The foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards the European Union seems reactive and devoid of any plan. The core question of Russian policy towards the EU is Russia's perception of the EU and the process of European integration. The central issue of the European direction in RF policy was the activity and future of NATO and the CSCE/OSCE3.
The Russian authorities assumed that the RF would remain an indispensable element of the European order. The consequences of the Russian-American rapprochement after September 11, 2001 for the European direction of the RF's foreign policy. A consequence of the defeat should be a return to the national model of the EU's foreign policy.
It is partly connected with the question of the relationship between the European and other directions in Russian foreign policy.
Instruments in mutual relations between Russia and the European Union
At the same time, the RF intends to support the creation of a common economic space without loss of sovereignty, which is sometimes thought to be directly linked to EU membership. As Russia faces the problem of reducing the negative effects of globalization, integration with the EU would be the best way to participate in the global economy. The question of possible integration with the EU also poses the question of Russian identity in the international arena.
The implementation of the common areas will imply even further harmonization of Russian legislation with European regulations. This became apparent both during the negotiations on the consequences of EU enlargement for Russia and in the case of the so-called roadmaps for the creation of the Common Spaces, which were negotiated and adopted in May 2005. By continuing negotiations with the Commission, Russia has also been deprived of the ability to divide EU states.
The EU remains the RF's most important trading partner (55% of Russian trade, after enlargement) and one of the main consumers of Russian resources. The Union's need to approve Russia's membership of the WTO also proved to be an essential tool, but the EU lost this asset as soon as the agreement was reached in 2004. However, before joining the WTO, Russia's access to the WTO was restricted. access to the Union market will still remain an instrument of EU economic policy.
Last but not least, regulations governing the movement of persons across the EU-Russian border are also the Union's policy instrument. Another political instrument that the EU has at its disposal could be the Union's aid to the CIS states, which was introduced in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. This is another case in which an EU instrument is linked to the dynamics of the international system.
Areas of Russian-EU cooperation
A good example of the aforementioned limitations of cooperation is the European security area, which failed to be a breakthrough. The notion of Russian-European theater missile defense (based on Russian S-300 and S-400 missiles) has also failed to go beyond declarations. In the Kremlin's view, a noteworthy issue in Russian-EU cooperation should be the war against Islamic terror, especially after the 2004 attacks in Madrid and the 2005 attacks in London.
This relationship is asymmetric, as trade with Russia accounts for only 5% of the EU's total trade. Further Russia-EU economic cooperation may face obstacles if Russia does not become a member of the WTO. In the first months after the enlargement of the EU in 2004, another dispute emerged, regarding the extension of the "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the European Union" to the new member states.
The growing discrepancy of opinions between the two partners postponed the practical implementation of shared spaces. Until the Moscow summit on May 10, 2005, the so-called guidelines were approved, regarding the four common areas of Russia-EU cooperation. He stated that he aims to establish a multipolar international order, recognizing the shared responsibility for international security, especially in the close neighborhood of the EU and Russia, and emphasizing the community of values.
Since Russia does not actually participate in the decision-making process in the EU, Russian commentators point to possible advantages of the four spaces concept. First, the cooperation would support the “Europeanization” of Russian officials, who would become acquainted with the EU's decision-making mechanism. Some commentators view the adoption of the above-mentioned road maps as Russia's final step towards integration with the rest of Europe.
Areas of rivalry between Russia and the European Union
Cohesion of Union law; it also proved that the Kremlin failed to understand how the EU works. On this basis, Russia can actively contribute to the military actions pursued by the EU, but must respect the same rules as other non-EU states, i.e. The EU is Russia's serious rival in terms of economic and civilizational potential, although it officially denies that the CIS states can join the EU.
The fear that the CIS states would join the EU, even though the Union's political plans do not currently provide for this, is the most crucial potential reason for a dispute with the EU. The possibility of Ukraine joining the EU raises fears that a new iron curtain could emerge between Russia and the West45. However, according to the EU, the border area between the EU and Russia is a source of potential crises and political confrontations.
Russia seems to have believed that it would maintain its dominance in the CIS region and that the EU could accept it in exchange for stability. Russia's policy towards Poland can be understood as a consequence of its policy towards the EU. Poland is said to be vitally interested in establishing even closer relations between the Union and Ukraine and consistently supports Ukraine's entry into the EU.
Russia sees it as a prelude to the expansion of the EU's competence in this area and its connection with the EU's legal and institutional network. In the case of the EU, it stems from uncertainty about where Russia's political and economic order will develop. EU authorities express criticism more often, as they are less vulnerable to Russian foreign policy tools.
The role of cooperation with France and Germany at the background of Russia’s policy towards the European Union
The role of cooperation with France and Germany against the background of Russian policy towards the European Union. On the other hand, Germany is the fourth foreign investor in terms of direct investment and the largest recipient of Russian fuels (20% of Russian exports). The views of both players on the international order are quite similar, especially when it comes to granting the UN a decisive role in issues such as the UN Security Council's authorization of the use of force in international relations.
In 2005, Russian-German relations intensified, culminating in the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II and the 750th anniversary of the city of Kaliningrad. President Putin repeatedly underlined the role of Russian-German cooperation for successful developments on the European continent52. A draft analysis of Russian-French relations gives the impression that their level is the same as that of Russian relations with Germany.
In the case of France, it is a multicultural society in terms of internal politics and a multicultural globalization (as opposed to. 54 This view was presented by Igor Tschernov, Saint-Petersburg State University, in a lecture at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, in May 2005. France initially views Russia as a geopolitical partner that can help offset American dominance.
At the same time, Germany and Russia are seen as "defenders" of Russian interests in the EU. Both countries take advantage of the privileged relations with Russia to strengthen their own position in the Union. The effectiveness of the current Russian policy towards the European Union and the perspective of relations between Russia and the EU (even after 2008).
Effectiveness of Russia’s policy towards the European Union so far and prospects of the Russia-EU relations (also after 2008)
Russian policy towards Germany and France was intended to provide the Kremlin with an instrument to influence EU policy and privileged relations with this organization. Such an approach stems from the view that mutual relations are more important than relations with the EU as a whole and can serve as a means of reinforcing divisions within the EU. The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis has failed to improve the effectiveness of the European dimension of Russian foreign policy.
Moscow has neither negotiated a privileged status for the Kaliningrad region nor prevented the participation of the Union representative in the solution of the Ukrainian crisis. Putin failed to convince Europe that Russia has exclusive rights to Central Europe and the CIS. As European politics became more autonomous, Russia became more concerned that the EU would transform into an independent geopolitical actor.
The first is already focused, to a large extent, on cooperation with the EU; the latter is evolving in a direction opposite to that introduced by the EU. In this way, without joining the Union, Russia would become a kind of colony of the Union. A declining share in world GDP coupled with a demographic crisis may limit Russia's independence as a geopolitical center.
A united and at the same time flexible Europe, offering a lot of economic freedom and few supranational components, can be a form of cooperation that Russia can aspire to in the future57. Some Russian political scientists fear that within 15-25 years Russia will not be able to act in the international order as an independent partner. In this case, EU membership, although unlikely within the next decade, could be a way to preserve, at least partially, the position of a superpower.
