energy needed for buildings to be operated has to be reduced and renewable energy sources have to be used to generate the heat they need.
For the development of new RES which tend to be scattered, it is necessary to expand grid, both transmission and distribution electricity lines (Kwiatkowska – Drożdż 2012: 34). In order to achieve this, a master plan of the energy infrastructure development was created. Apart from constructing new electricity transmission lines, it is, however, necessary to modernize the lines already in place, which often proves to be equally expensive (Bilanz zu Energiewende 2015: 8). That is why, 2.800km of new transmission lines are to be constructed by 2022, with 2.900km being scheduled for modernization. These investments will largely be carried out within the area of western Germany, with only one large investment in eastern Länder, it being the construction of a new line between Bärwalede and Schmölln (Bilanz zu Energiewende 2015: 8). The scale of investments in energy lines is enormous, as it ranged between EUR 2,6 and 4 billion alone over the period of 2007-2014 (Zweiter Monitoring-Bericht 2014: 60). These immense costs arise from a number of requirements which have to be met for the investments to be concluded. A stable energy network is important not only for large but also for small power stations generating electricity from RES.
being the US grand interests in the Persian gulf. 3
Foreign policy priorities have been affected by its past dominance as well as the religious ties with the Republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. However, these newly independent states (NIS) see Islamic Republic of Iran´s potential in cheap transit routes for oil and gas. Of the most concern are Islamic Republic of Iran´ s relations with Azerbaijan, hampered due to Azerbaijan´s westward cooperation on energy matters (Dekmejian et al., 2003, pp. 79-83) and the contradicting positions on defining the legal status of the Caspian. 4 Additionally, the ethnic Azeri minority makes up to nearly quarter of Islamic Republic of Iran´s population. 5 An economically strong and independent Azerbaijan, gaining acknowledgement on the international political stage, could potentially incite the Azeri population in Islamic Republic of Iran to its own nationalistic movement and threaten its territorial integrity. To prevent Azerbaijan to rise any further as a global oil player might as well be seen as an Islamic Republic of Iran’s strategic goal (Croissant and Aras, 1999, p.29). Nevertheless, Islamic Republic of Iran does not generally promote discrimination of the Azeri minority, because their intellectual and economic elite is very well integrated in the Iranian society. The textbook example for this is that the father of Ajatolla Khameini is an Azeri (Pivariu, 2014, p. 163).
Globally, there are more than 1 billion overweight adults, at least 300 million of them obese. These alarming facts published by the World Health Organisation (WHO)  demonstrate that obesity has reached epidemic dimen- sion in developed as well as in developing countries. Con- sequences on health range from several non-fatal but debilitating disorders that reduce quality of life to increased risk of premature death because of serious chronic diseases. Besides genetic factors and food con- sumption patterns exceeding the individual energy need, a sedentary lifestyle with lack of physical activity (PA) is one of the key causes . The relationship between obes- ity, PA and chronic diseases is close and several epidemi- ological studies could show that regular PA can prevent from obesity and related chronic diseases, such as type-2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease, hypertension, stroke, cancers of different sites, osteoporosis, and contribute to maintain mental health [1,3]. Thus, PA promotes health and well-being and has also enormous economic benefits considering the health care costs that could be attributed to obesity. However, the question of the adequate dose of exercise is still a matter of debate [4-6].
This work wants to bridge the gap between the mid-term time horizon of the network developments plans and the long-term payback time of grid investments, often linked to energysecurity arguments. It wants to add insight of the long-term horizon given by transformation processes such as the German Energiewende to a mid-term grid expansion planning process with a special focus on energysecurity. In literature, many studies deal with policy perspectives of energysecurity [7,8], analyze the natural gas supply security , provide an index for assessing national energysecurity  or develop methods to examine how a linkage of electricity and natural gas system effects energysecurity [11–13]. But yet no study considered the long-term impacts of transforming energy systems on the natural gas transport grid andits influence to grid expansion planning in a comparable manner. To achieve this, the status quo of the gas transport system in Germany is analyzed in Section 2. The presented data is basis of the gas flow calculations performed for this work. The applied methods for estimating the long-term gas demand in accordance with the goals of the Energiewendeand related gas flow calculations are given in Section 3. Section 4 shows the results with a focus on energysecurityand Section 5 gives a final discussion.
