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Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro

**Working Paper**

### Strategy-proofness and efficiency for

### non-quasi-linear common-tiered-object preferences:

### Characterization of minimum price rule

ISER Discussion Paper, No. 971

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

The Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka University

*Suggested Citation: Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro (2016) : Strategy-proofness and efficiency*

for non-quasi-linear common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule, ISER Discussion Paper, No. 971, Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka

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### Discussion Paper No. 971

**STRATEGY-PROOFNESS **

**AND EFFICIENCY **

**FOR NON-QUASI-LINEAR **

**COMMON-TIERED-OBJECT **

**PREFERENCES: **

**CHARACTERIZATION**

**OF MINIMUM PRICE RULE**

Yu Zhou Shigehiro Serizawa

May 2016

The Institute of Social and Economic Research Osaka University

### Strategy-Proofness and E¢ ciency for

### Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object

### Preferences:

### Characterization of Minimum Price Rule

### Yu Zhou

y### Shigehiro Serizawa

z### May 27, 2016

Abstract

We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogenous objects to a group of agents and determining how much they should pay. Each agent receives at most one object. Agents have non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. Especially, we focus on the cases: (i) objects are linearly ranked, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer a higher ranked object to a lower ranked one, and (ii) objects are partitioned into several tiers, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer an object in the higher tier to an object in the lower tier. The minimum price rule assigns a minimum price (Walrasian) equilibrium to each preference pro…le. We establish: (i) on a common-object-ranking domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy, and (ii) on a common-tiered-object domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying these four axioms.

Keywords: strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, non-quasi-linearity, minimum price rule, common-object-ranking domain, common-tiered-object domain

JEL Classi…cation: D44, D61, D71, D82

The preliminary version of this article was presented at the12th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Academia Sinica-ISER Economics Workshop 2014, 2014 SSK International Conference on Distributive Justice in Honor of Professor William Thomson, 2014 ISER Market Design Workshop, ISI-ISER Young Econo-mists Workshop 2015, and the Conference on Economic Design 2015. We thank participants at those conferences and workshops for their comments. We also thank Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Tomoya Kazumura, Takehito Masuda, Debasis Mishra, Shuhei Morimoto, James Schummer, Arunava Sen, Ning Sun, Jingyi Xue, Ryan Tierney, and Huaxia Zeng for their helpful comments. Especially, we are grateful to William Thomson for his detailed dis-cussion. We gratefully acknowledge …nancial support from the Joint Usage/Research Center at ISER, Osaka University, and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (15J01287, 15H03328, and 15H05728).

### 1

### Introduction

We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogenous objects to a group of agents and determining how much each agent should pay. Each agent receives at most one object. Agents have non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe the environment where changing the same amount of money at di¤erent payments for a given object exerts di¤erent impacts on the bene…t deriving from consuming that bundle. In addition to the non-quasi-linearity, the allocation problem we investigate also has the following features, which are exempli…ed below:

Example A: Central business districts are located in the city center where households are employed and commute everyday with same public transportation system. Houses are similar in qualities and sizes, but much di¤erent in the distances from the city center. Each household needs at most one house. As long as houses are equally priced, households prefer a house with shorter distance to the city center to the one with longer distance, since longer distance takes more commuting fee and time. However, when several houses have the same distance to the city center, even if those houses are equally prices, households might have di¤erent preferences on them. Since the purchase of houses has a great impact on the budget of most households, each household has non-quasi-linear preferences over houses and payments.1

Example B: Several condominiums belong to the same building and similar in qualities and sizes. Each household needs at most one condominium. As long as condominiums are equally priced, households commonly prefer condominiums in higher ‡oors to those in lower ‡oors. However, households might have di¤erent preferences on condominiums on the same ‡oor even if they are equally prices. Similarly to Example 1, each household has non-quasi-linear preferences over condominiums and payments.

The above examples introruce our special focus of the non-quasi-linear environment: (i) Objects are linearly ranked, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer a higher ranked object to a lower ranked one.

(ii) Objects are partitioned into several tiers, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer an object in the higher tier to an object in the lower tier. However, even if objects are equally priced, agents may have di¤erent preferences over the objects in the same tier.

We try to identify the (allocation) rules satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for above-mentioned allocation problems de…ned on the common-object-ranking domain and common-tiered-object domain. An allocation speci…es how the ob-jects are allocated and how each agent should pay. A rule is a mapping from the set of agents’ preference pro…les (called “domain”) to the set of allocations. The common-object-ranking domain contains a set of preference pro…les where for each preference pro…le, individual prefer-ence satis…es money monotonicity, object monotonicity, possibility of compensation, and more importantly, commonly ranks objects according to some object permutation. The common-tiered-object domain contains a set of preference pro…les where for each preference pro…le, in

1_{The housing market in a monocentricity has been investigated under di¤erent contents by Kaneko (1983),}

addition to the previous …rst four assumptions, objects are partitioned into several tiers and individual preference commonly ranks objects according to the tier partition. An allocation is e¢ cient if no one can be better o¤ without reducing others’welfare or reducing the total amount of the payments. E¢ ciency describes the property of a rule that for each preference pro…le, the rule always selects the e¢ cient allocation. Strategy-proofness says that for each agent and each preference pro…le, truthfully revealing the private information is always a weakly dominant strategy. Individual rationality says that for each agent and each preference pro…le, everyone should be no worse than getting and paying nothing. This property guarantees the agents’ voluntary participations. For the last property, no subsidy, it just says that the payment for each object is non-negative.

The “minimum price (Walrasian) rule”is an important rule satisfying the above-mentioned
four properties. In our model, the set of equilibrium prices forms a non-empty complete lattice
and the minimum (Walrasian) equilibrium price vector is well de…ned.2 _{The minimum price rule}

is a rule that given each preference pro…le, it always selects an equilibrium with the minimum price vector. We establish: (i) on a common-object-ranking domain, a rule satis…es e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy if and only if it is the minimum price rule; and (ii) on a common-tiered-object domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying these four axioms.

E¢ cient and strategy-proof rules for non-quasi-linear preferences have already been studied by the literature.3 Much attention has been paid to the model where the set of equilibrium prices or payo¤s has the lattice structure. In the one-to-one two-sided matching model with money transfer, although the set of equilibrium payo¤s forms a non-empty complete lattice, no rule satis…es e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness, in addition to individual rationality and no pairwise budget de…cit. However, if strategy-proofness is weakened to one-sided strategy-proofness, the one-sided optimal core rule satis…es this property in addition to e¢ ciency, individual rationality and no pairwise budget de…cit. Furthermore, it is the only rule satisfying those properties (Demange and Gale, 1985; Morimoto, 2016).

As a special case of the one-to-one two-sided matching model with money transfer, object assignment models with money transfer have also been studied.4 In these models, the set of equilibrium prices also forms a non-empty complete lattice and consequently, the minimum price (the agent-sided optimal core allocation) rule is well de…ned. Two strands of literature address this issue.

One strand analyzes the case where objects are identical. In this case, the minimum price rule is equivalent to the Vickrey rule (Vickrey, 1961). The Vickrey rule is the only rule satisfying e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness, in addition to individual rationality and no subsidy (Saitoh and Serizawa, 2008; Sakai, 2008). Moreover, the Vickrey rule is the only rule satisfying those

2_{See Fact 1 and Fact 2 for details.}

3_{Some authors also investigate the strategy-proof and fair rules for the non-quasi-linear preferences, for}

example, Alkan et al, (1991), Sun and Yang (2003), Andersson, et al, (2010), Adachi (2014), and Tierney (2015) etc. Recently, Baisa (2015a, 2015b) investigates the auction models for the non-quasi-linear preferences.

4_{Assuming each agent at most receives one object is also important for identifying e¢ cient and strategy-proof}

properties on subdomains including preferences only exhibiting positive or negative income e¤ects.

The other strand analyzes the case where objects are heterogenous. In this case, the Vickrey
rule is not equivalent to the minimum price rule.5 _{The minimum price rule is the only rule }

sat-isfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for losers (Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015). Housing markets with bounded house prices and existing tenants are also studied recently. In those models, the minimum price rule may not be well de…ned. However, with some mild conditions, there still are some (constraint) e¢ cient and strategy-proof rules (Andersson and Svensson, 2014; Andersson et al, 2016).

This paper is a further study of the e¢ cient and strategy-proof rules on the restricted non-quasi-linear domains for the heterogenous objects case. Although Morimoto and Serizawa (2015) already establish the characterization on a larger domain by using similar axioms, our results are independent of them in the following points.

First, our focus are the smaller domains, object-ranking domains and common-tiered-object domains. The above properties of rules are weaker on those domains than on the domain of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015). When we analyze the allocation problems exempli…ed above, the domain of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015) includes unsuitable preferences and their results cannot be applied.

Second, although we owe some proof structure to Morimoto and Serizawa (2015) to establish the characterizations, the detailed contents of the proofs are di¤erent. In addition, most of our proofs do not impose any restrictions on the numbers of agents and objects while the assumption that the number of agents is larger than the number of objects plays an important role in the proof of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015)’s characterization.

The common-tiered-object domain has already been studied to identify the e¢ cient and strategy-proof rules in the two-sided matching model without money transfer and probabilistic assignment model without money transfer (Kandori et al., 2010; Kesten, 2010; Kesten and Kurino, 2013; Akahoshi, 2014). However, such domains have not been studied in the object assignment model with money transfer for non-quasi-linear preferences. Our paper is the …rst one that studies the common-tiered-object domain with money transfer.

