UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY:

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UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY:

THE POSITIONS AND

ASSESSMENTS OF CITIZENS UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY:

THE POSITIONS AND

ASSESSMENTS OF CITIZENS

Mykhail PASHKOV, Leading Expert, Razumkov Centre

Priority spheres of foreign policy

As it is clear from Diagram Which component of Ukraines foreign policy should be a priority?, an absolute majority (69.6%) of people believe the economic component to be the priority of Ukraines foreign policy. Only one in ten polled (10.5%) attached priority to foreign political activity aimed at strengthening defence and national security of the country. The share of those who marked the priority of the political and humanitarian components was still lower (7% and 3.7%, respectively)².

Proceeding from such priorities, rather critical assessments of the present foreign policy of Ukraine given by the population strike the eye (Diagram Does the present foreign policy of Ukraine meet its national interests?). Only 5.7% of respondents answered: Yes, it meets them entirely. At the same time, 35.8% of the polled are sure that the present foreign policy of Ukraine does not meet its national interests; close to half of all respondents (46.6%) believe that it meets partially

Ukraines national interests.

The results of polls on rather complex issues, includ- ing foreign policy, should be viewed with caution. To be sure, people impart different senses to the notion of

national interests, and see differently the priorities of foreign policy and lack background knowledge and/or information to decide on the spheres of foreign political activity being a priority for Ukraine. At the same time, during the poll, people produce their assessments which

I

n order to assess the attitude of Ukraines population to foreign policy issues on the eve of the parliamentary election, on January 30 - February 6, 2002, Sociological Service of Razumkov Centre conducted a nation-wide poll¹. The results of the poll are presented and briefly analysed in this article.

1 2012 respondents aged 18 and above were polled in all Ukraines regions.

2 Such positions of the population are rather steadfast. According to the results of a sociological survey held by Razumkov Centre in October, 2000, then, the population also attached priority to the economic dimension of foreign policy. See: Razumkov Centre 2000. Kyiv, Zapovit, 2001, p.20.

Does the present foreign policy of Ukraine meet its national interests?

% of the polled

Yes, it meets them partially 46.6%

No, it does not meet them 35.8%

Yes, it meets them entirely 5.7%

Hard to say 11.9%

Which component of Ukraine's foreign policy should be a priority?

% of the polled

Economic 69.6%

Defence and national security

10.5%

Political 7.0%

Humanitarian 3.7%

Hard to say 9.2%

surely present an important element of feedback for the authorities.

(2)

The main national priorities include formation of civil society in Ukraine, growth of the national economy and provision of a decent standard of life for the population. As far as this latter task is concerned, despite the positive changes in the economy observed in 2000-2001, Ukraine still lags far behind the European standards of living. Evidently, this is the reason why a significant part of the population believes that the present foreign policy of the state does not entirely serve the attainment of those interests.

Therefore, the majority of citizens are convinced that foreign policy should in the first place defend Ukraines economic interests. Such a stance of the population is shared by the head of state and the leadership of Ukraines foreign office³.

Priority directions of foreign policy

Correlation of the results of this poll with the previous surveys conducted by Razumkov Centre (June, 2000; October, 2001) points to the relative steadiness of foreign policy orientations of the population (Diagram

Which direction of Ukraines foreign political activity do you consider to be a priority?).

As Diagram shows, the shares of adherents of the European choice of Ukraine (29%31%31.4%) and of those who give preference to relations with Russia (26%29%31.6%) over the recent year and a half

3 Speaking at an extended meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine on July 26, 2001, Ukraines Foreign Minister A.Zlenko said: I am convinced that it is high time to put foreign relations on a solid realistic basis, tie them with the urgent needs of the national economy... In other words, real economisation of external relations is needed. See: Web-site of the MFA of Ukraine, http://www.mfa.gov.ua/information.

Which direction of Ukraine's foreign political activity do you consider to be a priority?

% of the polled

2002 2001 2000

Relations with Russia 29.0%

31.6%

26.0%

Relations with EU countries 31.0%

31.4%

29.0%

Relations with CIS countries

Relations with the USA

Relations with other countries

Hard to say

22.0%

4.0%

5.0%

9.0%

20.6%

4.0%

2.1%

10.3%

31.0%

5.0%

2.0%

7.0%

1.0%

11.3%

Hard to say Hard to say

Hard to say 1.1%

8.7%

4.7%

11.1%

Relations with EU

countries 56.0%

EAST WEST

SOUTH CENTRE

Relations with the USA 9.4%

Relations with Russia 9.4%

Relations with CIS

countries 13.1%

Relations with other countries 1.1%

Hard to say 11.0%

Which direction of Ukraine's foreign political activity do you consider to be a priority?

