smart industries. However, where Chapter 3 falls short, Chapter 4 compensates. In Chapter 4, Veldsman and Pauw combine the works of Browne (2012) and Frow and Payne (2011) on the employee value proposition (EVP), and theories on the psychological contract, into an innovative model of attracting and retaining talent for the future world of work. The authors present practical guidelines on how organisations should craft a clear EVP to attract and retain talent, borrowing key principles from contemporary scientific and pop- management literature. Although this chapter is innovative, it’s clear that it’s a consulting firm’s ‘product’. The novelty of the content is undermined by the lack of a thorough theoretical discussion in support of the construction of MMI Holdings Limited’s EVP. Both chapters in Part 2 should be interpreted as practitioner-focused views and utilised as practice guidelines, rather than unique contributions to the discipline. Part 3 centres around the tenet that organisational factors (e.g. job demands/resources, culture and climate) influence the retention of employees. Chapter 5 presents Holtom and Darabi’s ideas around how job embeddedness influences individuals’ intention to stay. They argue that individuals who are embedded within an organisation are more likely to stay, as it aids in tying individual identities to organisational goals. They further argue that retention is a function of social contagion, whereby employee attitudes are influenced by the behaviour of team members, co-workers and other important social relationships. Finally, they indicate that job embeddedness is a better predictor of turnover intentions than job satisfaction. The chapter makes valuable contributions to the understanding of retention from a social– psychology perspective, through highlighting the impact which person–organisation fit has on retention. Chapter 6 draws upon this idea and argues that job demands and resources, and person–job fit are significant predictors of turnover intentions. Although this relationship is relatively well established within the literature (see Bakker & Demerouti, 2017), De Beer, Scholtz and Rothmann argues that this may differ from administrative to professional Source: Coetzee, M., Potgieter, I., & Ferreira, N. (2018). Psychologyof retention: Theory, research and practice. Zurich, Switzerland: Springer Nature.
Agenda setting has come a long way from McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) demonstration of a correlation between the issues emphasized in the media and the issues identi- fied as important by the public. The basic hypothesis has garnered substantial support across forty years of research and numerous extensions have been tested. In this article, we analysed the psychological underpinnings of agenda setting. After the early discovery of the Need for Orienta- tion, research on why agenda setting occurs stalled. As the media environment has evolved, and as it increas- ingly requires people to actively seek information, schol- arship has returned to the psychological factors that mod- erate and explain media selections and effects. The recent surge in scholarship connecting agenda setting with psy- chological perspectives on information selection and processing guided our review. In Figure 6 below, we sum- marize the emerging psychological model. This figure is an important contribution, as it summarizes a theoretical framework for studying the psychologyof agenda setting. Although some components are well established, such as the link between agenda setting and Need for Orientation, others are mere hypotheses requiring additional testing, such as the relationship between motivated reasoning and agenda setting.
“…test scores often reflect poor academic skills, but they may also reflect lack of motivation to do well in the criterion test…These results, obtained from both a population typically limited in skills and ability as well as from a group of normal children (Experiment II), demonstrate that the use of
20 Hegel takes freezing as emblematic of the individuals as depicted in the Commedia. Although the passage concerns all three realms, we think that his description perfectly captures the specificity of infernal weathering: ‘For as individuals were in their passions and sufferings, in their intentions and their accomplishments, so now here they are presented for ever, solidified into images of bronze. […] [O]n this indestructible foun- dation the figures of the real world move in their particular character, or rather they have moved and now in their being and action are frozen and are eternal themselves in the arms of eternal justice’ (G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, ed. and trans. by Thomas Malcolm Knox, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), ii, p. 1104 (part III. section 3. chapter. C. A. 3. ββ). For a reflection on this passage, see Erich Auerbach, ‘Dante and the Romantics’, in Time, History, and Literature: Selected Essays of Erich Auerbach, ed. by James I. Porter, trans. by Jane O. Newman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 141–42.
