The EU's first common strategies have been adopted for Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean. Moreover, I am convinced that the EU's first common strategy should be the one on the US. Why do EU assessments of the political systems in Russia and Ukraine differ?
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 proclaimed human rights as a cornerstone of EU foreign policy. An interesting paradox can be seen when observing the development of the EU's approach to Russia.
Brussels expressly excluded the possibility of EU membership for countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Unfortunately, merging the region with the southern Mediterranean states may eliminate even the long-term possibility of accession. A separate policy for Eastern Europe is necessary, regardless of whether this is part of the Wider Europe concept or not.
EU—R USSIAN R ELATIONS AFTER THE E NLARGEMENT : P ROBLEMS AND P ROSPECTS
It is obvious that Russia's cooperation with the EU has gained more importance during Putin's presidency. From this perspective, Russia's serious cooperation with the EU is much more than a policy that is particularly limited. The rise of new economic elites is one of the main driving forces of Russia's new policy towards the EU, and Russia's relations with the EU seem to be more interest-oriented than a value-based process.
P OLITICAL R ELATIONS BETWEEN R USSIA
Each phase shown in the table is characterized by a different pattern of Czech behavior towards Russia. Fear of an unstable Russia has often been seen as one of the main driving forces. While Havel and other representatives of the Czech foreign policy elite abandoned these ideas long before the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the same ideas (eg the OSCE as the cornerstone of the European security architecture) remained key pillars of the emerging Russian foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia. West.
Russia gradually weakened its political pressure on the CR, but a warming of bilateral relations did not follow this step. One was the abolition of the visa-free regime and the other payment of the $3.5 billion debt. Therefore, when we talk about the Eastern policy of the CR, we might as well mean the Czech policy towards other Visegrád countries.
An Eastern policy towards Russia was, strictly speaking, non-existent, with the sole exception of the early 1990s. It therefore often emphasized its exceptionalism and rejected deeper involvement of the country elsewhere than in the West. It would be disingenuous to blame only one of the two partners for the failure to build a normal partnership earlier in the 1990s.
The future of Russian-Czech relations therefore seems, if not bright, at least more promising than the time of the "cold peace" in the second half of the 1990s.
PART TWO
SHADOW ECONOMY AND CORRUPTION
Т ЕНЕВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА Р ОССИИ И ПУТИ ЕЕ ОГРАНИЧЕНИЯ
Хотя процедуры лицензирования хозяйствующих субъектов в России различаются от региона к региону, в среднем новому заявителю необходимо посетить 20-30 организаций и получить 50-90 утвержденных регистрационных форм.
B USINESS – S TATE R ELATIONS IN C ONTEMPORARY R USSIA IN C ONCERN TO C ORRUPTION P HENOMENON
R ELATIONS BETWEEN THE EFFICIENCY LEVEL OF
THE DANGERS OF COR- RUPTION
It can be regarded as a general view that the relevant regulations and their expected changes are adequate to significantly reduce the risk of corruption. Conflicts of interest cannot be ruled out. Maintaining information contacts or leaking information during the preparation phase cannot be eliminated either. The Lobbying Act is also missing, which, if properly formulated, could be a supporting force and public opinion would not confuse lobbying with corruption.
According to experts on the subject, it is unfortunately still difficult today to distinguish lobbying from corruption, not only in Hungary, but also in the entire post-socialist region. Many explain this phenomenon by the fact that politics is present throughout the preparation and implementation of tenders in connection with the implementation of large projects - which have a significant impact on international relations and the national economy - and are able to pursue their . Should we suspect corruption when the client is invited to a professional event or when the known supplier consults the client on the occasion of a tender.
It is a serious concern of many parties interviewed that the requirements regarding public procurement procedures should be fully enforced from one day to the next which calls into question the future of any previous professional cooperation. However, according to the new procedure, own experience may not be considered as a reference, that is to say, all the institutions that request tenders had a uniform opinion in that it is not necessary to further tighten the control of public procurement procedures.
Instead, the fulfillment of the contracts following the tender procedures should be monitored and deviations should be sanctioned.
