The aim of the present study was to expand previous research on REM sleep and emotionalprocessing to the realm of more natural- istic and intense emotional stimuli while focusing on night sleep and keeping sleep relatively undisturbed, in contrast to the various studies that had used sleep deprivation, nap, or other sleep designs. Participants were shown an emotionally highly aversive full-length film, went to bed, and watched specific scenes of the film again on the next morning. The design included negative and neutral scenes within the aversive film as well as a completely neutral control film (on another night). Pre- and postsleep emotional reactivity to the same film scenes were compared to assess to what degree natu- ralistic REM sleep is related to changes in emotional reactivity, which would point to a role of REM sleep in emotional process- ing—either in line with the SFSR theory (i.e., REM support in emotionalprocessing) or the opposing ESC account (i.e., REM interference in emotionalprocessing). The current study focused on psychophysiological measurements for quantifying changes of emotional reactivity from pre- to postsleep. Psychophysiological variables are well-validated measures of emotional reactivity and are in some respects superior to self-report data because they are less susceptible to judgment heuristics and biases (e.g., Wilhelm & Roth, 2001). Specifically, we measured electrodermal activity (skin conductance level, SCL) as an often used and well-validated objec- tive index of sympathetic nervous system arousal associated with threatening stimuli (Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001; Wilhelm & Roth, 1998). We measured facial electromyography (EMG) over the frowning muscle (musculus corrugator supercilii; cEMG) as well-validated objective index of valence-specific nega- tive affect (Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001), which has been shown to be responsive to intracerebral stimulation of the amygdala (Lanteaume et al., 2007). Surprisingly, to our knowledge only one study has used psychophysiological measures to opera- tionalize REM-related changes in emotionalprocessing (Pace- Schott et al., 2011, see Table 1).
Conclusions & Outlook
In this study, we took a meta-analytic approach to delineating brain regions, which consistently show activations during social cognition and emotionalprocessing and deactivations across a wide range of experimental tasks. By applying conjunction analyses, we demonstrated a close convergence of the brain regions involved. These results provide robust empirical evidence for a shared neural network that underlies emotionalprocessing, social and unconstrained cognition, which localizes to the precuneus and anterior medial prefrontal cortex. These two regions are known to be critical hubs in the neurofunctional architecture of the human brain [1,41,85–89]. Moreover, these regions have been shown as closely related to introspective abilities . Crucially, comparing the results of our triple conjunction analysis to the findings by Fleming and colleagues demonstrates significant anatomical overlap. Consequently, we argue that these findings are consistent with the idea that a ‘common denominator’ may exist in cognitive terms, which could consist in introspective processes. By making use of these, we may become aware of our own or others’ states, equally relevant for social cognition, emotionalprocessing and uncon- strained thought [5,24].
operationalized as heart rate (HR) as well as high-frequency heart rate variability (HF-HRV). Low HR and high amounts of HF-HRV were assumed to have a protective effect on the development of PTSD symptoms. The study design was based on the trauma film paradigm and used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This study focused on amygdala activation for the assessment of objective, and arousal/valence as subjective measures of ER, both assessed during trauma exposure. During the subsequent night, sleep and nocturnal arousal was assessed ambulatory; in addition, subjective load of aversive intrusive memories, a core symptom of PTSD, was assessed event-based during subsequent four days. Objectively assessed ER showed significant correlations between SQ and REM architecture. Contrary to predictions, subjectively assessed ER showed no effect of SQ and a positive effect on REM architecture. Furthermore, moderation analyses did not support the proposed role of HR or HF-HRV between the relationship of ER and intrusion load. The current findings could provide an explanation of the frequently observed association between amygdala reactivity and PTSD via the so far poorly understood pathway of nocturnal emotionalprocessing.
