CAN THE HUNGARIAN STATE BE SUED?
Nyilasi Zoltán1
University of Miskolc, Faculty of Law, student INTRODUCTION
In this recent study I am dealing with an uncontrolled issue of civil law, responsibility for damage caused by legislation. The starting poInt was on this topic, that the Parliament had adopted a number of acts that have caused significant damage to the recipients in recent years. In this circle we can mention the special tax on severance allowance of 98%, enabling legislation for dismissal from public- sector without public justification, the 'de facto' nationalization of coursebook market, the sudden cessation of slot machines or the rearrangement of the tobacconist's market. My goal is to investigate the arisen issues.
Previously I would like to signal the fact that my study actively includes the constitutional legal questions, at the same time my goal with this to provide the subject to be well-grounded before the inchoation of the potentional civil law regulation, that cannot be possible without clarifying or applying the rules of public law (constitutional law). Accordingly, the civil liability of the state (or the legislative body) becomes the most difficult and unusual question of the Hungarian civil law system, because question is occurred: public law or civil law, immunity or liability, public interest or rule of law?
1. THE ISSUE OF IMMUNITY
It must first be stated that damage caused by the judicial and executive power can be claimed in accordance with the current civil law rules. Under the Hungarian civil law regulation the immunity surrounding legislation is an obstacle to the legislator's liability. The concept of immunity is most often defined as a counterpoint of responsibility, that is irresponsibility. I have found Laszló Kecskés's statement appropriate which described the category of cases of non-liability as lack of liability, that is, that for some reason the responsible person or body can not be held accountable.2 The functional-relative immunity method gives answers to questions arising from state liability by separating iure imperii-iure gestioni categories, that is, that in some cases the state carries the immunity, while in some cases it appears in a coordinated position. The other method is essentially an organizational approach to the issue of state liability, which says: in the case of certain parts of the state it is possible to speak about responsibility while in other state departments it is excluded. It can be stated that either method does not fulfill its fully-defined goal,
1 Student, University of Miskolc, Faculty of Law; (e-mail:zoltan.nyilasi@gmail.com). This study is made under the coordination of Dr. László Leszkoven associate professor (joglacus@uni-miskolc.hu)
2 Kecskés László: Perelhető-e az állam? Immunitás és kárfelelősség, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1988., 15-17. o.
MultiScience - XXXII. microCAD International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference University of Miskolc, 5-6 September, 2018. ISBN 978-963-358-162-9
DOI: 10.26649/musci.2018.052
does not provide a global response to the problems, it only justifies the partialness of the state's immunity.3
2.EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTIVE REGULATION 2.1. The judicial practice
As a decision that has been repeatedly referred to states that law-making as an activity to create general and abstract behavioral rules and the related liability are governed solely by the rules of public law (constitutional law).4
The National Assembly is the supreme representative body.5 However, it is not possible to deduce from this wording of Fundamental Law that there is a clear conclusion that it would be responsible for the damage caused by its activity. It is preferable to start from a basic level, or more precisely to take the principle of the rule of law, which implies the question of absolute immunity. The Constitutional Court stated: "One of the essential requirements of the rule of law is that the public authorities exercise their activities in the organizational framework defined by law, in the established order of predictable operation established by law, within the limits of the law, which are known to the citizens." 6 It can be concluded from the referenced judicial practice that nobody or person exercises unlimited power in a rule of law. On this basis, we can name the principle of the division of powers and the relevant subject matter that the bodies exercising public authority, such as the parliament, can only and exclusively exercise their activities under the law.7 I would like to point out that only on the basis of the Fundamental Law and only the Constitutional Court may decide on the legilastive status of the state, no ordinary court may decide in the absence of a statutory mandate. From my point of view, the damage caused by legislation does not lead to a situation that would undermine the principle of separation of powers. This is basically based on the fact that the circumstance of examining the lawfulness of a conduct, which does not essentially fall within its competence (in more specific terms, from the aspect of the nature of the activity it does not fall within its competence), is not alien for the compensation law. The Civil Law Tribunal, of course, can not derive any public-law implications, but it does not hamper to question the legality of the legislation and, consequently, to determine the legal consequences of a potential damage and to establish the possibility for (financial) compensation. According to the judiciary standpoint considered to be correct, legislation is a matter of public law and is governed by the rules of public law. It is a fact that legislation is a public law activity, but that part of the claim which is intended to promote public law is not justified, since the activities covered by cases of liability for damages caused by the exercise of official
3 Kecskés László: Az állami kárfelelősség jogalkotási és jogalkalmazási kérdései, különös tekintettel a gazdaságirányítás kárfelelősségre Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Budapest, 1987., 7-8. old.