The remaining parts are organized as follows. Section 2 introduces concepts and establishes the model. Section 3 de…nes the minimum price equilibria. Section 4 provides characterizations. Section 5 gives concluding remarks. All proofs are placed in the Appendix.

### 2

### The model and de…nitions

Consider an economy with n 2 agents and m 1 objects. Denote the set of agents by
N _{f1; 2;} ; n_{g and the set of (real) objects by M} _{f1; 2;} ; m_{g. Not receiving an object}
is called receiving a null object. We call it object 0. Let L M _{[ f0g. Each agent receives}
at most one object. We denote the object that agent i 2 N receives by xi 2 L. We denote the

5_{Precisely speaking, when objects are heterogenous, the Vickrey rule is equivalent to the minimum price rule}

for the quasi-linear preferences (Leonard, 1983). But these two rules are distinct for non-quasi-linear preferences (Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015).

amount that agent i pays by ti 2 R. The agents’common consumption set is L R, and a

generic (consumption) bundle for agent i is a pair zi (xi; ti)2 L R. Let 0 (0;0).

Each agent i has a complete and transitive preference Ri over L R. Let Pi and Ii be the

strict and indi¤erence relations associated with Ri. A generic class of preferences is denoted by

R. We call (R)n a domain.

The following are basic properties of preferences, which we assume throughout the paper: Money monotonicity: For each xi 2 L and each pair ti; t0i 2 R, if ti < t0i, (xi; ti) Pi(xi; t0i).

Object monotonicity: For each xi 2 M and each ti 2 R, (xi; ti) Pi(0; ti).

Possibility of compensation: For each ti 2 R and each pair xi; xj 2 L, there is a pair

tj; t0j 2 R such that (xi; ti) Ri(xj; tj) and (xj; t0j) Ri(xi; ti).

Continuity: For each zi 2 L R, the upper contour set at zi, U C(Ri; zi) fz0i 2 L R :

z0

iRizig and the lower contour set at zi, LC(Ri; zi) fzi0 2 L R : ziRizi0g, are closed.

A preference Ri is classical if it satis…es the four properties just de…ned. Let RC be the

class of classical preferences. We call (RC_{)}n _{the classical domain.}

Note that by money monotonicity, the possibility of compensation and continuity, for each Ri 2 RC, each zi 2 L R and each y 2 L, there is a unique amount Vi(y; zi) 2 R such that

(y; Vi(y; zi)) Iizi. We call Vi(y; zi) the valuation of y at zi for Ri.

An object allocation is an n-tuple (x1; : : : ; xn)2 Lnsuch that for each pair i; j 2 N, if xi 6=

0_{and i 6= j, then x}i 6= xj. We denote the set of object allocations by X. A (feasible) allocation

is an n-tuple z (z1; : : : ; zn) ((x1; t1); : : : ; (xn; tn)) 2 [L R]n such that (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 X.

We denote the set of feasible allocations by Z. Given z 2 Z, we denote its object and payment components at z by x (x1; : : : ; xn)and t (t1; : : : ; tn), respectively.

A preference pro…le is an n-tuple R (Ri)i2N 2 Rn. Given R 2 Rn and N0 N, let

RN0 (R_{i})_{i2N}0 and R _{N}0 R_{N nN}0 (Ri)i2NnN0.

Next, we introduce two properties of domains we focus on. First is “common-object-ranking”. It says that objects are ranked linearly, and for each payment, each agent prefers the bundle consisting of the object that has the higher rank and that payment to the bundle consist-ing of the object that has the lower rank and that payment. Let ( (1); : : : ; (m); (m + 1)) be a permutation of objects in L, where (1) denotes the object ranked …rst, (2) denotes the object ranked second, and so on. For every pair x; y 2 L, x > y means that x has a higher rank than y according to .

A preference Ri 2 RC ranks objects according to if for each xi 2 L and each ti 2 R,

( (1); ti) Pi( (2); ti) Pi( (m); ti) Pi( (m + 1); ti).

Remark 1: Since Ri 2 RC, object monotonicity implies (m + 1) = 0.

Figure 1 illustrates a preference Ri ranking objects according to for M = fA; B; Cg and

Figure 1 Illustration of preference ranking objects according to

In Figure 1, there are four horizontal lines. The bottom line corresponds to the null object, the middle two lines to objects A and B, and the top line to object C, respectively. The intersection of the vertical line and each horizontal line denotes the bundle consisting of the corresponding object and no payment. For example, the origin 0 denotes the bundle consisting of the null object and no payment. For each point on one of three horizontal lines, the distance from that point to the vertical line denotes the payment. For example, zi denotes the bundle

consisting of object A and payment t. By money monotonicity, moving rightward along the same line makes the agent worse o¤, i.e., if d > 0, then (A; t) Pi(A; t + d). If the bundles are

connected by a indi¤erence curve, for example, zi and zi0, it means that agent i is indi¤erent

between them, i.e., ziIizi0. In Figure 1, for each t 2 R, (C; t) Pi(B; t) Pi(A; t) Pi(0; t) and Ri

ranks objects according to = (C; B; A; 0).

Let RR_{( )}_{be the class of preferences ranking objects according to}

and note that RR

( )
RC_{. A preference pro…le R ranks objects according to} _{if each preference in the preference}

pro…le all ranks objects according to , i.e., for each i 2 N, Ri 2 RR( ).

Figure 2 illustrates the preference pro…le R ranking objects according to _{for N = f1; 2g,}
M =_{fA; B; Cg, and} = ( (1); (2); (3); (4)) = (C; B; A; 0).

In Figure 2, for each t 2 R, (C; t) P1(B; t) P1(A; t) P1(0; t)and (C; t) P2(B; t) P2(A; t) P2(0; t).

Thus, R ranks objects according to .

We call (RR_{( ))}n_{the common-object-ranking domain if there is an object permutation}

such that for each R 2 (RR_{( ))}n_{, R ranks object according to .}

Second is “common-tiered-object ranking”. It says that objects are partitioned into tiers, and for each payment, each agent prefers the bundle consisting of the object in the higher tier and that payment to the bundle consisting of the object in the lower tier and that payment. We describe a tier partition by an indexed family T = fTlgl2K of non-empty subsets of L such

that (i) K _{f1; 2;} ; k_{g and 1} k m + 1_{, (ii) [}_{l2K}Tl = L and (iii) for each l; l0 2 K with

l _{6= l}0_{, T}

l\ Tl0 = ?, where Tl denotes the l th tier for each l 2 K. For every pair x; y 2 L,

x >_{T} y _{means that x is in a higher tier than y according to T .}

A preference Ri 2 RC ranks object according to T if for each ti 2 R, each x 2 Tl and

each y 2 Tl0 with l 6= l0 and l < l0, (x; ti) Pi(y; ti).

Remark 2: (i) Since Ri 2 RC, object monotonicity implies k 2and Tk =f0g.

(ii) If a preference Ri 2 RC ranks objects according to , then Ri also ranks objects according

to T such that T1 =f (1)g; T2 =f (2)g; ; Tm+1 =f (m + 1)g.

Figure 3 illustrates a preference Ri ranking objects according to T for M = fA; B; Cg and

T =T1[ T2[ T3 with T1 =fB; Cg, T2 =fAg, and T3 =f0g.

Figure 3 Illustration of preference ranking objects according to _{T}

In Figure 3, for each t 2 R, each y 2 T1, each x 2 T2, namely x = A, and 0 2 T3, we have

(y; t) Pi(A; t) Pi(0; t). Note that (C; s) Pi(B; s) Pi(0; t) and (B; s0) Pi(C; s0) Pi(0; t). Thus, Ri

ranks objects according to T , but does not rank objects according to any object permutation.
Let RT_{(}

T ) be the class of preferences ranking objects according to T . Obviously, RT_{(}

T ) RC. A preference pro…le R ranks objects according to T if each preference in the pro…le all ranks objects according to T , i.e., for each i 2 N, Ri 2 RT(T ).

Figure 4 illustrates the preference pro…le R ranking objects according to T for N = f1; 2g,
M =_{fA; B; Cg, and T =T}1[ T2[ T3 with T1 =fB; Cg, T2 =fAg, and T3 =f0g.

Figure 4 Illustration of preference pro…le ranking objects according to _{T}

In Figure 4, for each t 2 R, (C; t) P1(B; t) P1(A; t) P1(0; t)and (B; t) P2(C; t) P2(A; t) P2(0; t).

Thus, R ranks objects according to T .
We call (RT_{(}

T ))n

the common-tiered-object domain if there is an indexed family T = fTigi2K such that for each R 2 RT(T )n, R ranks objects according to T .

Remark 3: (i) Any common-object-ranking domain is included in the common-tiered-object domain with respect to some T = fTigi2K. If 2 k < m + 1, such a inclusion relation is strict.

(ii) If k = m + 1, a common-tiered-object domain with k tiers is a common-object-ranking domain.

(iii) Consider two common-tiered-object domains with respect to T = fTlgl2K and T0 =

fT0

l0gl0_{2K}0. If T0 is coarser than T , then the common-tiered-object domain with respect to

T is a subset of the one with respect to T0_{.}6

(iv) Since the classical domain is the common-tiered-object domain with the coarsest class of tiers, that is, k = 2, any common-tiered-object domain is a subset of the classical domain.