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is a multi-system disorder with the most prominent fea- ture of progressive pyramidal tract pathology but also involving extra-motor cortical areas and other spinal systems . Prefrontal cortical dysfunctions may occur in 30–40% of ALS patients . Furthermore, ALS patients may present with reduced memory capacity for i.e. emotional material . Other domains of emotionalprocessing are similarly affected such as evaluation of emotional stimuli of social situations. ALS patients regard negative pictures as less arousing and more positive . Neurodegeneration of cortical [1,5] and limbic structures such as the amygdala  and nucleus accumbens  might affect emotionalprocessing abilities especially for aversive emotional information  but environmental factors may also contribute to these changes . Furthermore, reduced afferent peripheral inflow (i.e. “somatic markers”)  to subcortical and cortical networks such as the limbic system may explain variance in emotionalprocessing and “dampening” of negative feelings.
We sought to investigate the effect of emotional compared to non-emotional distractors on the processes of interference resolution and expected, based on results from previous studies, emotional distractors to produce increased interference effect. We applied the tasks to test for two possible outcomes pertaining to increased distractibility prompted by emotional words. First, on the basis of evidence suggesting dissociable effect of emotion on brain activity , whether the emotional distractor would increase activity in brain regions responsible for emotionalprocessing (amygdala, ventrolateral and medial prefrontal cortices, rostral ACC) while simultaneously decreasing activity in the regions responsible for conflict resolution processes (dorsal ACC, dorso- lateral prefrontal cortex). Second, if any interference task (whether triggered by an emotional or non-emotional distractor) based on the semantic incompatibility between target and distractor would also involve networks associated with interference resolution in general. We deemed it likely that any interference (whether triggered by an emotional or non-emotional distractor) would also increase demands for executive control to suppress the distracting information. This, in turn, would suggest the involvement of overlapping networks associated with interference, whether triggered by emotional or non-emotional distractors. Like the networks underlying this function in the non-emotional interfer- ence Stroop tasks, we expected to see the involvement of the dorsal ACC, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the inferior frontal gyrus, the posterior parietal cortex, and the anterior insula [5,8]. We also sought to determine if these networks are capable of dynamic adjustments based on the increased demands exerted by emotional distractors. Finally, the goal was to prove whether interference resolution in the emotional task would be facilitated by the target’s emotional salience.
Biased motivated attention towards phobia‐relevant pictures is a typical finding in specific phobia. In the visual system, the allocation of motivated attention is indexed by two event‐related potential components – the Early Posterior Negativity and the Late Positive Potential. Enhanced Early Posterior Negativity and Late Positive Potential amplitudes are reliably observed in specific phobia such as, for instance, snake, spider, or blood‐injection‐injury phobia and to some extent also in dental pho- bia. However, regarding dental phobia results are sparse and its theoretical concept is not undisputed. To further elucidate the electrophysiological characteristics of dental phobia, we investigated visual emotionalprocessing in dental phobia patients and con- trols. Subjects viewed neutral, phobia‐irrelevant and phobia‐relevant pictures while magnetoencephalographic and behavioural measures were recorded. All patients re- ported a history of traumatic experiences and depressive and anxiety symptoms, as well as dissociative and posttraumatic symptoms. In the magnetoencephalography, patients showed generally less evoked neural activation at parietal and temporal re- gions and a reduced differentiation between picture categories compared to controls. At the behavioural level, patients rated phobia‐relevant pictures as clearly more nega- tive as did controls. In contrast to previous reports, our results suggest that dental phobia cannot be associated with the typical effects of biased motivated attention seen in other specific phobias. Instead, results indicate that dental phobia shares typical characteristics with mild forms of posttraumatic stress disorder.
