Széchenyi István University Doctoral School of Law and Political Science

Széchenyi István University

Doctoral School of Law and Political Science

Head of the Doctoral School: Professor Dr. Péter Takács CSc.

dr. Roland Kelemen

Theoretical and Historical System of Exceptional Power and Its Practical Realization in the Light of Press Regulation and Press Policies

Between 1914 and 1922

T

Doctoral advisors Dr. István Kukorelli DSc.

professor

Dr. Révész T. Mihály CSc.

honorary professor

Gy ő r

2022

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ... 3

II. METHODS USED IN THE RESEARCH ... 7

III. SUMMARY OF SCIENTIFIC RESULTS AND POSSIBILITIES OF UTILIZATION ... 7

IV. LIST OF PUBLICATIONS IN THE SUBJECTS OF THE DOCTORAL DISSERTATION ... 18

I. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The idealistic concept of the end of history and the expected expansion of the civil liberal state that emerged with the dissolution of the Soviet Union also dominated the thinking about the state and law. During the relatively long period of peace, which is mainly characterized the Western world, it could be observed that the system of defense legal institutions was pushed into the background, its development was rejected outside a narrow professional circle, and preparations for calm everyday life were postponed. However, it was not only in practice and education that legal institutions were pushed into to the background, but also within scientific thinking. Scientific thinking about the protection of the state, the monopoly of violence / compulsion have also pushed back into the walls of a narrower professional environment. As a result, we did not have consistent and sufficiently complex responses to the new types of defense challenges that explosively emerged in the 2010s, and in many cases did not even get to the point of formulating the real questions. These social, economic and technological changes have resulted in new types of defense situations that were already irresolvable for the defense legal institutions that emerged in the 19th century and were based on its defense environment and geopolitical relations, and were stuck at the level of development of the second half of the 20th century.

Autonomous weapons systems, machine learning, drones, cyber operations, hybrid warfare, the syndicalization and franchising of terrorism, the risks of a massive wave of migration, the undesirable effects of excessive globalism have all generated such defense challenges that have tested, are testing and will continue to test the standards of fundamental rights and the rule of law of Western societies – and this is leading to an escalation of the conflict between the desire for peace and a livable everyday life and fundamental rights standards. One of its fundamental contexts is the issue of the applicability, limits and instruments of exceptional power. Moreover, in some cases, as we can see in the case of France and in or country, due to the COVID-19 epidemic, it has the potential to infiltrate into everyday life for a long time.

The exceptional power has been the most marginalized institution in the defense legal system during the past decades. Its systematic renewal did not take place in two constitutional periods in Hungary only ad hoc corrections and amendments responding to specific challengers were implemented instead. Even in the Euro-Atlantic area, we can hardly find any examples that have adapted their own regulations to the dangers of the new age. At the level of scientific thinking, exceptional power as a legal institution began to be blurred with the issue of political

science and power theory, through which the institution became a demonized formation, even a boil on the body of the rule of law.

In this context, the escalating security policy challenges of 2010, such as the rise of the Islamic State, the terrorist attacks with large numbers of civilian casualties on the European continent and the consequent state of emergency in France, have resulted in a sharp censorship. In addition, due to Russia's power aspirations in Ukraine, more and more attention has been paid to the characterization of hybrid conflicts. The use of cyberspace and cyberspace processes beyond peacekeeping tools, the use of artificial intelligence, autonomous and automated weapons systems, and actions performed with drones also deserved special attention after the massive cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007 and against Georgia in 2008. This period was completed by the pandemic in the early 2020 and the necessary government responses to it.

Thus, in the mid-2010s, an examination of the legal institutions of defense was launched at the same time as the evaluation of the previous ones. The need to adapt exceptional power as a legal institution to 21st century challenges has emerged. However, it soon became clear that decades of gaps in that field needed to be filled, both theoretically and professionally. The conceptual framework contained numerous blank spaces, the processing of historical experiences was incomplete or did not take place at all, and a serious problem of interpretation is that the exceptional power – the special legal order – is treated by many authors as a separate institution, separate from the defense system, while it is an “ultima ratio” instrument of the defense system and the Constitution – and therefore a part of it.

It is of the utmost importance to examine and possibly revise the theoretical system underlying the rules on states of emergency, and to become familiar with the rules on exceptional power of earlier times. The knowledge of the precise conceptual web and the analysis of the previous regulation and its application are essential preconditions for rethinking the institution and its application in a way that adapts to the changing security environment, but also builds on historical precedents. At the level of questions, the dissertation intends to cover the following sub-areas:

1. What is called normal, special and exceptional?

2. In general, what is exceptional power?

3. Where does the exceptional power of rule of law have its roots?

4. What historical models have emerged and what are their main features?

5. What are the different manifestations of exceptional state?

6. What are the different layers of exceptional power?

7. Where is the borderline between exceptional power as a legal institution and exceptional power as a system of power theory?

8. How did the tools of exceptional power appear in the legal system of the Hungarian civil state, taking the issue of the exceptional power of the press policies as an example?

9. Have the rule of law postulates been taken into account in the exercise of press policies during the First World War?

10.How did the regulations and practices of press policies in the revolutionary period differ from the above?

In the course of my research, I have found that the literature attempts to define constitutional states of exception in a number of ways, as well as the instruments, i.e. the exceptional power, that the state can exercise in constitutionally fortified periods of emergency. The works of the authors I have examined discuss at length the characteristics of each state, the instruments (exceptional powers) that the authorized representatives can use, possibly the order itself, the mechanisms protecting and guarding the constitution, the prohibited regulatory issues, i.e. the framework of the legal institution, the theoretical issues. However, it can be stated that the subject of the study is not the delimitation of the basic concepts, i.e. what we mean by normal, special and exceptional.