During the 18th century, attention focused on problems of understanding risky decisions in games against nature. Daniel Bernoulli  presented the St Petersburg Academy with a problem that is nowadays called the St Petersburg paradox. Suppose you are invited to play the following game. A fair coin will be tossed; if it falls heads, then you will be paid one dollar and the game will end. If it falls tails, then it will be tossed again, and if it falls heads you will be paid two dollars and the game will end. This process will continue for as long as necessary, with the payoff doubling each time, until heads comes up and you win something, whereupon the game will end. Assuming that the house has unlimited funds, how much should you be willing to pay for the privilege of playing this game? You win one dollar with probability 1/2, two dollars with probability 1/4, four dollars with probability 1/8, and so on, and the infinite sum of this series is infinitely large, because each term is equal to exactly half a dollar. If your sole concern is to maximize your expected value, then you should be willing to stake your entire fortune, however large it may be, on playing this game. However, this is self-evidently absurd, because there is a high probability that you would lose almost everything; in fact, there is a 50% chance of reducing your entire fortune to one dollar after the very first toss, if the coin falls heads. According to the expected value principle, this is more than counterbalanced by the very small probability of winning a vastly larger sum after a long series of tails. But it is obvious that human decision makers do not normally have such preferences: we may consider two dollars to be twice as desirable as one dollar, but we do not normally consider $200 million dollars to be twice as desirable as $100 million. In the second edition of their landmark book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, von Neumann and Morgenstern  introduced an axiomatic expected utility theory, according to which decision makers do not seek to maximize expected value but rather expected utility, defined by their actual preferences between outcomes that can include risky gambles.
real (statistically measured) level of public debt (RD) and the experienced (subjectively perceived) level of public debt (ED) – including consequential future payments – correspond with each other. In fact, they rather tend to differ from each oth- er. The psychological phenomenon of debt illusion emerges if the real level of public debt remains practically unnoticed. The actual extent of the illusion is represented by the grey area (A) beneath the green line in Figure 2. In this case, the expe- rienced level of public debt (ED1) stays constantly low even though the real level of public debt (RD) is constantly on the rise. Only if the real level of public debt rises above a certain threshold (R) will the experienced level of public debt increase rapidly (increase from ED1 to ED2). Henceforward, the experi- enced level of public debt grows disproportionally strong and can even lead to a panicky government debt crisis. The poten- tial extent of such a crisis is represented by the white area (B) in Figure 2. This threshold effect may be caused by increased (critical) media reporting regarding public debt, strongly (neg- ative) reactions to the reached level of public debt on capital markets or political exploitation of the issue for campaigning purposes. This can result in fundamental attitude changes among politicians and citizens that lead to a budgetary policy of ‘zero-debt’ as it happened on a federal level in Germany in the recent past. Nevertheless, there are some cases in which government borrowing is a reasonable solution from a public ﬁ nance point of view. A budgetary policy of ‘zero-debt’ fails to appropriately take this option into account.
we find that the evidence is predominantly in line with an unconditional effect of weather on sales. The remaining three psychological mechanisms are consistent with all our empirical findings.
Our paper is part of the growing literature that takes behavioral models to field data (see DellaV- igna, 2009, for an overview). The articles most closely related to ours are Conlin et al. (2007) and Busse et al. (2015), who study how weather affects the purchasing behavior for durable goods. Conlin et al. (2007) point out that the overvaluation of a good at the time of purchase should lead to a higher fraction of customers who regret their choices ex post. They confirm this hy- pothesis by showing that customers who purchased winter apparel at times of cold weather are subsequently more likely to return those items. After ruling out a number of alternative explana- tions, they conclude that their results can be interpreted as evidence for projection bias. Busse et al. (2015) demonstrate that customers are more likely to buy convertibles in times of warm and sunny weather, and are more likely to opt for a four-wheel drive vehicle right after a snow storm. They thus convincingly show that projection bias and/or salience may play a role in high-stakes decisions. This paper complements this earlier work by finding similar results in a study of the purchasing behavior for a perishable good, where the decision problem closely resembles a standard expected utility maximization problem under risk.
Solution 2: Detecting and disrupting networks of social solidarity
Referring to organizational theory, Max Abrahms of Stanford University claims that terrorist organizations often do not follow a strategic logic. He argues that terrorist are primarily motivated by the desire to find social solidarity in a peer group of socially disenfranchised rather than by the idea of achieving clearly defined political goals. In tracing back the social network of known terrorists Abrahms sees one of the most effective ways to detect and disrupt terrorist organizations. Today, the three main counter-terrorism strategies all rest on the assumption that terrorist act under the premise of strategic thinking explicable with rational- choice models. Thus the counter-terrorism strategies of (1) deterrence, (2) appeasement, and (3) economic development & democracy promotion are designed to divest terrorism of its political utility and strategic value. However, when a terrorist’s primary motivation is social solidarity and not the trust in a strategic concept, these counter-terrorism approaches lose effectiveness. In focusing on the psychological motivations inducing people to join the rank and file of terrorist groups Abrahms thus encourages to put more emphasis on the socio- psychological point of view when debating counter-terrorism strategy.
