesis is that there is a gap
quantitative research, which enables the researcher to average across many observations, thereby benefiting from the law of large numbers.
In contrast to the profound survey, the short enterprise survey aims at “easy to get and handle” information and abstains completely from eliciting highly aggregated impacts such as profits or improvements in market access. The aim of this modesty is to avoid any misleading findings on more complex issues that might result if no sufficient methodological effort is dedicated (e.g. with regard to sample size or advanced statistical data analysis). After all, estimating highly aggregated impacts requires the convincing construction of counterfactual situations, a highly information-hungry affair. Following a more modest approach, M ODULE A envisages providing evidence on outcomes and on impacts that are close to the attribution gap. Consequently, one needs to appeal to plausibility when linking the observed changes in the direct results and impacts of the intervention to highly aggregated impacts. If the survey, for example, shows a considerable take-up of machinery, one might plausibly assume that this also positively affects productivity and, hence, firm profits and employees’ wages.
gathered for the stratification of the sample. The information from the census at the neighborhood as- sociation level was collected to explore whether basic living standard measures might correlate ex-post with Chaskinet assignment. This information was gathered by manually matching census enumeration areas with neighborhood associations using cartographic information. The basic information about neighborhood presidents and public officials was collected from administrative records to assess the extent to which some of these characteristics might be correlated with any of the three outcome vari- ables we look at in this paper. 16 Neighborhood presidents’ background characteristics may affect small infrastructureprojects delivery through two different channels in addition to the political engagement channel. First, neighborhood presidents’ education might be an important determinant of variation in monitoring capacity. Second, neighborhood presidents’ union power experience might be an important determinant of the capacity to navigate the treacherous waters of bureaucracy. Public officials’ char- acteristics may also affect small infrastructureprojects delivery through two related channels. First, public officials’ education and tenure might be an important determinant of variation in competence and efficiency within the administrative procedures required to complete a pre-certification request. Further, public officials’ tenure may affect the allocation of small infrastructureprojects through the building of social networks. That is, public officials with more tenure might have found their niches and built social networks, which directly translate into the use of favoritism and exercise of discretion when processing pre-certification requests.
Table 4 illustrates the scientific output of the completed FWF-funded projects. Though the sample for some scientific disciplines in the database is quite small, the results confirm the publication patterns of the FWF-survey performed in the course of the FWF Impact Analysis. Publications in peer-reviewed journals are the most important output of FWF funded projects, though considerable differences in publication patterns between scientific disciplines occur. On average, a single FWF funded project yields 5.25 publications in peer-reviewed journals, while journal articles in non-reviewed journals only play a minor role. In addition, FWF- funded projects yield about 0.9 publications in anthologies, and about 0.2 publications in form of monographs and journal articles in non-reviewed journals. Significant differences in scien- tific output occur when differentiating between fields of science, which reflects the specific publication culture of the different fields of science. Whereas in the natural sciences and hu-
these variables at project start. This is also true for the regressions in Table 5 and Table 6 (see columns (3) and (6)).
According to the results in column (1) and (2) the event of a conflict (taking place at any point in time in the period between appraisal andevaluation) significantly negatively affects the evaluation ratings. Interestingly, conflict does not seem to affect project performance when it is measured in terms of (changes in) water supply indicators (Table 4, columns 3-8). Similarly, a better political environment positively influences evaluation ratings whereas the evidence of its impact on water supply is rather mixed. Another interesting finding is that increasing levels of bilateral aid per capita have a negative impact on the evaluation ratings (column 1 and 2). 26 This result is akin to Guillaumont and Laajaj’s (2006) finding that increasing levels of ODA, measured in percent of GDP, reduce a project’s success probability. However, in our case, the result is only relevant for the evaluation ratings (which are similar to the outcome variables applied in previous literature). There is no clear relationship between the average flow of bilateral aid to a recipient country (between t0 and t1) and project indicators. Last, we observe that a higher GDP per capita is positively correlated with (changes in) water consumption (see
In parts, this model is very similar to the literature on strategic experimentation, in- troduced by Karatzas (1984), Berry and Fristedt (1985) and Mandelbaum (1987), as it models the behavior of players who optimize their decisions while gathering informa- tion at the same time. In these games every player has to divide her time between a “safe” and a “risky” action (as in the arms of a two-armed bandit) with unknown but common payoffs. Bolton and Harris (1999) analyze a two-armed bandit problem with many players in which the arms yield payoffs which behave like a Brownian Motion, with different drifts for the safe and the risky arm. They analyze the stationary Markov equilibria and are able to identify free-rider and encouragement effects. Keller, Rady, and Cripps’s (2005) model of strategic experimentation, in which the risky arm yields a lump-sum with a certain intensity if the the risky arm is good and nothing if the risky arm is bad. In this model new information arrive as a Poisson process, as in most of the recent literature on bandit problems. Two examples for this literature are Klein and Rady (2011), where the risky arms are negatively correlated, and Klein (2013) who extended the model to three armed bandits.
In the software where the model is available (DigSilent PowerFactory) it is possible to distinguish between static generators and synchronous machines. Similarly to the pro- cedure for line selection, the most relevant static generators and synchronous machines on each country were found. To achieve this goal, first the largest machines and generators based of their actual dispatch of apparent power were selected. However, this quantity only gives the maximum possible apparent power and not how much is actually provided on a given simulation. For this reason, this criteria was com- plemented comparing these ratios and only those with the highest ratios were shortlisted reducing the list of elements to 46 synchronous machines and 60 static generators. C. Load Selection