% of the polled

27.8%

Relations with Russia

31.3%

Relations with EU countries

21.4%

3.7%

Relations with the USA Relations with Russia 45.1%

21.9%

21.7%

1.5%

Relations with the USA

34.3%

Relations with Russia

24.0%

25.7%

Relations with other countries Relations with the USA 3.7%

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have somewhat grown and matched at a mark of approximately one third of the polled. Hence, society preserves a balance of sympathies, regarding the European and Russian vectors of foreign policy.

At the same time, in those eighteen months, the share of adherents of priority co-operation with CIS countries fell rather sharply (31%22%20.6%).

The share of votes given in favour of priority relations between Ukraine and the USA remains insignificant and generally unchanged (5%4%4%).

The map of foreign policy priorities of the population has a clear regional specificity. As the indicators presented on the map show, positions of the people living in the Western and Eastern regions of the country differ fundamentally⁴. The West is dominated by pro- European sentiments: there, co-operation with EU countries is favoured by 56% of the polled; with the CIS only 13.1%; the USA and the Russian Federation are still less popular (9.4% each). By contrast, in the East, the share of Russian sympathisers is much higher: there, 45.1% of the polled attach priority to relations with Russia, twice less (21.9%) with the EU, 21.7% with the CIS, and only 1.5% with the USA. It is noteworthy that in the East, the latter indi- cator is the country-lowest.

In the Southern and Central regions, foreign policy sympathies of the population are also varied but not so strikingly. In the South, co-operation with EU countries is considered a priority by 24% of respondents, in the Centre by 31.3%; relations with Russia by 34.3%

and 27.8%, respectively; with CIS countries 25.7%

and 21.4%; with the USA 3.7% of the polled in each region. As we may see, in the South, the share of adherents of relations with the Russian

Federation is somewhat higher and in the Centre with EU countries.

The public assessments of the cur- rent state and prospects of Ukraines foreign political activity taken separately along each of the mentioned directions are analysed below.

Relations with the EU

The majority of the population sup- ports the process of Ukraines European integration: 57.6% of respondents are sure that Ukraine should join the EU; 16.2% oppose this step (Diagram Should Ukraine join the EU?).

As the map shows, the dividing line in public opinion about Ukraines accession to the EU lies between the West and South of the country. Given the above figures, it is no wonder that the absolute majority (74.1%) of people

4 Hereinafter Ukraines territory is regionalised as follows: the South the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Kherson, Mykolayiv, and Odesa regions; the Centre the city of Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr regions; the West Chernivtsi, Ivano- Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Transcarpathian, and Volyn regions; the East Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Sumy and Zaporizhya regions.

EAST WEST

46.7%Yes 55.4%Yes

55.6%Yes 74.1%Yes

23.5%No 19.6%No

13.7%No 9.6%No

Hard to say 29.8%

Should Ukraine join the EU?

% of the polled

living in the Western region support accession to the EU; only one in ten (9.6%) is against it, 16.3% declined to give a definite answer. By contrast, in the South, Ukraines entry to the EU is supported by less than half (46.7%) of the polled; not supported by almost a quarter (23.5%), approximately a third (29.8%) is undecided.

Positions of the people living in the Central and Eastern regions differ little from the country average: in the Centre, accession to the EU finds support of 55.4%

of the polled, in the East 55.6%; 19.6% and 13.7%, respectively, spoke out against it; 25% and 30.7% were undecided. It is noteworthy that in the East dominated by pro-Russian sentiments the share of opponents of Ukraines accession to the EU is insignificant.

Evidently, people there do not view Ukraines co- operation with the EU as running contrary to relations with Russia.

Among those who want Ukraine to join the EU, the overwhelming majority (60.4%) wishes this to occur

Should Ukraine join the EU?

% of the polled

Yes 57.6%

No 16.2%

Hard to say 26.2%

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According to the results of a series of surveys conducted by Razumkov Centre in 2000-2001⁵, alongside with a clear desire to join the EU within the next five years, society is becoming aware of the complexity of this strategic goal, in particular, the duration of the preparation period necessary to draw Ukraine closer to the norms and standards of life of EU member states.

The greater part of respondents believe that this will take Ukraine some 20 years.

President L.Kuchma set the task to come close to all standards of joining the European Union within ten years.⁶However, given the present pace of move- ment towards the EU, the solution of this task before 2012 seems questionable. For instance, according to the Programme of Integration to the EU, Ukraine, inter alia, by 2007 is to work out and adopt more than 8,000 harmonised ISO, IEC and European EN standards.

Relevant actions are to be funded from the state budget at a level of UAH 12.5 million a year. Meanwhile, the 2001 budget allocated only UAH 8.5 million for this purpose, 2002 budget still less (UAH 4.5 million). As a result, for this reason alone, harmonisation of standards will take 10-15 years⁷. And this is not the most difficult problem on the road of integration to the EU at all.

By and large, there is a significant potential of support for the European vector of Ukraines foreign policy in society. The positive attitude of people to that process will be consolidated when concrete gains from co- operation with the EU become evident.