Especially the U.S.-India-deal should make the Europeans think about their role in the world’s new energy situation. If nuclear power will be the next big deal, Europe should define its position besides the different national interests and atti- tudes. Germany in this point can be referred to as a special demeanour. The former coalition of Social democrats and the Green Party with Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was resolved to back out of the nuclear energy program. Despite a new administration since autumn 2005, the current coalition has shown steady resis- tance to withdraw from that decision. But the German minister for economic affairs, Michael Glos, put this position into question when he said that nearly all developed nations have understood that nuclear power is essential for a save sup- ply with energyandfor achieving the climate protection goals. His final thought is simple: Why should Germany not come to this conclusion and use nuclear power peacefully? The answer on this question will also have effects on the European approach towards the current nuclear energy debate andits attempts to influence ambitions and decisions of third countries like India or China concerning their energysecurity.
Germany has clearly played a leading role in the release of the new Central Asia Strategy, though this role should not be exaggerated. German leadership on this issue is driven by several factors, both historic and realist in nature. First, approximately one million Ger- man-Russians lived in the Central Asian region. After the beginning of the Second World War in 1941, they were deported from the area where they had settled along the Volga river to Central Asia. Beginning with Adenauer’s Chancellorship, the federal government of Germany has been deeply concerned with their plight. When the states in the south of the former Soviet Union gained independence, the desire to immigrate to Germany was awakened in these German-Russians, and over two-thirds have since made the move. 20 Second, Germany has been an active North Atlantic Treaty Organisations (NATO) par- ticipant in Afghanistan since 2001. Germany has kept as many as 3,500 troops and six Tornado reconnaissance jets in Afghanistan, part of a larger NATO force of roughly 41,000 in the country. Almost all of the German contingent is based in Kabul and other parts of northern Afghanistan, close to the German military base in Termez, Uzbekistan. The Ter- mez base is favorable because of its comparatively better infrastructure and relative secu- rity. As long as Germany keeps its position in the International Securityand Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, it will be a priority to maintain good relations with the Uzbek government to ensure the continued use of the Termez base.
Energy experts are always worried about price increases, whether sudden or steady. At the same time, some forces will work to mitigate the price impact of the massive increase in oil consumption out of China and East Asia: increased global oil production, the increasing market orientation of national energy policy including privatization and deregulation, more efficient package-switched distribution of energy, conservation technologies and policies. Energysecurity is also dependent on non-market forces. It depends not least of all on the policies of the states concerned and the choice of national strategies forenergysecurity. This is especially true of the Asia-Pacific region, where 60-70 percent of all crude oil imports are still arranged by contracts with state-owned or semi-state con- trolled international Asian companies. These contracts are determined not only by economic factors, but also by strategic aspects of the foreign andsecurity policy of the individual country. Given the new energy policy dependencies in the early 1990s, Chinese foreign andsecurity policy had to deal with regions and countries that until then had played either no or only a secondary role in its tradi- tional foreign policy. For that reason, the possibility of greater economic and political rivalry, in particular with Japan, India, the United States and, in the medium and long-term, Russia (in Central Asia), for shrinking global oil reserves cannot be excluded.
Furthermore, Facebook recommends using common sense security practices, but thereby declines all responsibility for a possible data abuse (Facebook 2011). Hence, data abuse by a third party represents an element of risk that remains. Another question is how the network operator him-/herself uses the personal information provided by users. What many social media enthusiasts tend to ignore is that the network operator owns de facto any uploaded IP content. For example, users are granting Facebook a worldwide license to use their pictures, videos and texts posted on or in connection with Facebook. Even though this IP license ends when users delete the content, Facebook does not exclude the possibility that the removed content still persists in backup copies (Facebook 2011).