An (allocation) rule on Rn

is a mapping f from Rn

to Z. Given a rule f and R 2 Rn_{, we}

denote bundle assigned to agent i by fi(R) (xi(R); ti(R)) where xi(R) denotes the assigned

object and ti(R) the associated payment. We write,

f (R) (fi(R))i2N, x(R) (xi(R))i2N, and t(R) (ti(R))i2N.

Now, we introduce standard properties of rules. An allocation z ((xi; ti))i2N 2 Z is

(_{Pareto-)e¢ cient for R 2 R}n if there is no feasible allocation z0 ((x0_{i}; t0_{i}))_{i2N} _{2 Z such that}7
(i) for each i 2 N, zi0Rizi, (ii) for some j 2 N; zj0Pjzj, and (iii)

X

i2N

t0_{i} X

i2N

ti.

For each preference pro…le, the rule chooses an e¢ cient allocation.
E¢ ciency_{: For each R 2 R}n, f (R) is e¢ cient for R.

6_{T}0 _{is coarser than T if for each l 2 K, there is l}0_{2 K}0 _{such that T}
l Tl0.

7_{E¢ ciency described here takes the perspective of object suppliers, i.e., governments and auctioneers. Object}

No agent ever bene…ts from misrepresenting his preference.
Strategy-proofness_{: For each R 2 R}n

, each i 2 N and each R0

i 2 R, fi( truth Ri ; R i) truth Ri fi( lie R0 i; R i).8

No agent is ever assigned a bundle that makes him worse o¤ than he would be if he had received the null object and paid nothing.

Individual rationality_{: For each R 2 R}n

and each i 2 N, fi(R) Ri0.

The payment of each agent is always nonnegative.
No subsidy_{: For each R 2 R}n _{and each i 2 N, t}i(R) 0.

The …nal property is a weak variant of no subsidy: if an agent receives the null object, his payment is nonnegative.

No subsidy for losers_{: For each R 2 R}n_{, if x}

i(R) = 0, ti(R) 0.

### 3

### The Minimum price equilibria

In this section, we de…ne the equilibria and minimum price equilibria, and state several facts
related to them. Throughout the section, let us …x R RC _{and obviously, all facts hold on}

the common-object-ranking and common-tiered-object domains.

### 3.1

### De…nitions of equilibria and minimum price equilibria

Let p (p1; ; pm) 2 Rm+ be a price vector. The budget set at p is de…ned as B(p)

f(x; px) : x2 Lg, where px = 0 if x = 0. Given Ri 2 R, the demand set at p for Ri is de…ned

as D(Ri; p) fx 2 L : for each y 2 L; (x; px) Ri(y; py)g.

De…nition_{: Let R 2 R}n_{. A pair ((x; t); p) 2 Z} _{R}m_{+} is a (Walrasian) equilibrium for R if
for each i 2 N, xi 2 D(Ri; p) and ti = pxi, (E-i)

for each y 2 M, if for each i 2 N, xi 6= y, then py = 0. (E-ii)

Condition (E-i) says that each agent receives an object from his demand set and pays its price. Condition (E-ii) says that the prices of unassigned objects are zero.

Fact 1 _{(Alkan and Gale, 1990; Alaei et al, 2016) (Existence). For each R 2 R}n, there is an
equilibrium.

Given R 2 Rn, we denote the set of equilibria for R by W (R), the set of equilibrium allocations for R by Z(R), and the set of equilibrium price vectors for R by P (R), respectively, i.e.,

Z(R) _{fz 2 Z : for some p 2 R}m_{+}; (z; p)_{2 W (R)g, and}
P (R) _{fp 2 R}m_{+} :_{for some z 2 Z; (z; p) 2 W (R)g.}

Fact 2_{(Demange and Gale, 1985) (Lattice property). For each R 2 R}n_{, P (R) is a complete}

lattice and there is a unique equilibrium price vector p 2 P (R) such that for each p0 2 P (R),
p p0_{.}

A minimum price equilibrium (MPE)is an equilibrium whose price vector is minimum.
Given R 2 Rn, let pmin(R) be the minimum equilibrium price vector for R, Wmin(R) the set
of minimum price equilibria associated withpmin_{(R)} _{and Z}min_{(R)} _{the set of minimum}

price equilibrium allocations associated with pmin_{(R), respectively, i.e.,}

Zmin(R) _{fz 2 Z : (z; p}min(R))_{2 W}min(R)_{g.}

Although there might be several minimum price equilibria, they are indi¤erent for each
agent, i.e., for each R 2 Rn_{, each pair z; z}0 _{2 Z}min_{(R)}

and each i 2 N, ziIizi0.

### 3.2

### Illustrations of minimum price equilibria

In this subsection, we illustrate the de…nition of minimum price equilibrium for R RC,
R RR_{( )}

and R RT_{(}

T ) by means of three …gures. Since R is …xed, we write pmin _{instead}

of pmin_{(R)} _{for illustrations.}

Figure 5 illustrates a MPE for R RC, N = f1; 2; 3g, and M = fA; B; C; Dg.

Figure 5 Illustration of minimum price equilibrium for preference pro…le from classical domain

In Figure 5, a MPE allocation is as follows: agent 1 receives object A and pays 0. Agent 2 receives object B and pays pmin

B . Agent 3 receives object D and pays pminD . The prices of objects

A and C are 0.

Let’s see why the allocation z (z1; z2; z3) is a MPE allocation. First, for each agent

i = 1; 2; 3; zi is maximal for Ri in the budget set f0; (A; pminA ); (B; pBmin); (C; pminC ); (D; pminD )g.

Thus, z is an equilibrium allocation. Let pmin _{(p}min

A ; pminB ; pminC ; pminD ).

Next, let p (pA; pB; pC; pD) be an equilibrium price. We show p pmin. By the

If pB < pminB and pD < pDmin, then by pA 0 and pC 0, all three agents prefer (B; pB) or

(D; pD) to 0, (A; pA) and (C; pC). In such a case, at least one agent cannot receive an object

from his demand set, contradicting (E-i). Thus, pB pminB or pD pminD .

If pB < pminB , then pD pDmin. By pA 0 and pC 0, both agents 1 and 2 prefer (B; pB) to

0, (A; pA), (C; pC) and (D; pD). In such a case, one of agents 1 and 2 cannot receive the object

he demands, contradicting (E-i). Thus, pB pminB .

If pD < pminD , then by pA 0, pB pminB and pC 0, both agents 1 and 3 prefer (D; pD) to

0, (A; pA), (B; pB) and (C; pC). In such a case, one of agents 1 and 3 cannot receive the object

he demands, contradicting (E-i). Thus, pD pminD . Thus, p pmin and (z; pmin) is a MPE.

In Figure 5, the minimum equilibrium prices may not be monotonic with respect to the
object rankings and which objects are unassigned depends on the preference pro…le we choose.
However, when R RR_{( )}

or R RT_{(}

T ), the minimum equilibrium prices are monotonic with respect to the object rankings or object-tier rankings. Unassigned objects are the ones that have the lower ranks or are in the lower tiers. We specify these features in the following.

Figure 6 illustrates the MPE for R RR_{( )}

, N = f1; 2; 3g, M = fA; B; C; Dg, and = (D; C; B; A; 0).

Figure 6 Illustration of minimum price equilibrium for preference pro…le from common-object-ranking domain

Similarly to Figure 5, (z; pmin_{)} _{is a MPE in Figure 6. Note that p}min

D > pminC > pminB = pminD .

For R RR( ), the minimum equilibrium price of object that has the higher rank is larger than that of object that has the lower rank. This feature is summrized as Remark 4.

Remark 4: Let min_{fn; m + 1g. In the MPE for R} _{R}R( ), (i) if m + 1 n, then
= m + 1, pmin

(1)(R) > > p min

(m)(R) > p min

( )(R) = 0, and all the objects are assigned, and (ii)

if m + 1 > n, then = n, pmin_{(1)}(R) > > pmin_{( )}(R) = = pmin_{(m)}(R) = 0 and objects ranked
lower than ( ) are unassigned.9

9_{To see (i), let m + 1} _{n. Then,} _{= m + 1 implies} _{( ) = 0 and p}min

Figure 7 illustrates the MPE for R RT_{(}

T ), N = f1; 2; 3g, M = fA; B; C; Dg, and T = T1[ T2[ T3 with T1 =fC; Dg, T2 =fA; Bg, and T3 =f0g.

Figure 7 Illustration of minimum price equilibrium for preference pro…le from common-tiered-object domain

Similarly to Figure 5, (z; pmin) _{is a MPE in Figure 7. Note that minfp}min_{C} ; pmin_{D} _{g > p}min_{A} =
pmin

B = 0. In the MPE for R RT(T ), the prices of the objects in higher tiers are larger than

those in lower tiers. Remark 5 is parrell to Remark 4.