4 EBH 1999.14.
5 Alaptörvény 1. cikk (1) bekezdés
6 56/1991. (XI. 8.) AB határozat
7 Fülöp Györgyi: Az állam kártérítési felelőssége a közösségi jog megsértése esetén. Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 2003/5, 19. - http://ptk2012.hu/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2003- 5kodi.pdf (2017.10.21.)
authority can not be clasically regarded as private acts. Furthermore, cannot be found any statements as the provisions of the Civil Code on State may apply only to contractual relations. However, it is necessary to examine the further criteria for civil law liability. The Civil Code states as a generic clause that it prohibits unlawful torture, that is to say, with the name of Gyula Eörsi, that the damages are unlawful (so, in principle, every damage is unlawful). Unlawfulness means that such conduct is contrary to a civil law rule, and therefore serves to qualify the conduct. Unlawfulness is a material and not a personal aspect, that is, have to be sharply separated from the notion of culpability. The question arises as to whether the damage caused by legislation is unlawful. There are basically two types of response to the question: a general ban on torts or unlawfulness based on unconstitutionality. Due to the time constraints I would not go into details of this question.
The legislator acts accurately if it does not meet the requirement of the so called general expectation stated in the Civil Code. It is important to note that accountability is a standardized procedural measure, which, in general, interrupts with the use of the subjective liability measure. The question arises again, however, whether the court may be typifying in connection with the damage caused by legislation, whether the special nature of the legislator and the legislation justify the classification of the ideal groups. In this connection, but in-a-non-exhaustive way, it is important to point out the accountability of the organizational entities.8 Based on the findings of the dissertation, I would like to point out some examples which may be remarkable in relation to a lawsuit against the legislator: the legislator is considered to be accountable if it fails to comply with the legislative provisions on legislation (for instance, no preliminary impact assessment has been carried out) the legislature qualifies as accountable if the created legal regulation suffers from a content error (for instance it qualifies as unconstitutional) the legislator is considered to be accountable if it created a "seem-to-be act" (the legislator created an unique act in content).9 It could be seen from the above that the damage caused by legislation can be achieved by both law-making and failing to legislate, in particular by failing to comply with the EU's legal harmonization obligation or by failing properly to comply.10 In the context of the causal link, a law analysis has also been made which distinguishes between the legislator and the body exercises the implementative authority, naturally, from the point of view of the libality.11 This is based on the fact that the damage did not come up with the adoption of the law but by the adoption of an implementing act. It is also problematic because it contains guidance only for legislation with active conduct and ignores the institution of indirect damage.
8 Eörsi Gyula: A jogi felelősség alapproblémái, Akadémia Kiadó, Budapest, 1961., 235.old.
9 Vékás Lajos (szerk.): Új Polgári Törvénykönyv - Szerkesztőbizottsági Javaslat 2011. Complex, Budapest, 2011, 341-342. old.
10 Fuglinszky, 2015, 543-547.,583. o.
11 Fuglinszky, 2015, 219. o.
2.2. Seem-to-be-acts, ie. abuse of rights?
The question of whether legislation is immune is also related to the subject matter of damage caused by legislation even if the legislator has decided on a legal issue (makes a decision on a specific case, so that an individual decision), but in content, made a decision. Initially, judicial practice did not make any distinction between acts and so called “seem-to-be-act”. This approach leaves something to be desired, which is well reflected by the MOL case.12 The source of the problem was that the Minister for Economic Affairs ordered the sale of the natural gas price as a way to ignore the legal pricing formula. The oil company was damaged by the gas price calculated on the basis of the ministerial decree and the pricing formula. According to the applicant’s argument, MOL was the only organization with gas-sale-license, which shows that the only possible recipient of the decree could be MOL itself. The applicant also pointed out that the practice could be also challenged as it awaited the legislation only on the basis of formal criteria, since they are abstractly formulated and generally applicable behavioral norms. The court of second instance and the Supreme Court have stated that they have no legal or jurisdictional scope to consider the content of the law complying with the formal requirements. At this stage, the applicant could not initiate a substantive review of the decision nor initiate a claim for damage caused by administrative power. Afterwards, the Constitutional Court itself stated that, if the legislator makes an individual decision in a legally enforcable act form, it discourages the appealing possibility against the individual decision, and therefore acts contrary to the Fundamental Law, violating fundamental rights. But in recent case law, a welcome change has taken place.13 The Court of Appeal stated that it was a public law immunity concerning the creation of general rules of conduct for the legislature, but in this case, the content of the annulled legal act is considered to be a law enforcement decision (seem-to-be-act), thus cutting the remedy. Which is most prominent in the subject matter: the dysfunctional operation of the legislature makes the legislator's conduct legally unlawful in civil law. Since the Constitutional Court has relatively broadly interpreted the case of abuse of the law, the question is again raised: why is the code-level regulation left behind?14 Among the views of the legislator's liability a disapproving approach occured as it would lead to the raiseof financial legal issues and it would be a matter of concern if the court required the legislator to pay damages, since the legitimacy of the judiciary is not the same as the legitimacy of the Parliament, the depositary of the popular sovereignty. I categorically reject this point of view, since the code itself stated that the Parliament has the power to fulfill the obligations it has committed in the absence of budgetary resources as well, so that this provision does not impede the regulation of the Code but also reinforces its legitimacy.
