4.4 Ireland: Climate and ClimateChange It is well known that Ireland’s temperate climate is principally influenced by the North Atlantic Ocean and particularly the Gulf Stream circulation. The fact that significant indications of changes in climate can be detected in data from the west coast of Ireland in an oceanically dominated climatic regime is particularly noteworthy and is significant on a national and international level. Some of these changes could be regarded as being positive, i.e., higher minimum temperatures, decrease in occurrence of frost days and longer growing season. However, changes, such as increased winter-time precipitation levels and decreased sunshine levels, may not be regarded as beneficial developments. The build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is projected to lead to increased changes to our climate in future. There are very large levels of uncertainty as to what these changes will be (IPCC, 2001). What is certain is that the increased levels of greenhouse gases trap heat energy in our atmosphere. This more energetic atmosphere is likely to be more erratic and less predictable than today’s with more extreme weather events occurring. If unchecked, long- term climate changes for Ireland may be extreme, for example, if oceanic heating is reduced due to the North Atlantic Drift circulation being reduced or halted. There may also be surprises, which have significant environmental, social and economic impacts that will be difficult to deal with. Ireland should, therefore, support efforts to understand the impacts of climatechange through research and the further development of observational systems as required under the Kyoto Protocol. Some possible steps to do this are outlined in the following section.
module, and we assume that energy, produced by the processing of fossil fuels, a¤ects the economy via two di¤erent channels. On the one hand, energy enters as a separate factor in the …rm’s production function, thus in- creasing output. On the other hand, the processing of fossil fuels generates GHG emissions which increase the GHG concentration in the atmosphere, which in turn increases temperature. Higher temperatures negatively a¤ect economic outcomes. Therefore, these two channels imply con‡icting e¤ects for an economy’s productivity from the use of fossil fuels. In other words, once we take into account climatechange, the use of fossil fuels implies an interesting trade-o¤ which eventually drives our main …ndings. Our frame- work could be thought of as an integrated assessment model (IAM) in the sense that we incorporate both an economic and a climate sector in a uni…ed
We developed an analytical model of endogenous fertility and embedded it in a calibrated climate-economy model. Endogenous fertility choices generate an externality, i.e. a birth ex- ternality, as parents do not consider the contribution of each child to emissions when deciding the size of their family. Given the current global trend of population growth, our scenarios re- sults suggest that family planning aiming at smaller families should be addressed as a separate policy instrument against climatechange. In particular, we found that: (i) family planning contributes to abate emissions and a reduction of population growth is an important element of efficient climate policy. The fertility tax increases the cost of having many children while stimulating parents to invest more in the education of their offsprings; (ii) without a family planning policy, carbon taxes should be reduced as they otherwise (unintentionally) increase family size through the quality-quantity trade-off ; (iii) in absence of efficient climate policies, family control should further be tightened to reduce emissions indirectly. (iv) We also compute the implied fertility externality. Our results show that its magnitude is substantial, even larger than the emissions externality.
The developed world can not run away from the truth that the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has been due to their economic development through industrialization in the past century. We would admit that the developing world contributed to the process by their blood, sweat and tear; as well as depletion of their natural resources, including forests as colonies of the developed world. This includes China, India and Malaysia. It is Ironic that in emulating the development pathway of the developed world successfully, high income devel- oping countries like China and India are now the “villains” in this climatechange debate!
It is often argued that addressing climatechange and slowing down global warm- ing requires technological advances (see e.g. the discussion in Harstad (2016) or Schmidt (2014)). Potentially, technologies can indeed lead to emissions reduc- tion (see e.g. International Energy Agency (2013)), and certain abatement targets may not be achievable without technological breakthroughs. It is well-known that only a small fraction of the gains from developing new technologies can be ap- propriated by the innovator, the operative factor behind the under-provision of R&D investments for such technologies (e.g. Barrett (2006) and Hoel and Zeeuw (2010)). An additional challenge is to get developed abatement technologies onto the market. Many existing abatement technologies are not yet competitive (Ben- ner et al. (2012); Croezen and Korteland (2010); UNFCCC (2009) and Table 1 in the Appendix), a fact that may be related to financing problems in general (UN- FCCC, 2009) or to a lock-in in carbon-based technologies, as these carbon-based technologies benefit from investments made previously (Mazzucato, 2014).