Abstract: »Aufwachsen in (der) Gesellschaft. Eine historische Psychologie der Kindheit«. This paper develops a historical social psychology that can be used to understand young children’s social development. It compares the theoretical frameworks of three of the most important relational thinkers in the 20th cen- tury – Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu, and Erich Fromm – to shed light on their attempts to integrate the insights of psychoanalysis into their sociological per- spectives. I begin by exploring Bourdieu’s “uneasy” relationship with psychoa- nalysis, arguing that this has led to a less than successful quest by his followers for bridging concepts that can further develop the concept of social habitus. Fromm, one of the foremost but relatively neglected psychoanalysts of his gen- eration, developed a relational psychoanalysis to explain the social relatedness of individuals in society. However, although his key concept of social character is a bold attempt to make sense of the historical forces that shape our individ- ual and collective lives, it is still too heavily tied to the influence of economic structures in society. I argue that Elias is a more consistent, relational sociolo- gist, able to develop highly nuanced concepts that can fully explain the social habitus of young children, focusing on his concept of “love and learning rela- tionships” to explain how they grow up in society.
Counterfactual thoughts may influence emotions and judgments by way of a contrast effect, which is based on the juxtaposition of reality versus what might have been. For example, winning $50 feels nice, but if one came close to win- ning $100 instead of $50, it does not feel quite as nice. This effect of counter- factuals on emotion and satisfaction is an example of a widely observed psy- chological principle, that of the contrast effect. Contrast effects occur when a judgment is made more extreme via the juxtaposition of some anchor or stan- dard (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Contrast effects can apply to any sort of judg- ment, including physical properties, such as heaviness, brightness, loudness, or temperature. For example, ice cream feels especially cold immediately after sipping hot tea. A suitcase may feel especially light if one has just been moving furniture. Contrast effects also apply to subjective appraisals of value, satisfac- tion, and pleasure. Thus, by the same token, a factual outcome may be judged to be worse if a more desirable alternative outcome is salient, and that same outcome may be judged to be better if a less desirable alternative outcome is salient.
In keeping with their institutional context, it was very clear that the fund managers I studied were under pressure to search out (ahead of others) investment opportunities which they could believe were exceptionally interesting and profitable. The task was particularly challenging and potentially anxiety-provoking because although finding an exceptional opportunity was exciting, they always had both far too much and far too little information to determine future value and risk in any certain way. But, like Keynes entrepreneurs, they had to believe and get others to believe that they could regularly obtain and maintain information advantage over others, and they had somehow to feel convinced enough to overcome doubt. Another of the characteristics of financial assets mentioned above was relevant; not only did they have to find situations which they thought were exceptionally interesting and act, but they also had to hold on to their beliefs for the necessary time period for the underlying thesis to come true. In order to do this (to make the leap of faith) they needed to feel a degree of comfort; in other words they had to build what they could feel was a defensible conviction in their own judgement, which would last over time. The volatility of most financial assets is a fact; indeed they were counting on price changes in their favour. To build up the necessary confidence, to inspire confidence in others and to maintain a mentally committed relationship to their investments, fund managers had to be spurred by excitement at the prospects of the rewards that they imagined. They also had to insulate themselves _________________________
2014). As evolutionary psychologists Cosmides and Tooby (1997) state: “Our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind.”
Criticisms and controversies
Evolutionary psychology has had its fair share of criticism over the years, some of which is valid and some appears to be the result of misunderstandings. First, we discuss some com- mon misconceptions (for details, see Hagen, 2005). Evolutionary psychology is often ac- cused of genetic determinism: All of our behaviors are predetermined by our genes and cannot be changed by culture, learning, or our own volition. This accusation is simply not true. According to evolutionary psychology, the environment plays a crucial role in the decisions humans make. For instance, men may have evolved certain predispositions to physical violence, but whether they carry out such acts depends upon local factors such as poverty, education, or the presence of a culture of honor. Critics also accuse evolutionary psychologyof being reductionist. Yet, reductionism is one of the core features of the sci- entific enterprise because it forces researchers to develop parsimonious theories that un- cover fundamental relationships between phenomena at different levels of explanation (e.g., how brains, hormones, and genes interact to influence aggression). Evolutionary psychology makes an important distinction between ultimate and proximate levels of ex- planation. Understanding the conditions under which egalitarian work structures emerge in organizations is a different question to why humans evolved the capacity for egalitar- ianism in the first place. The proximate and ultimate questions complement each other (Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser, 2008). A third criticism is that evolutionary psychology hy- potheses are untestable, because we do not know what past environments looked like. Granted, there is no time capsule that brings us back to the ancestral environment of humans. Yet, by combining knowledge from a range of different fields such as evolution- ary biology, anthropology, primatology, and paleo-archeology, we have a pretty good pic- ture about what ancestral human organizations looked like (Dunbar, 2003).