Relations with Russia

The year of 2001 witnessed intensification of bilateral dialogue between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Useful meetings were held on the top level and between regional leaders, a number of agreements were signed in gas, electricity, aerospace and military-technical sectors.

The character of Russias relations with the USA, NATO and the EU has changed; respectively, Moscow became less prejudiced about Ukraines contacts with them. Co-operation is deepening between heads of Security Councils, law-enforcement bodies, border guards of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Parallel operation of power systems of the two countries was resumed, agreement of Russian gas transits signed and a decision was taken to complete power generating units of the Khmelnytskyi and Rivne NPPs. According to the statement of the presidents of the two countries, the year 2002 will be the year of Ukraine in Russia, 2003 the year of Russia in Ukraine. By and large, despite the existence of many unresolved problems in bilateral relations, the desire of the two countries

government to step up co-operation in all key spheres is evident.

This had an impact on public sentiments too.

According to Diagram What should Ukraines policy be towards Russia?, the overwhelming majority (62.5%) of the polled are sure that Ukraine should deepen co- operation with Russia⁸.

5 See: National Security & Defence, 2000, No.9; 2001, No.11; Razumkov Centre 2000. Kyiv, Zapovit, 2001; Razumkov Centre 2001. Kyiv, Zapovit, 2002;

http://www.uceps.com.ua.

6 Interfax-Ukraine, February 12, 2002.

7 Speech by the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) of Ukraine Ye.Marchuk on February 8, 2002, at a meeting devoted to the issues of European integration chaired by the President of Ukraine. See: Web-site of the NSDC of Ukraines, http://www.rainbow.gov.ua.

8 The attitude of the population to co-operation with the Russian Federation is largely conditioned by the common historic past, proximity of cultures and family ties. According to a sociological survey held by Razumkov Centre in February, 2001, half (49.6%) of Ukrainian citizens have relatives in Russia. See:

Chaly V., Pashkov Ì. Ukraine-Russia Relations: the View from Ukraine. Politia, 2001, p.23,http://www.uceps.com.ua.

When should Ukraine join the EU?

% of those, who want Ukraine to join the EU

In the next 5 years 60.4%

Hard to say 8.1%

What should Ukraine's policy be towards Russia?

% of the polled

Deepening of co-operation 62.5%

Maintenance of the present level of relations

23.4%

Curtailment of co-operation and reduction of the Russian influence on Ukraine

9.4%

Hard to say 4.7%

On the general background of optimistic assessments, the following indicators deserve particular attention. First, almost one fourth (23.4%) of citizens suggest the present level of relations with the Russian Federation to be optimal and propose to maintain it. In our opinion, this bears witness to rather cautions approach of a significant share of respondents to further rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia and at the same time awareness of the necessity to strengthen the Western (the EU and the USA) dimension of Ukraines foreign policy, where gains have recently been less evident.

Second, every tenth polled (9.4%) is evidently convinced that Ukraine has gone too far in relations with Russia and insists on curtailment of co-operation and reduction of the Russian influence on Ukraine.

within the next five years; a quarter (25.2%) within 10 years, and only 6.3% believe preparation for accession may take as long as 20 years (Diagram When should Ukraine join the EU?).

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Third, on the Russian direction, the positions of the population have been defined the most clearly: only 4.7% of respondents the least share declined to give a definite answer. Hence, reserves for strengthening one or another position have actually been exhausted.

Positions of the population towards co-operation with the Russian Federation seriously differ by region; this is especially noticeable along the East-West line. In the Eastern region, the absolute majority (77.3%) of respondents are sure in the necessity of deepening co- operation with Russia, every sixth (17.6%) believes it is expedient to maintain the present level of relations, and only 1.4% stand for curtailment of co-operation and a reduction of Russian influence in Ukraine. Such a ratio in assessments is quite natural, given the significant share of Ukraines Russian-speaking population living in the Eastern region and the high level of border co- operation with the Russian Federation.

In the West, the division of views looks as follows:

36.3% of the polled stand for deepening co-operation with the Russian Federation; 31.5% for maintenance of the present level of relations; 28.3% for curtailment of co-operation and reduction of Russian influence on Ukraine. The difference in positions between the East and West is evident, but there are no grounds to state that the western regions of Ukraine are swept over by negative attitude to co-operation with Russia adherents of deeper contacts with Russia surpass opponents by 8%.

As the map shows, the positions of people living in the South and Centre generally coincide with Ukrainian average, i.e., in those regions, adherents of deepening co-operation with Ukraine are in a clear majority.

Co-operation with CIS countries

The results of the poll show that every fifth respon- dent (20.6%) notes the priority of co-operation with CIS countries (see Diagram Which direction of Ukraines foreign political activity do you consider to be a priority?).

The results of co-operation within the Commonwealth of Independent States are not especially significant (noticeable) for citizens, hence, the overwhelming majority of the population does not consider co- operation with CIS countries as a priority.

