One such alternative is not to compare different countries (the so-called norm- oriented frame of reference), but rather the development of data within one country over time (the so-called individual f rame of reference) (Cater, Klein and Day, 1992; Hartig, Klieme and Leutner, forthcoming). However, we want to look for a more general alternative, which not only differs in the way it deals with results, but also does not rely on personal accounts. This option consists in asking people to judge others or parts of society. It may be easier to express an opinion on the corruptness of different sectors than to talk about oneself. To illustrate this approach, we will discuss three tables. The first table (6.19) shows the results of a single-item query from the 2005 GCB, namely perceived corruption wit hin the educ ation sy stem. This item was selected because it tells us s omething not only about activecitizenship, but also about the informal learning context (the so-called hidden curriculum) wit hin the educationa l system. Obvious ly the situation in each c ountry is judged quite differently by its inhabitants. The variance between countri es amounts to more than two s tandard deviations.
Our aim was to examine recent developments in terms of civics and citizenship outcomes and the need to promote activecitizenship among the young. We compared results from NAP- CC with data from the large CIVED study (Mellor et al., 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Even though the latter surveyed Year 9 students, we sought to “match” with NAP-CC data from Year 10 students (ACARA, 2011, 2014; and partly MCEETYA, 2006, 2009). There is no evidence that pedagogies changed during this period, and we did not identify differential item functioning (see Note 5). Furthermore, we aimed at investigating activecitizenship, as one of the primary goals of Australian civics and citizenship education has been to promote active engagement in students. If this goal was achieved we would expect an increase in participation rates and higher rates for older students once they studied civics and citizenship, which is most likely to happen in Year 9 or 10 in Australia. Taken together, our findings suggest that participation rates barely increased over time, though we also identified some promising results in the 2013 reports. However, 2013 was the first time data were collected online and not by paper-and-pencil instruments and this approach potentially produced a bias towards students who have an affinity towards (new) media (but see Note 5). Moreover, students in the NAP-CC 2013 round were somewhat older than their fellow students in 2010. 10
In German political education didactics, the importance of politics teaching for political partici- pation has been a subject of discussion since the 1970s. There is therefore an established tradition of regarding political action and knowledge dissemination as a central aim of such teaching. As with all aims, however, this one is tied to a range of normative expectations. On one hand, we have seen the continual revival of the myth of the active citizen. From this perspective, the task of poli- tics classes is to prepare pupils for their role as citizens in a democracy that demands participation from all. At the same time, it is assumed that the decision to take an active part in elections, dem- onstrations or party-related activities lies solely with each pupil.
The communitarian and republican emphasis on obligations promotes the active citizen and leads quite naturally to the idea of citizenship as a practice rather than a mere legal status of bearers of rights. This brings us finally to the last row in table 1. Of course, all rights of citizenship create ranges of action protected by the law. However, while thin liberal citizenship protects autonomous practices of citizens who pursue their own private goals, it does not necessarily generate practices of citizenship. The liberal regime of rights merely allows for activecitizenship but cannot directly bring it about. If civil and political rights are formulated as negative liberties, this means that refraining from a protected action is just as legitimate as performing it. Citizens are free to form voluntary associations or to vote, but do not have to engage in these practices. Social rights are different because they involve positive benefits rather than non-interference. 15 However, here the emphasis is on the agency of providing institutions rather than of citizens, whose role is generally that of recipients rather than of agents. In a purely rights-based conception, citizenship may then remain a merely passive status. From some perspectives this is not to be deplored. In a Schumpeterian theory of democracy, it is safer to leave the business of governing to competent élites and to reduce the involvement of citizens to a periodic opportunity to deselect bad leaders (Schumpeter 1950). Likewise, for libertarians extending citizenship beyond negative liberties entails a dual danger of empowering the state to encroach on individual freedom (e.g. by levying taxes for redistributive social rights) and of empowering tyrannical majorities (e.g. through plebiscitarian forms of political participation).