China’s emerging standing in the world demands a major rethinking of its diplomatic strategies. Given its population size, geographical scale, economic power and military presence, China is poised to play a larger political role in the twenty-first century, and is thus perceived by the international community to have greater capacities, capabilities and responsibilities. At the same time, environmental stresses caused by China’s energyand resources demands have become increasingly evident in recent years, urging China to cultivate delicate diplomatic relations with its neighbors and strategic partners. Tensions have been seen in areas such as transboundary air pollution, cross-border water resources management and resources exploitation, and more recently in global issues such as climate change. As the Chinese leadership begins to embrace the identity of a responsible developing country, it is becoming apparent that while unabated resources demands and environmental deterioration may pose a great threat to environmental security, a shared sense of urgency could foster enhanced cooperation. For China to move beyond existing and probable diplomatic tensions, a greater attention to domestic and regional environmental security will no doubt be necessary. This article explores such interrelations among domestic, regional and global environmental securities and China’s diplomacy, and suggests possible means by which China could contribute to strengthening global environmental security.
In comparison to the wide scope of the MEA, the IEA study closes in on one particular im- portant aspect of ecosystem change, namely the technological drivers of energy-related green- house gas (GHG) emissions. In line with its closer focus, the published output from the IEA study takes a far more compact form than that of the MEA. While the MEA study as a whole covers well over 3,000 pages, of which around 600 pages are devoted to the scenario analysis, the IEA study is less than 500 pages in length, of which only 60 pages are devoted to the ac- tual exposition of the scenarios, the remainder consisting of detailed background information on current and emerging technology developments and potential barriers to their implementa- tion. As a result, the IEA study is far more amenable to a concise selective review for purpos- es of the present paper, and thus in the following sections more space is generally devoted to the MEA scenarios. However, it should be emphasized that this does not imply that the policy implications of the IEA study are in some sense less important than the wider policy messages emerging from the MEA scenarios not related to climate change mitigation. Indeed, it may be argued that the opposite is the case. To put it bluntly, given that climate change – which is pri- marily driven by energy-related GHG emissions – is very likely to be the predominant force adversely affecting ecosystems over the course of the 21st century, discrete policy efforts to preserve ecosystems in the absence of decisive global climate change mitigation action would seem to be as useful as re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
The energy demand projections and efficiency potentials for ADV are based on Graus et. al. , , involving a global annual reduction in energy intensity of 3.55% in ADV, compared with 1.85% in REF. The annually utilized bio energy will be limited to 80 EJ by 2050, to meet Greenpeace sustainability criteria. This amount is based on a global bio energy assessment survey . The expansion of renewable energies defined in ADV are based on recent technology trends *, regional renewable energy potentials, current and future deployment costs , , and market development projections of the renewable energy industry , , , , , . In ADV, the annual markets for the dominant renewable power generation technologies will maintain the annual growth rates of the past decade (2004–2015) until 2030 to sustain the expansion rates of the renewable energy RE industry, and will decline to one-digit values between 2030 and 2050 (Table 17, appendix). The annual market for solar photovoltaic systems will increase from 51 GW in 2015 to 280 GW by 2050; that for concentrated solar power plants will increase from around 1 GW to 96 GW, and that for wind power from 64 GW to 250 GW by 2050. The model uses annual growth rates for all supply technologies. The future development pathways for cars and other transportation technologies are based on Schmidt et al.  and demand development is calculated from energy intensities based on Oezdemir et al. . Population development: The IEA World Energy Outlook 2014  and the ADV scenario were calculated with an average global population growth of 0.8% per year over the period 2015–2050, increasing from 7 billion to 9.9 billion people by 2050 (Table 13), based on the UN DESA World Population Prospect 2012 (medium fertility variant) . Later UNDESA editions have not been taken into account.
In the period since privatisation (1995 to 2010) passenger-km growth has been faster than in all other major European railways (Brown, 2013). To provide a few specific examples, between 1995-2010, passenger km increased 84% (Britain); 65% (Sweden); and 17% (Germany) 2 .