But a definition of the concepts is absolutely necessary; once the basic concepts have been defined, we can get a much nuanced picture of what is meant by exceptional state or exceptional power. However, these delimitations may also necessarily complicate the “simple”

constitutional formula, as they may also include in the theory those situations beyond the constitution, the systems of relations, the methods of exercising power that claim the title of exceptional state when we seek the demarcation of the normal, special and exceptional adjectives from the point of view of the existence of the state. Thus, it is necessary to examine the exceptional nature and characteristics of periods of legitimacy (revolutions, counter- revolutions, changes of sovereignty).

The conceptual definition of exceptional power therefore requires clarification of what we mean by a general or normal state, and what we consider to be special or exceptional. It is necessary to reveal that the specific, without further distinction, also requires an exceptional adjective in general – as a situation different from the normal situation –, or whether it must necessarily be further broken down according to the underlying causes, their effects and the necessary or applicable means. Consequently, one of the chapters of the dissertation attempts to define the basic concept circle, i.e. the triad of the normal, the special and the exceptional, and to form the

basis for the demarcation of the normal, the special and the exceptional from the point of view of the existence of the state.

It is also necessary to examine the origin of exceptional power – historical traditions also play a role in the regulatory system of a state. Here we need to think about the institution of the rule of law, the legal system. Giorgio Agamben argues that the rule of law's exceptional power rests on French revolutionary traditions. It will have to be specially investigated whether the legal institution can really be traced back to the French revolutionary traditions, or whether the roots of the institutional system may be different along various historical developments and different historical and social traditions. And if they are different, what original models emerged over the long 19th century? How can they be distinguished from each other? What specific characteristics do they reflect today?

Thereafter, and in the light of their experience, certain facts under the rule of law’s exceptional power to be treated as a legal institution must be distinguished. What are the factors that may give rise to different facts, and what are the historical experiences that give birth to different facts in different states? We will be able to concretize the concept of exceptional power, which is defined in general terms in the first chapters, by summarizing the characteristics of these facts. The correction will hopefully reveal the conceptual divergence between exceptional power as an institution of the rule of law and exceptional power as a mechanism for the exercise of power, which shall be broken down to the level of basic characteristics in order to obtain a chemically pure picture in the field of concepts.

After defining the established concepts, it is worthwhile to enter to the field of Hungarian historical experience and examine how the regulation of exceptional power under the rule of law was developed in Hungary, and what were its cornerstones. After the general approach, studying press policies of the First World War allows us to examine whether the outlined features of the above conceptual framework are actually reflected in practice or not. In order to draw the right conclusions, it is necessary to examine the war regulations and practices of the more important, decisive states, as these are the basis for a proper assessment of Hungarian practice.

Our post-war history also provides an opportunity to learn about the practical manifestations of the characteristics of exceptional power as a mechanism for the exercise of power, based on the regulations and practices of press policies in the early years of the People's Republic, the Soviet Republic and the emerging Horthy regime. The question to be answered is how the two interpretations differ. Was the conceptual separation really necessary?

II. METHODS USED IN THE RESEARCH

In order to achieve the above objectives, the dissertation sought to find and process the sources needed for interpretation in a multidisciplinary way. This can be said for all phases of the work carried out, including source material collection, systematization, processing and drawing conclusions. Accordingly, the dissertation came to formulate the results below using the knowledge and research methods belonging to the source material and tools of philosophy, history, economics, military science and jurisprudence.

In defining the conceptual scope, it was not possible to ignore the scientific knowledge of philosophy about the normal and peculiar planes of human existence, so I had to rely specifically on the results of existentialist philosophy.

In the search for historical roots, the knowledge of history, economics and military science was essential to draw the right conclusions. The examination of the individual models required the application of the tools of comparative law, in the framework of which, in addition to the Hungarian language sources, the English, German and Spanish language materials were also interpreted. The conceptual delineation and characterization relied on the results of law and state philosophy, trying to adapt the theoretical conclusions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries to the current challenges.

In the part summarizing the historical experiences and examining the practical implementation, the archival research was essential, the material of which was provided by the Archives of the Institute of Military History, the central archives of the National Archives of Hungary and the Archives of Győr-Moson-Sopron County. A significant amount of archival material has served as a compass in the labyrinths of contemporary literature, the daily press, House papers and journals, and the literature that has been created since then.

III. SUMMARY OF SCIENTIFIC RESULTS AND POSSIBILITIES OF UTILIZATION

During the formulation of the objectives, I had a number of questions to be answered, along which I have structured the line of thought of my dissertation.This line of thought provided an opportunity to move from a micro-level conceptual framework, through historical experience, to a macro-level system of exceptional power and its characteristics. Using the conclusions and findings, I examined the exceptional power regulations of the Hungarian constitutional and legitimation periods, with a special emphasis on their impact on the press policies and the freedom of the press. These chapters are a kind of justifications of the theoretical part.

The definition of micro-level concepts is of the utmost importance: the borderline situations of human existence, through intersubjectivity and social totality as a whole, have an influencing power on the state, its subsystems, such as the activity of executive power, within that, the functioning of the individual administrative bodies, the jurisdiction and the level of judicial decisions. The delimitation of micro-level concepts presupposes the adequacy of the conceptual definition of a well-developed state exceptionalism.