social movements. These have emerged mostly since the early 2000s on, when the rollout neoliberal phase became progressively more obvious due and so its side effects. Since then, numerous new episodes of (re)appropriation of urban public/private spaces contesting neoliberal restructuring (e.g. strategies of city marketing or mega projects, urban austerity) have emerged. In Berlin they have mostly emerged by the opposition against not-negotiated profit oriented urban development strategies that are producing the shrinking of the public city and the wild phenomena of speculation (producing gentrification cum displacement in central districts). In Rome mostly addressing the increasing housing crisis and the reckless sell-out of public spaces (often high value real estate or areas) and goods. All these controversial issues produced conflicts over contested forms of urban transformation and urban policies in the metropolitan area of Rome and Berlin and connected processes of (re)claiming of urban spaces. Even if the claims and context in which the claims arose were different, these cases often became a catalyst for a broader public discourse on the necessity to ‘rethink’ the right to the city, the autonomy of activecitizenship in the production of urban space, the definition of commons on the urban scale and the “right to write the Right”. They highlight the general claim for real democratic processes capable to neutralize or transform power relations and involve in or even make direct responsible for the decision making processes (citizens’ empowerment), to define more just and shared future visions on the two cities’ development strategies. In the face of globalization tendencies, which is the role do the decision-makers and practitioners, whose role have been reworked in the shift from government to governance and have now a more weak and blurred position, in negotiating such conflicts? In this framework, it looks central to redefine this role
Justice clearly requires that everyone have the opportunity to become active citizens, if they so choose, which means eliminating any economic or social barriers to the participation of disadvantaged groups, such as women, the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, etc. But whether we should encourage all individuals to choose to be active political participants is another matter. Whether activecitizenship should be encouraged depends, I think, on the second virtue listed above – namely, a sense of justice. To have a sense of justice does not simply mean that we do not actively harm or exploit others. It also involves the duty to prevent injustice, by creating and upholding just institutions. So if there are serious injustices in our society which can only be rectified by political action, then citizens should recognize an obligation to protest against that injustice. Or if our political institutions are no longer functioning, perhaps due to excessive levels of apathy, or to the abuse of power, then citizens have an obligation to protect these institutions from being undermined. To sit passively by while injustices are committed, or democratic institutions collapse, in the hope that others will step in, is to be a free rider. Everyone should do their fair share to create and uphold just institutions.
GCED könnte verpflichtend in den curricularen Aus- bildungskanon von TrainerInnen integriert werden, die an institutionalisierten Erwachsenenbildungs- einrichtungen (z.B. bfi, wifi) tätig sind. Dabei sollte eine grundlegende kritische Auseinandersetzung mit (Erwachsenen-)Bildung in der Weltgesellschaft ermöglicht werden, v.a. mit Citizenship-Konzepten, der eigenen globalen Verortung, mit politischem Denken, Migration, Rassismus und Menschen- rechten im Kontext globalisierter Arbeitsteilung. Angedacht werden könnte auch, GCED als einen Pflichtgegenstand für eine qualifizierende Zertifizie- rung und darauf aufbauend für eine Diplomierung im Bereich Training, Beratung oder Bildungsma- nagement bzw. Bibliothekswesen (etwa durch die Weiterbildungsakademie Österreich) zu installieren. Überdies sind Angebote im Bereich der allgemeinen und beruflichen Weiterbildung anzudenken.
Rainer Bauböck’s typically thoughtful and illuminating commentary is sub-titled: “Should Urban Citizenship be Emancipated from Nationality?” A central motivation for the question (and the answers provided) is his recommendation that urban citizenship be established on the basis of residence, which, in turn, would provide a basis for the enfranchisement of voters who are not recognised as citizens by the national government. Bauböck also suggests that “an attractive vision of urban citizenship” must be central to a new narrative on citizenship because “it is in the big cities that mobile populations find their homes while their voices and votes remain all too often unheard and undercounted in national arenas.” But rectifying this problem is not the main focus of his account.