processing ( see Dijkstra, Miwa, Brummelhuis, Sappelli, & Baayen, 2010, for a review ). Spanish and Catalan are both Romance languages with a high number of cognate translations. Therefore, the lack of modulation of the experimental effects by language in Experiments 1 and 2 might be produced by the large number of cognate words in the experimental materials (85% of the total). In contrast, in Experiment 3, there were only 48% of cognate words, the number of cognates between Spanish and English being far lower. In order to see whether cognate status has affected the results of Experiment 3, we analyzed cognate and non-cognate words separately. These analyses revealed that, for both %E in the LDT and the free recall task, results were very similar for cognates and non-cognates. In contrast, RT data showed that the interactions of emotional content and concreteness by language were obtained only with non-cognate words, not with cognate words. These results suggest that, although cognate status cannot entirely account for the findings of this study, it might have contributed to some extent. Further research is needed in which cognate status is experimentally manipulated to ascertain its role in differences in emotionalprocessing between languages.
Although this study provides interesting new information regarding cognitive emotional processes in women suffering from PMS, it does have some limitations. For example, the sample was not completely representative (especially concerning educational background of participants) and the online conduction limited the controllability of potentially systematic errors. Furthermore, we did not assess hormone levels in order to determine the beginning and ending of the follicular or luteal phases. Instead, we determined menstrual cycle phases on the basis of participants’ subjective reports concerning the first day of their last menses and duration of their last menstrual cycle. We also did not confirm menstrual cycle phase during the experimental tasks (e.g. by daily ratings). This is a major limitation since it restrains our conclusions about between-group differences in emotion regulation in the specific menstrual cycle phases. Moreover we examined PMS only from women’s individual perspective and did not include social factors in our study. This could be an important issue which should be considered in future research since alterations in information processing could reflect the result of the interplay of premenstrual symptoms and social reactions (Ussher & Perz, 2013b). Another limitation is that it is not possible to draw causal conclusions from our data. Our participants had PMS, but it remains unclear whether the deviations found are partially caused by, or are the cause of the premenstrual symptoms. Additionally assessing hormone levels could have the advantage that assumptions concerning alterations in cognitive emotionalprocessing in women with PMS can be justified by biological fluctuations and that conclusions about the direction of the association between hormonal processes, the interplay of emotional and attentional processes, and premenstrual symptoms, could be drawn. Finally the experimental paradigm of EST can be considered critically since, to our knowledge, there is no study or empirical evidence confirming validity of the EST.
Age-related changes on the neural correlates of sensory acuity have been previously reported. Reduced visual [31– 33] and auditory primary sensory areas  activation was reported with advance in age. The present study adds to the literature by indicating a modulatory age effect on automatic encoding of prosody. These findings are in line with previous studies form visual modality indicating decreased sensory areas response to emotional stimuli [8, 31–33]. Hilimire and colleagues  reported stronger negativity at occipital sites for sad face in young compared to older adults, whereas for happy faces stronger negativity was reported in older adults relative to young adults. Kensinger and Leclerc  suggested that automatic emotion processing is preserved with aging, whereas an age effect results in a more controlled emotionalprocessing, such as emotion regulation and emotional mem- ory involving a different neural mechanism showing an effect of age . In our study, employing an event-related oddball paradigm, frontal areas did not emerge. However, auditory responses to sad prosody perception declined like emotion recognition ability with age. Thus, emotion recognition impairment might be related to decline of sensory ability with aging.
Language and emotion are discussed to be closely related. Subcor- tical networks that support emotionalprocessing also contribute to music and prosody, which in turn are the probable evolutionary basis for spoken language (Panksepp, 2008). Thus, it is suggested in the language-as-context hypothesis that language evolved to reduce uncertainty in the perception of emotional stimuli (Feldman Barrett, Lindquist & Gendron, 2007). At an experimental level, the interaction of both is well documented, for example in spoken (e.g., Buchanan et al., 2000) and in written language (e.g., Briesemeister et al., 2011; Hofmann et al., 2009). Given such a close relationship, we consider lexical (word) stimuli to be an excellent candidate for the investigation of different models of affective space.