At the same time, as Diagram What should Ukraines position be regarding participation in the CIS?

shows, the majority of Ukrainian citizens still believe in the possibility of employing the positive potential of co- operation within the Commonwealth 55.1% of the polled are sure that Ukraine should play a more active role in the CIS.

WEST

Deepening of co-operation

Hard to say

36.3%

31.5%

28.3%

3.9%

EAST

Hard to say

77.3%

17.6%

1.4%

SOUTH 3.7%

Hard to say

66.3%

22.7%

6.3%

4.7%

CENTRE

Hard to say

59.1%

25.8%

8.8%

6.3%

What should Ukraine's policy be towards Russia?

% of the polled

What should Ukraine's position be regarding participation in the CIS?

% of the polled

Ukraine should play a more active role in the CIS 55.1%

The present level of participation in the CIS should be preserved

27.8%

Ukraine should quit the CIS 6.0%

Hard to say 11.1%

(6)

Meanwhile, a significant share of the population (27.8%) is against Ukraines more active involvement in the Commonwealth. Those people believe that the present level of participation in that Union should be preserved. Finally, only 6% of the polled share the view that Ukraine should quit the CIS. Hence, the ratio between opponents of Ukraines membership and adherents of its more active participation in the CIS makes up approximately 1:9.

The regional division of assessments is not unexpected. Adherents of more active participation of Ukraine in the CIS make up absolute majority in the East and South 66.8% and 53.7% of the polled, respectively.

However, the share of those who stand for the preservation of the present level of participation in the CIS is clearly higher in the South one third of the polled (34.3%), in the East every fifth (21.6%). In those two areas, the share of opponents to Ukraines participation in the CIS is the lowest: in the East only 2.3%, in the South 5%. In the Western region, respondents are more critical about co-operation within the CIS, but in general, their position cannot be considered fundamentally different: 43% of the polled support more active participation of Ukraine in the CIS; 28.1% suggest that the present level of participation should be preserved;

12.3% are sure that Ukraine should quit the CIS. In the West, the share of opponents of Ukraines participation in the CIS is five times higher than in the East, but still, a vast majority of the polled in the Western region generally support Ukraines participation in the Commonwealth.

Attitude to regional groupings within the CIS

The attitude of Ukrainians to integration processes involving CIS member states on a regional level (the Tashkent Treaty, the Union of Russia and Belarus, the Eurasian Economic Community, GUUAM) is not yet established and noticeably changes with time.

Earlier surveys of Razumkov Centre (May, 2001)⁹ showed that a significant part of the population remained undecided, and those who had a definite opinion were rather sceptical about the international author- ity and economic potential of regional unions formed within the CIS (with the exception of the Union of Russia and Belarus).

The present survey again demonstrates insufficient information of Ukraines population about the processes of regionalisation within the CIS and the generally low level of public interest to those issues. As is clear from Diagram What should Ukraines position be regarding integration processes within the CIS?, the share of those who declined to answer fluctuates between a quarter (27.6% with respect to the Union of Russia and Belarus) and a half (50.8% regarding GUUAM) of the polled.

The analysis of the views of the population on regional groupings existing within the CIS gives reason to draw the following conclusions. First,Ukraines citizens do not support accession to the Tashkent Treaty (for 15,2%, against 40.7% of the polled).

9 See:National Security & Defence, 2001, No.7, p.40-41, http://www.uceps.com.ua.

EAST WEST

Ukraine should quit the CIS Ukraine should play

a more active role in the CIS The present level of participation in the CIS should be preserved

Hard to say

43.0%

28.1%

12.3%

16.6%

Hard to say

66.8%

21.6%

2.3%

9.3%

Hard to say

49.0%

31.7%

7.0%

12.3%

What should Ukraine's position be regarding participation in the CIS?

% of the polled

Hard to say

53.7%

34.3%

5.0%

7.0%

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It is noteworthy that in the East, where the share of supporters of deeper contacts with Russia and more active co-operation with CIS countries is the highest, the prospects of Ukraines accession to the military-political bloc led by Russia finds no support either. However, the greater share of respondents do not yet have a definite position as to the Tashkent Treaty: from 41.4% in the West to 53% in the South.

The positions of citizens regarding Ukraines participation in GUUAM are equally uncertain. The shares of adherents and opponents of more active co-operation within that Union are roughly equal and in different regions of Ukraine fluctuate within the limits of 20-30%.

Interestingly, the share of advocates of GUUAM is the highest in the East (for 29.9%, against 20.3%).

By and large, the population stands for more active participation of Ukraine in the CIS. A significant share of the polled stands for Ukraines accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus. Co-operation with other regional structures existing within the CIS has no definite support of respondents.