The second most likely explanation relates to the surprising role of Wundt’s former students. They ap- pear to have distanced themselves from his basic principles as can be seen in their own textbooks and obitu- aries to Wundt. Wundt’s philosophy of science, his epistemology and methodology, and the central issues of Wundt’s psychologyof apperception and will (volition) were not adequately referred to or discussed by his former co-workers, and did not – with a few exceptions – receive due attention from other contemporary textbook authors. It is significant that former PhD-students and assistants like Felix Krueger, Oswald Kuelpe, Ernst Meumann, Hugo Muensterberg and Wilhelm Wirth refrained from presenting the majority of Wundt’s central concepts in their textbooks. None of these authors from his own circle developed a reasonably con- sistent and creative continuation of Wundt’s ideas. Instead, Meumann, Muensterberg and Kuelpe delivered highly critical commentaries on certain of Wundt's principles and findings, thus begging the question as to whether they did in fact reject Wundt’s central concepts altogether. Wundt’s dispute about Immanuel Kant’s profound criticism of psychological research and Wundt’s methodology of critical interpretation – the first of its kind – were completely disregarded.
Due to the fact that education in psychology gives priori- ties to theories that are constructed under a rationalist shelter and simultaneously aims at developing the stu- dent’s capacity of critical and ethical review of the dog- matic assumptions, a defensive ideology is created. This leads many students to an exercise of uprooting the reli- gious belief in their own subjective experience. This exer- cise is lived with suffering and anguish. It remains then the questions: the destruction of determined dogmas is only possible by their replacement at expense of the develop- ment and maintenance of other dogmas as it seems to be felt by some students? Or, would it be possible a more integrative approach for the sake of the psychology stu- dent’s and their future client’s mental health?
psychoinformatics to strike a balance between the almost infinite possibility of gaining knowledge through the use of innovative technologies and collecting data following the principle of minimum to protect participants’ privacy, but also to save technical resources. In this context, the responsible handling of the knowledge resulting from the work with new data types poses another challenge (Harari et al., 2020). Publishing articles in this line of research can have far-reaching consequences: For example, a paper describing how digital data predict the risk of depression can be misused by insurance companies to avoid insuring people with specific digital usage patterns. On the other hand, publishing is an essential part of scientific work. It draws the public’s attention to research that has probably been going on for years in private companies collecting large datasets of their users (Lazer et al., 2009; Miller, 2012). However, researchers should be careful not to misuse their results for commercial or political purposes. One prominent case highlighting researchers’ responsibilities to handle research results ethically is Cambridge Analytica (Isaak & Hanna, 2018). Researchers from the University of Cambridge presented psycho- graphic profiling, i.e., predicting the personality of Facebook users from their usage data. Based on these findings, the company Cambridge Analytica, with the participation of one of the researchers, retrieved the data of millions of Facebook users without their knowledge and created customized advertising in the US election campaign 2014 intending to influence voting behavior (Isaak & Hanna, 2018). In the long term, these media-effective cases likely contribute to a decline in the public’s trust in science. Accordingly, psychoinformatics is challenged by the reactance of people to participate in data-intensive studies for research purposes (Lazer et al., 2009).
