• Nem Talált Eredményt

ECONOMICS OF THE WELFARE STATE

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2022

Ossza meg "ECONOMICS OF THE WELFARE STATE"

Copied!
8
0
0

Teljes szövegt

(1)

ECONOMICS OF THE WELFARE STATE

Sponsored by a Grant TÁMOP-4.1.2-08/2/A/KMR-2009-0041 Course Material Developed by Department of Economics,

Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest (ELTE) Department of Economics, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest

Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Balassi Kiadó, Budapest

(2)

2

Authors: Róbert Gál, Márton Medgyesi Supervised by Róbert Gál

June 2011

Week 4

Redistributive effects of taxes and transfers Introduction

Aim: to measure the redistributive effect of cash transfers and taxes.

Analysing the distribution of transfers and taxes:

• Graphic representation of the distribution of transfers and taxes: concentration curve.

The curve represents the % share of transfers/taxes obtained by groups (e.g.

deciles), defined on the basis of total income. Typical curves: see next slide.

• For an index describing inequality of the distribution of transfers/taxes: concentration index (C). C measures the area between the concentration curve and the line (diagonal) of the equal distribution of transfers (similarly to the relation between the Gini index and the Lorenz curve).

)) ( , 2 (

_

Cov Y F Y

Y

C

k

k Yk





=

(3)

3 Concentration index ranges from –1 to 1

Negative in the case of progressive transfers (–1 if the poorest individual gets all the transfer). The distribution of transfers targeted at the poor belongs to this category.

0, if the distribution of the transfer is equal. The distribution of universal transfers belongs to this category.

Positive, in case of regressive transfers (1 if the richest gets all). The distribution of income-dependent transfers belongs to this category. E.g. social insurance programs (pension, unemployment benefit), where transfer depends on the amount of contribution paid.

Typical concentration curves of transfers/taxes

Source: Förster, 2000

(4)

4

Redistributive effect 1: Comparison of distributions before and after transfer

• Comparison of the inequality index of the distribution before and after transfers.

• The larger the change of the inequality index, the stronger is the redistributive effect.

• Example: see next slide

• Lesson:

The inequality-reducing effect is stronger:

– The lower the concentration index of a given kind of income, the more progressive the transfer

– The higher the share of the transfer in total income

• Disadvantage: in case of comparing the effects of more than one transfers the magnitude of the effects depends on the order the transfers are applied.

Comparison of inequality before and after transfer (example)

total=30 total=60 total=30 total=60 total=30 total=60

1 50 55 60 52 54 58 66

2 50 55 60 52 54 58 66

3 50 55 60 52 54 58 66

4 100 105 110 108 116 102 104

5 100 105 110 108 116 102 104

6 100 105 110 108 116 102 104

Mean 75 80 85 80 85 80 85

Gini 0,1667 0,1563 0,1471 0,1750 0,1824 0,1375 0,1118

dGini -0,0104 -0,0196 0,0083 0,0157 -0,0292 -0,0549

variance 625 625 625 784 961 484 361

relative variance 0,1111 0,0977 0,0865 0,1225 0,1330 0,0756 0,0500

drelvar -0,0690 -0,0802 -0,0442 -0,0337 -0,0910 -0,1167

Pre-transfer distribution Income group

Post-transfer distribution

universal transfer income-contingent targeted transfer

(5)

5

Redistributive effect 2: decomposition of inequality by source of income

• Question: to what extent is a given type of income responsible for the total inequality (in absolute and % terms). Let us express total inequality as the sum of the inequalities of income sources!

• Yki is the income of the ith person from source k. The distribution of type k incomes is Yk=(Yk1, Yk2,..,Ykn) and the distribution of total income Y=(Y1, ….,Yn), where the total income of the ith person is YikYk

i

• First we take variance as the index of inequality. Decomposition of the variance of Y:

• We need one term by type of income. How to allocate covariances among the different income sources?

• The “natural” solution (“natural decomposition” Schorrocks 1982) gives half of the covariance terms which include income source k to the given income type.