Relations with the USA

Ukrainian leaders in their official statements repeatedly make emphasis on the triad of foreign policy priorities of Ukraine co-operation with the EU, Russia and the USA. It is easy to notice (see Diagram

Which direction of Ukraines foreign political activity do you consider to be a priority?) that the American direction, by contrast to the European and Russian ones, enjoys far weaker support of the population only 4% of Ukrainians consider relations with the USA a priority. As is clear from the Diagram, such a position of the public is rather steadfast and not unfounded.

As Ukraine became independent, the USA extended political and diplomatic support and got Ukraine involved in the processes of disarmament, fruitful co- operation in the defence sector (both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of NATO). This was vital at that time. However, the pace of growth of the economic component of bilateral relations meets neither the expectations of Ukrainians nor the existing potential of economic co-operation of the two countries. Despite significant, compared to other partner states, volumes of American investments into Ukraine, their impact on the economic development of the country is meagre. In a number of cases, Ukraine lost profitable export contracts under US pressure or was forced to curtail production without adequate compensation. At the same time, on the background of unimpressive economic co-operation between Ukraine and the USA, the population remarks gradual growth of Russias presence in key sectors of Ukraines economy, alongside with preservation of critical dependence of the country on Russian energy supplies. The national information policy and informa- tional influence of the Russian media present important Second, the attitude of the public to GUUAM is

controversial and largely uncertain. Almost equal parts of the polled stand for and against intensification of Ukraines co-operation within the framework of that Union (25.8% and 23.4%, respectively), and a record high share of respondents (50.8%) declined to answer. It is worth mention that in May, 2001, 46% of citizens could not answer this question¹⁰; so, the awareness of Ukraines citizens about GUUAM and interest to that structure show negative dynamics.

Third, a controversial picture is observed regarding Ukraines accession to the Eurasian Economic Community: 31% spoke out for it, 20.6%

against, 48.4% of the polled declined to answer.

Fourth, among other regional unions, the attitude of the population to the Union of Russia and Belarus may be considered the most definite and generally positive:

45.2% stand for Ukraine joining the Union; 27.2% are against it. Probably, in the eyes of many Ukrainians that interstate Union is associated with the possibility of establishing more stable and beneficial for Ukraine co- operation with Russia (favoured by 62.5% of respondents, see above).

The regional specificity of assessments (see maps on the following page) is especially evident regarding the attitude of Ukrainians to the Union of Russia and Belarus. In the South and West of the country, the majority of respondents (62.2% and 54.3%, respectively) support accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus;

only 16% and 12.7%, respectively, are against it; a significant share of the population in those two areas gave no definite answer 21.8% and 33%. The population of the Western region stick to the opposite position: half of them (50.3%) are against joining the Union of Russia and Belarus; only 18.4% are for it, 31.3% of the polled declined to answer. The position of people living in the Central region is controversial: a bit more than a third (36.8%) support Ukraines accession to the Union, a third (33.8%) are against it; almost one third (29.4%) of respondents were undecided.

As for the Tashkent Treaty and GUUAM, the positions of the regions do not differ much. The share of adherents of joining the Tashkent Treaty fluctuates between 11.7% in the West and 19.3% in the Centre;

the share of opponents exceeds one third in all regions from 34% (the South) to 46.9% (the West).

10 Ibid., p.9, http://www.uceps.com.ua.

What should Ukraine's position be regarding integration processes within the CIS?

% of the polled

Ukraine should join the Tashkent Treaty of

collective defence of CIS countries 15.2% 40.7% 44.1%

Co-operation within the framework of GUUAM should be stepped up

25.8% 23.4% 50.8%

Ukraine should join

the Union of Russia and Belarus 45.2% 27.2% 27.6%

Ukraine should join

the Eurasian Economic Community 31.0% 20.6% 48.4%

No

Yes Hard to say

(8)

factors that determine the attitude of Ukrainians to co-operation with the USA. The events of September 11, 2001, and further co-operation of Ukraine (as well as Russia) with the USA within the framework of the anti- terrorist coalition helped restore a positive balance in the media coverage of Ukraine-US relations shattered in the period of the tapegate. However, the fall of 2001 brought problems in Ukraine-US bilateral relations widely discussed in the Ukrainian media.

On this background, it is difficult to predict a significant increase in the share of respondents advocating priority relations with the USA. Diagram

What should Ukraines policy be towards the USA? shows that the prospects of future co-operation with the United States are also assessed sceptically.

A quarter (24.8%) of the population believes that co-operation with the USA should be curtailed and its influence on Ukraine reduced; meanwhile, the same share of the polled (24.2%) are sure that co-operation should be furthered. However, the greater share of respondents (39.6%) insist on maintaining the present level of relations between Ukraine and the USA. In our opinion, the predominant lurch of Ukrainians to preservation of the achieved level of contacts does not mean that the two countries have secured an optimal model of relations.

Rather, this points to the generally cautious attitude of the polled to further development of contacts with that influential partner.