The delimitation of the normal and the special, the definition of an exceptionalism within the special as a core, and its current level also confirms the social realities. After all, in the light of what counts as normal or special, and within that as exceptional, also reflects the moral and ethical level of society. Historical determinism is not negligible either. Because the historical circumstances and the current events clearly influence the boundary between normal and special. So, when I claim that the general or normal state is the order of unanimity, which, through the rights of law, technology and nature, becomes planned and mechanical, in which recordable events do not occur, but which is wished and outlined during the existence of special / exceptional, then I created a working concept, thanks to which I marked the direction of the inquiry of social totality and historical conditions. This is precisely why I have argued that the notions of the special and exceptional in themselves, without proper historical reasoning and social processes, do not give a clear perspective on what special and exceptional borderline situations really mean in human existence. A perfect example of this is the pandemic situation caused by COVID-19. The emergence of the virus has significantly transformed everyday life, work, education, sports and so on. What seemed special, even exceptional in the spring of 2020, such as the transfer of university education to the digital space, is now a part of normal life, as well as digitally held conferences and consultations.

Certain boundary situations of existence, such as the boundaries of the normal, the quasi- special, the special and the exceptional states, represent a moving boundary line – their determination rests on current social realities. So the concept of exceptional I have created¹ provides the framework for the investigation, not the result of the investigation. The shifting of the border means not only drawing the boundaries between the normal, the special and the exceptional elsewhere in certain historical periods, but also means that certain life situations are incorporated into the mechanisms of the normal or the special through experience. This

1It is a set of recordable life situations or life situations that are not immanent parts of life, but seek to attack, distort or eliminate its exfoliated core. In contrast, the tools of the normal legal system, the usual social interactions cannot function effectively, so they want to resolve the situation by extending the decision to the greatest possible amplitude, with the aim of returning to the general course of life by overcoming and resolving the exceptional.

alone demonstrates the need to periodically review the legal institution and to incorporate the experiences into legislation.

Although exceptional is socially and historically determined, conceptual demarcation is what provides a good basis for recognition, so it was necessary to define at the beginning what exceptional state and exceptional power mean in general. Border situations which are not immanent parts of the normal functioning of society – as a result of social totality –, law and state, or even specifically seek to attack, distort or eliminate their exfoliated core, and against which ordinary social interactions, tools of the normal legal order and the normal operating mechanisms of the state cannot function effectively, are called exceptional state. While an alternative or transformative legal system that responds to this, which seeks to resolve the situation by extending the decision to the greatest possible amplitude, with a view to returning to the general normal framework of exceptional state, whether earlier or redefined, is called exceptional power. Because right after that, we can move on to the question of what were the social and historical processes that brought the exceptional power to life as a legal institution.

Agamben argues that the exceptional power rests on French revolutionary traditions, not on absolutism. However, this idea of the great philosopher was a rather generalizing statement that ignored exactly the above duality, that is, the coexistence of social and historical determinism.

Thus, his finding ignores the different historical and social traditions of different states and societies, including the differences in legal traditions. Thus, although the state of siege legislation was actually enacted as a law in France in 1791, its proper adoption was only carried out on the continent. Considering its original model, it only had a real impact on the French, Spanish and Dutch territories on the continent. But this does not mean that Agamben's thought is wrong; it is the result of a proper examination of the Anglo-Saxon tradition. In the United Kingdom, the roots of the legislation were not the adoption of the French model, since by the time of the revolution, the transition to civil and rule of law had already taken place in this area, and the system of rules for dealing with exceptional border situations had also been implemented. Its instruments were martial law, the suspension of habeas corpus, or the Riot Act. The martial law was specifically a law enforcement toolkit of the Tudor and Stuart periods that ceased to be part of the legal system with the glorious revolution – as Lord Hale said. Which did not mean that it could not be used in the colonies or in Ireland. In this way, it also became part of the exceptional power traditions of the emerging United States. The institution's solutions, its tools, its system of responsibility clearly show absolutist traits, which were clearly appeared at the American war presidential conception and practice during Lincoln's exercise of

power in the Civil War. However, this did not and does not mean an absolute exercise of power, as the legislature and the Supreme Court could and can serve as appropriate controls. On the other hand, it made it obvious that the legacy of the French revolutionary exceptional power generally expected by Agamben was not real for the Anglo-Saxon territories, what is more, we must definitely look back to the period of absolutism in that case.

This, in turn, has led us to look at what original models can be distinguished in the Euro-Atlantic area if the legal institution did not grow from common roots. It is natural that one model is the French state of siege regulation. In this model, the primacy of the civilian central administration can be observed, however, it is also characterized by the strong development of military administration. However, the state of siege authorization does not include the emergency decree, and the authorized executive power could not constitute an emergency rule against the regulation. Through the revolutionary / civil war traditions, a special model of exceptional power emerged that could be invoked in the event of an attack by an external enemy threatening the very existence of the state, and combined with acts attacking the internal social order when the attack targeted the existing constitutional, political order. In both cases, the decision has a strong (interstate or domestic) political tone. During this exceptional state, implementation took on a strong military character under the control of the civilian government, and – at least in terms of the ordering mechanism – meanwhile, the alternative order was delineated along the principles of the rule of law.

The so-called continental model, which has developed in German areas, is different. In addition to the strong powers of the head of state, this model has made it possible to establish a wide- ranging military administration and judiciary. As part of this, the executive power, clearly because of its role in the system of ruling power was already empowered to issue emergency regulations. The continental model can be characterized by the following: a.) The exceptional power is an institution with constitutional determination, which; b.) allows the restriction of fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution; c.) it can be used in both internal and external emergencies; d.) the possibility of making regulations on the side of the executive branch is wide; e.) the predominance of the executive was strong and was also based on the traditional rights of the head of state; f.) the military administration was elevated above the civilian administration; g.) special substantive and procedural rules of criminal law have been applied.