One further issue requires discussion: We found a clear emotion-induced modality-based shift in audio-tactile temporal processing when the two signals came from different locations, but not when they originated from the same location. What might be the reason for this dissociation? Studies of multisensory integration suggest that multisensory stimuli coming from the same origin are more likely to be integrated as one single, multisensory „object‟ than two spatially separate signals (Stein & Stanford, 2008; also see the assumption of unity, Welch & Warren, 1980). Neurophysiological studies have shown that when multisensory stimuli (e.g., an audiotory and a visual signal) are presented within the overlapping receptive fields of a superior colliculus (SC) neuron, neuronal responses are enhanced (Stein & Meredith, 1993; Stein & Stanford, 2008). Behavioral studies have similarly revealed that the integration window is larger and crossmodal temporal discrimination diminished for vision- related multisensory integration at the same location, compared to separate locations (Spence et al., 2003; Zampini et al., 2003a, 2003b). However, it is still controversial whether such a spatial modulation would also apply to audio - tactile temporal perception (Kitagawa et al., 2005; Occelli, Spence, & Zampini, 2008; Occelli et al., 2011; Zampini et al., 2005). On this background, our differential effects on audio-tactile TOJs between spatially coincident and separate stimuli may suggest that the „prior‟ assumption of unity assumption for audio-tactile stimuli that originate from the same location somehow counteracts the otherwise ensuing modality-oriented attentional bias. This view is also consistent with recent suggestions that crossmodal congruency results in enhanced binding of multisensory stimuli and reduced prior entry effects (Spence & Parise, 2010) .
Da Startups oft nur über ein knappes Marketingbudget verfügen, gelten hier besondere Handlungsempfehlungen für den Aufbau einer emotional aufgeladenen Marke. Gerade hier sollte das markenführende Unternehmen auf die richtige Auswahl der Kommunika- tionsmittel achten und diese sinnvoll einsetzen. Hier besteht die Möglichkeit für Star- tups besonders kostengünstige Kommunikationsinstrumente zu Hilfe zu nehmen, um schnell einen gewissen Bekanntheitsgrad zu erreichen. Ein sehr mächtiges Instrument, das recht kostengünstig eingesetzt werden kann ist die Webseite. Sie dient jungen Unternehmen als erster Kommunikationskanal. Die Webseite sollte strukturell und in- haltlich mit der eigenen Markenidentität übereinstimmen und der Zielgruppe alle rele- vanten Informationen über Unternehmen, Marke und Produkte bieten. Sie kann mit Hilfe einer einheitlichen Unternehmenssprache, emotional aufgeladenen Bildern und in Verbindung mit geschickten Social-Media-Marketing zu einem sehr nachhaltigen Werkzeug werden. Ein weiterer kostengünstiger, aber sehr wirkungsvoller Kanal ist die Pressearbeit. Auch hier sollten Startups empfängergerecht und professionell kommuni- zieren. Vor allem der hohe Multiplikatoreffekt, der durch wirksame Pressearbeit ausge- löst werden kann, ist nicht zu unterschätzen. Des Weiteren sollten Startups die Wirkung ihrer Kommunikationsmaßnahmen stetig überprüfen und optimieren, da sich die Zielgruppe selbst auch ständig weiterentwickelt.
Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2002) sowie seinen Vorgänger, der Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS; Mayer et al., 1999). Neben den wenigen Leistungstests existiert eine große Anzahl von Selbstberichtsverfahren, die der Messung von EI dienen sollen. Diese Instrumente sind fast ausschließlich mit dispositionellen Konzeptualisierungen von EI assoziiert. Selbstberichte der EI beinhalten Fragen über das typische Verhalten der Getesteten oder Selbsteinschätzungen von emotionsbezogenen Fähigkeiten. Beispiele für Selbstberichtsverfahren zur Messung von EI sind das Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i; Bar-On, Brown, Kirkcaldy & Thomé, 2000) die Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale (SEIS; Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden & Dornheim, 1998), der Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue; Petrides, Pita & Kokkinaki, 2007) sowie die Wong & Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS; Wong & Law, 2002). Dabei steigt die bereits hohe Anzahl von Selbstberichtsverfahren stetig an. Selbstberichte wurden von vielen Forscherinnen und Forschern als unangemessene Ansätze zur Messung von Fähigkeitskonstrukten bewertet (Schulze et al., 2007). Einige Belege sprechen dafür, dass sich Fähigkeiten nur ungenügend über Selbstberichte abbilden lassen (z. B. Freund & Kasten, 2012; Lievens, Klehe & Libbrecht, 2011). Da nur wenige Leistungstests existieren und der MSCEIT/MEIS-Ansatz die Messung von EI dominiert, beruhen fast alle Erkenntnisse über EI auf einem einzelnen Messinstrument, was als unerwünschter Umstand identifiziert wurde (Schulze et al., 2007; MacCann & Roberts, 2008).
Theory and Hypotheses
A Framework for Bureaucratic Red Tape in Citizen-State Interactions
Research into bureaucratic red tape has expanded our knowledge on a variety of topics, including organizational effectiveness (e.g., Pandey, Coursey, and Moynihan 2007), public and private sector specifics (e.g., Pandey and Kingsley 2000), managerial alienation (e.g., DeHart-Davis and Pandey 2005), personnel recruitment (e.g., Linos and Riesch 2019), and career intentions (e.g., Hattke, Vogel, and Znanewitz 2018). The few investigations into the consequences of red tape in citizen-state interactions (e.g., Christensen et al. 2019; Moynihan and Herd 2010; Scott and Pandey 2000; Tummers et al. 2016) have demonstrated that it delays the delivery of services (Bozeman, Reed, and Scott 1992) and imposes administrative burdens on citizens (Herd et al. 2013). Still, there is an ongoing debate about what red tape actually is and how best to assess it. In their review of concepts and measures of red tape, Pandey and Scott (2002, 567) found agreement among scholars that “red tape is concerned with negative effects of rules and procedures.” Similarly, a survey among public sector employees found that when asked about their own definitions of red tape, participants most commonly referred to inefficient processes and barriers (Kaufmann, Borry, and DeHart-Davis 2018). According to the most common definitions by Bozeman (1993, 2000), the distinction between necessary bureaucracy and dysfunctional red tape involves a normative judgment about a rule’s contribution to a “legitimate” or “valued” purpose. This requires scholars to establish the targeted outcomes of rules and to evaluate their contributions to these goals. Authors have tried to resolve this dilemma by establishing objective measures for red tape. For instance, they have investigated whether administrative delays, as the amount of time required for processing administrative tasks, indicate red tape (e.g., Pandey and Bretschneider 1997; Pandey and Welch 2005). Others have advanced the costs of bureaucratic rules to evaluate the administrative burdens imposed by red tape (e.g., Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey 2014). Although both approaches include important characteristics of red tape, they do not acknowledge whether a rule contributes to a valued purpose. A rule may be costly yet still functional to achieve a legitimate goal. Rosenfeld’s (1984, 603) reply to Kaufman’s (1977) seminal book already pointed to this problem, stressing that “individuals who deal with bureaucracies develop their own criteria for red tape. Therefore red tape may be understood best as a problem of individual
in the regulation of emotional states. Although performance in the categorization task was comparable in BN and controls, the present ERP data demonstrate significant differences at the post-perceptual level of emotional face processing. While early processes of structural encoding, as indexed by the N170, were found to be intact, BN patients had a significant reduction of N2 amplitudes and showed higher P3 amplitudes in response to facial stimuli than healthy subjects. Furthermore, a source analysis in the time interval of the N2 revealed that these differences could be related to specific structures that collaborate with the emotional face processing system. In addition to core structures of face recognition, a dipole in the inferior parietal lobule was found in healthy controls as responding to fearful faces, whereas BN patients’ data revealed neural activity in the parahippocampal gyrus.