12 Pf.V.26 769/2000/4.
13 31/1998.(IV.25.) AB határozat, Kiss László, alkotmánybíró különvéleménye
14 Fuglinszky, 2015., 587. o.
2.3. EU's legal harmonization obligation meets the responsibility for the damage caused by the legislation.
By the middle of the XX. century, responsibility for damage caused by a state featured on the agenda of the Council of Europe and the European Community. As a result of progress and mutual interaction, the European Immunity Treaty was signed in 1972. However, it became clear that, as in many other issues, the Court's law-making activities will answer the arised issues.15 The question of the EU legal harmonization obligation is closely related to the liability of the state, including the liability of setting up so called seem-to-be-acts, as well as serious concerns occur about the damage caused by the creation of "real" acts, which again entails immersion of the practice of immunity. The compensation law is the ultimate means of enforcing community law. Harmonization obligation is a contractual obligation for the Member States. It should be emphasized, first of all, that this obligation also extends to the directives, what’s more, directives that have not been published at Member State level. This is only possible if the rule is detailed and compete in substance, ie. it does not result the possibility for law enforcement authorities to replace the legislator to deicide any regulatory issues. Citizens of Member States should not be disadvantaged in deciding a dispute because of failure to comply with community law. The Union's assumption of this kind of responsibility is understandable and compatible with EU policy, however it raises more interest from the point of view of the Member States. The 1972 Immunity Treaty was preceded by the Schöppenstedt v. Council case, which is an important milestone in the subject of damage caused by the state. The Court of Justice has acknowledged that a company in a Member State may sue the Community legislature, in this case the Council, in order to compensate for the damage caused by the legislation which it has created, thereby giving rise to the possibility of bringing an action in the hands of the otherwise unlawful legal entities. The decision is based on a limited functional immunity by recognizing the liability for damage caused by Community legislation enforceable if (i) it is a policy of economic policy, (ii) the injury is caused by a violation of higher law protecting the injured person and (iii) the infringement was sufficiently serious. This is the substantive significance of the decision. The Francovich “phenomenon” was composed of the arguments put forward in the C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and Others v. the Italian Republic merged case.16 The judgment can not be regarded as a further point in the development of state liability, even though it may have gone too far to judge the issue. The case was based on the non-transposition of directive 80/987 EEC into national law. The subject of the directive was the protection of the employees in the event of the insolvency of the employer, under which Member States were obliged to take the necessary measures to ensure that the guaranteeing institutions guarantee the payment of outstanding claims of workers arising out of a contract of employment or an employment relationship for a certain period of time.
Due to the similarity of the facts of the two cases, the national courts have referred the same questions to the Court of Justice. From the point of view of the issue,