The Anglo-Saxon model can be divided into two branches. The development of English regulation advocated the creation of legal regulation at the beginning of the First World War.

The empowerment law provides for additional rights granted to civil government, without

prejudice to the competences of the legislature. Another feature of the regulation is that the exercise of exceptional power was essentially concentrated in the army, the civilian central government remained at the level of rule-making and strategy-making, which also did not lack the involvement of the armed forces. It was part of the constitutional tradition that the exceptional state was closed by an indemnity law, which protected all good faith measures taken and implemented by the authorities to protect the state, maintain public safety and discipline.

The American model rests on the Lincoln Civil War interpretation of presidential authority.

Indeed, this filled the phrase of the presidential authority of war with actual content. Compared to the English development, by the end of the 19th century, it was applied in a clearly separate way, both internally and externally. Overall, the presidential authority of war formed by Lincoln was left untouched by the court's ex parte Milligan decision, which defined its scope for territorial, temporal, necessity, and narrowly constitutional review only. The Posse Comitatus Act narrowed the scope for action: it only allowed the internal deployment of the force at a higher degree of escalation, but beyond that, it did not affect the presidential exceptional power authority. In essence, the American-style exceptional power, that emerged in the long 19th century, retained the basic features of the English one, creating an almost unlimited presidential authority, which meant locally delegated military rule and necessarily military justice.

However, by not knowing the institution of indemnity, it created an opportunity for a constitutional remedy before the ordinary courts. In addition, the role of the legislature cannot be neglected, as it provides a significant counterbalance through ad hoc legislation (such as the Insurrection Act), decision-making (e.g. on the issue of war), the adoption of the budget and the enactment of military legislation.

The result of historical experience is that the exceptional states present an extremely varied picture; these can take the form of escalating domestic and foreign crises, radicalization of certain social or religious groups and natural, economic, industrial and health disasters. Thus, their grouping is necessary in order to properly characterize each variety of exceptional power.

The first typing is grouped according to the direction of the classical attack, the second makes a distinction according to the political nature of each exceptional state, thus creating a more complete system of facts that is better adapted to everyday realities.

Grouping of exceptional states according to their direction:

I.) I.) external, i.e. state of emergency, and

II.) internal, of an emergency nature, which includes 1) the so-called emergency (natural, medical, industrial); 2) acts seriously infringing the order of the state, and 3) acts attacking the constitutional order of the state.

Complemented by quasi-exceptional states in both directions.

Grouping of exceptional states according to their political nature:

A.) Exceptional legal order

I. political or state of siege situations: 1. state of emergency; 2. acts attacking the constitutional order;

II. neutral or emergency types of factual situations: 1. emergency situation, 2. acts seriously undermining the order of the state, 3. those which are necessary to fulfill obligations under international law;

B.) Non-legal, power / legitimacy exceptional states: 1. revolutionary, 2. counter- revolutionary.

The first two categories should be treated as rule of law institutions or legal institutions, in summary, special legal factual situations according to the current Hungarian constitutional term, to which, due to gradual crises, quasi-special legal situations must also be connected. The contemporary information on the state of emergency in power / legitimation exceptional states lies in the fact that in hybrid conflicts, the underlying attacking state is in fact seeking to create such a state, at the end of which the state itself or a regime operating as a puppet state, subordinate to it, legitimizes itself.

The grouping of the facts made it possible to distinguish between exceptional power as a legal order concept, which in the Hungarian constitutional terminology is called a special legal order, and exceptional power as a mechanism for the exercise of power as an instrument of legitimacy.

The concept of exceptional legal order, as a legal order concept, can be summarized as follows:

a system of rule of law and legal instruments formulated by the constituent / legislator in the period of the general, unanimous order, as a result of which a temporarily existing, alternative legal system is created during the period of exceptional state. Through the transfers of rights included in this, the decision will enable operative action to be extended to the largest possible amplitude, with the aim of returning to the general normal operating framework of the state by overcoming and resolving the challenges of the exceptional state. The state of exceptional legal order is accompanied throughout by the core values of the rule of law, pre-established guarantees, safeguards and liability systems.

In contrast, the exceptional power of legitimacy is characterized by the fact that – knowing them – it applies the exercising power methods of previous regimes; this is exponentially true in the case of law enforcement organizations. This means, in essence, nothing more than the return of the emerging political regime to the instruments of absolutism, which is embodied in a dual character. (1) On the one hand, in order to achieve this goal, the decision-making authority of those in power expands to the extreme, they are not bound by anything, only the need to retain power, as it comes with their existence. (2) On the other hand, it means the need for the representation of power, that is, the possession of power is not enough, it must be made clear to the governed from time to time for legitimacy to succeed. The decision-making power extended to the limits and the necessity of representing power result in thinking in extremes, thus the typology of good and evil, the friend-enemy pair of values appears in political thinking;

ultimately, this will necessarily escalate into the instrument of terror as a means of governance.

If this state persists beyond the period of the exceptional power of legitimacy, the system shall be considered a totalitarian regime and has made the exception general.