Josephine van Zeben’s contribution ). Even allowing for this coexistence, every choice has an opportunity cost. My view is that focusing on developing ‘urban citizenship’ risks missing the need to address the role that cities can play in tandem with other important actors. So, while I would not go as far as Avigail Eisenberg in doubting that ‘enhancing urban democracy will help meet the global challenges we confront today’ , I do believe that a focus on internal city developments would miss more important dynamics. As Nir Barak observes , city networks such as the C40 have had real impacts on climate policy, but cities nevertheless ‘lack the capacity’ to solve the climate crisis in isolation from other actors. On the other hand, cities are key contributors to multi-stakeholder collaborations alongside
citizenship should be abandoned. Rather, I mean to ask its advocates – note that Bauböck describes his enthusiasm for urban citizenship as “ambivalent” only – to think through the challenges that are posed by describing and defending it more robustly. The answer that we should remain attentive to the importance of national- level citizenship, as the main vehicle for delivering remedies to inequalities among citizens, suggests we should be circumspect about giving urban citizenship a more robust status, since doing so threatens to divide urbanites and non-urbanites in ways that will render the project of democratic equality more difficult to attain. The answer that we should treat residence as the basis for urban citizenship, which can just as well translate into non-urban spaces, seems not to fare much better, especially when the resources to manage so many problems faced by non-urban spaces are being absorbed by urban spaces. The path forward is not clear, except to encourage urban citizenship advocates to avoid the homogenisation of non-urban views that lends to downplaying their struggles.
The second sense of citizenship is that of participation. The issue of participation and civic engagement is much more difficult to define as it may include a range of things from voting to participation in organisations of civil society as well as more direct actions such as taking part in a demonstration, signing a petition or undertaking some kind of service for the community, which may be formally or informally organised. Participation is sometimes discussed narrowly in terms of participation in organisations (Putnam 2000). We can also stretch this idea of participation to include the issue of “deliberative democracy” in which citizens are able to discuss and debate political and social issues in public debate(Habermas 2002). This public debate can be seen as a “public space” in which various forums are found, either informal or formal, mass media, internet discussions and web sites and so on. Citizenship as participation often takes on a moral or normative dimensions: the good citizen should be active in their community, but does all kind of action count? For example how about participation in neo-nazi organisations of spraying ones opinions on walls (sometimes offensive ones) through graffiti?
Dass Unternehmen ein solches oder ähnliches Selbstverständnis formulie- ren ist in zweifacher Hinsicht interessant: Erstens sollten solche Formulie- rungen mehr sein ein reines window dressing, und zwar auch aus ökonomi- schen Gründen: Zu sagen „ich bin ein gutes, anständiges Unternehmen“ ist ein kommunikativer, performativer Akt. Er richtet sich an Adressaten und er findet Adressaten. Josef Wieland hat darauf hingewiesen, dass es für Un- ternehmen sehr gefährlich sein kann, dies so zu formulieren und dem keine Taten folgen zu lassen, denn gerade durch diese Form der Selbstbeschrei- bung richtet sich der Blick einer kritischen Öffentlichkeit in verstärktem Maße auf eben diese Unternehmen. Zweitens ist die Verwendung der Beg- riffe interessant, weil man mit Unternehmen darüber ins Gespräch kom- men kann, was Corporate Citizenship, Corporate Social Responsibility, Nachhaltigkeit usw. denn konkret für die Akteure bedeuten und was sie bedeuten sollen – mit diesen Fragen beschäftig sich auch die Wissenschaft: Corporate Citizenship oder Good Corporate Citizenship bezeichnen bür- gerliches Engagement von Unternehmen in der modernen Gesellschaft, bzw. den Anspruch ein guter Bürger (Good Corporate Citizen) zu sein (Schrader 2003: 37). Einzelwirtschaftliche Interessen werden hinten ange- stellt. Allgemeine Interessen werden in den Vordergrund gerückt. Es geht um kollektive Interessen und nicht um die Partikularinteressen der Gewinn- erzielung als Grundlage eines friedlichen Miteinanders.
In the case of Third World the situation is more complex and mixed. The only thing more or less common to all the countries in them is the absence of the citi- zen’s right to even a modicum of economic welfare and social security. This is so not necessarily because of any ideological resistance from any section of the popu- lation which was the case at least until recently, but because of the gross inadequacy of material resources at the command of Third World states. As for civil and politi- cal rights, some of the Third World countries have exemplary records in this, while the performance of others is as tainted as that of the Second World. The point is that the countries of the Third World cannot be put into the same basket. The inescapable conclusion that one reaches is that the tripartite division of the world which was very popular during the Cold War period does not reflect the differences in and conceptions about citizen rights. In fact, differences within each of these »worlds« are as numerous as the differences across them. Hence, the appropriate unit to understand citizenship is an individual state and not a block of states.