Remark 5: Let min_{fn; m + 1g. Let l}0 2 K be such that

Pl0 1 l=1 jTlj <

Pl0

l=1jTlj.10 In

the MPE for R RT(_{T ), (i) if l < l}0, for each x 2 Tl, pminx (R) > 0 and x is assigned to some

agent, (ii) if l < l0 _{l}

0, minfpminx (R) : x 2 Tlg > maxfpminx (R) : x 2 Tl0g, (iii) there is x 2 Tl0

such that pmin

x (R) = 0 and x is assigned to some agent, and (iv) if l > l0, for each x 2 Tl,

pmin_{x} (R) = 0 and x is unassigned.11

implies that there is i 2 N such that xi= 0. If there is x 2 M such that pminx (R) = 0, then (x; pminx (R)) Pi0,

contradicting 0 2 D(Ri; pmin(R)). Thus, for each x 2 M, we have pminx (R) > 0. Thus, by (E-ii), all the objects

are assigned. To see pmin_{(1)}(R) > > pmin_{(m)}_{(R) > 0, by contradiction, suppose that there is a pair x; y 2 M}
such that y > x ( ) and pmin

x (R) pminy (R). Let j 2 N be such that xj = x. By (E-i), we have

x 2 D(Rj; pmin(R)). By Rj 2 RR( ), we have (y; pymin(R)) Pj(x; pminx (R)), contradicting x 2 D(Rj; pmin(R)).

Thus 0 = pmin_{( )}(R) < pmin_{(} _{1)}(R) < < pmin_{(1)}(R).

To see (ii), let m + 1 n. Then, _{= n. If there is a pair x; y 2 M such that x} ( ) and x is unassinged,
and y < _{( ) and y is assigned to some i 2 N, then, by (E-i), we have y 2 D(R}i; pmin(R)). By (E-ii), we have

pminx (R) = 0. Thus, by Ri 2 RR( ), we have (x; pminx (R)) Pi(y; pminy (R)), contradicting y 2 D(Ri; pmin(R)).

Thus, for each x 2 M such that x ( ), x is assigned to some agent. By = n, objects ranked lower than ( ) are unassigned. Thus, by (E-ii), we have pmin

( +1)(R) = = pmin(m)(R) = 0. Similarly to (i), we can show

pmin

(1)(R) > > pmin( )(R) pmin( +1)(R) = 0. If pmin( )(R) > 0, then f (1); ; ( )g is weakly underdemanded,

contradicting Fact 3. Thus pmin

( )(R) = 0.
10_{If l}

0= 1, then

Pl0 1

l=1 jTlj = 0.
11_{To see (i), let l < l}

0. By contradiction, suppose there is x 2 Tl such that pminx (R) = 0. Then, by l < l0,

Pl0 1

l0_{=1} jTl0j < n, (E-i), and (E-ii), there is y 2 M and i 2 N such that y <_{T} x and y 2 D(R_{i}; pmin(R)). By

pmin

### 3.3

### Overdemanded and underdemanded sets

In the following, we de…ne the concepts of an “overdemanded set” and a “(weakly) underde-manded set” to characterize minimum equilibrium price vector.

Given p and M0 M, let ND(p; M0) _{fi 2 N : D(R}i; p) M0g and NW D(p; M0) fi 2

N : D(Ri; p)\ M0 6= ?g.

Example 1. Figure 5 illustrates ND_{(p; M}0_{)} _{and N}W D_{(p; M}0_{)} _{for M}0 _{=} _{fAg, fA; Bg and}

fA; B; Dg. For M0 _{=} _{fAg, we have N}D_{(p}min_{;}

fAg) = ? and NW D_{(p}min_{;}

fAg) = f1g. For
M0 _{=} _{fA; Bg, we have N}D_{(p}min_{;}

fA; Bg) = f2g and NW D_{(p}min_{;}

fA; Bg) = f1; 2g. For M0 _{=}

fA; B; Dg, we have ND_{(p}min_{;}

fA; B; Dg) = f1; 2; 3g and NW D_{(p}min_{;}

fA; B; Dg) = f1; 2; 3g. Given a set S, jSj denotes the cardinality of S.

De…nition: (i) A non-empty set M0 _{M} _{of objects is overdemanded at p for R if}

ND_{(p; M}0_{) >}_{jM}0_{j.}

(ii) A non-empty set M0 _{M} _{of objects is (weakly) underdemanded at p for R if}

[_{8x 2 M}0; px > 0]) NW D(p; M0) ( ) <jM0j :

By using “overdemanded set”and “(weakly) underdemanded set”, we can characterize the minimum equilibrium price vector.

Fact 3(Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015).12

Let R 2 Rn_{. A price vector p is a minimum }

equilib-rium price vector for R if and only if no set is overdemanded and no set is weakly underdemanded at p for R.

Example 2. Figure 5 illustrates Fact 3. First, ND_{(p}min_{;}

fAg) = 0 < jfAgj = 1 and
ND_{(p}min_{;}

fCg) = 0 < jfCgj = 1. Similarly, fBg nor fDg are overdemanded. Then,
ND_{(p}min_{;}

fA; Bg) = 1 < jfA; Bgj = 2 and ND_{(p}min_{;}

fA; Cg) = 0 < jfA; Cgj = 2. Similarly,

l < l0, for each x 2 Tl, pminx (R) > 0. By (E-ii), x is assigned to some agent.

To see (ii), let l < l0 _{l}_{0}_{, x 2 T}_{l}_{, and y 2 T}_{l}0 be such that pmin_{x} (R) = minfpmin_{x} (R) : x 2 T_{l}g and

pmin

y (R) = maxfpminx (R) : x 2 Tl0g. By contradiction, suppose p_{x}min(R) pmin_{y} (R). By (i) and l < l_{0},

0 < pmin

x (R) pminy (R). Thus, by (E-i) and (E-ii), there is j 2 N such that y 2 D(Rj; pmin(R)). By x >T y,

Rj 2 RT(T ), and pminx (R) pminy (R), we have (x; pmin(R)) Pj(y; pmin(R)), contradicting y 2 D(Rj; pmin(R)).

Thus, pmin

x (R) > pminy (R).

To see (iii), if n m + 1, then = m + 1. Thus Tl0 = f0g and p

min

0 (R) = 0. By n m + 1, there is

i 2 N such that xi = 0. If n < m + 1, then = n. By Fact 3, there is x 2 M such that pminx (R) = 0 and x

is assigned to some agent. Then there is l 2 K such that x 2 Tl, and by (i), l l0. If l > l0, then, for each

x 2 Tl0, p

min

x (R) > 0. If not, then there is y 2 Tl0 such that p

min

y (R) = 0. Then, (y; pmin(R)) Pi(x; pmin(R)),

contradicting x 2 D(Ri; pmin(R)). Let l00 l0. Thus, for each x 2 Tl00, pmin_{x} (R) > 0. However, by the de…nition

of l0, [l2f1;2; ;l0gTl is weakly underdemanded. This contradicts Fact 3. Thus l = l0.

To see (iv), let l > l0. By contradiction, suppose there is x 2 Tl such that pminx (R) > 0. Then, by

(E-ii), there is i 2 N such that x 2 D(Ri; pmin(R)). If there is l0 < l and y 2 Tl0 such that pmin_{y} (R) = 0,

then (y; pmin(R)) Pi(x; pmin(R)), contradicting x 2 D(Ri; pmin(R)). Thus, for each l0 < l and each y 2 Tl0,

pmin

y (R) > 0. However, this contradicts (iii). Thus, if l > l0, for each x 2 Tl, pminx (R) = 0. If there is x 2 Tl

such that x is assigned to some i 2 N, then, by the de…nition of l0 and l > l0, there is y >T x such that y is

unassigned. Thus, by (E-ii), pmin

y (R) = 0. Then, y; pmin(R)) Pi(x; pmin(R)), contradicting x 2 D(Ri; pmin(R)).

fA; Dg, fB; Dg, fB; Cg nor fC; Dg are overdemanded. Furthermore, ND_{(p}min_{;}

fA; B; Cg) =
1 < _{jfA; B; Cgj = 3, and N}D(pmin;_{fA; B; Dg) = 3} _{jfA; B; Dgj = 3. Similarly, fA; C; Dg}
nor fB; C; Dg are overdemanded. Thus, no set is ovedemanded. For the objects with
pos-itive prices, namely, B and D, NW D_{(p}min_{;}

fBg) = 2 > jfBgj = 1, NW D_{(p}min_{;}

fDg) =
2 > _{jfDgj = 1 and N}W D(pmin;_{fB; Dg) = 3 > jfB; Dgj = 2. Thus, no set of is weakly}
underdemanded.

Fact 4 (Demange and Gale, 1985; Miyake, 1998; Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015; Alaei et al,
2016)(Demand connectedness). Let R 2 Rn _{and (z; p}min_{(R))}

2 Wmin_{(R)}

. For each x 2 M with pminx (R) > 0, there is a sequence fikgKk=1 of K distinct agents such that (i) xi1 = 0 or

pmin

x_{i1}(R) = 0, (ii) for each k 2 f2; ; Kg, xik 6= 0 and pminx_{ik}(R) > 0, (iii) xiK = x and (iv) for

each k 2 f1; ; K 1_{g, fx}ik; xik+1g 2 D(Rik; pmin(R)).

Example 3. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate Fact 4. In Figure 5, objects B(= x2)and D(= x3) are

connected to object A(= x1) by agent 1’s demand. In Figure 6, object D(= x3) is connected

to object C(= x2) by agent 2’s demand. Object C(= x2) is connected to object B(= x1) by

agent 1’s demand.

### 3.4

### Minimum price rule

De…nition_{: A rule f on R}n

is called a minimum price (MP) rule if for each R 2 Rn_{,}

f (R)_{2 Z}min_{(R).}

The following fact shows the characterization of minimum price rule on (RC)n.

Fact 5 _{(Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015). Let R} _{R}C and n m + 1_{. A rule f on R}n satis…es
e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for losers if and only if it is
a minimum price rule: for each R 2 Rn

, f (R) 2 Zmin_{(R).}

### 4

### Characterizations of minimum price rule on the

### common-object-ranking and common-tiered-object domains

First, we consider the common-object-ranking domain. We show that the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy on the common-object-ranking domain.

Theorem 1_{: Let R} _{R}R( )_{. A rule f on R}n_{satis…es e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual}

rationality and no subsidy if and only if it is a minimum price rule: for each R 2 Rn, f (R) 2
Zmin_{(R).}

Next, we consider a common-tiered-object domain with respect to an indexed family of tiers T = fTigi2K with jKj = k and 2 k m + 1. By Remark 3(ii), Theorem 1 implies

the characterization of k = m + 1. Recall that min_{fn; m + 1g and l}0 2 K are such that

Pl0 1 l=1 jTlj <

Pl0 l=1jTlj.

Theorem 2_{: Let R} _{R}T(_{T ) and 2} k < m + 1_{. Assume that jT}l0j = 1. Then, a rule f on

Rn

satis…es the axioms of Theorem 1 if and only if it is a minimum price rule: for each R 2 Rn_{,}

Remark 6_{: (i) In Theorem 2, for the case of k = 2, jT}l0j = 1 implies n m + 1. Then the

characterization result of Theorem 2 coincides with that of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015). (ii) In contrast to Fact 5, no additional assumption is made on the numbers of agents and objects for Theorems 1 and 2

Remark 7: In Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual ratio-nality, and no subsidy for losers implies no subsidy. In our characterizations, such an argument still holds when n m + 1. However, for the case where n m, no subsidy is not implied by e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers. Consider the MP rule with negative entry fee on a common-object-ranking domain. This rule satis…es e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality.13 Since n m, no agent is a loser and such a rule satis…es no subsidy for losers. However, for the agent who receives (n), he receives a subsidy (the negative entry fee). A similar example can be given on a common-tiered-object domain.

The "only if" parts of Theorems 1 and 2 fail if we drop any one of the four axioms. We …x R RR( ) and take Theorem 1 as an example.

Example 1 (Dropping E¢ ciency). Let f be the no-trade rule that for each preference pro…le, it assigns (0; 0) to each agent. Then, f satis…es strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy, but not e¢ ciency.

Example 2 (Dropping Strategy-proofness). Let f be the maximum equilibrium rule that for each preference pro…le, it selects the maximum price equilibrium. By Facts 1 and 2, for each preference pro…le, there is a unique maximum equilibrium price. Then, f satis…es e¢ ciency, individual rationality, and no subsidy, but not strategy-proofness.

Example 3 (Dropping Individual rationality). Let f be the MP rule with positive entry fee for each agent and n m+1. Then, f satis…es e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, and no subsidy, but not individual rationality.14

Example 4 (Dropping No subsidy). Let f be the MP rule with negative entry fee for each agent and n m. Then, f satis…es e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality, but not no subsidy.15

Similar examples can be given to show the independence of axioms for Theorem 2.

### 5

### Concluding Remark

We use e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy to characterize the
MP rule on the common-object-ranking and common-tiered-object domains. Two open
ques-tions remain. The …rst is to introduce indi¤erence to the preferences ranking objects according
to _{and the preferences ranking objects according to T . The second is to investigate the case}
where there may be several copies for each object. Our proofs depend on the heterogenous

13_{See Morimoto and Serizawa (2015).}

14_{n} _{m + 1 implies that there is i 2 N such that x}

i = 0. Since i pays a positive entry fee ei, then,

(0; 0) Pi(0; ei), violating individual rationality.
15_{See Remark 7 for details.}

objects assumption. We believe the MP rule is still the only rule satisfying those four axioms for above-mentioned open questions.

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Appendix

We owe Morimoto and Serizawa (2015) for the structure of proofs that they have developed. However, we emphasize that our domains are smaller than theirs and their proofs often employ preferences outside our domains. Thus, even in the cases where their proof techniques can be applied, we have to modify them carefully and in some cases we need to develop new proof techniques.

Part A: Proof of Theorems 1

Let R RR( ). Recall that = ( (1); : : : ; (m); (m + 1)), (m + 1) = 0, min_{fn; m +}
1_{g, and for every pair x; y 2 L, x > y means that x has a higher rank than y according to .}
Let M0 f (1); ; ( )g and M1 f (1); ; ( 1)g.

Lemma A.1_{: Let f satisfy e¢ ciency. Let R 2 (R)}n

. Then, (a) for each x 2 M0, there is

i_{2 N such that x}i(R) = x, and (b) for each i 2 N; xi(R)2 M0.

Proof_{: (a) By contradiction, suppose that there is x 2 M}0 such that for each i 2 N,

xi(R)6= x. By the de…nition of M0, there is i 2 N such that x > xi(R).

De…ne z0 _{by: (i) z}0

i (x; ti(R)), and (ii) for each j 2 Nnfig, zj0 fj(R). Then, by R 2 (R)n,

(x; ti(R)) Pi ( ( ); ti(R)). Thus, z0 dominates f (R), contradicting e¢ ciency.

(b) If n m + 1 (i.e., = m + 1 and ( ) = 0), then M0 = L and (b) holds trivially. If

n m (i.e., = n _{and ( ) > 0), then jM}0j = n and (b) follows from (a). Q.E.D.

Lemma A.2: Let f satisfy e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Let
R_{2 (R)}n

. Then, for each i 2 N, fi(R) Ri ( ( ); 0).

Proof_{: By contradiction, suppose that there is i 2 N such that ( ( ); 0) P}ifi(R).

Claim_{: For each x 2 M}0, Vi(x; fi(R)) > 0.

By contradiction, suppose that there is x 2 M0 such that Vi(x; fi(R)) 0. Then,

fi(R) Ii(x; Vi(x; fi(R))) Ri Vi(x;fi(R)) 0

(x; 0) Ri x2M0

( ( ); 0), contradicting ( ( ); 0) Pifi(R). Thus the Claim holds.

By the above Claim, there is bRi such that for each x 2 M0, bVi(x; 0) < Vi(x; fi(R)). By

Lemma A.1(b), xi( bRi; R i)2 M0. Thus,

ti( bRi; R i) individual rationality b Vi(xi( bRi; R i); 0) < Vi(xi( bRi; R i); fi(R)): Thus fi( lie b Ri; R i) truth Pi fi( truth

Ri ; R i), contradicting strategy-proofness. Q.E.D.

Lemma A.3_{: Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R)}n_{. Then, for each}

i_{2 N, if x}i(R) = ( ), ti(R) = 0.

Proof_{: Let i 2 N be such that x}i(R) = ( ). By Lemma A.2, fi(R) Ri ( ( ); 0). Thus

ti(R) 0 while no subsidy implies ti(R) 0. Thus, ti(R) = 0. Q.E.D.

Lemma A.4_{: Let R 2 (R)}n_{, i; j 2 N and z 2 Z be such that z}iRizj and ziPjzj. Assume

Proof: Let t0

i Vi(xj; zi) and t0j ti+ tj Vi(xj; zi).

De…ne z0 by: (i) zi0 (xj; t0i), (ii) zj0 (xi; t0j), and (iii) for each k 2 Nnfi; jg, zk0 zk.

Then, z0

iIizi, and for each k 2 Nnfi; jg, zk0 Ikzk. Since tj + ti Vi(xj; zi) < Vj(xi; zj), then

z0
jPjzj. Moreover,
X
k2N
t0_{k}= X
k2Nnfi;jg
t0_{k}+ t0_{i}+ t0_{j} = X
k2Nnfi;jg
t0_{k}+ ti+ tj =
X
k2N
tk:

Thus, z0 _{dominates z.} _{Q.E.D.}

Given zi (xi; ti)2 L R and Ri 2 R, R0i 2 R is a semi-Maskin monotonic transformation

of Ri at zi if (i) for each y < xi, Vi0(y; zi) < 0, and (ii) for each y > xi, Vi0(y; zi) < Vi(y; zi).

Let RSM M(Ri; zi) be the set of semi-Maskin monotonic transformations of Ri at zi.

Lemma A.5_{: Let f satisfy strategy-proofness and no subsidy. Let R 2 (R)}n _{and R}0
i

2 RSM M(Ri; fi(R)). Then, fi(Ri0; R i) = fi(Ri; R i).

Proof: Strategy-proofness implies
fi(
truth
R0_{i} ; R i)
truth
R0_{i} fi(
lie
Ri; R i):
Thus, ti(R0i; R i) Vi0(xi(R0i; R i); fi(R))).
If xi(R0i; R i) < xi(R), then by R0i 2 RSM M(Ri; fi(R)), we have:

ti(R0i; R i) Vi0(xi(Ri0; R i); fi(R))) < 0, contradicting no subsidy. Thus, xi(R0i; R i) xi(R).

Suppose xi(R0i; R i) > xi(R). Then by ti(R0i; R i) Vi0(xi(Ri0; R i); fi(R))), fi(R0i; R i) Ri(xi(R0i; R i); Vi0(xi(R0i; R i); fi(R))): Thus by R0i 2 RSM M(Ri; fi(R)), (xi(R0i; R i); Vi0(xi(R0i; R i); fi(R))) Pi(xi(R0i; R i); Vi(xi(R0i; R i); fi(R))) Iifi(R): Thus, fi( lie R0 i; R i) truth Pi fi( truth

Ri ; R i), violating strategy-proofness. Thus xi(R0i; R i) = xi(R).

Again, by strategy-proofness, fi( truth Ri ; R i) truth Ri fi( lie R0 i; R i) and fi( truth R0 i ; R i) truth R0 i fi( lie Ri; R i).

Thus, by xi(R0i; R i) = xi(R), we have ti(R0i; R i) = ti(R). Q.E.D.

Given R 2 (R)n

, x 2 L and z 2 [L R]n_{, let} x_{(R)} _{(} x

1(R); ; xn(R))be the permutation

on N de…ned by V x

n(R)(x; z xn(R)) V x1(R)(x; z x1(R)). For each k 2 N, let C

k_{(R; x; z)} _{be}

the k-th highest valuation of x from z for R, i.e., Ck_{(R; x; z)} _{V} _{x}

k(R)(x; z x k(R)).

Lemma A.6 (Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015): Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R)n

, i 2 N and x xi(R). Then, ti(R) C (R; x; ( ( ); 0)).

Proof_{: By Lemma A.1(b), x 2 M}0 and x ( ).

Case 2: x > ( ). By contradiction, suppose that ti(R) < C (R; x; ( ( ); 0)). By x >

( ), there is Ri0 2 RSM M(Ri; fi(R)) such that Vi0( ( ); fi(R)) < C (R; x; ( ( ); 0)) ti(R).

By Lemma A.5, fi(Ri0; R i) = fi(Ri; R i). Thus

V_{i}0( ( ); fi(Ri0; R i)) < C (R; x; ( ( ); 0)) ti(R0i; R i):

By Lemmas A.1(b) and A.3, there is j 2 Nnfig such that fj(R0i; R i) = ( ( ); 0) and

Vj(x; ( ( ); 0)) C (R; x; ( ( ); 0)). Thus,
ti(R0i; R i) Vi0( ( ); fi(R0i; R i)) < C (R; x; ( ( ); 0)) Vj(x; ( ( ); 0)):
De…ne z0 _{by:}
(i) z0
i ( ( ); Vi0( ( ); fi(R0i; R i))),
(ii) z0
j (x; ti(R0i; R i) Vi0( ( ); fi(R0i; R i))), and

(iii) for each k 2 Nnfi; jg, z0

k fk(R0i; R i).
Then, z0
iIi0fi(R0i; R i)and zj0 Pjfj(Ri0; R i). Furthermore,
V_{i}0( ( ); fi(R0i; R i))+ti(Ri0; R i) Vi0( ( ); fi(R0i; R i))+
X
k2Nnfi;jg
tk(R0i; R i) =
X
k2N
tk(R0i; R i).

Thus, z0 dominates f (R0i; R i), contradicting e¢ ciency. Q.E.D.

Lemma A.7 (Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015): Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R)n

and i 2 N be such that x xi(R) > ( ). Then, Vi(x; ( ( ); 0))

C 1(R; x; ( ( ); 0)).

Proof: By contradiction, suppose that Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) < C 1(R; x; ( ( ); 0)). Then,

Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) C (R; x; ( ( ); 0)) Lemma A.6 ti(R) Lemma A.2 Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)): Thus, ti(R) = Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) = C (R; x; ( ( ); 0)) < C 1(R; x; ( ( ); 0)). Thus, Vi( ( ); fi(R)) = 0and fj 2 Nnfig : Vj(x; ( ( ); 0)) C 1(R; x; ( ( ); 0))g = 1:

By xi(R) = x > ( ), = minfn; m + 1g 2, and Lemmas A.1 (b) and A.3, there is

j _{2 Nnfig such that f}j(R) = ( ( ); 0) and Vj(x; ( ( ); 0)) C 1(R; x; ( ( ); 0)). Thus

Vj(x; ( ( ); 0)) > C (R; x; ( ( ); 0)) = ti(R):

By Vi( ( ); fi(R)) = 0 and tj(R) = 0,

tj(R) Vi( ( ); fi(R)) = 0 < Vj(x; ( ( ); 0)) ti(R):

By Lemma A.4, fi(R) is not e¢ cient, a contradiction. Q.E.D.

Lemma A.8_{: Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R)}n

, i 2 N, x 2 M1

and z 2 Z ( ). Assume that

(8-i) for each j 2 Nnfig, fj(R) Rjzj,

(8-ii) Vi(x; (( ( ); 0)) > C1(R i; x; z),

(8-iii) there is " > 0 such that Vi(x; (( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) > 2", and for each y 2 M1 such

that y < x,

Vi(y; (( ( ); 0)) < minfC 1(R; y; (( ( ); 0)); Vi(x; (( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) 2"g;

and

(8-iv) for each j 6= i, each t 2 [0; Vi(m; 0)], each t0 2 [0; Vj(m; 0)] and each y > x,

t0 Vi(x; (y; t0)) < Vj(y; (x; t)) t.

Then xi(R) = x.

Proof: By contradiction, suppose xi(R)6= x. By Lemma A.1(b), there is j 2 Nnfig such

that xj(R) = x.
Note
tj(R)
(8-i)
Vj(x; zj) C1(R i; x; z) <
(8-ii)
Vi(x; (( ( ); 0)):
Thus, there is R0
j 2 RSM M(Rj; fj(R))such that
(i) V_{j}0(( ( ); fj(R)) = Vi(x; (( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) ",

(ii) for each y 2 M1 such that y < xj(R), Vj0(y; ( ( ); 0)) > Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) 2",

and,

(iii) for each y > xj(R), (8-iv) holds with respect to the pair Ri and R0j.

By R0

j 2 RSM M(Rj; fj(R)) and Lemma A.5, fj(R0j; R j) = fj(R). Thus by (i),

(i’) V0

j(( ( ); fj(R0j; R j)) = Vi(x; (( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) ":

Let y xi(R0j; R j). By fj(R0j; R j) = fj(R), y 6= x. If y > x, then by (iii),

tj(R0j; R j) Vi(x; fi(R0j; R j)) < Vj0(y; fj(R0j; R j)) ti(Rj0; R j):

By Lemma A.4, f (R0

j; R j)is not e¢ cient, a contradiction. Thus, by y 6= x, y < x.

If y 2 M1, then
Vi(y; ( ( ); 0)) <
(8-iii)
Vi(x; (( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) 2" <
(ii)
V_{j}0(y; ( ( ); 0)):
Since (8-iii) also implies Vi(y; ( ( ); 0)) < C 1(R; y; ( ( ); 0)), then we have

Vi(y; ( ( ); 0)) < C 1((R0j; R j); y; ( ( ); 0)).

By Lemma A.7, this contradicts y 2 M1. Thus, y < x but y =2 M1.

By Lemmas A.1(b) and y =_{2 M}1, xi(R0j; R j) = ( ). Thus, by Lemma A.3, ti(R0j; R j) = 0.

Thus, by (i’) and tj(R0j; R j) = tj(R) C1(R i; x; z),

Thus, by Lemma A.4, f (R0

j; R j)is not e¢ cient, a contradiction. Thus xi(R) = x. Q.E.D.

Proposition A.1_{: Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R)}n _{and z 2}
Zmin_{(R)}

. Then, for each i 2 N, fi(R) Rizi.

Proof: Without loss of generality, let = ( (1); (2) ; (m + 1)) = (m; ; 1; 0). Let x0 maxf0; m n + 1g. By minfn; m + 1g, we have = m x0 + 1 and ( ) = x0.

If m > n, then x0 = m n + 1. If m n, then x0 = 0. Note M0 fx0; ; mg and

M1 fx0 + 1; ; mg. We only prove f1(R) R1z1. For each j 2 Nnf1g, fj(R) Rjzj can be

proved similarly.

Case 1x1 = x0. By Lemma A.3, z1 = (x0; 0). By Lemma A.2, f1(R) R1z1.

Case 2x1 > x0. Let Nx0 fi 2 Nj xi > x0g. By contradiction, suppose that z1P1f1(R).

Claim 1: For each k = 0; 1; 2; : : :, there are a set N (k + 1) of k + 1 distinct agents, saying
N (k + 1) _{f1; 2; :::; k + 1g, and R}0
N (k+1) 2 (R)
k+1 _{such that:}
(1-i) zk+1Pk+1fk+1(R0_{N (k)}; R N (k));
(1-ii) pmin
xk+1(R) < V
0
k+1(xk+1; (x0; 0)) < Vk+1(xk+1; fk+1(R0N (k); R N (k)));

(1-iii) for each j 2 N(k + 1),

(1-iii-a) there is "j > 0 such that Vj0(xj; (x0; 0)) pminxj (R) > 2"j, and for each y 2 M1 such

that y < xj,

V_{j}0(y; (x0; 0))

< min_{fC}m x0+1((R0_{f1;:::j 1g}; R_{N nf1;:::j 1g}); y; (x0; 0)); Vj0(xj; (x0; 0)) pminxj (R) 2"j; Vj(y; (x0; 0))g;

(1-iii-b) for each y > xj

(1-iii-(b-1)) for each i 2 f1; ; j 1_{g, each t 2 [0; V}0

i(m; 0)]and each t0 2 [0; Vj0(m; 0)],

t0 V_{j}0(xj; (y; t0)) < Vi0(y; (xj; t)) t,

(1-iii-(b-2)) for each i 2 fj + 1; ; n_{g, each t 2 [0; V}i(m; 0)] and each t0 2 [0; Vj0(m; 0)],

t0 V_{j}0(xj; (y; t0)) < Vi(y; (xj; t)) t,

and

(1-iii-(b-3)) V0

j(y; (x0; 0)) < pminy (R);

(1-iv) N (k + 1) Nx0_{.}

We inductively prove Claim 1.