In der sechsten und letzten Hypothese wurde schließlich angenommen, dass auch durchgeführte Suizidversuche in der Gruppe der PatientInnen mit emotional instabiler Persönlichkeitsstörung häufiger sind als in der Kontrollgruppe. So haben laut vorliegender Untersuchung 43,6% der EIP-PatientInnen vs. 15,4% der Kontroll- patientInnen mindestens einen Suizidversuch in der Vergangenheit verübt. Dieser deutlich erscheinende Unterschied reichte jedoch aufgrund der recht kleinen Fallzahl und der verwendeten Bonferroni-Korrektur nicht für einen statistischen Beleg aus. Bereits veröffentlichte Studien, in denen Suizidversuche bei kinder- und jugendpsychiatrischen Borderline-PatientInnen berücksichtigt werden, kommen jedoch auf höhere Zahlen: Bei Fleischhaker et al. (2005) hatten 83,3% der Borderline- Patientinnen bereits Suizidversuche unternommen, bei Ludolph et al. (1990) 81,5%. Ludolph und Mitarbeiter trennen jedoch noch einmal „ernste Suizidversuche“ ab, deren Häufigkeit sie mit 18,5% angeben. Diese Ergebnisse für Jugendliche unterscheiden sich also kaum von den Zahlen, die aus Studien in der Erwachsenenpsychiatrie bekannt sind: Bei Soloff et al. (1994) hatten 72,6% der 84 untersuchten PatientInnen bereits mindestens einen Suizidversuch unternommen.
Job feedback is the “ degree to which carrying out the work activities required by the job results in the individual obtaining direct and clear information about the effectiveness of his or her performance” (Hackman and Oldham, 1976: 258). As a consequence, employees can modify their working progress or change processing resolutions according to the feedback message in order to achieve work requests and organizational goals. Employees recognize their working performance through job feedback, while the feedback message is from co-workers, organizations, or even customers. The negative impact from emotional labor could be reduced through internal job design or external feedback. For emotional jobs, employees must induce emotional reactions during interactions with customers (Grandey and Diamond, 2010). Therefore, appropriate and positive feedback from customers creates massive inspiration and support can diminish employees’ negative emotions (Grandey and Diamond, 2010; Yagil and Ben-Zur, 2009). The lack of accomplishment perception or explicit feedback expectation will lower employees’ job performance. Therefore, it is presumed that, as service employees recognize customer response, the inspiring effect that is especially induced from positive feedback can increase employees’ job satisfaction and decrease emotional exhaustion caused by the
Emotional labor is characterized by face-to-face or voice-to-voice interactions with clients (for example, patients, children, customers, passengers, or guests); inclusion of the behavioral expressions that aim to change others’ emotions, attitudes, and behavior; and displaying of emotions related to social expectations. Emotional labor may be described by the episodes (for example, dealing with an angry customer before or after dealing with an angry co-worker), by the job (different professions; possibilities of controlling other employees), and by the person (different individual characteristics) (Ashkanasy and Cooper 2008).
Emotional labor is defined as “the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display ” by Hochschild (1983, s.7) while it is also defined as “The act of displaying the appropriate emotion ” by Ashforth & Humphrey (1993,p.90). Grandey(2000, p. 97)defined emotional labor as “the process of regulating both feelings and expressions for the organizational goals ”. The work done by the labour in manufacturing department may require coordination between mind and arm, mind and finger, mind and shoulder, which can simply be called as physical labor. On the other hand, when the flight attendant pushes heavy meal carts through the aisles she is acting as physical labor, but she is acting as mental labor when she prepares for and actually organizes emergency landings and evacuations. While she is acting as both physical and mental labor she is also doing something which is called as emotional labor. Emotional labour requires individual to out loud or suppress his feelings, because one wants to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others (Hochschild, 2002, p. 6-7).