We identify conditions in which the two-part punishment strategy we propose can support the efficient outcome as a subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., where cooperation can be achieved through a self-enforcing international environmental agreement. Though such
conditions are necessarily complicated for dynamic games with nonlinear payoff functions, we exploit several properties of the game to simplify the analysis. We provide a simulation model to illustrate when it is possible for a self-enforcing agreement to support an efficient outcome. We also parameterize the simulation model to mimic current conditions to show whether a self- enforcing agreement that achieves efficient climatechange policy is likely to be possible. We find that whether the two-part punishment strategy leads to a self-enforcing efficient policy depends non-monotonically on the discount factor. While sufficiently small discount factors do not support an efficient outcome for the standard reason that the threat of future punishment is insufficient to deter the current benefit from cheating, sufficiently large discount factors may also fail to support an efficient outcome. Dutta (1995b) found that monotonicity regarding the
Finally, as public health depends to a large extent on safe drinking water, sufficient food and secure shelter, climatechange is bound to have a range of health effects (McMichael et al., 2003). On the first level, a shortage of freshwater caused by climatechange will increase risks of water-borne disease, just as shortage of food will increase the risk of malnutrition. On the second level, climatechange, via both a shift in background climate conditions and changes in regional climatic variability, will affect the spatial and seasonal patterns of the potential transmission of various vector-borne infectious diseases. With global warming, it is expected that there will be an increase in the geographic range of potential transmission of malaria and dengue - two vector borne infections, each of which currently affects 40- 50% of the world population. A rise in temperatures, for example, would result in an increased prevalence of malaria in higher altitudes and latitudes. Within their present ranges, these and many other infectious diseases would tend to increase in incidence and seasonality, although decreases would occur for some infectious diseases in some areas. The human-induced warming that the world is now experiencing is already causing 150,000 deaths and 5 million incidents of disease each year from additional malaria and diarrhoea, mostly in the poorest nations (Patz et al., 2005). However, in all circumstances actual disease occurrence is strongly influenced by local environmental and social conditions. On the third level, climatechange will be accompanied by an increase in heat waves, often exacerbated by increased humidity and urban air pollution, which would cause an increase in heat related deaths and episodes of illness. The impact would be greatest in urban populations, particularly affecting the elderly, the sick, and those without access to air-conditioning. Furthermore, a reduction in crop yields and food production will predispose food-insecure populations to malnutrition, leading to impaired child development and diminished adult activity (IPCC, 2001).
Keywords : agriculture, climate, climatechange, greenhouse environment. INTRODUCTION
Today we have a number of environmental problems, many of which are closely related. The most important issue is climatechange. During Earth's history, the climate has changed many times, sometimes dramatically. The ages of warmer replaced and superseded always been glacial. However, the climate of the past about 10 000 years has been particularly stable. During this period has developed the human civilization. In the last about 100 years - since the beginning of industrialization - the global average temperature has increased by approx. 0.6 ° C (after IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange)), faster than ever in the past 1000 years.(fig 1)
for technology sharing initiatives, this paper provides an argument in favor of sharing cost- reducing technologies. A country may provide a new technology, because it can induce other countries not to delay their e¤orts but instead to contribute to climate protection today.