Along these findings, I began to examine the conditions of the Hungarian press policies between 1914 and 1922, separating the legal regulation and practice of the constitutional and the legitimation periods. The most important legislative product of the constitutional period in terms of the special legal order was Article LXIII of 1912, which established exceptional measures for the event of war. The law provoked fierce criticism from the contemporary press and the parliamentary opposition. From the latter group also, despite the fact that actually they started drafting the bill back in 1906. However, it can be deduced from the views of prominent jurists of the era that the adequate law on exceptional power allowed the freedom rights that were the cornerstone of peaceful everyday life to be restricted for the sake of the state existence, under the responsibility of all members of government, only by using the means specified by law and only to the extent necessary. In addition, it is clear that the regulation of the law on exceptional power complied with all of them, so it was entirely up to the holder of the authorization, i.e. the government, to determine the state in which each fundamental right can survive the First World War. If we compare the first Hungarian law on exceptional legal order with the original models, it must be said that the imprints of the Anglo-Saxon and state of siege- like rules can be observed on it, rather than the solutions of the continental model. Namely, the Hungarian regulations, unlike the states of the so-called continental model – i.e. Austria and Germany – did not place the military administration above the civilian administration. The law on exceptional power followed French or Anglo-Saxon practice much more, stating that in areas

not directly related to the war, the civil administration continued to operate with the necessary restrictions. The latter were included mainly as a result of coexistence and the Vienna coercion, such as the institution of a government commissioner – however, an attempt was made to strengthen its civilian nature even more, even if its basic function was obviously a smoother implementation of the war administration better suited to military needs. It can be said that compared to the conditions of the age, the Hungarian legislature created a law of empowerment that fit into a modern, constitutional structure.

The law widely affected fundamental rights, including the issue of the press freedom.The rights set out in Section 11 of the law on exceptional power (provisions on the press) can be divided into three groups: (1) authorization to ex-ante review of periodicals and to impose sanctions in the event of a criminal offense; (2) a ban on domestic papers by the government if the interests of warfare are threatened; (3) ex-ante review and banning of foreign papers if they threaten the interests of war.

The first group of decrees issued pursuant to the provisions of the law were the legislation that provided authority to inspect press products, as well as those that laid down the rules of control.

In Decree No. 5.483/1914 on the inspection of periodicals and other press products, the Government authorized the Minister of Justice to regulate the inspection of periodicals and all other press products not included in them by decree, in agreement with the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Commerce. The pre-inspection was not intended to be ordered in general, but only against those who gave them reason to do it.

During the war, the range of press papers placed under 3-hours censorship changed steadily.

Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to keep track all of the sanctioned papers from the surviving records at any given time, mainly because no central statement of rural cases has been made. The organizational and operational regulations of the Press Committee, completed in early 1918, also recorded the current situation only. But this did not include, for example, the paper “Magyarország”, which had previously been subject to 3-hours censorship, which proves the practice that the attitude of the editorial board influenced the existence of the sanction.At the beginning of 1918, 15 periodicals from Budapest fell under the 3-hours censorship. Almost all of these newspapers from Budapest were linked to a labor movement, so the balance clearly shifted towards domestic controls. In the spring of 1918, the situation between the Budapest press and the government became significantly more serious, so some of the largest political newspapers – Az Est, Pesti Hírlap, Neues Pester Journal and Népszava – were also subject to preliminary review. The “Pesti Napló” also shared their fate. In addition, after the Serbian

invasion of the Southern Land, and after the Romanian invasion of 1916 in Transylvania, and in parallel with the outbreak of the war, general 3-hours censorship were ordered in the territory of Rijeka. Preliminary press control was not generally applied by the government, as they believed the papers were able to operate under less strict rules under war conditions. The means of the milder revision were the so-called press bans and confidential communications.

Section 11 of the Act on Exceptional Power for the duration of the war stated only that its provisions were in conflict with communications harmful to military interests, and this was not substantially chiseled by the implementing decree, so it had to be filled with real content in practice. It could not have been otherwise, as it would have been difficult to determine in advance the range of news that would harm the current interests of warfare. This was the reason for the development of a range of objective and subjective press bans, supplemented by the authorization of individually submitted articles and the ex-post control of press products issued by prosecutors. The scope of objective press bans was defined by decree of the Minister of Justice, and these were types of case or news (such as the movement or location of troops).

While the scope of subjective press bans meant subjecting individual cases to quasi-objective prohibitions. The latter were communicated to the editorial boards by the Press Committee on a case-by-case basis. An objective list of prohibitions was issued by Jenő Balogh, Minister of Justice in 1915, and the Prime Minister's Office took over the Vienna bans on prisoners of war and internees, and in 1917, Minister of Justice Vilmos Vázsonyi; in addition, the Press Committee determined additional prohibition points based on its own practice. In total, a list of 58 points was made for the last period of the war. Archival sources also reveal that rural newspapers were subject to a much wider ban list. The list, which was limited to rural newspapers only, contained bans on political, economic and judicial communications. It can also be observed – in addition to the fact that it also contains news with confidential notifications for the Budapest newspapers –, that certain points on Balogh's list are in fact repeated in sub-items of the rural objective list. In essence, it was an extension of that list.

Confidential notifications were statements made by the Press Committee concretizing the above objective prohibitions. So, confidential notifications were an adaptation of objective, general prohibitions to real-life situations. The Press Committee issued more than a thousand such subjective bans during the outbreak of the war. The high number of bans has made it impossible to know which of them is still in force, and which is already communicable. The main problem with the bans requested by the Austrian side was that the Hungarian newspapers were banned from publishing certain news, but the Austrian newspapers later brought them down.