proteic subject, unable to assure itself in the manifold change, have been taken as the hermeneutic condition of our times. Those critical psychologists have detached themselves from systemic thinking not through epistemological discussions but by following the experiences and reflections of their professional work. Although being a critique of science too their work finds its impulses primarily in a professionally mediated everyday-ness. In this way no general concepts emerge but it offers an understanding of the temporal, local and disjunctive. The authors of the journal `Psychologie & Gesellschaftskritik' went on further and are now that much more diversified making it impossible to focus on one name except that of their journal. Since the beginning of its publication the editorial working method favoured an openness that avoided a committment either to a political line or to a scientific school. Authors are requested to submit texts that are a critical reflection with their living and working conditions. Decisions about publishing are made at editorial conferences held by a heterogeneous committee. In the course of time a journal has developed whose main topics sensitively trace, accompany or actively influence the
In order to give a clinically relevant example and to refer to a persistent public health problem drug dependence (including alcohol dependence) can demonstrate that an integrative view for understanding and treatment might be useful. First of all, the useful distinction of misuse and dependence in context of DSM 5 is subsumed under the general category “substance use disorders” ( American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013 ). Traditionally, in clinical psychiatry alcohol dependence is specified by symptoms that are related to alcohol consumption like craving, loss of control over consumption, neglect of other fields of life, symptoms at withdrawal or dose reduction, etc. As expected, DSM 5 shows nearly no effort to explain addiction unless one thinks of the high rate of co-morbidity (anxiety, depression, borderline personality disorder, etc.) that “drives” drinking but also could be “caused” by drinking ( Atkins, 2014 ). In contrast, psychoanalysis (PA) assumes that drug consumption is a defense strategy to handle anxiety, anger and depression (“self-medication hypothesis”, Khantzian, 1987, 2003 ). In this view, psychoactive drugs are used because the ego functions are too weak to handle conflicts and because they compensate a vulnerable self that is experienced as a low and labile self- esteem ( Dodes, 2009 ). Summarizing viewpoints of PA, addiction is the result of a disorder of self-regulation. In therapy PA relies mainly on (self-)exploration of mainly unconscious internalized representations of object relations ( Kernberg, 1976, 1987 ; Krystal and Raskin, 1983 ; Joseph, 1985, 1989 ; Fonagy et al., 2002 ). In contrast, the causal model of addiction of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) uses conscious descriptions ( Marlatt and Gordon, 1985 ; Beck et al., 1990 ; Wright et al., 1993 ): in a stressful social situation, an addictive consumer thinks that he is disliked by others whereby this thoughts are enforced by underlying dysfunctional cognitive schemata (“I am a loser“). These schemata are self-related, and therefore a conceptual correspondence to the psychoanalytic concept exists, but CBT does not use explicitly the concept of an ego or a self, but implicitly of a self-representation. In therapy, the change of behavior, situation processing, stress coping, considering positive and negative consequences of drinking and abstinence, etc. are aimed.
The second issue is that of the accumulation of knowledge and the progress of the discipline. Traditional social science prized itself on these capacities. Performative approaches are less committed to these goals, but more invested in the meaningfulness of the research, and the ethical issues related to the re- search process itself (Keen & Tordes, 2007). In the case of performative in- quiry, there may be accumulation in terms of communicative efficacy, but an investment in increments in knowledge and disciplinary progress is typically replaced by a concern with making an immediate impact of cultural signifi- cance. Performatively oriented scholars note that because patterns of social life are continuously transforming, the emphasis on accumulation is misleading. The social sciences acquire their significance not from attempting to predict the future from observations of the past, but from entering into those deliberations that create the future.
Regret is a negative emotion experienced when the outcome of an individual’s decision is less favorable than if the individual had made an alternate decision (Zeelenberg & Beattie 1997). Regret is proto-typically related to decision making. The hypothesis of this paper is that many of the mistakes that people have been observed to make, and the biases and heuristics that they rely on in managing their individual pension plans are explainable by a desire to avoid regret. I also hypothesize that the social nature of the workplace amplifies the regret that employees might feel from making pension plan choices which turn out badly. Regret has been widely studied in many disciplines. In economics, regret has been used to explain decision-making that appears to diverge from Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1953) rationality axioms (Savage 1951; Bell 1982; Loomes & Sugden 1982). Finance scholars have shown that regret plays a role in stock market investing (Saunders 1993; Kuhnen & Knutson 2011). Regret’s role in decision- making under uncertainty and risk been extensively studied in psychology (Zeelenberg et al. 2007). Neuro-scientists have shown that those with damage to their brains that leave them unable to experience regret make different decisions under risk and uncertainty than those with normal brains (Camille et al. 2004). Regret has also been studied in the context of consumer decision-making (e.g. Inman & Zeelenberg 2017). Accordingly, there is a rich body of regret research from a wide range of disciplines.