• Nem Talált Eredményt




Defence planning is a basis for creating balanced armed forces of any coun- try. There is no country in the world, except perhaps for the Third World countries, where national defence, the creation of armed forces does not have precise purposes, objectives and, most importantly, ways and methods of creating an army.

It is possible to categorically assert and to easily prove that such a planning, programming and budgeting system does not exist in the Moldovan Armed Forces.

This situation results in a series of negative consequences, but there is also one „positive“ feature, which made possible the existing situation. That is the

„capability“ of the state to finance the army by the remaining principle and, as result, the „possibility“ to allocate large financial assets for solving social and other kind of problems. For leaders of the Ministry of Defence, the existing situation is also profitable. Such an approach of the country’s defence financing takes away a significant part of the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence relating to the following issues: inability to maintain the National Army in proper shape within the framework of the approved numerical and combat structure, low battle readiness, and extremely low material stocks.

Thus, the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) presumes the precisely designated objectives faced by the armed forces, developing programs for the implementation of these objectives; for instance, the Armed Forces cre-

ation programs that can be really implemented, and also, appropriate financing, which is very important to those who conduct these programs.

Once again, it is necessary to note that such a system does not exist in the Republic of Moldova.

The system’s planning part should contain the following elements at various levels:

1. The national development strategy, where there should be a section on defence issues, containing the following elements:

a) the geopolitical situation, possible sources of potential crises, external risks and threats;

b) sources of internal instability and risks, as well as solutions;

c) to get the armed forces involved in problem solving related to stability in Europe; possible participation in blocks, alliances; possible participation of armed forces in peacekeeping operations, etc.;

d) the economic situation of the country and the economical capacities of maintenance of the armed forces; also, determined financial resources, which the country can allot to address military issues;

f) and, as a conclusion, general internal and external objectives of the armed forces should be clearly formulated.

Elements of this system should be drafted and issued by the President of the Republic of Moldova, as the head-of-state and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, together with the support of the Government of the Republic of Moldova. The national strategy, as a presidential message to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, as one of the possible forms, should be issued with a certain periodicity.

The periodicity can be determined by the term of the president, parliamentary elections, or may depend on changes of both external and internal factors. The term should become a topic for a separate research; however, it should be precisely specified in the legislation.

1.Based on objectives set by the president, a Military Strategy or Military Doctrine should be elaborated, to describe the optimum ways and methods for achieving the objectives of the Armed Forces. This should prepared by the Min- istry of Defence in collaboration with the Main Headquarters of the National Army and the support of the headquarters of the Gendarmerie and Border Guards;

2. Based on the National Strategy for Development of the Country,, a Military Strategy (Military Doctrine) for each of the Armed Forces branches, the building- planning document (for example, the National Army building plan) should be drafted. Such a document should determine concrete objectives and purposes, should provide general ways for their solution, the forces’ structure and means intended for achieving these objectives, and financial resources (which, for the National Army development, should be allotted by the Main Headquarters). By this, the planning part of the planning, programming and budgeting system comes to an end.

The program part of PPB system assumes an appropriate development of pro- grams for building various branches of troops, departing from the force structure and means determined by the AFRM (or the National Army) building plan. Such programs can be the antitank systems equipping program, the combat training program, the material stocks replenishing program, the communication means re- equipment program, the human reserve training program, etc.

Any program should contain objectives and tasks, all necessary calculations proving its cost-effectiveness, distribution of financial resources for every year of the program implementation.

The appropriate ministries and departments should develop concrete pro- grams for the National Army.

The programs adjustment should be carried out by any body within the Ministry of Defence framework, which has the right to update the programs (but not the MOD – the Military-Finance Department – which should act as a partici- pant in developing the programs). So far, such a body does not exist, but it is very necessary. That is explained by the importance of issues that should be solved by this department.

The financial part of the PPB system presumes endorsement of the calculation accuracy in the appropriate governmental departments, the state budget possi- bilities and the AFRM current needs adjustment for the next years, as well as the approval of the co-ordinated programs by the Government of the Republic of Moldova. As a final document, it should include the budgets for the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Department of Border Guard Troops for one year.

During the program co-ordination by the Government of the Republic of Moldova, the lack of necessary financing will require reconsideration for the AFRM building plan and objectives posed before the Armed Forces. In turn, this could generate a reconsideration of the entire national strategy, both in defence and other areas.

The process comes to an end when the National Strategy in the defence area is coordinated with the state financial possibilities. In other words, the state can demand from the Armed Forces the results for which it is willing to pay.

What are the advantages of the PPB system?

1. Involving the country’s supreme authorities in the building process of the Armed Forces;

2. The precise statement of objectives for the Armed Forces and, as a result, the possibility to calculate forces and means necessary for achieving these ob- jectives;

3. Possibility for a correct distribution of defence money among various de- partments in the best way;

4. Possibility to change tasks faced by AFRM in the absence of the necessary resources for their performance (basically, due to the lack of financial resources),

to search other scenarios to achieve the objectives. For example, through diplo- matic channels, or through joining military blocks, etc.;

5. The optimisation of financial expenditures for defence that is especially important, due to the limited financial and material resources.

As disadvantages of this system, it is possible to mention the complexity of the informational flow, which creates the necessity to co-ordinate efforts in vari- ous vertical lines of authority that do not assure sufficient objectivity and effi- ciency of the PPB system.

However, such a system has a future and there is a necessity for its imple- mentation in Moldova.

In this study, we dealt with the analysis of the National Army’s status and the basic components of the Armed Forces. The trends of its development and the National Army’s building prospects were shown. The value of the Armed Forces military potential was calculated (the mission capable score) sufficient for preven- tion of military conflict with the so-called Transdnistrian Republic of Moldova. The general directions for creating the planning, programming and budgeting system were given.


This study is one of the few researches in the area of economic security conducted in the Republic of Moldova, where, unfortunately, economic security is a fully ignored topic. There are no objective reasons to justify this rather weird situation, given that in several occasions the national economy may have been damaged irreversibly due to both foreign and local factors. Just as in other coun- tries undergoing transition, the significance of this topic can be fully realised only when threats regarding economic security become fait accompli. As it is well known, security in general and economic security in particular do not allow for partial or occasional approaches. Economic history proves convincingly that the issue of economic security should not be restricted to academic exercise, but, instead, should be the object of an ongoing monitoring and management system.

The concept of economic security is useful as long as it can be directly implemented into practice. However, despite its practical significance, the theo- retical side of economic security is far from simple or easy to disregard. Thus, the study of economic security in small countries that are either underdeveloped or undergoing transition to a market economy showed that such countries are cha- racterised by proto-economic systems rather than true national economies. In such countries, their economic interests abroad are not clear enough, the pro- cess of gathering primary capital is still ongoing, and the cause-effect system is not yet clearly defined for corporate, political, and economic interests, etc. In many such countries organized crime and corruption are flourishing and public administration bodies are not strong enough to ensure social trust in the ability of the state to warrant that „the rules of the game“ will be complied with. Thus, in most of such countries a significant share of economic activity is illicit or even criminal. These sectors can reach up to 50-60% of the declared economy and, by their existence, they generate serious difficulties while analysing economic secu- rity. This is just one of the reasons explaining why barriers hampering understand- ing and ensuring economic security are twice as difficult when the object of