To develop this rationale, three distinctive features, which in‡uence the decision of con- tributing to climate protection, are taken into consideration. First, e¤orts to mitigate global warming are, to a large extent, private contributions to a global public good. As such, the strategic interaction between countries causes strong incentives to delay one’s own contri- bution since, in reaction to the high e¤ort of one country, other countries can reduce their e¤ort on climate protection. Second, international coordination is hampered by the fact that there is uncertainty with regard to the (country-speci…c) need for climate protection. The uncertainty connected with climate protection stems from the fact that the costs and bene…ts of environmental damage and its reduction remain largely uncertain. Particularly di¢ cult is the assessment of the impact of climatechange, which is highly reliant on di¤er-
Contributing to ClimateChange
The disruption to our climate system that has been brought about by rising emissions from the burning of fossil fuels since the industrial revolution alongside the emission of other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere (IPCC 2007) and can only be tackled by profound changes in the patterns of production and consumption that our economies have come to rely on (Jones & Levy 2007). Any business therefore needs to not only look at its own operations but also at the introduction of greenhouse gases at all levels of the system the company is part of. Having said that, a company must, of course, start by measuring the greenhouse gases of its operations in order to then move to the system thinking required to tackle climatechange. Measuring carbon emissions is not straight forward for many types of operations and requires some learning in the organization (Molisa & Wittneben 2008). It is critical, however, that the measurements are undertaken in such a way that they are reliable, verifiable and comparable. A system of carbon performance measurement is likely to be established under any type of regulatory regime that will eventually make this data comparable and publicly available. In order to adequately assess the contributions of any one business on climatechange, there are various aspects that need to be considered:
particular scenarios like previous research does (e.g. Jacobsen et al., 2013; Susaeta et al., 2014; Boulanger et al., 2016; Yousefpour et al., 2017), we use scenarios of climate eects on trees that have a suciently broad range to cover changes which are, by far, more extreme than anything that can possibly happen in the future. Then, we calculate the prot losses from following the reactive rule for each one of a very large number of scenarios within this range (i.e. a Monte Carlo simulation). This setup enables getting an upper bound for what the losses may be if an owner is not forecasting the future. This upper bound is simply the losses of the reactive owner in the scenario with the largest prot losses. It is important to note that the upper bound of losses is not the same as the expected losses which by denition are smaller. The benet of this approach is that if we nd the upper bound to be of negligible size, which is exactly what we do, we can draw the conclusion that forecasting long-term forest dynamics is not important for optimal rotation. The benet furthermore is that, to draw this conclusion, it is only necessary that the range of the scenario distribution is broad enough. That is, whether the underlying distribution of the scenarios is realistic within this range is of no concern. The analysis is performed for boreal forests (i.e. those covering the northern part of the northern hemisphere). For our simulations to credibly cover the actual outcome, which is unknown to us today, we need to ensure that our parameter variations span over at least what can possibly happen in reality. With this in mind we include very extreme scenarios where, for example, the risk of re changes from happening every thousand years at the onset to instead happening every third year, trees growing to become four times larger and growing to 90% of their maximum size twice as fast. These scenarios are, by an order of magnitude, more extreme than those predicted in forest research. We also vary the trajectories of climatechange to include, for instance, threshold eects. Since we use so extreme scenarios our conclusions are probably on the conservative side. They are also conservative since we compare the reactive rule of thumb to an optimal rule based on perfect information. A more realistic benchmark would be a decision maker using the best available estimate of future changes or using decision making under uncertainty (Sethi et al., 2005; Tsur and Zemel, 1996; Huang and Loucks, 2000). Our losses will by construction be larger than if the reactive owner would be compared to such decision makers.
Google Insights allows us to search at the state/year/week level and permits a peek into the “zeitgeist” at that moment. We match this data to state unemployment data by month and document that in those states in which the unemployment rate increases, searches for “global warm- ing” decline and searches for “unemploy- ment” increase. These findings support the claim that the recession has chilled interest in prioritizing climatechange as a pressing policy issue. This finding is important because it challenges the con- ventional wisdom that recessions are good for the environment. The traditional view is that industry activity is dirty and pro- cyclical. These facts imply that pollution improves during recessions. But, if we need to introduce a Pigouvian incentive to combat climatechange, then my results suggest that the probability of this taking place will decline during recessions.