The third tool of the press policies (not part of the 3-hours censorship) was the authorization of articles submitted by editorial offices. In the capital, this was done by the Press Committee, in the countryside by the Shireman’s Office or by designated prosecutor's offices. In the case of prisoners of war and internees, the press department of the Prime Minister's Office performed this task in the case of rural newspapers. According to the rules of procedure of the Press Committee, news that the editorial offices considered to be of military interest or in the case of which the editorial offices were called upon to do so in confidential notices had to be presented.

The organization of the press policies showed an extremely complex, sometimes chaotic picture. The control over the press policies’ organizations was the job of the Secretary of Justice – at least until the last period of the war, when Wekerle took it into his own hands. So, the prosecutor's office, the Press Committee and the heads of the rural competent bodies, including the regional administration, carried out their activities under the supervision of the Minister of Justice. However, the situation was peculiar in that the Military Oversight Committee (Hadfelügyeleti Bizottság, hereinafter referred as HFB.) also exercised control over the Press Committee and over the prosecution. The Press Committee also had oversight over the work of prosecutors.In addition, the press department of the Prime Minister's Office cannot be left out of the circle, the head of which was a member of the HFB. and exercised a strong influence and effective control over the press policies. The Prime Minister’s Office was also involved in the rural press policies, mainly by communicating confidential notifications to the rural authorities and to the editorial offices. In addition, the competent regional military commanders also exercised supervisions. The authorities of the joint bodies could vary from case to case, from requesting information to instructing, but in each case either through the Prime Minister's Office or through the HFB.

The government did not abuse the right of banning papers either. 23 papers were banned between 1914 and ‘18. The real weight of this number is obtained by examining the number of press organs before the war. In the year of the outbreak of the war, 707 newspapers were on the market in Hungary, 74 new ones were founded during the war, and the number of national newspapers was 201 in 1914. The number of bans is not significant in the period under review, they were, in fact, eliminated essentially for circumvention of the press policies, support for hostile power or contents against public order. The Hungarian newspapers were most affected by what was not settled by the end of the war, which was perhaps the biggest restriction on the press beyond the government.

Overall, the tools and practices of the First World War press policies did not go beyond constitutional authority, and did not mean a more significant restriction on the press than in the case of the Western states examined (United States, United Kingdom, France, the German Empire and Austria). It even meant less strict control than, for example, the Austrian one. The executive power exercised but did not abuse the powers of the law.

The People's Republic was the weakest state of legitimacy, a type that in many respects showed continuity with the previous regime. However, the liberal idea of a bourgeois state did not, could not tolerate the fundamental restrictions imposed by the governments on power during the war, precisely in order to protect the existence of the state. Accordingly, Károlyi's cabinet began to release the shackles burdening the press a very short time after they came to power.

Although the peculiarity of exceptional power is that a descending branch is required to eliminate it, when the general, normal legal order regains control to an increasing extent, and the special legal framework is becoming more and more limited. This was also the case in the field of press policies in England, France and the United States – they maintained restrictions on the press at different times but also after the end of hostilities.

The authorities of the Soviet Republic, on the other hand, acted much more violently. According to the creed of the proletarian dictatorship, the former press, legal system and legal layer should have been essentially abolished and their own press and legal layer should have been created.

The Soviet Republic saw the law and the press as tools for the exercise and legitimacy of power.

They followed this approach when they stood to settle the situation of the press.

In the emerging Horthy regime, between the autumn of 1919 and the end of 1922, the Hungarian press and press freedom never reached the pre-war state of 1914. But it also seems appropriate to state that even the conditions experienced in the first years of the war could only appear as a dream in the post-war years. This was definitely due to the defeat of the war, the reckless actions of the Soviet Republic, the uncertain, chaotic political and power environment and the social and economic impacts of Trianon, but the emerging new regime could not be exonerated, as it often not used, but abused the authorizations of the act on exceptional power, or created new credentials for itself when it was necessary. It is also indisputable that the attitude of the executive power during the World War, which in most cases treated the press as a partner to consolidate the order, has apparently led to the increasing prevalence of radical forces since the autumn of 1918. Thus, the temporary stricter action was justified, which was allowed by the previous regulation. However, acts beyond this, such as the terrorist measures against Andor Miklós or Béla Bacsó, cannot be justified.

IV. LIST OF PUBLICATIONS IN THE SUBJECTS OF THE DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

[1.] Kelemen Roland: Út a nemzeti jogalkotásig, avagy a jogállami kivételes hatalmi törvény megalkotásának több évtizedes története, In: Margittay-Mészáros Árpád (szerk.): Ünnepi Tanulmányok Siska Katalin 60. születésnapjának tiszteletére – Viginti Quinque Anni in Ministerio Universitatis et Iurisprudentiae, Debrecen, Debreceni Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, 2021, 123-137. o.

[2.] Kelemen Roland: Első világháborús magyar sajtórendészet: Válogatott források az első világháború időszakának képviselőházi beszédeiből, Parlamenti Szemle, 2021/2. szám, 135-148. o.

[3.] Kelemen Roland: A kivételes hatalom alapfogalmainak mikroszintű elhatárolása. In: Gaál Gyula – Hautzinger Zoltán (szerk.): Rendészet a rendkívüli helyzetekben: húsz éves a Szent László napi konferencia, Pécs, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoport, 2021, 355-361. o.

[4.] Kelemen Roland: Radikalizálás, dezinformálás és tömegpszichózis modern köntösben: a hibrid konfliktus kibertérben, Jog Állam Politika, 2021/3. szám, 71-85. o.