If analysed by region (see maps on the following page), the positions of the public regarding Ukraine-US co- operation differ substantially, between the South and East, on the one hand, and the West, on the other, which is quite predictable. In the South and East, the ratio between adherents of deeper co-operation with the USA and those who stand for its curtailment is in favour of the latter: in the South 22.1% and 31.1%; in the East 20.1%

and 26.1%, respectively. At the same time, in those two areas the share of respondents who propose to maintain the present level of bilateral relations is significant (37,1% and 41,5%, respectively).

In the Western region, the picture is entirely different: there, the share of adherents of deeper contacts with the USA exceeds the percentage of those who stand for the curtailment of co- operation and reduction of US influence on Ukraine almost two-fold:

32.3% against 17.9%. At the same time, What should Ukraine's position be

regarding integration processes within the CIS?

% of the polled

EAST WEST

13.0%Yes 19.3%Yes

14.6%Yes

No34.0%

No39.0%

No41.7%

11.7%Yes

No46.9%

Ukraine should join the Tashkent Treaty of collective defence of CIS countries Ukraine should join the Union of Russia and Belarus

EAST WEST

62.2%Yes No16.0%

18.4%Yes No50.3%

36.8%Yes No 33.8%

54.3%Yes No12.7%

Co-operation within the framework of GUUAM should be stepped up

EAST WEST

27.2%Yes No 25.3%

22.6%Yes No 25.8%

20.9%Yes No 23.6%

29.9%Yes

No20.3%

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39.7% of people living in the Western region see it as expedient to maintain the present level of co-operation with the United States. The distribution of votes in the Central region almost entirely coincides with the nation average figures.

Co-operation with NÀÒÎ

Ukraine has established lasting co-operation with the North Atlantic Alliance, beneficial from the political, military and economic points of view. In 2001 alone, nearly 600 joint military co-operation events were held with NATO (with Russia only 52). To be sure, the

Alliance that, to a large extent, rests on the US potential for some time to come will continue to play the lead role in consolidation of regional security in Europe.

However, sociological surveys held by Razumkov Centre for years (June, 2000; August, 2001) used to record negative attitude of a significant part of Ukraines population to NATO. Almost half of those polled in course of the mentioned surveys (48.1% and 46.2%, respectively) viewed NATO as an aggressive military bloc; roughly the same share of citizens spoke out against NATOs eastward enlargement¹¹.

The results of the present poll give reason to argue that the attitude of Ukrainians to NATO has somewhat

11 The results of those surveys and the grounds for such a position of respondents are presented in a work by a Razumkov Centre expert: Pashkov Ì. Problems of European Security: Positions of the Population of Ukraine. National Security & Defence, 2001, No.9, p. 27-28, http://www.uceps.com.ua.

What should Ukraine's policy be towards the USA?

% of the polled

Curtailment of co-operation and reduction of US influence on Ukraine 39.6%

24.8%

24.2%

11.4%

Hard to say

WEST

Curtailment of co-operation and reduction of the US influence on Ukraine

Hard to say

32.3%

39.7%

17.9%

10.1%

CENTRE

Hard to say

25.4%

38.4%

24.4%

11.8%

EAST

Hard to say

20.1%

41.5%

26.1%

12.3%

SOUTH

Hard to say

22.1%

37.1%

31.1%

9.7%

What should Ukraine's policy be towards the USA?

% of the polled

changed for the better. In our opinion, this conclusion is indirectly confirmed by the answers of respondents presented in Diagram Should Ukraine join NATO?.

As is clear from the Diagram, the attitude of half (50.7%) of the countrys population to the Alliance may generally be assumed positive: 14.4% of respondents support Ukraines accession to NATO; another 36.3% do not rule out such possibility in the remote future. Opponents of Ukraines accession to NATO make up nearly a third (30.5%) of the population; at the same time, a significant share of respondents (18.8%) remained undecided on this issue.

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Most probably, changes in the attitude of Ukrainians to the Alliance occurred under the influence of the following factors: the effective anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan led by NATOs leader the USA; resolve to oppose international terrorism demonstrated by the Alliance in general; Russias presence in the anti-terrorist coalition, restoration (after the Balkan war) and improve- ment of relations between the Russian Federation and NATO; active efforts of Ukraine, jointly with NATO countries and Russia, at fighting terrorism, etc.

In the regional dimension, the position of respondents from Western region stands out: there, the share

of those convinced in the necessity of Ukraines accession to NATO (27.5%) exceeds relevant indicators in other regions more than two-fold (in the East and South this position is shared by 10% of the polled, on the average; in the Centre 13.5%). At the same time, the share of those who believe that Ukraine should under no circumstances join NATO is the lowest 20.5%. In other areas, the share of opponents of accession to the Alliance reaches one third of the polled (the Centre 30.5%, the East 33.5%, the South 35.7%).