The external cost of rail transportation is about 3 to 4 times lower than the cost of road transportation, and about 2.5 times lower than for air transportation. For the latter, the cost of climatechange risks are most relevant, since air transportation has increased the cost of climatechange due to its emissions in high altitudes. Therefore, the strategy of a modal shift towards rail seems to be a possible way of meeting the increasing demand for transportation. On closer inspection, however, it is important to distinguish between different transport segments: The strategy should focus on segments in which rail transport is competitive, e.g. in urban areas and in competitive (high-speed) corridors, e.g. alpine transit. At the same time, the electricity mix plays an important role: The environmental balance of rail transport will deteriorate if railway electricity is produced with non-renewable sources such as coal, oil or nuclear energy.
The analysis of second-best scenarios is related to the discussion about the optimal timing and coordination of policies in the context of climatechange mitigation; see Sorrell and Sijm ( 2003 ). Böhringer et al. ( 2009 ) evaluate the simultaneous application of a cap-and-trade system and renewable penetration targets in the EU using a computable general equilibrium model. They find that the additional costs of the technology policy are small and the CO 2 permit price is decreased. Kverndokk and Rosendahl ( 2007 ) discuss the optimal choice of emission taxes and technology subsidies for limiting cumulative emissions in the presence of spill-over effects due technology learning-by-doing. The highly stylized partial model covers the electricity sector of a single region. The study analyzes delays in choosing carbon taxes and technology subsidies. The paper finds that delaying the optimal carbon emissions tax has little impact on welfare. In addition, its effect is smaller than delaying the optimal technology subsidy. Similar studies on first- and second-best policies with explicit representation of policy instruments to address multiple and interlinked externality problems have been undertaken on the coordination of technology R&D and emission taxing policies; see e.g. Gerlagh et al. ( 2009 ). Also other market failures could be considered, but like the issue of technology R&D this is not the focus of this paper.
Regarding the first objection, the question to which degree abstraction, simplification and isolation is warranted in economic theory is arguably the most important methodological problem for economics (Hausman, 2013). Hence whether merging two previously unrelated subfields is considered an improve- ment over previous research may fundamentally depend on one’s basic method- ological commitments. Examining these for the case of merging climate policy with major topics of public finance is beyond the scope of this article. How- ever, the thesis that embedding analysis of climate policy in a public finance framework results in non-negligible effects for both fields is a theoretically very modest claim. We do not know of any metaphysical, methodological or norma- tive controversy (see M¨ aki, 1992, Section 10) that would provide arguments for or against merging the two fields; on the contrary doing so is likely to yield sounder policy advice. Current greater interest (or earlier lack thereof) in linking the fields of public finance and climatechange mitigation may thus need to be discussed differently: first, evidence for the fact that linking the two fields would yield truly non-negligible effects is provided by relatively re- cent studies (Metcalf, 2007; Bauer et al., 2013; Carbone et al., 2013) that show that ambitious climate protection will yield substantial revenues for gov- 21 For extensive discussions about the appropriateness of discounted standard utilitarianism
Climate policy, as the second topic which this thesis covers, presents a classic case of positive externalities as the bene…ts of climate mitigation e¤orts cannot be lim- ited to one country. Given that climate protection is a global public good, countries have an incentive to free-ride on the contribution of others and, as a result, con- tributions to climate protection are ine¢ ciently low. In order to increase the level of overall climate protection, international cooperation and coordination is needed. However, questions of climate policy adoption are further complicated by timing considerations. Countries are faced with the decision of when to adopt climate mit- igation policies, given that the extent of the damage of climatechange is unknown but waiting for more information might prove to be too costly. On the international policy agenda, climate policy has long been identi…ed as a topic where international