15 Mádl Ferenc: Az Európai Gazdasági Közösség joga. Budapest 1974. 388–390. o.
16 C-5/71,1971.
however, it is more important that the Court emphasized in the context of state liability: the liability of the state is required by community law, but the conditions which give rise to a right of reparation must prevail. In this sense, it is a condition that
the result targeted by the directive also extends to individuals; the content of these rights can be determined on the basis of the provisions of the directive; there is a causal link between the breach of the state's obligation and the concerned person (legal or natural).17
It should be pointed out that this condition system is not applicable in all cases, since in the absence of Community legislation, the internal legal order of each Member State is responsible for designating the competent court and settling detailed rules of procedure. The essence of the Francovich case has been formulated in a fairly broad sense, which can be regarded as rather rigorous from the point of view of the Member States.18
Within the Union's law, Francovich judgment did not stop the development of state liability.19 This period is commonly referred to as the "post-Francovich" era, in which details of the rules of state liability have been elaborated by the Court. In my opinion, Brasserei and Factortame III joint case has the greatest impact on domestic legal development. According to the decision, the Member State is obliged to reimburse the damage caused by the breach of Community law by the State, even if national legislation is liable for the infringement. If an infringement of Community law can be considered from the point of view of the Member State- as an activity where it has a wide discretion right over the choice of legislative solutions, then the individual is entitled for compensation in case the infringed Community legislation gives the individual the right to sublicense and, furthermore,the infringement is sufficiently serious or, if so, there is a causal link between the infringement and the damage. In 2014, the Court reiterated that compensation for damages caused by a sufficiently serious breach of EU law is a Member State's obligation. It can be seen, therefore, that the European Court of Justice and the Council of Europe's development activities point to the fact that Member States are accountable for legislative action.20 The EU has also examined the failure of its own organs and the legislation of the Member States that infringe EU law, which shows that: 20 years after the elaboration of these principles, formulas and prerequisites, the internal regulation did not adequately answer the question of liability for failure to comply with the legal harmonization obligation. Legal harmonization is not just a formal requirement or merely a kind of recommendation for the Member States, so failure to comply with it can not be handled at a pitty level.
17 Kecskés László: Európa-jogi tapasztalatok az állam jogszabályalkotással okozott károkért való felelősségének megalapozásához, Polgár Jogi Kodifikáció, HVG-Orac, 2003/4. 4-6. (2017.11.05.)
18 Kecskés, 2003., 8-10. o.
19 Kecskés, 2003., 8-10. o.
20 Dr. Gadó Gábor: Eltérő és egyező álláspontok az új Ptk. előkészítése során, Magyar Jog, 2008/6, 396.
(2017.09.25.)
3. SUMMARY
In this paper, I undertook to make one of the sensitive issues of civil law in-depth investigation. I wanted to give a comprehensive picture of the state liability, which is perhaps the most difficult category for civil law. As I have said, the starting point for dealing with the subject was the creation of laws that are difficult to handle by the laity, and which revision is called by the rule of law itself. In the dissertation, I have consistently sought to illustrate the relationship between constitutional and civil law issues. It is clear from the thesis that the subject matter could be considered as a source of failure of the compensation law (civil law) however the problem should be settled only and exclusively by civil law. Only in this context can we achieve substantive results.
They are playing a game. They are playing at not playing a game.
If I show them I see they are, I shall break the rules and they will punish me.
I must play their game, of not seeing I see the game.
(R.D.Laing: Knots, 1971.) BIBLIOGRAPHY, REFERENCES
Sources of Law
Magyarország Alaptörvénye
2013.V. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről 1959. évi IV. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről
1991.évi XIV. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyv módosításáról 1995.II.törvény a Polgári Perrendtartásról
1997. évi LXXVIII. törvény az épített környezet alakításáról és védelméről A honvédelemről és a Magyar Honvédségről szóló 2004. évi CV. törvény 2009.évi CXX. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről
2011.évi CXXX. a jogalkotásról
2011. évi CXXVIII. törvény a katasztrófavédelemről és a hozzá kapcsolódó egyes törvények módosításáról
80/987 EGK irányelv a munkavállalók védelméről a munkáltató fizetésképtelensége esetén
Crown Proceedings Act, 1947. (Egyesült Királyság)
Federal Tort Claims Act, 1946. (Amerikai Egyesült Államok) State Immunity Act of 1978. (Egyesült Királyság)
Studies, publications, periodicals, online journals
Bárdos Péter: Megjegyzések a Javaslat kárfelelősségi fejezetéhez, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció, HVG-Orac, 2002/5-6.
Borbás Beatrix: Fejezetek a bírósági kárfelelősség köréből a magyar és az európai szabályozás tükrében – különös tekintettel a tisztességes eljárás követelményére, PTE ÁJK, Pécs,2012, http://ajk.pte.hu/files/file/doktori-iskola/borbas- beatrix/borbas-beatrix-vedes-ertekezes.pdf
Chiovini Márk: Az állam polgári jogi felelőssége, Új Polgári Törvénykönyv – Aktuális kérdések. , ELTE Bibó István Szakkollégium, Budapest 2013,http://bibo.elte.hu/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/biszk_ujptk.pdf
Fülöp Györgyi: Az állam kártérítési felelőssége a közösségi jog megsértése esetén, Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció 2003/5 - http://ptk2012.hu/wp- content/uploads/2012/11/2003-5kodi.pdf
Hans-BerndSchäfer: ÖkonomischeAnalyse der StaatshaftungfürlegislativesUnrecht - http://www.law-and-economics.eu/_data/Schaefer.pdf
Gadó Gábor: Eltérő és egyező álláspontok az új Ptk. előkészítése során, Magyar Jog, 2008/6.