Regional differences are not insignificant but it would be an exaggeration of things to speak about diametrically opposite positions of people living in different regions. The differences are somewhat

12 For more details see an article by a Razumkov Centre expert: Polyakov L. External Aspects of Military Policy. National Security & Defence, 2002, No.1, p.47-50, http://www.uceps.com.ua.

Should Ukraine join NATO?

% of the polled

Ukraine's accession to NATO should not be ruled out, but this issue is for the remote future 36.3%

Ukraine should under no circumstances join NATO 30.5%

Ukraine should join NATO 14.4%

Hard to say 18.8%

WEST

Ukraine's accession to NATO should not be ruled out, but this issue is for the remote future

Ukraine should join NATO

Ukraine should under no circumstances join NATO

Hard to say

27.5%

20.5%

33.6%

18.4%

CENTRE

Ukraine's accession to NATO should not be ruled out, but this issue is for the remote future Ukraine should join NATO

Hard to say

13.5%

30.5%

34.2%

21.8%

EAST

Hard to say

10.3%

33.5%

40.3%

15.9%

SOUTH

Hard to say

10.0%

35.7%

34.7%

19.6%

Should Ukraine join NATO?

% of the polled

equalised by the fact that a significant number of respondents in all regions do not rule out Ukraines accession to NATO in the remote future (at that, their share in the East was unexpectedly great 40.3% of the polled).

By and large, for the overwhelming majority of the population, Ukraines accession to NATO is not on the agenda. The desire of a country to join the Alliance, even backed by a majority of citizens, is to be accompanied with the countrys compliance with the criteria of NATO membership and the willingness of the Alliance to adopt the country¹².

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The factors of influence on Ukraines foreign policy

Public assessment of the level of Ukraines independence in formulation of its foreign policy, as represented on Diagram Is Ukraine independent in the formulation of its foreign policy?, deserves attention. As one can see, only 7.8% of the polled believe that the state is fully independent in the formulation of its foreign policy; by contrast, the absolute majority of citizens tend to believe that Ukraine is either not entirely independent (40.6%), or not independent at all (43.4%) in its foreign policy.

Public assessments, despite their conventionality and certain emotionality, cannot be considered ungrounded.

The results of the previous surveys of Razumkov Centre¹³ prove that in many aspects, Ukraine has really lost and continues to lose ground on the international scene; quite often, it behaves not as an actor but rather as an object of international politics staying under significant influence of other countries and international organisations.

In this connection, the answers of respondents about the countries that exert the greatest influence on Ukraine are of interest (Diagram What countries exert the greatest influence on Ukraines foreign policy?).

It is no wonder that the list compiled after the results of the poll is led by the USA (36.1% of the polled) the world leader, the most powerful economy and the greatest military power in the world, which also holds a leading position in influential international organisations. The second position (23.7%) was occupied by Russia the main trade and economic partner and a crucial supplier of energy resources to Ukraine. Finally, 14.2% of respondents cited EU countries as the main party influencing Ukraines foreign policy. It is noteworthy that co-operation with exactly those three

greatest factors of influence was declared priorities of Ukraines foreign policy, although with a somewhat different allocation of foreign policy efforts.

It is important that Ukraines citizens do not view co- operation along priority directions of Ukraines foreign policy as one-sided, exerting predominant influence on Ukraines policy, but see gradual consolidation of the basis of mutualism and equality in

relations with partners.

The following Diagram (What is the level of influence on the formulation and implementation of Ukraines foreign policy?) gives an idea of the internal factors of influence on the formulation and implementation of Ukraines foreign policy, as seen by ordinary citizens.

In peoples view, foreign policy is mainly formulated within the quadrangle the President business circles the Government Parliament, which is generally true. Among the main actors here, respondents

gave the first place to the head of state (a high level of his influence was noted by 33.2% of the polled, medium 34%); followed by business circles (27.5%

and 32%, respectively), the Cabinet of Ministers (18.9%

and 41%), the Verkhovna Rada (18.1% and 37.1%).

Mass media (14.1% and 37%) occupied the fifth place in this rating; at the same time, other institutes of civil society (political parties, public organisations), according to the public opinion, are on the periphery of active formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of the state. The greater share of the polled (respectively, 41.6% and 48.3%) assesses the level of influence of those social institutes as low. Such assessments are not unexpected, since civil society in Ukraine is still in the making¹⁴.

13 See analytical reports by Razumkov Centre experts: Ukraines Strategic Partners: Declarations and Realities; The International Image of Ukraine: Myths and Realities; Ukraine on the International Markets: the Problems and Prospects. Razumkov Centre 2000, p.16-72, 78-117, 402-437.

14 Those problems were considered in another survey by Razumkov Centre. See: Ukraine's Political Parties on the Eve of Parliamentary Election: the Present Is Ukraine independent

in the formulation of its foreign policy?

% of the polled

No, it is not independent 43.4%

Yes, it is entirely independent 7.8%

It is not entirely independent

40.6%

Hard to say 8.2%

What countries exert the greatest influence on Ukraine's foreign policy?