• Then the absolute contribution of type k to the total variance is (Sk)

• The percentage contribution of the income type k to the total inequality (sk) measured by variance is:

• If inequality is measured by the relative variance of the distribution (var(Y)/µ2), then the contribution of the given k income-type to the total inequality:

∑∑

+

=

k j

j k

k k

k

Y Y

Y

Y ) var( ) cov( , ) var(

) , cov(

) , cov(

) , cov(

) var(

) , cov(

5 . 0 )

var(Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

S k

j

j k j

k j

k k

j k

j k

k k

k = +

∑ ∑

= +

=

=

) var(

) , cov(

Y Y

s Y

k

k

=

2

) , cov(

Y Y

S Yk

k =

(6)

6 sk is the same no matter if inequality is measured by absolute or relative variance.

• The “natural decomposition” of the Gini coefficient (Rao, 1967), where, CYk is the concentration index of the kth type of income:

The attributes of decomposition

Shorrocks (1982):

• The inequality index (I(Y)) is continuous, symmetric, and its value is I(Y)=0 if and only if distribution is equal.

• Uniform treatment of income-types: the contribution of income-types should be independent of the order of taking them into consideration.

• Independence of the level of aggregation: the contribution of income type k should be the same irrespective of the other types are taken separately or as aggregate.

• Consistency: the sum of contributions of income types equals to total inequality.

“Natural” decompositions satisfy axioms 2., 3., 4. but there are other decompositions that satisfy them, too. Therefore, decomposition is not unambiguous. Further axioms have to be adopted to narrow down the set of decompositions:

• 2-factor symmetry: if there are two income types and the distribution of the first is the permutation of the second their contributions should be equal.

• Normalization: contribution of income types of equal distribution should be 0.

Theorem: axioms 1.–6. imply that the percentage contribution to total inequality is sk=cov(Yk,Y)/var(Y)

This formula applies to all inequality indices!

Yk

K

k k

Y

C

Y G ∑ Y

=

=

1 _ _

(7)

7

Interpretation of decomposition of inequality

What does the contribution of an income-type to total inequality mean?

• Inequality that would be observed if k was the only source of inequality (the distribution of all other income types was equal)

Ck

A=I(Yk+(µ−µk)e),

where I is the inequality index, µ is the average income, and e is the unit vector.

• Decrease in total inequality when distribution of k is equalized CkB=I(Y) − I(Y−Ykke)

Interpretation A ignores interdependence (covariance) between income-types.

Interpretation B allocates income-type k’s covariance of all other types to k.

If variance is the inequality index, then Sk=0.5(Ck A+Ck

B).

In the case of other inequality indices there is no obvious connection between S, CkA and CkB.

In these cases the interpretation of decomposition is not unambiguous.

(8)

8

Comparison of two methods

What kind of transfers have inequality increasing (+) or decreasing (–) effects?

CT: concentration index of transfer

CM: concentration index of income (before transfer)

Before-after comparison Decomposition

CT>0 (Income contingent

transfer)

CT>CM + +

CT=CM 0 +

CT<CM +

CT=0 (universal transfer) 0

CT<0 (targeted transfer)

Hivatkozások

KAPCSOLÓDÓ DOKUMENTUMOK

• The share of cash transfers in total income decreased between 1995 and 2005 in most OECD countries. Sharpest decrease took place in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Ireland

• Monotonicity: if income is given to an individual below poverty threshold, then the value of poverty index decreases (strong monotonicity). Weak monotonicity requires that

• If a household with characteristics x obtains a welfare level of u(q,x) by the consumption of consumer basket q, then the minimum level of expenditure

Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest (ELTE) Department of Economics, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest.. Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy

Cash benefits other than Social Insurance Benefits with the aim of poverty alleviation Advantages and disadvantages of targeting Methods of targeting.. Unemployment benefits

A) The rational median voter does not want total redistribution. B) The dominant preference is not that of the median income individual. A) The rational median voter does not

– age profiles of transfer-flows and accumulation of life cycle wealth in traditional and industrial societies – family as the organizer of ”welfare programs”:..

Resource reallocation between generations of the traditional society: insurance performance of the family as the organizer.. of