As we saw in the last sub-chapter Essam El-Hinnawi’s 2 definition of ‘environmental refugees’ is very inclusive. The author does not give a clear framework and allows a huge number of people migrating from their home to be part of his definition. Following Saunders (2000) El- Hinnawi differentiates between three types of refugees according to the duration of their out- migration and the underlying events: (1) temporary migration due to sudden-onset hazards where the affected area is likely to recover; (2) permanent migration because of large development projects such as dams and (3) temporary or permanent migration due to slow- onset hazards as for example desertification which affected the resource base of the residing population. El-Hinnawi further names five drivers for environmental induced migration: “[…] natural disasters, land degradation, large dams, environmental accidents and degraded and/or mined environments as a result of war” (Saunders 2000: 235). There has been some criticism of this definition for ‘environmental refugees’. Diane Bates states that “his definition makes no distinction between refugees who flee volcanic eruptions and those who gradually leave their homes as soil quality declines. So many people can be classified under the umbrella of ‘environmental refugee’ that critics question the usefulness of the concept” (Bates 2002: 466). El-Hinnawi does not differentiate between different types of ‘environmental refugees’ and he also fails to offer criteria to establish a border between ‘environmental refugees’ and other types of migrants (Bates 2002: 466). Gemenne (2011: 42) further criticises that the definition from El-Hinnawi covers internal as well as international migration and also temporary and permanent migration. While it is too inclusive on the one hand it excludes mobility as such and just focuses on forced migration. He further emphasizes that El-Hinnawi includes all types of environmental change instead of focusing on the impacts of climatechange on migration.
In this thesis, radiative feedback processes such as the Planck, lapse rate, stratospheric temperature, water vapour, albedo, and cloud feedbacks are investigated. The basic data are taken from several simulations forced by various increases of atmospheric CO 2 con- centration. To determine the feedback parameters, the "Partial Radiative Perturbation"- method is used. This work investigates the strengths and weaknesses of the PRP-method. The FW or the BW PRP calculation may provide very different results for the same feed- back parameter. For the Planck feedback, the FW and BW PRP calculation differ only by 7% for the 2xCO2 simulation experiment, but for all other feedbacks the variation is at least 20%. In particular, for a small CO 2 radiative forcing, the greatest variation between the two PRP calculations can be found for the lapse rate, the water vapour, and the cloud feedback. This indicates that the determination of feedback parameters is very sensitive to small perturbations depending on whether the reference or the climatechange experiment is considered. For large perturbations, the feedback calculations are robust and do not strongly depend on the chosen climate state. The stronger the applied perturbation gets, the better FW and BW PRP calculation seem to agree. Block and Mauritsen (2013) investigates feedbacks under a quadrupling of CO 2 by means of radia-
benefit from preventing global warming is the same
for all countries. Benefits may be of different types. Following the classical Samuelson (1954) formula- tion of the theory of public goods, it has been com- mon to think of public goods as yielding primarily consumption benefits, but in the case of the global climate one has to take a broader view. A change in the climate affects a country’s production possibili- ties, so that an evaluation of the benefits should include the effects of climatechange on both con- sumption and production possibilities. A rise in the level of the ocean in a country like Bangladesh, for example, will have serious direct effects on human well-being because periodic flooding may give rise to epidemics. But in addition a rising see level will affect the conditions for production, especially in agriculture. A rise in the level of the oceans will have serious consequences for all coastal areas, but they will be much more serious for Bangladesh than for most other countries. It seems likely that in most people’s view of global welfare, a fair distribution of the costs of preventing climatechange should take account not only of income levels, but also of the dif- ference in benefits. 3
4 The Failure of U.S. Leadership
Lack of U.S. leadership has also held back global progress. As already suggested, it is simplistic to view U.S. non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol as exceptional. At the same time, the United States has failed to provide leadership and that has been a setback for the whole world. To be specific, the U.S. has failed: (1) to negotiate a treaty it could get ratified; (2) to adopt meaningful domestic legislation to address climatechange; (3) to offer an alternative to Kyoto. The administration of George W. Bush has championed the role of R&D and helped create the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (the other members of which include Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, and South Korea), but all these efforts have so far achieved nothing. As just one example, the Bush administration recently cancelled plans for its FutureGen pilot “clean coal” plant, citing cost overruns of $900 million. The world has reason to expect more from a superpower.