[5.] Kelemen Roland: A nem állami kibertéri műveletek egyes szereplőinek jelentősége a hibrid konfliktusokban, SmartLaw Research Group Paper, 2021/2. szám, 1-17. o.

[6.] Kelemen Roland: A kivételes hatalom kontinentális modelljének eredeti rendszerei - A német és az osztrák kivételes hatalmi struktúra kialakulása és fejlődése az első világháborúig, Honvédségi Szemle, 2021/3. szám, 126-134. o.

[7.] Kelemen Roland: A legitimációs kivételes hatalom fogalmi rendszere, In: Pongrácz Alex (szerk.): Ünnepi tanulmányok a 65 éves Cs. Kiss Lajos tiszteletére. Ut vocatio scientia, Budapest, Ludovika Egyetemi Kiadó, 2021, 177-186. o.

[8.] Kelemen Roland: Vasútra vonatkozó sajtóközlemények tilalmának esetköre a Hadfelügyeleti Bizottság és a Sajtóalbizottság gyakorlatának tükrében, Jogtörténeti Szemle, 2020/3. szám, 49-54. o.

[9.] Kelemen Roland: Sajtórendészet különleges jogrend idején: Az első világháborús különleges sajtórendészet a külföldi és a hazai szabályok és gyakorlat tükrében, In Medias Res, 2020/2. szám, 280-307. o.

[10.] Kelemen, Roland: Az angol kivételes hatalom története a kezdetektől a második világháborús szabályozásig, Jog Állam Politika, 2020/2. szám, 53-65. o.

[11.] Kelemen Roland: A háromórás cenzúra és azt enyhíteni hivatott objektív és szubjektív sajtótilalom elhatárolása - sajtótilalmak az első világháború éveiben, In: Gergely András

– Holló József – Jeszenszky Géza – Révész T. Mihály – Szeiler, Erika (szerk.):

Magyarország 1918. Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia és a történelmi Magyarország utolsó éve, Budapest, Ifjabb Gróf Andrássy Gyula Alapítvány, 2020, 20-38. o.

[12.] Kelemen Roland – Farkas Ádám (szerk.): Szkülla és Kharübdisz között – Tanulmányok a különleges jogrend elméleti és pragmatikus kérdéseiről, valamint nemzetközi megoldásairól, Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2020.

[13.] Kelemen Roland: Különleges jogrend az Európai Unió egyes tagállamainak alkotmányaiban, In: Kelemen Roland – Farkas Ádám (szerk.): Szkülla és Kharübdisz között – Tanulmányok a különleges jogrend elméleti és pragmatikus kérdéseiről, valamint nemzetközi megoldásairól, Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2020, 207-234. o.

[14.] Kelemen Roland: A különleges jogrend, mint jogrendi fogalom jellemzői, Kelemen Roland – Farkas Ádám (szerk.): Szkülla és Kharübdisz között – Tanulmányok a különleges jogrend elméleti és pragmatikus kérdéseiről, valamint nemzetközi megoldásairól, Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2020, 185-203. o.

[15.] Kelemen Roland: A mítoszokon túl – önképű kivételes hatalmi szervek a magyar alkotmánytörténetben (A Honvédelmi Bizottmánytól a Honvédelmi Tanácsig), Kelemen Roland – Farkas Ádám (szerk.): Szkülla és Kharübdisz között – Tanulmányok a különleges jogrend elméleti és pragmatikus kérdéseiről, valamint nemzetközi megoldásairól, Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2020, 113-147. o.

[16.] Kelemen Roland: Az 1912-es kivételes hatalmi törvény születése és rendszere, Kelemen Roland – Farkas Ádám (szerk.): Szkülla és Kharübdisz között – Tanulmányok a különleges jogrend elméleti és pragmatikus kérdéseiről, valamint nemzetközi megoldásairól, Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2020, 81-111. o.

[17.] Kelemen Roland: A különleges jogrend történeti modelljeinek kialakulása és fejlődése a 20. század második évtizedének végéig, Kelemen Roland – Farkas Ádám (szerk.): Szkülla és Kharübdisz között – Tanulmányok a különleges jogrend elméleti és pragmatikus kérdéseiről, valamint nemzetközi megoldásairól, Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2020, 43-79. o.

[18.] Kelemen Roland: Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok kivételes hatalmi rendszerének fejlődése a hosszú 19. században, Iustum Aequum Salutare, 2020/3. szám, 107-120. o.

[19.] Kelemen Roland: A biztonsági környezet átalakulása a hosszú 19. században, Vélemények a katonai jogi világából, 2020/3. szám, 1-9. o.

[20.] Kelemen Roland: A kibertérből érkező fenyegetések jelentősége a hibrid konfliktusokban és azok várható fejlődése, Honvédségi Szemle, 2020/4. szám, 65-81. o.

[21.] Kelemen Roland: Sajtó és sajtórendészet szabályai a kivételes hatalom tükrében az 1919 ősze és 1922 közötti időszakban, Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Szemle, 2020/2. szám, 65-88.

o.

[22.] Kelemen Roland: A normál, a különös és a kivételes mikroszintű elhatárolása, In: Szigeti Péter (szerk.): Ordo et connexio idearum : Ünnepi kötet Takács Péter professzor 65.

születésnapjára, Győr, Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó, Széchenyi István Egyetem Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar, 2020, 137-145. o.

[23.] Kelemen Roland: Különleges jogrend szabályozása az egyes alkotmányokban III. - Spanyolország különleges jogrendi szabályai az alkotmány és a különleges jogrendre vonatkozó organikus törvény rendelkezései alapján, Vélemények a katonai jog világából, 2019/3. szám, 1-8. o.