The EU has long faced a problem: as the Community has shift- ed from common market to Union, with certain attributes of a state, it needs a people who are its members, who identify with its objec- tives, and with whom it has a relationship. The principle of citizen- ship introduced by the Treaty on EU was intended to create this link between nationals of the member states and the European Union (Barnard, 1999:383). Even though the first intention of the Treaty of the European Union was to create a link between nationals of the member states and the Union, since then a little has been done in bringing citi- zens closer to the EU. Citizenship of the Union does not replace the cit- izenship of a member state and the rights and duties listed in the Treaty of Amsterdam are simply not enough in obtaining a full membership in the Union. This argument could be supported by quoting Marshall (1950:40) who argued that “citizenship involves full membership of the community which has gradually been achieved through the historical development of rights, starting with civil rights (basic freedoms from state interference), political rights (such as electoral rights) and, most recently, social rights, including rights to health care, unemployment insurance and old age pensions – the rudiments of a welfare state”. Ac- cording to the fact that a European citizen is defined as one holding the nationality of a member state, the concept as such is exclusionary. The concept excludes a priori any third-country national. xvi
But let’s turn back to the law. President Trump has not detailed the reasoning behind the claim that he could end birthright citizenship by executive order, but a former Trump administration official named Michael Anton did so this summer in a Washington Post op-ed . The constitutional provision widely understood to establish birthright citizenship is the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.” Anton argues that we have been focusing too much on the “born . . . in the United States” part and too little on “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” although he himself is somewhat cagey on what the latter phrase means. Drawing from the congressional floor debates on the amendment, he quotes Senator Lyman Trumbull as opining, somewhat vaguely, that it meant “not owing allegiance to anybody else.” The strongest arrow in Anton’s quiver is a quote from Senator Jacob Howard, one of the provision’s sponsors, that the language excludes “persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, [or] who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers.”
Early studies based on cross-sectional data (i.e. data in which immigrants are only observed once) or panel data (i.e. data where the same immigrant is observed in multiple periods) found that naturalized immigrants have better labor market outcomes than non- naturalized immigrants. Cross-sectional studies from Canada and the US, for example, suggest that naturalized immigrants do indeed have better educational qualifications, which are associated with higher earnings, than non-naturalized immigrants , . Panel data studies that can compare labor market outcomes before and after naturalization for the same immigrant also report positive earnings effects , , , , , . The most convincing proof comes from quasi-experimental evidence that exploits specific features or reforms of citizenship laws to shed light on the benefits of citizenship , , , . In these studies, reforms create different eligibility criteria for citizenship among immigrants depending on their year of arrival and birth year, for instance. An alternative source of variation is that children with foreign-born parents who are born in Germany, for example, obtain the host country citizenship at birth if their parents have resided legally in Germany for eight years. In Switzerland, in turn, citizens often decide on the citizenship applications of immigrants in local referenda.
Discussing the relevance of the nation-state to gender equality aspirations in Central and Eastern Europe, Joanna Regulska [2002: 11–12] observes that ‘neither the official “sameness” imposed by the communist political culture nor the “differ- ence” engendered by differing degrees of democratisation has liberated women as fully participating political actors’. She therefore poses the question: ‘Will the fact that women have not found significant opportunities in formal, domestic political structures make them more likely to search for alternative ways to act politically be- yond the nation-state?’ The impressively effective international lobbying activities of Karat, a coalition of NGOs in Eastern Europe, might suggest an affirmative re- sponse. Yet as already argued, such transnational networking, however effective in lobbying supra-national bodies such as the EU or the UN, in the short- to medium- term must be seen as complementing rather than supplanting the nation-state’s role as the appropriate address for citizenship claims.