P ERSPECTIVES FOR E CONOMIC C OOPERATION BETWEEN
R USSIA AND THE C OUNTRIES OF C ENTRAL AND E ASTERN
E UROPE IN THE L IGHT OF THE E NLARGEMENT OF THE
E UROPEAN U NION
Its share in Hungarian exports in recent years is greater than the share of the Soviet Union in the CMEA years. Taking into account the overvaluation of the transferable ruble (the accounting currency of most intra-CMEA trade) prior to 1989, the figures are particularly striking. Mutual trade between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had a relatively limited importance for most of the last century.
In post-socialist times, despite the cessation of CMEA, and the establishment of the CEE's own - however temporary. The harmful negative human (regional) implications of those policies, the ultimate problems of business as usual notwithstanding, the macroeconomic impact of the measures on Russia-SOE trade appears to be limited. In any case, they should not hide the deeper, basic causes of the decay in relationships.
The issue that may affect relations between Russia and the CEEC is the share of gas (and perhaps other energy sources) that the EU is prepared to allow from any source. A third category of problems (determining the geographic and commodity pattern of CEE's trade) concerns the globalization of the economies of the region or some characteristics of the current global division of labor. Due to inherited weaknesses from the Soviet era and the protracted crisis of the 1990s, the size of the Russian import market is much smaller than usually assumed.
Dynamism is fueled by political stability, the depreciation of the ruble after 1998 (making many important segments of domestic production competitive with imports) and high international oil.
R ELATIONS BETWEEN B ELARUS AND THE V ISEGRÁD
C OUNTRIES
However, this trade regime is used de facto in commercial and economic relations between Belarus and the EU. The move to the EU's common customs tariff and preferential system by the new member states can either bring tangible benefits or create extra tariff walls. It is clear that the enlargement of the EU will bring problems for the export of certain groups of products from Belarus to the Visegrád countries because the application of non-tariff trade measures of the EU will automatically be extended to the new EU member states.
The extension of these restrictive trade measures mainly concerns the automatic application of anti-dumping duties on potash, nitrogen fertilizers and chemical fibers and the application of import quotas for textile products. As a result, the total negative impact of the extension of anti-dumping measures to EU-Belarus bilateral trade alone could amount to USD 110 million per year, including up to USD 65 million of Belarusian exports to the Visegrad countries (mainly potash to Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic and small quantities of polyester staples to Hungary and Poland). Fortunately, there are voluntary quantitative export obligations of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine regarding the supply of potassium fertilizers to the new EU members.
The full list of EU non-tariff measures related to Belarusian exports is listed in Table 3. In addition, Belarusian exporters will face technical barriers to their export production in terms of compliance with standards and norms of EU. . The most important are the technical and ecological safety requirements of the EU, which affect food, the growth of wild products and industrial products (tractors, automobiles, televisions) originating in Belarus.
The following preparatory steps and measures should be taken to mitigate the possible negative consequences of EU enlargement on mutual trade between the Republic of Belarus and the Visegrád countries:
R ECOVERY
The regression in the dynamics of small and medium-sized enterprises; small and medium-sized enterprises produce only 10% of GDP, and there is almost no government support for this type of enterprise. There is no success in consolidating the post-Soviet area due to the fact that centrifugal tendencies are stronger than centripetal forces. Despite the growth in GDP, there is an increase in unemployment due to the end of import substitution due to the growth of the ruble's real exchange rate (by 13% in 2003).
Personal income growth was not comparable: the lion's share (2/3) was accounted for by 20% of the richest. The selective approach to the privatization deals of the 1990s also does not improve the investment climate in the country. It seems that this year there will be nothing new in terms of quality, although economic policies in the country for the second presidential term should be desirably adjusted and based on state activities and private initiative that complement each other.
The improvement of the prosperity of Russians, or in other words, of the entire nation, can be the only goal. And the government announces its ambitions to pursue the same policy in the future by following these tracks. As a result, it has come up with the bizarre idea of creating a stabilization fund, a duplicate of CBR gold and foreign reserves, but this time these will be at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance.
It is an inert policy of taking excess profits from the oil industrialists, in fact an almost manic belief that only the reduction of tax burdens will ensure stable economic growth and ultimately rejection.