[24.] Kelemen Roland: A különleges jogrend szabályozása az egyes alkotmányokban II.: A lengyel, cseh és szlovák különleges jogrend alkotmányos szabályai, Vélemények a katonai jog világából, 2019/2. szám, 1-9. o.

[25.] Kelemen Roland: A különleges jogrend szabályozása az egyes alkotmányokban I.:

Általános alapvetés, fogalmi elhatárolás, Vélemények a katonai jog világából, 2019/1.

szám, 1-11. o.

[26.] Kelemen Roland: Az Alaptörvény szükségállapot szabályozásának kritikai áttekintése az egyes európai uniós tagállamok alkotmányainak figyelembevételével - különös tekintettel a visegrádi államok alkotmányaira, In: Bartkó, Róbert (szerk.): A terrorizmus elleni küzdelem aktuális kérdései a XXI. században, Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó, 2019, 9-35. o.

[27.] Kelemen Roland: A derogáció értelmezése a Polgári és Politikai Jogok Nemzetközi Egyezségokmányának, valamint az Emberi Jogok Európai Egyezményének tükrében, Közjogi Szemle, 208/4. szám, 52-57. o.

[28.] Kelemen Roland: A kivételes hatalom szabályozásának elméleti rendszere, honvédelmi kapcsolódásai és megvalósulása a dualizmus kori Magyarország, In: Farkas Ádám (szerk.): A honvédelem jogának elméleti, történeti és kortárs kérdései, Budapest, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Nordex Kft., 2018, 59-86. o.

[29.] Kelemen Roland: A Honvédelmi Tanács. Szerves fejlődés vagy elnevezésbeli hasonlóságok a magyar jogtörténetben? (Honvédelmi Bizottmány - Legfelső Honvédelmi Tanács - Honvédelmi Tanács szabályozása, jellege.), Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Szemle, 2018/1. szám, 63-94. o.

[30.] Kelemen Roland: A magyar sajtó és a sajtószabadság helyzete az első világháborút követő vészidőszakokban - A magyar sajtójog a hatalmi/legitimációs kivételes állapotok időszakában (1918-1922), In: Kelemen Roland (szerk.): Sajtójogi források a kivételes hatalom árnyékában: A magyar sajtójog a hatalmi/legitimációs kivételes állaptok időszakában (1918-1922), Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2018, 43-66. o.

[31.] Kelemen Roland: Előszó helyett – Kísérlet a hatalmi/legitimációs kivételes állapot és hatalom fogalmának vázlatos meghatározására, In: Kelemen Roland (szerk.): Sajtójogi források a kivételes hatalom árnyékában: A magyar sajtójog a hatalmi/legitimációs kivételes állaptok időszakában (1918-1922), Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2018, 9-15. o.

[32.] Kelemen Roland (szerk.): Sajtójogi források a kivételes hatalom árnyékában: A magyar sajtójog a hatalmi/legitimációs kivételes állaptok időszakában (1918-1922), Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2018.

[33.] Kelemen Roland (szerk.): Források a kivételes hatalom szabályozásának magyarországi geneziséről, Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2017.

[34.] Kelemen Roland: A háború esetére szóló kivételes intézkedéseket tartalmazó 1912. évi LXIII. törvény genezise és sajtó, valamint jogtudományi visszhangja In: Kelemen Roland (szerk.): Források a kivételes hatalom szabályozásának magyarországi geneziséről, Budapest, Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, 2017, 12-38. o.

[35.] Kelemen Roland (szerk.): Az első világháború sajtójogi forrásai: Sajtójog a kivételes hatalom árnyékában, Budapest: Médiatudományi Intézet, 2017.

[36.] Kelemen Roland: Sajtójog és sajtószabadság: az első világháborús kivételes hatalmi szabályozás In: Kelemen Roland (szerk.): Az első világháború sajtójogi forrásai:

Sajtójog a kivételes hatalom árnyékában, Budapest: Médiatudományi Intézet, 2017, 35- 62. o.

[37.] Kelemen Roland: Sajtókorlátozás az első világháborúban: Egy alapjog léte az első világháborús kivételes hatalmi szabályozás árnyékában, Iustum Aequum Salutare, 2017/4. szám, 113-126. o.

[38.] Kelemen Roland: A kettős forradalom hatása a 19. század eleji geopolitikai viszonyokra:

Avagy a polgári jogállam születése, Doktori Műhelytanulmányok, 2017, 81-102. o.

[39.] Kelemen Roland: Pillanatképek a kivételes állapot elméleti kérdéseinek köréből, Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Szemle, 2016/1-2. szám, 65-80. o.

[40.] Kelemen Roland: A közigazgatási bíráskodás és a garanciális panasz szabályozása és annak korlátozása kivételes hatalom idején, avagy ki volt az alkotmány őre a dualizmus vészkorszakaiban?, Acta Humana, 2016/2. szám, 95-116. o.

[41.] Kelemen Roland: A háború esetére szóló kivételes intézkedéseket tartalmazó 1912. évi LXIII. törvény országgyűlési vitája és sajtóvisszhangja, Parlamenti Szemle, 2016/1.

szám, 70-92. o.

[42.] Farkas Ádám, Kelemen Roland: Háborús sajtószabályozás a kiegyezés védelmi jogi rendszerében, Jog, Állam, Politika 2015/4. szám, 79-93. o.

[43.] Pataki Márta, Kelemen Roland: Kiberterrorizmus. A terrorizmus új arca, Magyar Rendészet, 2014/5. szám, 103-116. o.