In Chapter 4 of Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka reconstructs the history of liberal attitudes towards minority cultures, attempting to isolate those moments at which liberalism turned away from minority rights and toward abstract universalism. One such turning-point, he tells us, came by way of Brown vs. Board of Education (1954), a U.S. Supreme Court case which considered the system of "separate but equal" schools for black and white children, and which resulted in the abolition of racial segregation within the American educational system. This case was hugely influential, resulting in the widely held view that minority groups are best
1 Einleitung 9 ökologische wie soziale Leitplanken organisieren. Kritiker hingegen befürchten den Ausverkauf des multilateralen Systems durch die Privatisierung globaler Politik. Sowohl Unternehmen als auch Staaten könnten sich auf diese Weise regulatorischen Maßnahmen entziehen – auf der Strecke bliebe eine nachhaltige Entwicklung. Folglich werden globale Politiknetzwerke aus dieser Sicht häufig als illegitime und ineffektive Mechanismen betrachtet (vgl. Hummel 2001). Diese kontroverse Einschätzung der Effektivität und Legitimität von globalen Politiknetzwerken legt zum einen Effektivitäts- und Legitimitätsdefizite von globalen Politiknetzwerken offen und spiegelt zum anderen eine politische Polarisierung wider. Sie zeigte sich intensiviert im Laufe des Weltgipfels für Nachhaltige Entwicklung als einem Prisma globaler Netzwerkgovernance. Diese Arbeit hat ihren wissenschaftlichen „Standort“ in der gesellschaftsorientierten Manage- mentlehre. In deren Perspektive gehören gesellschaftsorientierte Kooperationen und das proak- tive Engagement von Unternehmen in Politik und Gesellschaft zum strategischen Repertoire (vgl. Aulinger 1996; vgl. Brockhaus 1996; vgl. Schneidewind 1998, 286-328). Vor dem skiz- zierten politisch-praktischen Hintergrund stellt sich daher im Interesse einer gesellschaftsorien- tierten Managementlehre die Frage, wie globale Politiknetzwerke durch entsprechende institu- tionelle Maßnahmen gestaltet werden können, um (1) ein effektives Instrument von Corporate Citizenship-Strategien zu sein und (2) nicht der demokratischen Legitimität zu entbehren. Es geht also darum, wie potentielle Defizite behoben sowie Potentiale genutzt werden können – dies im Kontext der Debatten des Weltgipfels für Nachhaltige Entwicklung. Damit lautet die Leitfrage dieser Arbeit:
WHAT DRIVES CHANGE
Within the socio-political sciences, several theories have aimed at explaining the dynamics of citizenship laws. The legal tradition of a country is considered a fundamental determinant of current laws, given the strong persistence of this type of institution. Immigra- tion is also a potential primary cause of change. The effect of this factor is however a priori ambiguous. In fact, if on the one hand immigration can foster a more inclusive legislation toward newcomers through the adoption of jus soli elements, it can also induce restrictions in countries that start with an inclusive legislation. According to Weil (2001), the combination of these two opposing forces should induce conver- gence toward a mixed regime, whereas Bauböck et al. (2006) point to the de facto persistence of divergent trends and Goodman and Howard (2013) emphasize evidence of the surge of a restrictive backlash. Among other potential determinants, a role for the welfare state has also been recognized. Since citizenship can affect the ability to obtain benefits, in countries where the welfare state is more generous there may be a resistance to openness to foreigners (Joppke, 1998). However, in countries with low population growth, this consideration could be countered by the assess- ment of the potentially positive effect on the public finances of a relatively young immigrant workforce. Political factors can also come into play, since the presence of a consolidated democratic regime should favor the equal treatment of immigrants, and there- fore the adoption of jus soli with the implied voting franchise. The stabilization of national borders should reduce the tendency to use jus sanguinis as a tool for defining a national identity, while a threat to their stability can produce opposite effects. As previously mentioned, such geo-political considerations turned out to be crucial in the face of two historical events that led to profound redefinitions of national borders: the period of decolonization that followed World War II and the collapse of the socialist system after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Cultural factors and a different view of the role of the state in establishing a national identity have also been proposed by Brubaker (1992) as an explanation for the different paths followed by France and Germany.