% of the polled

Russia The USA

23.7%

36.1%

EU countries 14.2%

There are no such countries 3.0%

Other countries 1.7%

Hard to say 21.3%

What is the level of influence on the formulation and implementation of Ukraine's foreign policy?

% of the polled

Medium Low

High Hard to say

The President 33.2% 34.0% 19.6%

Business circles 27.5% 32.0% 18.6%

The Cabinet of Ministers 18.9% 41.0% 22.5%

The Verkhovna Rada Mass media Political parties Public organisations Regional state administrations

18.1% 37.1% 28.9%

14.1% 37.0% 28.7%

8.5% 29.4% 41.6%

5.1% 22.4% 48.3%

4.1% 21.5% 47.7%

13.2%

21.9%

17.6%

15.9%

20.2%

20.5%

24.2%

26.7%

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When identifying the desired level of influence of different actors on formulation and implementation of Ukraines foreign policy, the polled respondents pro- duced a somewhat different list (Diagram What should be the level of influence on the formulation and implementation of Ukraines foreign policy?).

As is clear from the Diagram, unconditional priority in formulation and implementation of foreign policy is given to state institutes the President of Ukraine (82.4% of the polled are sure that his influence should be high), followed by the Cabinet of Ministers (67.6%) and the Verkhovna Rada (64.1%), whose indicators of desired influence in times exceed those of their actual impact (see previous Diagram). Among the non-state factors of influence, Ukrainian citizens would like to see the influence of the media on foreign policy processes somewhat greater (45.2%).

Budget expenditures on foreign political activity

While being rather critical about the results of foreign political activity and stressing the necessity of defending and promoting Ukraines national interests on the international scene, people are unwilling to support an increase in budget expenditures on those goals (Diagram Should budget expenditures on foreign political activity be increased?).

As is clear from the Diagram, the majority (54.1%) of respondents do not consider it necessary to increase budget funding of foreign political activity. Only 18.1%

of the polled support an increase in relevant expenditures.

It is evident that on the background of unresolved socio- economic problems, any propos- als of increasing expenditures on somewhat not quite comprehen- sible for the population will not be supported by rank-and-file citizens. Regrettably, those pro- posals were not always supported even by better-informed people MPs, representatives of financial divisions of the Government. Evidently, it is still to be comprehended that the effectiveness of foreign policy is not least dependent on the time- ly payment of Ukraines membership fees to international organisations, funding of Ukraines participation in international events, formation of a highly qualified and properly remunerated diplomatic corps, creation of material, technical and financial conditions for the activity of diplomatic mis- sions adequate to the tasks set, etc.

Conclusions

In society, a balance of sympathies between the European and Russian vectors of Ukraines foreign policy persists each of them was called a priority by approximately one third of the polled. Over the recent year and a half, the share of adherents of co-operation with CIS countries has declined. The American vector of the foreign policy is seen as a priority by a meagre share of respondents.

Society has a significant potential of support for the European vector of Ukraines foreign policy the majority of respondents are supportive of Ukraines accession to the European Union. Positive attitude of the public to that process will be consolidated, as the concrete gains from co-operation with the EU become evident.

Despite a decrease in the number of adherents of the priority of contacts with the CIS, the population generally stands for a more active role of Ukraine in the Commonwealth of Independent States. A significant share of the polled advocate Ukraines accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus; at the same time, citizens do not support joining the CIS Collective Security Organisation the Tashkent Treaty. Ukrainians are not very enthusiastic about co-operation with the Eurasian Economic Community and GUUAM.

The attitude of Ukrainians to NATO remains ambigu- ous, despite evident changes half of the polled are chiefly positive about the Alliance.

Significant differences in foreign policy preferences of the population of different regions of Ukraine persist.

In the Western region, people are more predisposed in favour of contacts with the EU, NATO and the USA. In the South and East, preference is clearly given to contacts with Russia and CIS countries. Positions of the people living in the Central region are close to Ukraines average. Most probably, regional specificity will have certain impact on the results of parliamentary

election of March 31, 2002. n

What should be the level of influence on the formulation and implementation of Ukraine's foreign policy?

% of the polled

The President 82.4% 8.3%

0.7%

Business circles

67.6% 18.9%

2.4%

The Cabinet of Ministers

64.1% 23.1%

2.6%

The Verkhovna Rada Mass media

Political parties Public organisations Regional state administrations

45.2% 31.5% 9.0%

38.9% 31.8% 14.4%

32.9% 38.0% 14.8%

30.6% 37.4% 15.8%

27.7% 35.1% 17.3%

Medium Low

High Hard to say

8.6%

11.1%

10.2%

14.3%

14.9%

14.3%

16.2%

19.9%

Should budget expenditures on foreign political activity be increased?

% of the polled

No 54.1%

Yes 18.1%

Hard to say 27.8%

UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY: