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GENDER AND RACE

IN THE LABOR MARKET

(2)

GENDER AND RACE IN THE LABOR MARKET

Sponsored by a Grant TÁMOP-4.1.2-08/2/A/KMR-2009-0041 Course Material Developed by Department of Economics,

Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest (ELTE) Department of Economics, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest

Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Balassi Kiadó, Budapest

(3)
(4)

GENDER AND RACE

IN THE LABOR MARKET

Author: Anna Lovász

Supervised by Anna Lovász June 2011

ELTE Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics

(5)

GENDER AND RACE

IN THE LABOR MARKET

Week 5

Measuring discrimination II:

other methods using databases

Anna Lovász

(6)

Literature for next week

• Bertrand–Mullainathan 2004

• Goldin–Rouse 2000

• Further recommended reading:

– Heckman 1998

(7)

Estimation of group-level relative

productivity from production functions

• Unexplained wage gap from wage equations

≠ discrimination, since there may be unobserved group-level differences in productivity.

 How can we take these into account?

• Firms differ in output (revenue) and in the

demographic composition of their workforces.

• Over time, a given firm’s workforce composition and output varies

 Can use to estimate the effect of the ratio of different worker groups on output/productivity

(8)

Goal

Estimate the relative productivities and wages of various worker groups (gender, age, education)

MPn / MP0 ≠ wn / w0

wage discrimination (or efficiency wages, compensating wage differentials)

Research questions:

• Do differences in the relative productivity of various worker groups explain their wage differentials? (For example, the gender wage gap)

– Kertesi–Köllő (2002): the wage and productivity of young skilled workers increased relative to unskilled worker in Hungary.

• Do firms set relative wages closer to relative productivities since the transition (more efficient wage setting)?

• Increased competition decreased the gender wage gap (Becker)

(9)

Benefits of the methodology

• Mincerian wage equations (residual wage gap):

estimate of discrimination is consistent if:

• We can measure all differences in group-level productivity.

• Production function augmented with workforce

composition → relative productivity of worker groups

• This relative productivity estimate includes the effect of unobservable and observable differences in

productive characteristics

Makes it possible to take systematic differences in group- level productivity into account

• Literature: Hellerstein–Neumark (1999), Dostie

(2006), Van Biesebroek (2007), Hellerstein–Neumark (2005), Zhang és Dong (2009), Lovász–Rigó (2009)

(10)

Main steps

• Step 1:

• Estimation of production function augmented with workforce composition → relative

productivities

• Step 2:

• Estimation of firm-level wage equation → relative wages

• Step 3:

• Test:

• Relative productivity = relative wage?

(11)

Methodology: production function (Hellerstein–Neumark 1999)

lnY = α lnK + β lnM + γ lnQL

• Workers are perfect substitutes:

φ0 : productivity of reference group

• Estimated equation:

• Can easily calculate relative productivities based on NLS estimates:

φn / φ0 = MPn/MP0

Z: industry, year, ownership, (firm fixed effects)





  

N

n

n n

n N

n

n n

N

n

n L

L L L

L L

QL

1 0

0 1

0 0 0

1

1

jt jt

N

n jt

n n jt

jt jt

jt Z u

L L L

M K

Y jt





1 0

0

0 ln ln ln ln ln 1 1

ln

(12)

Estimation strategy

• Worker groups:

Gender: male (G), female (F)

Age: <40, 40<

Education: elementary or secondary school (E), higher education (U)

– 8 worker groups (interactions)

– 7 relative productivity parameters

• Reference group: male, below 40, no diploma

jt jt

N

n jt

n n jt

jt jt

jt Z u

L L L

M K

Y jt





1 0

0

0 ln ln ln ln ln 1 1

ln

(13)

Estimation strategy

QL simplification:

1. Constant relative productivity:

For example, gender difference is the same within each age group

Traditional wage equation estimation also assumes this if there are no interaction terms

The number of relative productivity parameters decreases to 3

2. Equiproportional assumption:

For example, the ratio of women is the same within each age group

Number of parameters: 3

Ratios of worker groups are estimated for larger groups

(14)

Estimation strategy

• Equation with constraints 1. + 2.:

• Most studies use both constraints (e.g.

Hellerstein–Neumark 1999 and 2004;

Hellerstein–Neumark–Troske 1999 , 1999;

Van Biesebroeck, 2007; Dostie, 2006)

   

 

jt jt

jt U U

jt O O

jt F F

jt jt

jt jt

u L Z

L

L L L

L

L M

K Y

jt

jt jt

 





  

 





  

 





  

1 1

ln

1 1

ln 1

1 ln

ln ln

ln

ln 0

(15)

Production function – problems

• Differences over time or between industries

(structural):

• Divide sample:

• into time periods

• by industries

• Measurement of labor inputs (QL)

• Determining worker groups (which

characteristics, how many categories)

• Measurement error: we estimate the firm-level ratio of worker groups from the sample of

workers in the dataset

• Unobserved productivity shocks

• Firm fixed effects

• Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method

(16)

Methodology: firm-level wage equation (Hellerstein–Neumark 1999)

• Aggregation of individual wage equations

• Dependent variable: weighted sum of worker wages, OR firm-level wage bill

• Benefits of firm-level estimation:

• Simultaneous estimation of production and wage equations

• Straightforward hypothesis testing

• Two firm-level variables

• All wage-related costs

jt jt

N

n jt

n n jt

jt jt

jt d Z u

L L w

c w L

c w c M

b K

a a

W jt





1 0

0

0 ln ln ln ln ln 1 1

ln

(17)

Linear estimation

NLS (Stata:nlsur) is slow and difficult to implement, so usually estimate linear approximation

• As long as , the

approximation is:

• Estimated equations (Stata: sureg):

jt jt

jt U F jt

O O jt

F F jt

jt

jt Z u

L L L

L L

L L K

Y ln ln jt jt jt

ln 0

1

0.1

L LF

F

   

L L L

L F

F F

F 1 1

1

ln





jt jt

jt U F jt

O O jt

F F jt

jt

jt Z u

L L L

L L

L L K

W ln ln jt jt jt

ln 0

(18)

Data

• Hungarian Wage and Employment Survey

• 1986, 1989, 1992–2005

• Matched employer-employee dataset: worker variables (wage, education, gender, age,

occupation) and firm variables (revenue, size, ownership, industry, capital, material and wage costs)

• All firms with at least 20 employees, sample of smaller firms

• 6.5% of blue collar workers, 10% of white collar workers sampled on average

• Panel in terms of firms, not workers

(19)

Data – sample restrictions

• Only firms with at least 50 employees

• Only those with at least 5% of their workers included in the sample

• 47,928 firm-years

• 1,245,577 worker-years

• 15,804 firms

• 10,155 with at least 10 workers

• 5,624 with at least 20 workers

(20)

Data – variables

• Ratio of worker groups within each firm, each year: from worker-level dataset

• Y (output): value added (VA)

• W (wage): firm’s wage bill

• K (capital)

• Z controls

jt jt

jt U F jt

O O jt

F F jt

jt

jt Z u

L L L

L L

L L K

Y ln ln jt jt jt

ln 0

(21)

Results – women

-3,0 -2,0 -1,0 0,0 1,0 2,0 3,0 4,0

1986, 1989 1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005

Female-male productivity wage

Gap

(22)

Results – by skill level

-6,0

-4,0 -2,0 0,0 2,0 4,0 6,0 8,0

1986, 1989 1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005

Diploma - no diploma productivity wage

Gap

(23)

Results – by age

-0,2

0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0 1,2 1,4

1986, 1989 1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005

Above 40 - below 40 productivity wage

Gap

(24)

Summary

• The female-male wage productivity-wage gap decreased after the transition.

• Women are paid in line with their productivity – no evidence of discrimination.

• Highly skilled have a negative gap: they are underpaid.

• Workers above 40 are overpaid

– Productivity decreased compared to younger

workers significantly following the transition: skill obsolence

(25)

Results: old and new firms

-0,2 -0,1 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5

1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 Female-male wage-productivity gap, FE

pooled old new

0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,2

1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005

Female-male estimates, pooled sample, FE

rel wage rel prod

0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,2

1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005

Female-male estimates, old firms, FE

rel wage rel prod

(26)

Results: old and new firms

-1,2 -1,0 -0,8 -0,6 -0,4 -0,2 0,0

1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005

Degree - no degree, wage-productivity gap, FE

pooled old new

0,8 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8 2,0

1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 Degree-no degree estimates, pooled

sample, FE

rel wage rel prod

0,8 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8 2,0

1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005

Degree-no degree estimates, old firms, FE

rel wage rel prod

(27)

Results: old and new firms

-0,3 -0,2 -0,1 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3

1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005

Above 40 - below 40, wage-productivity gap, FE

pooled old new

0,8 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,2

1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005

Above 40-below 40 estimates, pooled sample, FE

rel wage rel prod

0,8 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,2

1992-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005

Above 40-below 40 estimates, old firms, FE

rel wage rel prod

(28)

Indirect tests

• Use the implications of discrimination models to test for the presence of

discrimination

• For example: the relationship between the ratio of minority workers and profit:

(taste-based) discriminating employers are not profit-maximizing.

• Hellerstein–Neumark–Troske (1995):

negative significant relationship between

profits and the ratio of female workers

(29)

The effect of competition on discrimination – Lovász 2009

 The log female-male wage gap decreased from 0.31 to 0.18 following the transition:

The change is mostly unexplained (Campos és Joliffe 2004)

Were discriminating employers forced out of the market due to increased competition?

If yes: empirical evidence of discrimination against women

 Becker (1957): an increase in product market competition will decrease discrimination in the long-run

• Empirical testing opportunity:

• Rapid liberalization of Hungarian markets: sudden, large change in the level of competition

• Large, representative matched employer-employee database, long time period: 1986–2005

(30)

Statistics

Relative Wage of Women 1986-2003

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

1986 1989 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Year

Relative Wage

Source: CSO

(31)

Gender wage gap in Hungary, 1986–2005

Source: WES database

(32)

Empirical strategy

 Step 1: estimation of unexplained wage gaps:

 For every firm j and year t:

lnw

ijt

= α

t

+ β

t

X

ijt

+ δ

jt

FE

it

+ ε

ijt

Xij = worker characteristics (education, experience, occupation) FEi = female dummy

δjt = firm-level residual wage gap = upper-bound estimate of discrimination

 Step 2: testing the effect of competition:

δ

jt

= α

t

+ β

1

CM

kt

+ β

2

N

t

+ ε

jt

CMkt: competition measures in industry k and year t Nt: controls (year, region, industry fixed effects)

Becker’s implication: β

1

< 0

(33)

Competition measures

• Concentration ratio (1-HHI: for ease of evaluation)

– 3 digit industries, based on Tax Authority revenue data – 0=monopoly, 1=perfect competition

• Export share (export revenue/revenue)

– 3 digit industries, based on Tax Authority revenue and export data

– 0=no export, 1=all export

• Import penetration ratio (import/revenue+import- export)

– 3 digit industries, based on Tax Authority revenue, Customs import data

– 0=no import, 1=all import

• Price Cost Margin (profit/revenue)

– 3 digit industries, based on Tax Authority revenue data

All increase as competition increases

(34)

Empirical issues

Collective agreements decrease wage discrimination

Subsamples based on presence of agreement

2 step estimation: the wage gap

Weighting the second step based on the standard errors from the first step

Unobservable industry characteristics

Industry fixed effects: estimate the effect within industries of changes over time

Selection bias: exit of low-skilled women

Worker controls, subsamples by skill level

Identification: is there sufficient variation within

industries?

(35)

Changes in competition over time

0.2.4.6.8 1

HHI in 1998

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1

HHI in 1989 1989-1998

Changes in Industry Concentration Ratios

(36)

Changes in competition over time

0.2.4.6.8 1

Export share in 1998

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1

Export share in 1989 1989-1998

Changes in Industry Export Shares

(37)

Data

Hungarian WES: 1986, 1989, 1992–2005

Matched employer-employee data

Panel in firms, not workers

Worker characteristics: gender, age,

education, occupation, potential experience, workplace

Firm characteristics: size, industry, region, ownership

Sample:

Firms with at least 20 employees

At least 2 men and 2 women in the sample (for FE)

Private sector only

(38)

Results: δjt = αt + β1CMkt + β2Nt + εjt

All industries Manufacturing

1 2 3 4

1-HHI -0.075**

(0.018)

-0.081**

(0.025)

-0.133*

(0.054)

-0.117*

(0.056) Import

penetration

0.094**

(0.036)

0.012 (0.032)

0.129**

(0.027)

0.057 (0.032) Export share -0.056

(0.041)

-0.160**

(0.043)

-0.169**

(0.048)

-0.186**

(0.048)

Year dummies Y Y Y Y

Industry FE N Y N Y

Weighted Y Y Y Y

Number of

observations 9312 9312 5274 5274

R squared 0.378 0.597 0.407 0.562

(39)

Results: δjt = αt + β1CMkt + β2Nt + εjt

All industries Manufacturing

1 2 3 4

Price Cost Margin -0.137**

(0.051)

-0.104**

(0.035)

-0.305**

(0.075)

-0.074**

(0.031) Import penetration 0.014

(0.034)

0.055 (0.036)

-0.095 (0.091)

-0.020 (0.063)

Export share -0.018 (0.032)

-0.042 (0.045)

-0.059*

(0.026)

-0.056 (0.046)

Year dummies Y Y Y Y

Industry FE N Y N Y

Weighted Y Y Y Y

Number of obs. 9312 9312 5274 5274

R squared .453 .639 .495 .621

(40)

Results: by presence of collective agreements

Collective Wage

Agreement

No Collective Wage Agreement

1 2 3 4

1-HHI -0.046*

(0.022)

0.061 (0.063)

-0.115**

(0.024)

-0.101 (0.054) Import

penetration

-0.079 (0.053)

0.021 (0.042)

0.013 (0.057)

-0.005 (0.053) Export share -0.108

(0.072)

-0.038 (0.091)

-0.161**

(0.049)

-0.070 (0.082)

Year dummies Y Y Y Y

Industry FE N Y N Y

Weighted Y Y Y Y

Number of obs. 2231 2231 2846 2846

R squared 0.152 0.499 0.170 0.468

(41)

Results: by skill level

High skilled Medium and low skilled

1 2 3 4

1-HHI -0.064 (0.036)

-0.044 (0.037)

-0.094**

(0.033)

-0.092*

(0.043) Import penetration 0.272

(0.157)

-0.019 (0.051)

0.386**

(0.073)

0.023 (0.035) Export share -0.390

(0.209)

-0.098 (0.056)

-0.368**

(0.069)

-0.165 (0.054)

Year dummies Y Y Y Y

Industry FE N Y N Y

Weighted Y Y Y Y

Number of obs. 9289 9289 8741 8741

R squared 0.482 0.727 0.873 0.928

(42)

Summary

• The results support Becker’s implication that an increase in

competition decreases the unexplained wage gap.

• How big is the effect?

• The observed changes in competition levels can explain roughly 26% of the decrease in the gender wage gap.

• Import results contradictory?

(43)

Meta-analysis: the effect of competition

• International comparison: relationship between the gender wage gap and the legal/economic environment – Weichselbaumer & Winter-

Ebmer

• Method: meta-analysis:

• Dependent variable: wage gap estimates from international studies

• Explanatory variables: competition (Economic

freedom index), legislature (equal treatment laws)

• Results:

• Competition decreases the wage gap

• Equal treatment laws do so as well

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