In the passenger market, many studies have shown that economic growth is the main driver of increases in demand. However, one major change which started in the 1990s was that the degree to which car was increasing its competitiveness declined markedly. Growth in car ownership and use greatly slowed down (and actually fell amongst men under 30), car journey times (which had greatly improved with construction of the motorway network) worsened as road building slowed and congestion worsened, car operating costs rose after decades of decline (partly due to government taxation). Thus the degree to which increases in traffic due to economic growth were offset by loss of traffic to car was greatly reduced. Even to the extent that increases in rail traffic were brought about by improvements in services, reductions in regulated fares and new rolling stock, in a franchise system much of this improvement was prescribed by and paid for by government. A residual effect attributed to privatisation is a small share of the total (see Wardman, 2006).
crisis. Although in modern states this competition is ultimately organized universalistic, that means, there are formal, equal and transparent access rights. But precisely because of this basic formal equality, competitions are then discharged to ascriptive characteristics, so to speak to the visibility of strangers like race, religion and culture (Nassehi and Nassehi 1999). The main question still remains unanswered: Are the new guest workers a convenient es- cape of the liberal paradox? The highly qualified guest enabled the society to open up the borders and justify the enrichment by economic arguments and by the individualistic cosmo- politan culture. The specific notion of guest-workers highlights on the one hand the im- portance of economic capacity and power but on the other side it widely ignores the im- portance of cultural integration. The expectation on today’s Guest-workers is clear. They do what they are supposed to do: they work, they fit into the society and then they leave. Kristin Surak argues that these expectations are becoming the norm for migration per se and any deviance or exception of the rule needs further explanations (Surak 2013). Interestingly, if the guest-worker regime is the norm to perceive migration, the norm doesn’t conflate with quantitative amounts. According to the ILO, 20% of all international migration are guestwork- ers, just a little bit more than the total amount of refugees.
after 2005. But this would surely be oversimpli…ed, because the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2010 a¤ected many …nancial and economic outcomes over the same time period and in a much bigger way than HFT. 5
Financial markets have changed in many ways to re‡ect the technological advances and regulatory changes. The encouragement of competition between trading venues brought about by reg NMS in the United States and Directive concernant les services d’investissement/ MiFid in Europe lead to a more diverse …nancial ecosystem, which lead to improvements in market quality, Gresse (2011) and O’Hara and Ye (2011). There are more trading venues than there were twenty years ago, and the diversity of trading venue type has also increased. Best execution policy in the US forces some integration of the trading venues by imposing the law of one price for a small quantity. It fosters competition so that for example NYSE can’t just trade through a better quote placed elsewhere. This integration is accomplished by smart order routing technology that links markets together, Foucault and Menkveld (2008). There has been a substantial development of algorithmic software to e¤ectuate a variety of trading strategies. These algorithms are given names such as "Stealth", "Iceberg", "Dagger", "Guerrilla", "Sniper", and "Sni¤er". They are routinely bought or rented by a range of participants along with the technology to implement them. There has also been the development of electronic dark pools. These are alternative trading systems that are private in nature— and thus do not interact with public order ‡ow— and seek instead to provide undisplayed liquidity to large blocks of securities. In dark pools trading takes place anonymously, prices and quantities are not displayed as in the "lit" venues of standard exchanges, and execution prices are usually set at the midpoint of the best bid and o¤er from some lit venue or venues. Some authors have questioned whether dark pools degrade the overall market quality by impeding price discovery, Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2015). More recently, there has been concern as to whether the transaction prices achieved in dark pools are accurately pegged to current best quoted prices, Aquilina, Diaz-Rainey, Ibikunle, and Sun (2017).
To reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyber-attack, the OSCE should build on and expand its previous work in the Good Practices Guide on Non- Nuclear Critical Infrastructure Protection and serve as a platform for informal in- formation-sharing on cyber-attacks tar- geting the energy sector. Such a platform could serve as a forum to bring together country Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), whereas the information on incidents could remain anonymous and non-attributed to a specific company or country to ameliorate concerns. A mecha- nism of codified information-sharing – for instance, facilitating exchange by type of attack, sector, and network – could en- hance the OSCE’s role as a trusted broker. The OSCE could also convene common trainings and simulations, bringing to- gether technical experts to exchange best practices and experiences and build rela- tionships and networks. Such an exchange would build on the OSCE’s nascent work in the cyber realm, which includes attack simulations and exercises.
otherwise we find very few changes in the age and skill composition of the workforce around acquisitions.
4 Match quality around acquisitions
Does the excess turnover documented in the previous section improve the match between the plant andits workers? From the previous results we found that the changes in the age and skill composition of the workforce around acquisitions do not differ markedly from changes in non- acquired plants. If anything, we found a decline in the share of high-skilled workers following domestic acquisitions. As firms may select their workers based on criteria other than only age and skills which we observe in our data, the workforce could change systematically along unobservable dimensions. Thus, in this section we explore other ways of assessing whether the turnover around acquisitions results in an improvement in worker and match quality relative to plants not subject to ownership change. First, in section 4.1 we look at the selection process in separations and hires, by using measures of unobservable worker and match quality from Mincer wage regressions, and by looking at the wage growth of new hires. By definition, the workers who stay in acquisition plants from before to after acquisition cannot contribute to a change in the plant-level average match quality, we therefore consider two alternative ways to assess whether there is any evidence that ownership change is an event that seems to improve the match between these workers and the plant. The metrics we use are wage growth and job tenure. The results are presented in section 4.2.
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consumers to both RES and DG integration and to innovation in the energy networks in case the cost of those technologies is completely passed to them.
The seventh barrier is related to the role of the regulator. The regulator should identify a clear boundary between regulation and the market. For instance, while penetration of electric vehicles significantly impacts DSOs’ operation (E-DSO, 2018), there remains ambiguity regarding whether to involve DSOs in the roll-out of PEVs or not. Another example is the different approaches by the European regulators towards allowing DSOs to own and operate storage systems, due to the risk of having a monopolist operating in a potentially competitive market. While in Norway DSOs can own and operate them, in the UK storage is classified as generation and therefore DSOs can own but only third parties can operate them due to unbundling constraints (CEER, 2019). In Italy, the regulator allows DSOs to invest in storage systems, but this investment cannot be recovered through distribution tariffs unless it is justified through a cost-benefit analysis (CEER, 2019). The lack of a clear and uniform policy regarding what network operators are allowed to do can influence the emergence of new players, new business models and the adoption of ESI-enabling technologies.
The emergence of China’s middle class would not have been possible without fundamental changes in the economy. During the past three decades, millions of new small and medium-sized businesses sprang up throughout the country, and by 2003, the private sector accounted for as much as 59 per cent of the GDP (OECD 2005). Many of China’s most successful companies were founded by former peas- ants whose entrepreneurial spirit and dynamism took the political leadership by complete surprise (Fishman 2004: 74). Like the state-owned enterprises, they started out producing relatively simple everyday necessities and utilizing cheap labour. But even China’s manufacturing is now way beyond the stage of purely assembly-driven, low-technology commodity production. The image of the world’s workshop or factory is still valid (see Zhang 2006) – if the industries that epitomize it had disap- peared, the millions of migrants that leave the farms each year could not find any jobs suiting their skill levels, nor could the masses of workers who have lost theirs’ in the fast declining state sector. Yet, this is only part of the story. China is continu- ously moving up the technology ladder, positioning itself for higher levels of indus- trialization, and the country keeps flooding the world markets with ever-more advanced goods and services. This creates opportunities for the rapidly expanding middle class – in engineering, banking, merchandising, legal and financial counsel- ing, the provision of medical services, etc. In cities such as Shanghai, this class is virtually creating itself by setting up thousands of new firms that cater to expensive tastes and that prosper because a critical mass of well-to-do customers already exists.