Step 1: We prove Claim 1 for the case of k = 0.

Note N (1) = f1g. By z1P1f1(R), (1-i-1) holds and pminx1 (R) < V1(x1; f1(R)). Thus, there is

R0_{1} _{2 R such that}
(1-ii-1) pmin

x1 (R) < V10(x1; (x0; 0)) < V1(x1; f1(R));

(1-iii-a-1) there is "1 > 0 such that V10(x1; (( ( ); 0)) pminx1 (R) > 2", and for each y 2 M1 such

that y < x1,

(1-iii-b-1) for each y > x1

(1-iii-(b-2)-1) for each i 2 Nnf1g, each t 2 [0; Vi(m; 0)] and each t0 2 [0; V10(m; 0)],

t0 V_{1}0(x1; (y; t0)) < Vi(y; (x1; t)) t,

and

(1-iii-(b-3)-1) V0

1(y; (x0; 0)) < pminy (R).16

Then, by the construction of R01, (1-ii-1) and (1-iii-1) holds. Thus, we prove (1-iv-1), i.e.,

N (1) Nx0_{. By Lemma A.2, z}

1P1f1(R) R1(x0; 0). Thus 1 2 Nx0. Thus, N (1) = f1g Nx0.

By contradiction, suppose that Nx0 _{=}

f1g. Then by Lemma A.1, = min_{fn; m + 1g = 2,}
which implies n = 2 or m = 1. Thus, by Lemma A.1, for each j 2 Nnf1g, zj = (x0; 0).

By z 2 Zmin_{(R)}

, z 2 Zx0_{. We show (8-i), (8-ii), (8-iii) and (8-iv) of Lemma A.8 with respect}

to z to conclude x1(R01; RN nf1g) = x1.

By Lemma A.2, for each j 2 Nnf1g, fj(R01; RN nf1g) Rj(x0; 0) = zj. Thus, (8-i) holds.

(1-iii-b-1) implies (8-iv).

Note that for each j 2 Nnf1g, by z 2 Zmin_{(R), (x}

0; 0) = zjRjz1 and Vj(x1; (x0; 0))

pmin

x1 (R). Thus C1(R i; x1; z) pminx1 (R), and so by (1-ii-1), (8-ii) holds. By C1(R i; x1; z)

pmin

x1 (R) and (1-iii-a-1),

0 < V_{1}0(x1; (x0; 0)) pminx1 (R) 2"1 V10(x1; (x0; 0)) C1(R i; x1; z) 2"1,

which implies (8-iii).

Since (8-i), (8-ii), (8-iii) and (8-iv) of Lemma A.8 hold, x1(R01; RN nf1g) = x1.

Note
t1(R01; RN nf1g)
Lemma A.2
V_{1}0(x1; (x0; 0)) <
(1-ii-1)
V1(x1; f1(R)):
Thus, by x1(R01; RN nf1g) = x1,
f1(
lie
R_{1}0; R_{N nf1g})
truth
P1 f1(
truth
R1; RN nf1g):

This contradicts strategy-proofness. Thus, N (1) Nx0. Thus (1-iv-1) holds.

Induction hypothesis: There are a set N (k) of k > 0 distinct agents, saying N (k) =
f1; 2; :::; kg, and R0
N (k) 2 (R)
k _{such that:}
(1-i-k) zkPkfk(R0N (k 1); R N (k 1));
(1-ii-k) pmin
xk (R) < Vk0(xk; (x0; 0)) < Vk(xk; fk(R0_{N (k 1)}; R N (k 1)));

(1-iii-k) for each j 2 N(k);

(1-iii-a-k) there is "j > 0such that Vj0(xj; (x0; 0)) pminxj (R) > 2"j, and for each y 2 M1 such

that y < xj,

V_{j}0(y; (x0; 0))

(1-iii-b-k) for each y > xj

(1-iii-(b-1)-k) for each i 2 f1; ; j 1_{g, each t 2 [0; V}_{i}0(m; 0)] and each t0 _{2 [0; V}j0(m; 0)],

t0 V_{j}0(xj; (y; t0)) < Vi0(y; (xj; t)) t,

(1-iii-(b-2)-k) for each i 2 fj + 1; ; n_{g, each t 2 [0; V}i(m; 0)]and each t0 2 [0; Vj0(m; 0)],

t0 V_{j}0(xj; (y; t0)) < Vi(y; (xj; t)) t,

and

(1-iii-(b-3)-k) V0

j(y; (x0; 0)) < pminy (R);

(1-iv-k) N (k) Nx0_{.}

Step 2: We prove Claim 1 for the case of k + 1.
Step 2-1: _{We prove that there is i 2 N}x0

nN(k) such that ziPifi(R0_{N (k)}; R N (k)).

By (1-iv-k), Nx0_{nN(k) 6= ?. By contradiction, suppose that for each i 2 N}x0_{nN(k),}
fi(R0_{N (k)}; R N (k)) Rizi.

Let z0 _{be such that for each i 2 NnN(k), z}0

i zi and for each i 2 N(k)nfkg, zi0 (x0; 0).

Then z0 _{2 Z}x0_{. We show (8-i), (8-ii), (8-iii) and (8-iv) of Lemma A.8 with respect to z}0 _{to}

conclude xk(R0N (k); R N (k)) = xk.

For each i 2 NnNx0_{, by z}

i = (x0; 0) and Lemma A.2, fi(R0_{N (k)}; R N (k)) Rizi = z0i. For

each i 2 Nx0

nN(k), by z0

i = zi, fi(R0_{N (k)}; R N (k)) Rizi0. For each i 2 N(k)nfkg, by Lemma

A.2, fi(R0N (k); R N (k)) R0i(x0; 0) = zi0. Thus, (8-i) holds. (1-iii-(b-1)-k) and (1-iii-(b-2)-k) imply

(8-iv).

In the following, we show:

C1((R0_{N (k)nfkg}; R N (k)); xk; z0) pminxk (R): ( )

For each i 2 NnN(k), by z 2 Zmin_{(R), z}0

i = ziRizk, and so Vi(xk; zi0) pminxk (R). For each

i_{2 N(k)nfkg, if x}i > xk, (1-iii-a-k) implies:

V_{i}0(xk; zi0) = Vi0(xk; (x0; 0))

< Cm x0+1((R0_{f1;::i 1g}; R_{N nf1;::i 1g}); xk; (x0; 0))

Cm x0+1(R; xk; (x0; 0)) pminxk (R),

and if xi < xk, (1-iii-(b-3)-k) implies Vi0(xk; z0i) = Vi0(xk; (x0; 0)) pminxk (R). Thus, ( ) holds.

By (1-ii-k) and ( ), (8-ii) holds. By ( ) and (1-iii-a-k),

0 < V_{k}0(xk; (x0; 0)) pminxk (R) 2"k V
0

k(xk; (x0; 0)) C1((R_{N (k)nfkg}0 ; R N (k)); x1; z0) 2"k.

Thus, by (1-iii-a-k), (8-iii) holds.

Note
tk(R0N (k); R N (k))
Lemma A.2
V_{k}0(xk; (x0; 0)) <
(1-ii-k) Vk(xk; fk(R
0
N (k)nfkg; R ((N (k)nfkg))).
Thus, by xk(R0N (k); R N (k)) = xk,
fk(
lie
R0_{k}; R0_{N (k)nfkg}; R N (k))
truth
Pk fk(
truth
Rk; R0_{N (k)nfkg}; R N (k)):

This contradicts strategy-proofness. Thus, there is i 2 Nx0

nN(k) such that ziPifi(R0N (k); R N (k)).

Let N (k + 1) N (k) _{[ fig. Without loss of generality, let i} k + 1. By (1-iv-k),
N (k + 1) Nx0_{. z}

k+1Pk+1fk+1(R_{N (k)}0 ; R N (k)) implies that there is R0k+1 2 R

satisfying(1-i-(k + 1)), (1-ii-satisfying(1-i-(k + 1)), and (1-iii-satisfying(1-i-(k + 1)).

Step 2-2: _{We prove (1-iv-(k + 1)), i.e., N (k + 1) N}x0.
By contradiction, suppose that N (k + 1) = Nx0_{.}

Let z0 _{2 Z}x0

be such that for each i 2 Nnfk + 1g; z0

i (x0; 0). We show (8-i), (8-ii), (8-iii)

and (8-iv) of Lemma A.8 with respect to z0 to conclude xk+1(R0N (k+1); R N (k+1)) = xk+1.

By Lemma A.2, for each i 2 NnN(k + 1), fi(RN (k+1)0 ; R N (k+1)) Rizi0. By Lemma A.2 again,

for each i 2 N(k + 1)nfk + 1g, fi(R0_{N (k)}; R N (k)) R0izi0. Thus, (8-i) holds. (1-iii-(b-1)-(k + 1))

and (1-iii-(b-2)-(k + 1)) imply (8-iv). In the following, we show:

C1((R_{N (k+1)nfk+1g}0 ; R N (k+1)); xk+1; z0) pminxk+1(R): ( )

For each i 2 NnN(k + 1), by N(k + 1) = Nx0_{, we have z}

i = (x0; 0). Then, by z 2 Zmin(R),

z_{i}0 = ziRizk+1. Thus Vi(xk+1; z0i) pminxk+1(R). For each i 2 N(k + 1)nfk + 1g, if xi > xk+1,

(1-iii-a-(k + 1)) implies:

V_{i}0(xk+1; zi0) < C

m x0+1_{((R}0

f1;2;3;::i 1g; RN nf1;2;3;::i 1g); xk+1; (x0; 0))

Cm x0+1(R; xk+1; (x0; 0)) pminxk+1(R),

and if xi < xk+1, (1-iii-(b-3)-(k + 1)) implies Vi0(xk+1; zi0) = Vi0(xk+1; (x0; 0)) pminxk+1(R). Thus,

( )holds.