Karsai Dániel: Jogalkotással okozott kárról, Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2014.06. - http://drkarsai.hu/fajl/jogtud_kozlony_karsaidaniel_a%20jogalkotassal_okozott_kar 021.pdf
Kecskés László: Európa-jogi tapasztalatok az állam jogszabályalkotással okozott károkért való felelősségének megalapozásához, Polgár Jogi Kodifikáció, HVG- Orac, 2003/4
Kecskés László: Beszámoló a magyar polgári jog kodifikálásának hányatott sorsáról és egy, a reményt újraébresztő tudományos ülésről, Magyar Jog 2008/7.
Lajer Zsolt: A jogalkotó kárfelelőssége, Magyar Jog, 1995/3.
Lajer Zsolt: Felelősség a jogszabályalkotással okozott károkért az Európai Unió és egyes tagállamai jogában. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2001/3.
Lehotay Veronika: Adalékok a jogalkotással okozott kár szabályozásának kérdésköréhez, SectioJuridica et Politica, Miskolc, Tomus XXVIII., 2010, 405.
http://midra.uni-
miskolc.hu/JaDoX_Portlets/documents/document_10720_section_3223.pdf
Papp Mónika: A Magyar Állam kártérítési felelőssége a nem megfelelően átültetett irányelvből eredő károk megtérítésére, MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Lendület-HPOPs Kutatócsoport, 2014. - http://hpops.tk.mta.hu/blog/2014/02/a- magyar-allam-karteritesi-felelossege)
Rixer Ádám: Az állam felelősségének egyes kérdései, De irus prudentio et iure publico, 2011/1. - http://dieip.hu/wp-content/uploads/2011-1-szam.pdf
Stipkovits Tamás István: A jogalkotással okozott kár megítélése alkotmányjogi és polgári jogi szempontból, In: Mailáth György Tudományos Pályázat 2016: Díjazott dolgozatok, OBH, 2016, 278. - http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/stat- tart-file/mailath-2016.pdf
Books
Gárdos Péter (szerk.).: Kézikönyv az új Polgári Törvénykönyvhöz Complex Kiadó, Budapest, 2009.
Eörsi Gyula: A jogi felelősség alapproblémái, Akadémia Kiadó, Budapest, 1961.
Fuglinszky Ádám: Kártérítési jog, HVG-Orac, Budapest,2015.
Kecskés László: Perelhető-e az állam? Immunitás és kárfelelősség, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1988.
Kecskés László: Az állami kárfelelősség jogalkotási és jogalkalmazási kérdései, különös tekintettel a gazdaságirányítás kárfelelősségre Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Államtudományi Kutatások Programirodája, Budapest, 1987.
Mádl Ferenc: Az Európai Gazdasági Közösség joga. Budapest 1974.
Mádl Ferenc és Vékás Lajos: Nemzetközi magánjog és nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok joga, ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2015.
Menyhárd Attila: Az állam kártérítési felelőssége és állami immunitás, In: Nochta Tibor-Fabó Tibor-Márton Mária: Ünnepi tanulmányok Kecskés László professzor 60.születésnapja tiszteletére, PTE ÁJK, Pécs, 2013.
Mezei Barna: Magyar jogtörténet, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2014.
Osztovits András (szerk.): A Polgári Törvénykönyvről szóló 2013.V.törvény és a kapcsolódó jogszabályok nagykommentárja, Opten Kiadó, Budapest, 2014.
Petrik Ferenc: Közigazgatási bíróság - közigazgatási jogviszony, HVG-Orac, Budapest, 2011.
R.D.Laing: Knots, 1971.
Vékás Lajos (szerk.): A Polgári Törvénykönyv magyarázatokkal, Complex, Budapest, 2013.
Other
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A61990CJ0006) https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations- dictionary/state-liability
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30d6f50e66 a28c2c47a79d1ba5516f945662.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxyMc310?text=&docid=
146821&pageIndex=0&doclang=HU&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=219 1512
http://birosag.hu/szakmai-informaciok/altalanos-sajtokozlemeny/fovarosi- torvenyszek-reszitelet-budaors-varos
http://hpops.tk.mta.hu/blog/2014/02/a-magyar-allam-karteritesi-felelossege