By (1-ii-(k + 1)) and ( ), (8-ii) holds. By ( ) and (1-iii-a-(k + 1)),

0 < V_{k+1}0 (xk+1; (x0; 0)) pminxk+1(R) 2"k+1

V_{k+1}0 (xk+1; (x0; 0)) C1((R0_{N (k+1)nfk+1g}; R N (k+1)); xk+1; z0) 2"k+1:

Thus, by (1-iii-a-(k + 1)), (8-iii) holds.

Note
tk+1(RN (k+1)0 ; R N (k+1))
Lemma A.2
V_{k+1}0 (xk+1; (x0; 0))
<
(1-ii-(k+1)) Vk+1(xk+1; fk+1(R
0
N (k); R (N (k))).
Thus, by xk+1(R0N (k+1); R N (k+1)) = xk+1,
fk+1(
lie
R0_{k+1}; R0_{N (k+1)nfk+1g}; R N (k+1))
truth
Pk+1fk+1(
truth
Rk+1; R0_{N (k+1)nfk+1g}; R N (k)):

This contradicts strategy-proofness. Thus, (1-iv-(k + 1)) holds.
By Claim 1, for each k 0_{, N (k + 1) N}x0_{. Let k = m} _{x}

0. Then, jN(k + 1)j = k + 1 >

m x0 = jNx0j, a contradiction. Q.E.D.

The rest of the proof of Theorem 1 is similar to the proofs of Proposition 3 and the com-pletion of the proof of Theorem 2 in Morimoto and Serizawa (2015). Thus, we omit it.Q.E.D.

Part B: Proof of Theorem 2

Recall that min_{fn; m+1g and k denotes the number of object tiers. Let 2} k < m + 1.
Recall that l0 2 K and Pl0_{l=1}1jTlj < Pl0_{l=1}jTlj. Assume jTl0j = 1. Then, Tl0 f ( )g. Let

M0 [

j2f1; ;l0gTj and M1 j2f1; ;l0[ 1gTj.

Lemma B.1_{: Let f satisfy e¢ ciency. Let R 2 (R}T_{(}

T ))n

. Then, (a) for each x 2 M0, there

is i 2 N such that xi(R) = x, and (b) for each i 2 N; xi(R)2 M0.

Proof_{: (a) By contradiction, suppose that there is x 2 M}0 such that for each i 2 N,

xi(R) 6= x. Since jTl0j = 1, by the de…nitions of l0 and M0, there is i 2 N such that xi(R) 2

[

j2fl0+1; ;kgTj.

De…ne z0 _{by (i) z}0

i (x; ti(R)), and (ii) for each j 2 Nnfig, zj0 fj(R). Then, by R 2

(_{R}T_{(}

T ))n_{, (x; t}

i(R)) Ri ( ( ); ti(R)) Pi (xi(R); ti(R)). Thus, z0 dominates f (R), contradicting

e¢ ciency.

(b) If n m + 1, = m + 1 and ( ) = 0. Then M0 = Land (b) holds trivially. If n m,

= n_{. Then, since jT}l0j = 1, by the de…nition of l0, jM0j = n and (b) follows from (a). Q.E.D.

The proofs of Lemmas B.2 to B.7 are similar to those of Lemmas A.2 to A.7. Thus, we omit them.

Lemma B.2_{: Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R}T_{(}

T ))n_{. Then, for}

each i 2 N, fi(R) Ri ( ( ); 0).

Lemma B.3_{: Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R}T(_{T ))}n. Then, for
each i 2 N, if xi(R) = ( ), ti(R) = 0.

Lemma B.4_{: Let R 2 (R}T_{(}

T )), i; j 2 N and z 2 Z be such that ziRizj and ziPjzj.

Assume that tj Vi(xj; zi) < Vj(xi; zj) ti. Then, there is z0 2 Z that dominates z.

For each x 2 L, let l(x) 2 K be such that x 2 Tl(x). Given zi (xi; ti) 2 L R and

zi if (i) for each y 2 [

j2fl(x); ;kgTjnfxig, V 0

i(y; zi) < 0, and (ii) for each y 2 [

j2f1; ;l(xi) 1gTj,

V_{i}0(y; zi) < Vi(y; zi). Let RSM M(Ri; zi) be the set of semi-Maskin monotonic transformations

of Ri at zi.

Lemma B.5_{: Let f satisfy strategy-proofness and no subsidy. Let R 2 (R}T_{(}

T ))n_{. Let R}0
i

2 RSM M(Ri; fi(R)). Then, fi(Ri0; R i) = fi(Ri; R i).

Lemma B.6_{: Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R}T(_{T ))}n_{. Let i 2 N}
and x xi(R). Then, ti(R) C (R; x; ( ( ); 0)).

Lemma B.7_{: Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R}T_{(}

T ))n

. Let i 2 N be such that x xi(R)2 M1. Then, Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) C 1(R; x; ( ( ); 0)).

Given R 2 (RT_{(}

T ))n_{, let Z} ( )

fz 2 Z : ziRi( ( ); 0) for each i 2 Ng.

Lemma B.8_{: Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R}T_{(}

T ))n

. Let i 2 N,
x_{2 M}1 and z 2 Z ( ). Assume that

(8-i) for each j 2 Nnfig, fj(R) Rjzj,

(8-ii) Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) > C1(R i; x; z),

(8-iii) there is " > 0 such that Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) 2" > 0 and for each y 2

[

j2fl(x); ;l0 1g

Tjnfxg,

Vi(y; ( ( ); 0)) < minfC 1(R; y; ( ( ); 0)); Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) 2"g;

and

(8-iv) for each j 6= i, each t 2 [0; max

y2T1Vi(y; 0)], each t

0 _{2 [0; max}

y2T1Vj(y; 0)] and each y 2

[

j2f1; ;l(x) 1gTj, t
0 _{V}

i(x; (y; t0)) < Vj(y; (x; t)) t.

Then xi(R) = x.

Proof: By contradiction, suppose xi(R) 6= x. By Lemma B.1(b), there is j 2 N such that

xj(R) = x.
Note
tj(R)
(8-i)
Vj(x; zj) C1(R i; x; z) <
(8-ii)
Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)):
Thus, there is R0
j 2 RSM P(Rj; fj(R)) such that
(i) V_{j}0( ( ); fj(R)) = Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) ",

(ii) for each y 2 [

j2fl(x); ;l0 1gTjnfxg, V 0

j(y; ( ( ); 0)) > Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) 2", and,

(iii) for each y 2 [

j2f1; ;l(x) 1gTj, (8-iv) holds with respect to the pair Ri and R 0 j.

By R0j 2 RSM P(Rj; fj(R)) and Lemma B.5, fj(R0j; R j) = fj(R). Thus, by (i),

(i’) V0

j( ( ); fj(R0j; R j)) = Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) ".

Let y xi(R0j; R j). By fj(R0j; R j) = fj(R), y 6= x. If y 2 [

j2f1; ;l(x) 1gTj, then by (iii),

tj(R0j; R j) Vi(x; fi(R0j; R j)) < Vj0(y; fj(R0j; R j)) ti(Rj0; R j):

If y 2 [
j2fl(x); ;l0 1gTjnfxg, then
Vi(y; ( ( ); 0)) <
(8-iii)
Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z) 2" <
(8-ii)
V_{j}0(y; ( ( ); 0)):
Since (8-iii) also implies Vi(y; ( ( ); 0)) < C 1(R; y; ( ( ); 0)), then we have

Vi(y; ( ( ); 0)) < C 1((R0j; R j); y; ( ( ); 0)):

By Lemma B.7, this contradicts y 2 [

j2fl(x); ;l0 1g
Tjnfxg. Thus y 2 [
j2fl(x); ;kg
Tjnfxg but
y =_{2} _{[}
i2fl(x); ;l0 1gTinfxg.
By Lemma B.1(b) and y =_{2} _{[}
i2fl(x); ;l0 1gTinfxg, xi(R
0

j; R j) = ( ). Thus, by Lemma A.3,

ti(R0j; R j) = 0. Thus, by (i’) and tj(Rj0; R j) = tj(R) C1(R i; x; z),

ti(R0j; R j) Vj0( ( ); fj(R0j; R j)) < Vi(x; (( ( ); 0)) C1(R i; x; z)

Vi(x; ( ( ); 0)) tj(R0j; R j):

Thus, by Lemma B.4, f (R0

j; R j) is not e¢ cient, a contradiction. Thus xi(R) = x.Q.E.D.

Proposition B.1_{: Let f satisfy the four axioms of Theorem 1. Let R 2 (R}T_{(}

T ))n_{. Let}

z _{2 Z}min(R)_{. Then, for each i 2 N, f}i(R) Rizi.

The proof of Proposition B.1 is similar to that of Proposition A.1. Thus, we omit it. The rest of the proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that the proof of Theorem 1. Thus, we also